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FOREWORD

In reaching the conclusions reflected in its report, the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America had the
benefit of numerous papers prepared by consultants, expert
witnesses and its own staff. The Commission decided that
publication of some of this material in the fo.rm of an appendix
would provide useful background to the report.
Due to space limitations it was not possible to publish
more than a fraction of the documents the Commission made use
of in more than five months of intensive deliberations. The
selection offered here is by necessity arbitrary; inclusion or
exclusion of a particular paper should not be taken as
indicating any measure of relative significance. The
Commission's records are being delivered to the National
Archives (except for administrative material that will be held
by the Department of State) and will be available to the
public, as provided by law.
Brief explanations are in order as to what this appendix
contains and what it does not contain. Sections III and IV
provide basic documents on the Commission's mandate and the way
it went about its work. The document in Section V, the 21
points put forward by the Contadora group as the objectives to
be reached in a regional peace settlement, is included as an
addendum to Chapter 7 of the Commission's report.
Members of the staff prepared the country papers in Section
VI at the Commission's request. These papers were not meant to
be authoritative or comprehensive studies of the complex
societies of the region. Rather, the purpose was to furnish
some perspective in looking at the individual nations of
Central America and to highlight issues of importance. The
country papers were informally reviewed by the Commission and
suggestions from some of the members have been incorporated in
the drafts as they appear here, although the staff bears full
responsibiity for their overall content.
In going about its work, the Commission selected a pair of
lead consultants to organize sessions on each general set of
issues: social, economic, political, security and diplomatic
-- as well as on the question of u.s. interests in Central
America. In addition to helping enlist witnesses, most of the
lead consultants prepared papers of their own. These are to be
found in Section VII in the order in which the Commission took
up the topics they treat. Section VIII contains four
additional studies prepared by other consultants to fill
specific needs encountered in the Commission's deliberations.
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Most of those invited to meet with the Commission in
Washington supplied written as well as oral presentations.
Section IX offers a selection of these papers reflecting to
some degree the diversity of views to which the Commission was
exposed.
With the exception of a brief statement by the Peace Corps
and a Department of State paper on legal reform, the appendix
includes no documents from the U.S. Government. The Department
of State, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Central Intelligence Agency and the staff of the National
Security Council all provided full briefings to the
Commission. These were clearly important in terms of the
information they made available to the Commission -information which contributed to the report's findings.
But
because of the classified nature of those briefings it was not
possible to include any of that material.
In addition, the
Agency for International Development furnished to the
Commission an extraordinary amount of data, analyses and
proposals. Space limitations made it impossible to include
these valuable submissions.
As indicated in the report, the Commission met with
government officials and a broad spectrum of private citizens
during its travels to eight Central American and Contadora
countries. In a few cases these discussions were accompanied
by written statements, but problems of time, space and language
led the staff to omit those papers in compiling this appendix.
It should be borne in mind, however, that they as well as the
numerous meetings on the trips contributed significantly to the
Commission's report.
Finally, although the Commission's conclusions are entirely
its own, the members do wish to acknowledge their debt to the
hundreds of individuals who as consultants, witnesses or
through corespondence made their views known on Central
America's difficult problems. Their contributions were
invaluable.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER

NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COr.!HISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America, and in
order to establish, in accordance with the provisions of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. I),
the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.

Establishment.

(a)

There is established the

National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

The

Commission shall be composed of not more than 12 members
appointed or designated by the President.

These members shall

be drawn from among distinguished leaders of the government,
business, labor, education, Hispanic and religious communities.

No more than seven members shall be of the same

political party.
(b)

The President shall designate a Chairman from among

the members of the Commission.
Sec. 2.

Functions.

(a)

The Commission shall study the

nature of United States interests in the Central American
region and the threats now posed to those interests.

Based on

its findings, the Commission shall provide advice to the
President, the Secretary of State and the Congress on elements
of a long-term United States policy that will best respond to
the challenges of social, economic, and democratic development
in the region, and to internal and external threats to its
security and stability.

The Commission also shall provide

advice on means of building a national consensus on a comprehensive United States policy for the region.
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(b)

The Commission shall report to the President by

December 1, 1983.
Sec. 3.

Administration.

(a)

The heads of Executive

agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the
Commission such information as it may require for purposes of
carrying out its functions.
(b)

Hembers of the Commission shall serve without

compensation for their work on the Commission.

HoHever,

members appointed from among private citizens of the United
States may, subject to the availability of funds, be allowed
travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as
authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in the
government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707).
(c)

The Secretary of State shall, to the extent

permitted by law, provide the Con@ission with such
administrative services, funds, facilities, staff and other
support services as may be necessary for the performance of
its functions.
Sec. 4.

General.

(a)

Notwithstanding any other

Executive Order, the functions of the President under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended, which are
applicable to the Commission, shall be performed by the
Secretary of State, in accordance with guidelines and
procedures established by the Administrator of General
Services.
(b)

The Commission shall, unless otherwise extended,

terminate 60 days after submitting its final report.

TilE WHITE HOUSE,
July 19, 1983.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER

NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended
(5

u.s.c.

App. I), it is hereby ordered that Section 2(b)

of Executive Order No. 12433, establising the National
Bipartisan Commission on Central America, is amended to
provide as follows:
"(b)

The Commission shall report to the President by

February 1, 1984.".

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 18, 1983.
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CHARTER OF THE
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
I. AUTHORITY
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was
established by Executive Order No. 12433 of July 19, 1983 ("the
Order"}, and is governed by the provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act ("the Act"}, 5 u.s.c. App. I, which sets
forth standards for the formation, use, and operation of
advisory committees.
II. PURPOSE
The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America was
established to study the nature of United States interests in
the Central American region and the threats now posed to those
interests. Based on its findings, the Commission will provide
advice to the President, the Secretary of State and the
Congress on elements of a long-term United Stat:es policy that
will best respond to the challenges of social, economic, and
democratic development in the region, and to internal and
external threats to its security and stability. The Commission
will also provide advice on means of building a national
consensus on a comprehensive United States policy for the
region.
III. ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP
A. MembershiE· Pursuant to section l(a} of the Order, the
Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the
President from among distinguished leaders of the government,
business, labor, education, Hispanic, and religious
communities. No more than seven may be members of the same
political party.
B. Officers. Pursuant to section l(b} of the Order, the
President shall designate one of the members of the Commission
to be the Chairman. The Chairman may appoint, from among the
members of the Commission, other officers as he deems
appropriate.
C. SubgrouEs· The Chairman may establish formal or
informal subgroups as he deems appropriate to carrying out the
work of the Commission.
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IV. SENIOR COUNSELLORS
The President may designate Senior Counsellors to the
Commission, who, based on their individual experience and
expertise, shall each be available for consultation at the
request of the Chairman. Such Senior Counsellors may include
up to eight Members of Congress, drawn in equal numbers from
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
V. SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
A. Provision of Support. Pursuant to section 3(c) of the
Order, the Department of State shall, to the extent permitted
by law, provide administrative services and other necessary
support to the Commission. Expenses of the Commission shall be
paid from funds available to the Secretary of State.
B. Assistance from Executive Agencies. Pursuant to
subsection 3(a) of the Order, heads of Executive agencies
shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Commission
such information as it may require for the purpose of carrying
out its functions.
C. Staff. The Under Secretary for Management of the
Department of State shall designate an officer or employee of
the Department of State to serve as Executive Director of the
Commission, and other persons to serve as Counsel to the
Commission and to fill such other staff positions as he deems
appropriate.
VI. OPERATIONS
In accordance with the Act,
A. Functions of the Chairman.
the Chairman shall:
(1) call meetings with the concurrence of the
Executive Director;
(2) prepare or approve the agenda for meetings;
(3) preside at meetings;
(4) provide for the keeping of detailed minutes of
meetings of the Commission;
(5) provide for the maintenance and retention of the
records of the Commission; and
(6) certify the accuracy of the minutes of meetings of
the Commission.
B. Functions of the Executive Director.
In accordance with
the Act, the Executive Director shall:
(1) attend each meeting of the Commission and adjourn
such meetings if adjournment is in the public interest;
(2) call or concur in the calling of all meetings of
the Commission;
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(3) serve as contact point for the public to provide
current information concerning the operations of the
Commission; and
(4) under the general direction of the Commission and
its Chairman, supervise the operations of the staff.
C. Meetings of the Commission. No quorum for meetings is
required. All meetings of the Commission will be open to the
public unless a determination has been made, in accordance with
section lO(d) of the Act and 41 CFR 101-6.1023, that a meeting
or a portion of a meeting should be closed to the public. All
necessary measures shall be taken to protect information of a
classified nature. Unless otherwise expressly directed by the
Chairman, attendance at closed meetings shall be limited to
Commissioners and Commission staff and, at the invitation of
the Chairman, Senior Counsellors and those called by the
Commission to testify or consult on a particular matter.
Unless otherwise determined by the President for reasons of
national security, timely notice of each meeting, whether open
or closed, shall be published in the Federal Register stating
the name of the Commission, the time, place, and purpose of the
meeting, and the name, address, and telephone number of the
designated Government employee that members of the public may
contact for further information. Except in exceptional
circumstances, such notice shall be published at least 15 days
in advance of the meeting day.
If shorter notice is given, the
reason must be stated in the notice.
It is estimated that the
Commission will hold approximately 40 meetings.
D. Records of the Commission. The Commission's records
will consist of all papers, documents, and other materials
pertinent to its establishment and activities, including its
charter, agendas of meetings, determinations for closed
meetings, minutes, reports, and all documents related to its
proceedings and those of its subgroups, including working
papers, drafts, studies or other documents made available to or
prepared for or by the Commission or its subgroups.
These
records shall be available for public inspection and copying to
the extent required by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
552. These records shall be maintained by the Commission for
the term of its operations, and shall be deposited with the
Department of State upon the termination of the Commission.
E. Minutes of Meetings. Detailed minutes shall be kept of
each meeting of the Commission, which shall include a record of
the persons present, a complete and accurate description of
matters discussed and conclusions reached, and copies of all
reports received, issued or approved by the Commission. The
accuracy of such minutes shall be certified by the Chairman.
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F. Public Participation. At any meeting of the Commission
open to the public, but not at closed meetings, interested
persons shall be permitted to attend and, at the discretion of
the Chairman, to make an appearance before or to file written
statements with the Commission.
VII. REPORT
The Commission shall make a report to the President as•
provided by Executive Order.
VIII. COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS
Pursuant to subsection 3(b) of the Order, members of the
Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on
the Commission. However, members appointed from among private
citizens of the United States may be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized for
persons serving intermittently in the government service (5
u.s.c. 5702-5707), to the extent funds are available therefor.
IX. ESTIMATED COSTS
Subject to the availability of funds, the estimated cost
for operating the Commission, including travel expenses for
members but excluding staff support, is $475,000. Estimated
staff support required is five man-years, at an estimated cost
of $225,000.
X. TERMINATION
Pursuant to subsection 4(b) of the Order, the Commission
shall, unless otherwise extended, terminate 60 days after
submitting its final report.

p{\~6_-/

Secretary for Management

LIST OF APPEARANCES BEFORE THE
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUGUST 10 - DECEMBER 12, 1983
August 10 - 11*
Judge Hilliam Clark, National Security Adviser, and others,
National Security Council briefing
Mr. Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, and others, Department of State
briefing
Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense, and others,
Department of Defense briefing
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator, and others, AID
briefing
August 31 - September 1
Secretary Cyrus vance
Secretary Alexander Haig
President Gerald Ford
Ambassador Thomas Mann
Ambassador Sol Linowitz
Secretary Hilliam P. Rogers
Secretary Dean Rusk
President Jimmy Carter
September 7 - 8 (Session on Social Development)
Mr. Edward Marasciulo, Executive Vice President, Pan
American Development Foundation
Dr. Loy Bilderdack, California State University at
Fresno
Dr. Russell Davis, Littauer School, Harvard University
Mr. Ronald Scheman, Assistant Secretary for Management,
OAS
Mr. Leveo Sanchez, Development Associates, Inc.
Ms. Loret M. Ruppe, Director, Peace Corps
Mr. William Doherty, Executive Director, American Institute
for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)
Mr. Richard Hough, AIFLD
Dr. Roy Prosterman, University of Hashington
Ms. Mary Temple, The Land Council
Dr. Nevin Scrimshaw, MIT
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator
Central Intelligence Agency briefing

* President Reagan met with the Commission at the White
House on August 11, October 21, 1983 and January 11,
1984. The Commission also met on several occasions with
Secretary of State Shultz.
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September 12 - 13 (Session on Economic Development)
Mr. Alan Stoga, First National Bank of Chicago
Dr. Sidney Weintraub, University of Texas
Dr. Raul Prebisch, Economic Commission for Latin America
Mr. Samuel F. Segnar, Inter-North Corporation
Mr. Seymour Milstein, United Brands
Mr. Lawrence Harrison, Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University
Mr. Fred Bergsten, International Institute of Economics
Mr. Monteagle Yudelman, World Bank
Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Schweitzer Professor of the
Humanities, City University of New York
Ambassador John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to Honduras
September 21 - 22 (Session on Security)
Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense
Mr. Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of Defense, SAIS
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Dr. Gregory Treverton, Harvard University
Dr. Edward Luttwak, Center for Strategic International
Studies
Dr. Jiri Valenta, Woodrow Wilson Center
Dr. Richard Millett, Air War College
Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor-Ridruejo, Special Repporteur for
UN Human Rights Commission on El Salvador
Mr. Keith Kreul, National Commander, American Legion
Vice Admiral Arthur Moreau, Assistant to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Sam Dickens, New World Dynamics Co.
Dr. Jack Child, American University
General Gordon sumner (USA Ret.)
September 28 - 30 (Sessions on Political Development and
Diplomatic Options)
President Richard M. Nixon
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky, Georgetown University
Dr. Howard Wiarda, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Roland Ebel, Tulane University
Dr. Ronald McDonald, Syracuse University
Dr. William LeoGrande, American University
Dr. Tom Farer, Woodrow Wilson Center
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Dr. Allen Weinstein, The Demoracy Program
Mr. Robert L. Bernstein, Americas Watch
Mr. Aryeh Neier, Americas Watch
Mr. Orville Schell, Americas Watch
Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Mr. Bruce McColm, Freedom House
Mr. Mark Benenson, Attorney, New York City
Ambassador Richard Stone, Ambassador at Large for Central
America
Dr. Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Robert Hunter, Georgetown University
Dr. Robert Pastor, University of Maryland
Mr. William Hyland, Carnegie Endowment
Ambassador Deane Hinton, former Ambassador to El Salvador
Dr. Irving Louis Horowitz, Rutgers University
October 7 (Session on Additional Economic Topics)
Mr. Carlos Manuel Castillo M., President, Central Bank of
Costa Rica
Mr. Gert Rosenthal, United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America
Mr. Marc Leland, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Mr. Peter McPherson, AID Administrator
October 21 - 22 (Session on U.S. Interests)
Ambassador J. William Middendorf II, u.s. Permanent
Representative to the OAS
Mr. David Rockefeller
James A. Hickey, Archbishop of Washington
Mr. Carl s. Gershman, United States Mission to the UN
Ambassador Hilliam H. Luers, former Ambassador to Venezuela
Dr. Luis Aguilar, Georgetown University
Dr. Jorge Dominguez, Harvard University
Dr. samuel Huntington, Harvard University; Woodrow
Hilson Center
Mr. Ed Gonzalez, Rand Corporation
Mr. Brian Jenkins, Rand Corporation
Mr. David Ronfeldt, Rand Corporation
Mr. Cesar Sereseres Rand Corporation
Mr. Norman Podhoretz, Editor-in-Chief, Commentary
Mr. David Aaron, Vice President, Oopenheimer & Co.
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November 2
Mr. James H. Michel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. L. Craig Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Philander Claxton, The Futures Group
Mr. John Stover, The Futures Group
Mr. Arnoldo Torres, National Executive Director, League of
United Latin American Citizens
Dr. Seymour Rubin, Executive Director, American Society of
International Law
Dr. Ronald Lohrding, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Verne Loose, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. Rey Morales, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Dr. John Whetten, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Msgr. Jose Joaquin Salcedo, Accion Cultural Popular
Dr. James Murphrey, agricultural expert
Dr. Louis Roberts, agricultural expert
Dr. E.T. York, Board for International Food and
Agricultural Development, AID
November 16 - 17
Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. L. Craig Johnstone, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs
Mr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy Planning
and Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, DOS
General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Dr. Eugene L. Stockwell, World Council of Churches
Mr. Michael Novak, American Enterprise Institute
Central Intelligence Agency briefing
December 9
General Eugenio Vides Casanova, Defense Minister
of El Salvador
Mr. Arnaud de Borchgrave, former Senior Editor of Newsweek
magazine
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Participants in Individual Meetings in the United States
with Members of the Commission
Alfredo Cesar Aguirre, former President of the Central Bank of
Nicaragua
Juan Agurcia, Ambassador of Honduras
Diego Aria, former Governor of Caracas
Nicholas Ardito Barletta, Vice President, Latin American and
Caribbean Region, World Bank
Belisario Betancur, President of Colombia
Luis Boorstein, Costa Rica
Aquilino Edgardo Boyd, Ambassador of Panama
Adolfo Calero, member of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN•
Francisco Campbell, First Secretary, Embassy of Nicaragua
Gonzalo Carias, President of Central Bank of Honduras
Mario Carvajal, Minister of Exports and Investments, Costa Rica
Lawrence Chewning, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Panama
Manuel Cordero, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Nicaragua
Arturo Corleto, Minister of Finance, Honduras
Arturo Cruz, former Junta member, Government of National
Reconstruction (GRN• , Nicaragua
Jorge Espinosa de los Reyes, Ambassador of Mexico
Frederico Fahsen, Ambassador of Guatemala
Alvaro Gomez, Ambassador of Colombia
Luis Guardia, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Costa Rica
Antonio Jarquin, Ambassador of Nicaragua
Archbishop Pio Laghi, Papal Nuncio to the United States
Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, President of the Costa Rican Commission
on Central America
Jose Montes, Political Counselor, Embassy of Guatemala
Angel Navarro Deshon, former Vice Minister of Agriculture,
Nicaragua
Martin Peretz, Editor, The New Republic
Marciel Perez Chiriboga, Ambassador of Venezuela
Carlos Andres Perez, former President of Venezuela
Diego Pizano, Economic Secretary to the President of Colombia
Ernesto Rivas Gallont, Ambassador of El Salvador
Leonel Poveda Sediles, former Vice Minister of Interior
Commerce, Nicaragua
Fernando Soto Harrison, Ambassador of Costa Rica
Guillermo Ungo, President of the Revolutionary Democratic Front
(FDR.
Norma Vasquez, Charge d'Affaires, Embassy of Guatemala
Francisco Villagran, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Guatemala
Xavier Zavala, Secretary, Permanent Commission on Human
Rights, Nicaragua, and Mrs. Ann McCarthy Zavala
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Individuals Consulted During Trip
To Central America
National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America
October 9 - 16, 1983
PANAMA
President Ricardo de la Espriella
Oyden Ortega Duran - Foreign Minister
Mario de Diego - Minister of the Presidency
Carlos Hoffman - Minister of Commerce
Jose Menalco Solis Rivas - Minister of Planning
Gabriel Castro - Minister of Finance
Arturo D. Melo - Minister of Labor
Hector Alexander - Vice Minister of Planning and Economic
Development
Ricaurte Vasquez - Vice Minister of Finance and Treasury
Luis Anderson - Vice Minister of Labor
Nander Pitty Velasquez - Legal advisor to various government
agencies
Francisco Rodriguez - Comptroller General
Jorge Canto - Vice Minister of Agriculture
Carlos Ozores Typaldos - Ambassador to the United Nations
Nicholas Barletta - Regional Vice President for Latin American
Caribbean, \vor ld Bank
Luis Pabon - General Manager, Panama Savings Bank
Alfredo Muschette - Presidential Assistant
Paulino Romero - Director General IFARHU
Fernando Manfredo - Canal Commission
Archbishop Marcos McGrath - Archbishop of Panama
Ceferino Sanchez- Rector of the University of Panama
Luis Anderson - Vice Minister of Labor
General Antonio Noriega - Commander of the Defense Forces of the
Republic of Panama
Col. Marcos Justine - Deputy Chief of Staff
Major Aristedes Valdonedo - Defense Force Staff
Major Armando Palacios - Defense Force Staff
Lt. Commander Jesus Antonio Correa - Commander of the Panamanian
Navy
Major Teodoro Alexander - Commander of the Panamanian Air
Force
Lt. Col Alberto Purcell - Civic Action
Major Luis Ruiz - General Staff
Lt. Col Julio Ow Young - General Staff
Lt. Col Bernardo Barrera - Chief of Defense/Security Commission
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PANAMA (cont.)
Ruben Dario Carles - Member of Molinera National Directorate
Joseph L. Saltiero - President of the Panamanian Bankers
Association
Frederico Humberto Azcarraga - President of Panamanian National
Fisheries Association
Jorge Abadia Arias -Secretary General PRD
Raul Pedro Brostella - Vice President PRD
Nils Castro - National Directorate PRD
Berta Torrijos de Arosomena - President of PRD
Ricardo Arais Calderon - President of Christian Democratic Party
Hilderbrando Adames - First Vice President Authentic Panamanian
Party
Juan Medrano - Labor Party Political Commission
Roger Decerega - Labor Party Training Secretary
Jose Renan Esquivel - Presidential Candidate Leftist Coalition
Dominador Baldomero Bazan - President of Chamber of Commerce
Ricardo Monterrey- President of the Panamanian Confederation of
Workers
Antonio Reina - Secretary General AFSCME
Leroy Jackson - Assistant Secretary General of Confederation of
Panamanian Workers
Gabriel Galdeano - Organization Secretary-Confederation of
Panamanian Workers
Delfin Galvez - Rector, Catholic University
Paulino Romero - Institute of Human Resources
Ambassador Briggs
General Gorman - SOUTHCOM
General Woerner - SOUTHCOM
General McAuliffe - Panama Canal Commission
COSTA RICA
President Luis Alberto Monge
Fernando Volio - Foreign Minister
Alberto Fait - First Vice President
Armando Arauz - Second Vice President
Manuel Carballo - Minister of the Presidency
Alfonso Carro - Minister of Government and Police
Angel Edmundo Solano - Minister of Public Security
Frederico Vargas - Minister of Finance
Francisco Morales - Minister of Agriculture and Livestock
Marco Antonio Lopez - Minister of Economy and Commerce
Eugenio Rodriguez - Minister of Public Education
Juan Jamarillo - Minister of Health
Guillermo Sandoval - Minister of Labor and Social Welfare
Hernan Gonzalez - Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports
Carlos Jose Gutierrez - Minister of Justice
Calixto Chaves - Minister of Industry, Energy, and Mines
Joe Manuel Salazar - Minister of Agrarian Development
Claudio Volio - Minister-Director of OFIPLAN
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COSTA RICA (cont.)
Mario Carvajal - Minister-Counselor of Exports
Rodolfo Silva - Minister Counselor of Finance and External Debt
Armando Vargas - Minister Counselor of Information and
Communications
Rafael Angel Rojas - Presidential Advisor for Cooperative
Development
Oscar Aguilar Burgarelli - UNIDAD Leader in the Legislative
Assembly
Danilo Chaverri - Deputy UNIDAD leader in the Legislative
Assembly
Rodrigo Mora - PLN leader in the Legislative Assembly
Miguel Guillen - Deputy PLN leader in the Legislative
Assembly
Rodolfo Navas - PLN Congressman
Fabio Araya - President of the Legislative Assembly
Gilbert Brown - Secretary General of the National Confede~ation of Workers
Eduardo Irias - President of the National Confederation of
workers
Guido Miranda - General Manager of Social Security
Rodrigo Madrigal - Chairman of the Costa Rican Counterpart
Commission
Jorge Manuel Dengo - Member of the Costa Rican Commission
Fernando Soto Harrison - Ambassador to the United States
Ronald Garcia - Vice Minister of Exports.
Minor Vargas - Advisor, Ministry of Exports
Carlos Pacheco - Member of the Costa Rican Commission
Daniel Oduber - Former Foreign Minister
Gonzalo Facio - Former Foreign Minister
Msgr. Roman Arrieta - Archbishop of San Jose
Eduardo Ulibarri - Editor of La Nacion
Rodrigo Fournier - TV Commentator
Guido Fernandez - TV Commentator
Alfonso Robelo - leader of Nicaraguan group, ARDE
Oliver Castro -General Manager, Central Bank
Eduardo Lizano - Dean, School of Economics, University of
Costa Rica
Fernando Naranjo - Executive Director, Costa Rican Coalition
for Development Initiatives
Jorge Torres - Vice Minister of Agriculture
Francisco Murrillo - Director General, Inter-American Institute
for Agriculture Cooperation
Rodolfo Quiros - Former Minister of Agriculture
Guillermo von Breymann - General Manager, BANEX
Richard Breck - President, CINDE
Sam Stone - CIAPA
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COSTA RICA (cont.)
Jose Figueres - Former President
Oscar Arias - Secretary General of the PLN
Rafael Angel Calderon - Leader of UNIDAD Coalition
Rafael Grillo - Vice-President of Central American Christian
Democratic Parties
Francisco Saenz - President of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Rafael Villegas - Director of the Civil Registry
Constantino Urcuyo - Head of Political Science Department,
University of Costa Rica
Carlos Saenz Pacheco - President of FERTICA
Enrique Cheverri - former manager of Agrarian Development Inst.
Guido Nunez - Deputy Secretary General of National Workers
Federation
Luis Paulino Echeverri - President of Union Solidarista
Marcelo Marten - son of founder of Solidarismo
Jose Marica Crespo - businessman
Alfo Piva - Rector of the National Univeristy
Jaime Ordonez - President of the Student Federation of the
University of Costa Rica
Carlos Jose Gutierrez - Minister of Justice
Jose Luis Monteil - Representative of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Migration
Ambassador Winsor
EL SALVADOR
President Alvaro Magana
Fidel Chavez Mena - Foreign Minister
Francisco Guerrero - Minister of the Presidency
Jose Napoleon Duarte - Christian Democratic Party
Roberto D'Aubuisson - President of the Constiuent Assembly
General Flores Lima - Acting Minister of Defense, service
commanders and members of the General Staff
Monsignor Kada - Papal Nuncio
Monsignor Freddy Delgado - National Human Rights Commission
Manuel Lainez Mendez - Human Rights Commission
Mario Luis Velasco - Human Rights Commission
Bejamin Cestoni - Human Rights Commission
Francisco Quinonez - Peace Commission
Guillermo Trabanino - Peace Commission
Monsignor Marcos Rene Revelo - Peace Commission
Roberto Murray - Economic Foundation
Conrado Lopez - Chamber of Commerce
Rigoberto Monge - President National Association of Private
Enterprise
Alberto Benitez - President, Central Bank
Roberto Escobar - PAISA
Fortin Magana - Democratic Action
Raul Molina - Party of National Reconciliation
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El SALVADOR (cont.)
Jorge Ruiz Camacho - President ACOPAI
Ramon Aistides Mendoza - Salvadoran Campesino Union
Salvador Carazo - Secretary General of the Construction Workers
and Transportation Workers Federation
Gregorio Rosa Chavez - Auxiliary Bishop of the Archdiocese of
San Salvador
Ignacio Martin Baro- Vice Rector, Central American University
Ambassador Pickering
GUATEMALA
Chief of State Brig. General Oscar Mejia Victores
Fernando Andradae Diaz - Foreign Minister
Haroldo Cabrera - Acting Minister of the Interior
Brigadier General Hector Mario Lopez Fuentes and other members
of the General Staff
Arturo Padilla Lira - Minister of the Economy
Col. Leonardo Figueroa Villate - Minister of Finance
Mare! Martinez - Secretary General Guatemalan Confederation for
Labor Unity (CUSG)
Juan Francisco Alfaro - Legal Advisor CUSG
Adolfo Hernandez - Adjunct Secretary General CUSG
Felix Zarazua - Cachiquel Indians
Fortunato Pablo Mendoza - Quiche Indians
Monsignor Ramiro Pellecer Samayoa - Interim Vicar
Monsignor Eduardo Ernesto Fuentes Duartes - Bishop Coadjutor
of Solola
Domingo Guitz Cuxil - Protestant Leader
Guillermo Percy Galindo Ordonez - Protestant Leader
Rudolfo Estrada - former Vice Minister of Agriculture
Raul Sierra Franco - Secretary General of Central American
Economic Integration
Gilberte Secaira - CABEI
Carlos Enrique Rivera - Executive Secretary of Central American
Federation of Chambers and Associations
Industry
Luis Alberto Archila - President of the Bar Association
Arturo Herburgher - President Supreme Electoral Tribunal
Jaime Caceres Knox - Private Business Consultant
Jorge Skinner Klee - Supreme Court Justice
Roberto Herrera - Former Foreign Minister
Leone! Gonzalez Bolanos - Planning Council Director
Miguel von Hoegen - Planning Council
Ariel Rivera Irias - Planning Council
Ronald Dent - President of the Chamber of Commerce
Jose Miguel Gaitan Alvarez - Professor Rafael Landivar
University
Twenty three representatives of pre-party committees attended a
coffee with members of the Commission
Ambassador Chapin
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HONDURAS
President Roberto Suazo Cordoba
Edgardo Paz Barnica - Foreign Minister
Carlos Flores Facusse - Minister of Presidency
General Gustavo Alvarez - Chief of the Armed Forces
Leticia Ma Tay - Minister of Economy and Commerce
Arturo Corletta Moreira - Minister of Finance and Public Credit
Gustavo Alfaro - Special Economic Advisor to the President
Luis Flores - Executive Secretary of Superior Economic Planning
Council
Gonzalo Carias Pineda - President of the Central Bank
Ubudoro Arriaga Iraheta - Director of the National Agrarian
Institute
Jose Azonca del Hoyo - Liberal Party Congressman
Donald Suzao Tome - Nationalist Party Congressman
Carlos Lopez Contreras - Foreign Ministry Advisor
Leo Vallardes Lanza - Foreign Ministry Advisor
Jorge Hernandez - Foreign Ministry Advisor
Mauricio Villeda Bermudez - Honduran Human Rights Commission
Oswaldo Ramos Soto - Rector, University of Honduras
Carlos Roberto Reina - President of the Inter-American Human
Rights Court
Paul Vinelli - President, Banco Atlantica
Roberto Galvez - Government Debt Negotiator
Jaime Rosenthal -· Bank President
Dante Ramirez - President of Central American Bank of Economic
Integration (CABEI)
Felix Martinez - CABEI
Victoria Diaz - CABEI
Frandisco Guerrero - President, North Coast Workers Federation
Adan Benitez - President, Honduran Federation of Free Workers
Mariano de Jesus Gonzalez - Secretary General, Honduran
Confederation of Workers
Mario Belot - San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce
Fernando Larzibal - Council of Private Enterprise
Miguel Facusse - Pro-Honduras Association
Lt. Col Juan Lopez Grijalva - Chief, Armed Forces Intelligence
Col. Jose Bueso Rosa - Chief of Joint Staff
Walter Lopez - Air Force Commander
Col Ruben Montoya - Honduran Navy Commander
Werner Blatter - UN High Commission on Refugees
Col. Abraham Garcia Turcios - GOH Refugee Coordinator
Ambassador Negroponte

21.

NICARAGUA
Enrique Bolanos - COSEP
Ramiro Gurdian - COSEP
Benjamin Lanzas - COSEP
Andres Zuniga - COSEP
William Baez - COSEP
Ernesto Palazio - COSEP
Jaime Bengochea - COSEP
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro - La Prensa
Jaime Chamorro - La Prensa
Roberto Cardenal - La Prensa
Luis Rivas Leiva - Social Democratic Party
Miriam Arguello - National Coordinator of Democratic
Conservative Party
Mario Oviedo - Secretary General Constitutional Liberal Party
Augustin Jarquin - President, Social Christian Party
Edgardo Rivas Gasteazoro - President of Democratic Coordinating
Council
Jose Altimi~ano - Nicaraguan Workers Central
Augustin Rodriguez - Nicaraguan Workers Central
Alvin Guthrie - Confederation of Labor Unification
Jose Espinosa - Confederation of Labor Unification
Xavier Zavala - Permanent Commission on Human Rights
Line Hernandez - Permanent Commission on Human Rights
Monsignor Obando y Bravo - Archbishop of Managua
Commandante Daniel Ortega - Coordinator of the Junta, and member
of the National Directorate of the
FSLN
Miguel D'Escoto - Foreign Minister
Nora Astorga - Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Victor Tinoco - Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sub-Commandante Rafael Solis - Vice President of the Council of
State and other members of the
Council
Two other small groups sessions were devoted to economic and
human rights issues from the GRN-FSLN perspective
Julio Ramos - Sandinista Army Intelligence
Saul Arana - Foreign Ministry Official
Antonio Jarquin - Ambassador to the U.S.
Ambassador Quainton

22.
Individuals consulted During Trip
To Mexico and Venezuela
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
December 12-15, 1983
Mexico City (December 12-13)
In addition to Ambassador John Gavin and his staff, the
Commission met and consulted with the following:
President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado
Bernado Sepulveda Amor, Secretary of Foreign Relations
Under Secretaries of Foreign Relations:
Alfonso de Rosenzweig-Diaz
Victor Flores Olea
Ricardo Valero Becerra
Jorge Eduardo Navarrette
Jesus Silva Herzog Flores, Secretary of Finance and
Public Credit
--Francisco Suarez Davila, Under Secretary of Finance
Members of the Mexican Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
Sen. Miguel Gonzalez Avelar
Sen. Celso Humberto Delgado Ramirez
Sen. Alfonso Zegbe Sanen
Sen. Victor Manzanilla Schaffer
Sen. Humberto Hernandez Haddad
Sen. Hugo B. Margain
Sen. Raul Salinas Lozano
Sen. Jose Ramirez Gamero
Sen. Antonio Martinez Baez
Sen. Gonzalo Martinez Corbala
and other Senators:
Sen. Riva Palacio
Sen. Millan Escalante
Sen. Gonzalez Garredo
Sen. Sobarzo Loaiza
Academic/Intellectual Leaders:
Dr. Olga Pellicer de Brody
Lie. Sergio Raimond-Kedilhac
Dr. Lorenzo Meyer
Dr. Eduardo Borrell Navarro
Dr. Miguel Gonzalez Carranca
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Private Sector Leaders:
Antonio Ruiz Galindo
Claudio X. Gonzalez
Jorge Chapa
Jacobo Zaidenweber
Manuel sosa de la Vega
Gabriel Alarcon, Jr.
Caracas (December 14-15)
In addition to Ambassador George Landau and his staff, the
Commission met and consulted with the following:
President Luis Herrera Campins
President-Elect Jaime Lusinchi
Members of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Affairs (CARE):
Gustavo Planchart
Ignacio Arcaya
Ignacio Iribarren Borges
Aristides Calvani
Luis Esteban Rey
Jose Angel Ciliberto
Luis Herrera Marcano
Gustavo Gonzalez Eraso
Rafael Emilio Marquez
Efraen Schacht Aristiguieta
Private sector leaders:
Eugenio Mendoza
Adan Celis
Pedro Tinoco
Gustavo Vollmer
Ricardo zuloaga
Carlos Guillermo Rangel
Labor leaders:
Manuel Penalver
Juan Jose del Pino
Antonio Rios
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Economic commentators:
Carmelo Lauria
Luis Raul Matos Azocar
Hector Hurtado
Luis Ignacio Mendoza
Benito Raul Losada
Leopoldo Carnevali
Political commentators:
Jose Carta
Marcel Granier
Jose Rafael Revenga
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THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

LEAD CONSULTANTS

u.s.

Interests
Ambassador William H. Luers
Mr. Carl s. Gershman

Economic Development
Mr. Alan Stoga
Dr. Sidney Weintraub
Social Development
Mr. William c. Doherty, Jr.
Mr. Edward Marasciulo
Political Develooment
Dr. Howard J. Wiarda
Ambassador Viron P. Vaky
Security
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes
General Gordon Sumner
Dr. Gregory Treverton
Diplomatic Options
Dr. Mark Falcoff
Dr. Robert Hunter
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STAFF ORGANIZATION
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America
Chairman
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Ms. Chris Vick, Personal Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
Executive Director
Ambassador Harry w. Shlaudeman
Mr. Gerald M. Sutton, Deputy Executive Director
Editor
Mr. Raymond K. Price
Congressional Relations
Mr. Tom c. Korologos, Director
Ms. Jonna Lynne Cullen, Assistant Director
Public Affairs
Mr. Herbert E. Hetu, Director
Mr. Charles A. Black, Jr., Assistant to Director
Staff
Mr.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Ms.
Ms.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.

Joshua B. Bolten, Executive Assistant
John Cavallaro, Administrative Officer
Colleen Getz, Research Analyst
Robin Little, Assistant Research Officer
Diane Maimone, Secretary to Executive Director
Sharon Mussomeli, Staff Assistant
Barbara Rangel, Secretary to Deputy Director
Timothy Stater, Assistant Research Officer
J. Raymond Walser, Research Officer

Military Aides
Maj Edward J. Robarge
CMSgt Gary Glaeser
MSG Roger Goodman
YNC Jerry Zarecky
YNl Paul Heine

27.

Contadora/Central Anerica Docunent of Obiect~;es
At their Septe~ber 7-10, 1983 ~eeting in Panama, the
Foreign Ministers of the Contadora Four and the Central
Anerican countries agreed ~D the following objectives for
continuing negotiations o~~the Central American problem:
1.
To promote detente in the area while avoiding any action
that jeopardizes the political trust needed for an effective,
peaceful dialogue.
2.
To put an end to conflicts by making a political cornmit~ent
to the achievement of regional peace and stability by avoiding
any action that might hinder these objectives.
3.
To resolve controversies by peaceful means on the basis of
mechanisms commonly agreed on.
4.
To curb the arms race in all its forms and to initiate
negotiations on the control and reduction of the current arms
inventory and the number of armed troops.
5.
To ban in their territories the presence of foreign forces,
facilities, or military bases.
6.
To reach agreements in order to reduce, with an eye to
eliminating, the presence of foreign military or other advisers
who might be used for military and security purposes.
7.
To eliminate the arms traffic for persons, groups, or
organizations trying to destabilize the Governnents of Central
America, and to establish control mechanisms for this purpose.
8.
To prevent the use of their territories and to abstain from
either lending or permitting either military or logistical
support to those individuals, groups, or organizations trying
to destablize Central American governments.
9.
To abstain from either fomenting or endorsing terrorist or
sabotage actions in the area countries.
10. To organize ~ixed security commissions and coordinate
direct communications systems to prevent and, if needed,
resolve incidents between bordering and nonbordering states.
11. To respect and guarantee the exercise of human, political,
civilian, economic, social, religious, and cultural rights.
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12. To adopt measures guaranteeing the improvement of pooular
consultation methods and the people's effective participation
in the decision-making process as regards the political conduct
of the states: also, to guarantee the free access of the various
political currents to the electoral processes.
13. To promote national reconciliation actions in those cases
where profound divisions ~~ve taken place within society by
establishing representative and pluralistic systems.
14. To foster suitable conditions for the voluntary
repatriation of Central American refugees or, if such were the
case, to offer the necessary facilities for their integration
or relocation under the supervision of the UN High Commissioner
for Refuges or other similar international organizations.
15. To endorse actions undertaken to obtain material aid for
Central Anerican refugees.
16. To set in motion economic and social development programs
to achieve greater welfare and an equitable distribution of
wealth.
17. To revitalize and normalize economic integration
mechanisms to achieve sustained development based on solidarity
and mutual benefit.
18. To make joint efforts to obtain foreign monetary resources
to insure additional resources with which to finance the
reactivation of intraregional trade, to o~ercome the serious
balance of payment problems, to attract funds for working
capital, to endorse programs for expanding and restructuring
productive systems, and to foment medium- and long-term
investment plans.
19. To make joint efforts to obtain better and broader access
to international markets in order to expand the trade flow
between Central American countries and the rest of the world,
especially the industrialized countries; through a revision of
the commercial practices, the elimination of tariff and
nontariff barriers, and the guarantee of profitable and just
prices for regional exports.
20.
To make joint efforts toward obtaining technical
cooperation mechanisms for the planning, programming, and
execution of varied plans for commercial investment and
promotion.
21. To begin immediate negotiations to conclude the treaties
and other international documents needed to formalize the
co~itments included in this document and to guarantee the
establishment of suitable systems for control and verification.
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NICARAGUA

Size

57,000 sq. miles (roughly size of
Iowa)

Population
(1981)

2.8 million

Population Growth
(1970-81)

2.9 percent

GNP Per Capita
(1981)

$860.00

Adult Literacy
tl980)

90 percent of total adult population

u.s.

Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year 1983
(Development Assistance,
ESF, PL 480)

none

Perspective
Nicaragua is the largest in land area and the most thinly
populated of the five republics - only 43 persons per square
mile.
It is also the Central American country with the most
turbulent history.
Bloody conflicts bet\veen Liberals and
Conservatives, and among factions of these parties, attracted
repeated foreign intervention in the last century and the early
decades of this one.
British penetrations along the Mosquito
coast dated from colonial times and left a legacy of language
and culture important in that area to this day.
In 1855, a Tennessee-born freebooter, William Walker,
invaded Nicaragua vvith the intent of converting all of Central
America into a slave-holding colony of the United States.
Combined military forces from the five republics drove Walker
out two years later.
Trying again in 1860 he was caught and
executed in Honduras.
Although Halker was disavowed by the
U.~. Government from the outset, this episode left a deep fear
of u.s. intervention and helped shape Central American
attitudes toward this country down through the years.
From the 1840's on the United States Government took a
particular interest in Nicaragua as the possible site of an
inter-oceanic canal.
(The existence of Lake Managua meant in
theory that a canal could more easily be dug across Nicaragua
than elsewhere on the isthmus.)
Involvement in Nicaragua's
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internal affairs and rivalry with the British for influence
there followed from that interest.
In 1893 the Liberal Party
strongman, Jose Santos Zelaya, seized power in Nicaragua and,
among other forceful moves, cancelled a concession held by a
u.s. company to build a canal. Continuing turbulence in the
region, in large part created by Zelaya's ambitions, led the
TctLt Administration in cooperation with Mexico to promote a
series of central American treaties directed at limiting
armaments, prohibiting the export of revolution and
establishing arbitration agreements to settle disputes.
These
efforts did not prevent Zelaya in 1907 from invading Honduras
with a 16,000-man army and occupying Tegucigalpa.
In 1909 the United States intervened openly in Nicaragua,
landing Marines and deposing Zelaya.
The succeeeding
Conservative regime was unable to establish internal peace and
the Marines returned in 1912 to stay, with one brief
interruption, until 1933. The United States pursued the
elusive goal of political stability in Nicaragua during those
years, concerned that turbulence and the country's inability to
pay its debts would offer an opportunity for the intervention
of another power.
In the background of this policy was the
continuing preoccupation with Nicaragua as the site for a
canal. The Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, signed in 1914, granted the
United States the sole right in perpetuity to construct a
canal.
By this time, with the Panama Canal in operation, the
objective was to preempt any other nation with an interest in
such a project. The circumstances in which the Treaty were
negotiated and its terms constituted over the years a
humiliation in the eyes of many Nicaraguans and other Central
Americans.
(The treaty was abrogated in 1972.)
The withdrawl of the 100-man Marine legation guard from
in 1925 touched off a new round of fighting between
Liberals and Conservatives.
The Marines came back once again
the following year.
u.s. mediation was successful, leading to
elections and an end to the fighting in 1928, except on the
part of the forces led by Agusto Sandino who remained in the
field against the Marines until their departure in 1933.
In an
effort to ensure future stability, the u.s. authorities created
a single National Guard with responsibility for all police and
defense functions.
This was the instrument Anastasio Somoza
used after the end of the occupation to impose the dictatorship
of the Somozas, a corrupt and repressive rule that lasted 45
years.
The precise degree of u.s. responsibility for the
imposition and long survival of the Somoza regime is a matter
of dispute.
But that many Central Americans, especially
Nicaraguans, have associated the dictatorship with u.s.
intervention and subsequent u.s. support is clear. This
perception is an important underlying factor in the current
crisis.
Matl~gua
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Recent History
Nicaragua developed economically in the pattern we have
identified with Central America, although with somewhat greater
diversification, including mining, lumber, cocoa and livestock
production. The average per capita growth rate between 1960-78
of over 6 percent was one of the highest in the region and
income calculated in a per capita basis was superior to that of
Honduras or El Salvador.
But again in the ECLA formulation,
national income \vas distributed in a "flagrantly inequitable
manner."
In 1978, the upper five percent of the population
received approximately 40 percent of the national income.
Social conditions paralleled those we have seen elsewhere in
the region: pervasive illiteracy (40-50 percent), a high
infant mortality rate (around 120/1,000 per live births) and
widespread malnutrition among the urban and rural poor.
The Somoza dictatorship was, of course, Nicaragua's
distinctive feature in political terms.
The concentration of
military, economic and political power in the hands of the
family made the structure of authority ultimately more
vulnerable than in other Central American societies where power
was dispersed among the members of larger elites and their
military allies.
(The Somozas, for one example, controlled
about half of the country's agricultural production.)
The
personalistic nature of this repressive dictatorship also
converted it into a repugnant anachronism for the outside world
-- a symbol of an age of tyrants now passed in Latin America.
That perception made the regime an object of international
opprobrium in its later years and encouraged outside
intervention in Nicaragua's affairs as internal opposition grew.
A major force in that opposition was the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Sandinista movement
emerged from the universities in the usual fashion of
clandestine Latin American opposition.
In 1961 a group of
about 20 students founded the FSLN, enlisting the name of the
hero of guerilla resistance to the u.s. Marine occupation.
(It
should be noted that Augusto Sandino himself was an ardent
nationalist, but not a Marxist.
At one point he expelled
Farabundo Marti from his forces for being a communist. Marti
is, of course, the revered martyr of today's Salvordoran
guerilla movement.) The FSLN had ties to Castro's Cuba from
the outset through its leading figure, Carlos Fonseca, who for
a time lived in Havana in exile. The Sandinistas staged a
series of terrorist attacks through the 1960's, but were
several times virtually wiped out by Somoza's security forces.
Before 1978 they made little headway, either in attracting
popular support or shaking the grip of the regime.
The murder in January 1978 of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro,
editor of the opposition newspaper in La Prensa and implacable
foe of the Somozas, set off what has aptly been called a
"national mutiny" against the regime,
Nicaraguans across the
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entire spectrum of society came together in a common effort to
bring the regime down. With the death of Chamorro the
Sandinistas emerged as the symbol of opposition to Somoza.
Other opposition forces were fragmented.
Many Sandinistas had
been trained for guerrilla combat in Cuba and, with their own
supply of Cuban arms, were well positioned to take the
leadership of the upheaval, even though they constituted only a
minority of the movement.
They formed a people's militia and
recruited large numbers into their fighting forces, many of
these youngsters, some of no more than 12 years.
The barbarous
cruelties committed by Somoza's forces greatly aided that
recruitment.
Representatives of the FSLN joined with political parties,
business and professional groups to establish in 1978 the Broad
Opposition Front (FAO).
This association \lith democratic,
non-Marxist groups enabled the guerrilla leaders to present
themselves as heading a democratic movement and to obtain
external material and political support that might not
otherwise have been forthcoming.
That was particularly the
case with the Socialist International, some Western European
governments, as well as with human rights, church and political
groups in the United States. The FAO had virtually dissolved
by early 1979 because of tactical differences among its member
groups and as the conflict became increasingly militarized
under Sandinista leadership.
But the front had clearly served
its purpose.
The Sandinista-led forces initially were no match for
Somoza's professionally-trained National Guard.
But they
enjoyed distinct advantages in external support and in the
progressive internal collapse of the Somoza dictatorship. The
government of President Carazo in Costa Rica permitted the use
of that country's territory for guerrilla recruitment, staging
and safehaven.
Financial support and arms came to the
Sandinistas from Venezuela, Panama and Colombia. The United
States, the country the Somozas had long advertised -- for much
of the time erroneously -- as friend and ally, had already cut
off the regime's supply of arms and ended several aid projects
in January of 1979.
In the spring of that year, after the end
of Carlos Andres Perez's presidential term in Venezuela, Fidel
Castro took over as the principal outside supporter of the
rebellion.
In March 1979, after more than a year of efforts under
Castro's guidance, the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) announced the unification of its three guerrilla
factions.
During the next three months, Cuba escalated its
military involvement, trans-shipping through Panama to Costa
Rica 450 tons of weapons for use in the Sandinistas' final
offensive. The Cubans also provided the FSLN with some 200
military advisers, who manned the heavy artillery and other
sophisticated weapons, and with an "internationalist brigade"
drawn from Central and south American left-wing revolutionary

33.

groups.
In addition, an intelligence center was set-up at the
Cuban Embassy in San Jose under the control of Julian Lopez,
the intelligence officer sent to Costa Rica the previous year
to coordinate Cuba's assistance to the FSLN.
Critical diplomatic support for the rebellion was also
forthcoming.
In the Organization of American States, Venezuela
led the effort to isolate the regime. At a climactic meeting
of the hemisphere's foreign ministers on June 21, 1979 the OAS
condemned Somoza and called for him to step down in the
interests of peace and democracy, an unprecendented event in an
organization dedicated to non-intervention.
The United States
did not oppose that call, but its proposals for a peace-keeping
force under OAS auspices and the formation of a broadly-based
provisional government in Nicaragua were not accepted. The
policy of the Carter Administration from the outset of the
crisis in Nicaragua was to support measures which would open
the way for a democratic alternative to the Somoza
dictatorship, while preserving significant elements of the
National Guard as a barrier to the conquest of power by the
extreme left.
In early July of 1979 the Sandinistas established in San
Jose, Costa Rica a Government of National Reconstruction (GRN)
prepared to take power once Somoza fell.
Heading the GRN was a
junta composed of three leaders of the FSLN (Sergio Ramirez,
Daniel Ortega and Moises Hassan) and two prominent
representatives of Nicaragua's democratic forces (businessman
Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro, widow of the murdered
Pedro Joaquin).
On July 9 the junta issued the "Basic statute
of the Republic of Nicaragua," which purportedly still serves
as Nicaragua's fundamental law.
It guarantees the
"organization of a truly democratic government" and all
fundamental human rights, including the right to organize
political parties "without ideological discrimination," full
freedom of expression and information, freedom of religion and
freedom to organize labor unions.
On July 17 the junta
dispatched a letter to the Secretary General of the OAS
reiterating the guarantee of fundamental rights and promising
to hold "the first free elections our country has known in this
century."
The Government of National Reconstruction assumed office in
Nicaragua on July 19 following Somoza's departure and in the
aftermath of the bloodiest conflict in Central American
history.
Estimates of the dead vary, but some experts put the
cost in lives as high as 50,000 -- a staggering total in a
country of only 2.7 million people.
In its early stages the
new government enjoyed massive popular support and aroused
genuine popular enthusiasm.
Virtually all outside observers
were in agreement that the atmosphere in Nicaragua after the
success of the revolution and through the early months of 1980
was one of optimism -- of high hope, that a bright new day had
dawned for the country. The energies of young Nicaraguans --
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and they make up the majority of the population -- were
enlisted in the cause of promised reform and the building of a
just society.
The Government of National Reconstruction launched
campaigns against illiteracy and the chronic health problem of
the poor -- the twin curses of the impoverished two-thirds of
the population. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans participated in the
1980 "Literacy Crusade." They reportedly helped 400,000 of
their fellow citizens to learn to read and write.
The
"Crusade" reduced overall illiteracy by 15 percent according to
government figures.
As set forth in testimony to the Commission, the Somoza
regime seems to have been largely indifferent to the health
problems of the rural poor. One of the first measures of the
new regime was to iodize the table salt distributed in the
country in order to eliminate widespread endemic goiter.
Nicaragua was the last country in Central America to take this
step. Drives similar to the literacy campaign to eliminate
preventable disease have reportedly eradicated polio, reduced
maleria from 120,000 cases in 1980 to 7,000 in 1983, cut infant
mortality from 120/1,000 in 1980 to 90/1,000 in 1982 and raised
life expectancy from 55.2 years in 1978 to 57.6 years in 1982.
The United states initially provided funding for these
efforts. And the Catholic Church supported and participated in
some features of these campaigns.
In appearance the new government was pluralistic. Two of
the five members of the junta were not members of the FSLN; and
according to the basic statute, representatives of 19 political
parties, labor federations, private sectors organizations, the
National University and the church, along with members of the
FSLN, were to serve on the Council of State.
It soon became
apparent, however, that real power resided in the nine-man
National Directorate of the FSLN.
In 1975, during its underground existence, the Sandinista
movement had become embroiled in arguments over tactical
theories of armed revolution -- although not over the ultimate
objective of a Marxist-Leninist state to which the principal
leaders were all committed. Three so-called "tendencies"
emerged:
one favoring a prolonged guerrilla war of the Chinese
variety (the GPP); another advocating a sudden mass rising in
the urban centers (the "proletarians"), and a third, more
pragmatic, seeking wider alliances outside the movement (the
terceristas).
(Divisions along the same lines and over very
much the same theories also occurred in El Salvador's FMLN).
Under heavy pressure from Fidel Castro, who reportedly
threatened to withdraw all assistance if the Sandinista high
command did not unify, the three factions agreed in May of 1979
to appoint three members from each to a joint national
directorate.
The nine members of the Directorate have since
operated in a collegial style.
No tendency or leader has
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achieved primacy as far as can be determined. Daniel Ortega of
the terceristas, Tomas Borge of the GPP and Jaime Wheelock of
the "proletarians" are the most prominent in terms of public
exposure.
The FSLN in Power
The Government of National Reconstruction took a form
contrary to that envisaged in the basic statute of July 9,
1979. That document, as we have seen, provided for the
creation of a Council of State on which representatives of the
political parties opposed to Somoza and a broad range of other
existing organizations would sit.
It was envisaged that the
Council of State would act as a legislative body. Alfonso
Robelo and other democratic leaders saw the Council in
particular as the body that would write a constitution for the
new state and undertake the legal and other preparations
necessary to hold the promised elections. But the FSLN
Directorate postponed naming the Council of state until May of
1980, expanded the membership from the 33 planned to 47, packed
it with Sandinista representatives of the so-called mass
organizations and initially gave the Council only advisory
functions.
By this time Robelo and Violeta Chamorro had
already resigned from the junta. And then Humberto Ortega,
speaking for the Directorate in August of 1980, announced that
there would be no elections until 1985 and that these would not
have a "bourgeois character."
A key element in the Sandinista drive for domination was
the establishment of mass organizations designed to mobilize
support for the regime in all sectors of Nicaraguan society.
These appear to have been modeled on those previously developed
in Cuba with the ultimate objective of replacing all
independent intermediate institutions.
In Nicaragua the
sandinista-controlled mass organizations run from a children's
movement (the ANS), to an association of women (the AMNLAE), to
the Sandinista Workers Central (CST), to the Association of
Campesino Workers (the ATC). These and other organizations,
including pro-FSLN professional associations, are vehicles for
indoctrination and control.
Most important in this latter
respect is the system of Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS)
established throughout the country down to the level of the
local block unit.
The CDSs provide the regime with what
official Sandinista statements have described as "revolutionary
vigilance," keeping watch on Nicaraguans in every neighborhood
and identifying purported counter-revolutionaries. They are
also charged with distributing ration cards, a formidable
source of power in a country increasingly plagued by severe
shortages of food and consumer goods.
The Sandinistas have employed the mass organizations in the
series of literacy and health campaigns to which we previously
referred.
Cuban teachers and doctors played a major role in
mobilizing and directing the mass organizations in these
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campaigns,
The factor
to rely on
assistance

which also featured heavy doses of indoctrination.
of ideology vvould explain why the Sandinistas chose
the Cubans and ignored an offer of Peace Corps
in the literacy and public health efforts.

The Sandinistas assert that the mass organizations create
the basis for popular participation in government.
But these
organizations are in fact directed from the center by the
FSLN's Department of Mass Organizations and there would appear
to be little room for local or individual initiative.
The
drive for mass mobilization has encountered considerable
resistance.
Democratic trade union federations -- the
Christian Democratic Workers Central of Nicaragua (CTN) and the
Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS) with ties to the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions -- have
struggled to maintain their independence.
An umbrella
private-sector organization, COSEP, attempts to promote the
views of its members.
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church,
and independent human rights group, the newspaper La Prensa and
the remnants of Nicaragua's democratic political parties speak
out as best they can.
The independent labor unions, private
sector and most opposition political organizations are loosely
banded together in a front under the name Coordinadora
Democratica.
On the labor front, the government has made use of the
state of emergency decreed in March of 1982 to suspend
indefinitely the right to strike.
Leaders of the democratic
federations have been threatened, harassed and jailed. The
objective of doing avvay with all rival labor organizations has
been freely discussed by leaders of the Sandinista Workers
Central. The CST already enjoys a monopoly in some sectors of
the work force, including the only teachers union.
COSEP, the
umbrella organization of Nicaragua's private sector, played a
leading role in the resistance to Somoza, but is now in a
precarious position similar to that of the independent labor
federations.
Former junta member and a dominant figure in
COSEP, Alfonso Rebelo, was forced into exile.
Jorge Salazar,
for a time acting president of COSEP, was shot and killed by
Sandinista security agents in November of 1980. Other COSEP
leaders have been jailed at various times, and current members
live with the threat of confiscation of their properties if
they are seen as exceeding the limits the Sandinistas impose on
opposition activity.
The most sweeping and ominous measure for the mobilization
and control of the Nicaraguan people came in 1983 in the guise
of the so-called "Law of Patriotic Military Service."
It
provides that all male citizens from 18 to 40 years will be
required to perform active or reserve military training.
(Females are invited to do so voluntarily.)
The Sandinistas
argue that such conscription is necessary because of the joint
threat posed by anti-Sandinista guerrillas (labeled as the
contras by the Sandinistas) and the revival of the Central
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American Defense Council (CONDECA).
(At the initiative of
Guatemala, defense ministers of that country, El Salvador and
Honduras met on September 30 last year to reconstruct CONDECA
without Nicaraguan participation. The Commander of the Panama
Defense Force also attended, as did the Commander in Chief of
the u.s. southern Command.)
But Nicaragua already has the
largest armed force in Central America, and the potential to
put more men under arms than all its neighbors combined.
Conscription is thus perceived by many Nicaraguans as the
ultimate means to militarize the society and bring it under
totalitarian control.
The conscription issue has for that reason particularly
concerned the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. The
Archbishop of Nicaragua, Msgr. Obando y Bravo, was a firm
opponent of Somoza and supported the revolution. But he spoke
out early against Sandinista attempts to curtail personal and
religious liberties and to foster divisions along class lines.
The FSLN responded by denying him the use of the radio for his
homilies.
More direct efforts at intimidation followed.
The
FSLN-controlled media launched vitriolic personal attacks on
members of the hierarchy beginning in 1982; mobs (turbas) of
Sandinista supporters harassed and abused priests; and FSLN
cadres in an action unprecedented anywhere shouted down the
Pope during his visit last March to Managua.
In September of last year the Nicaraguan Episcopal
Conference attacked the conscription law as serving the
interests of a party and of an ideology opposed to human rights
rather than the interests of the nation. The Sandinistas
reacted by sending their mobs to invade churches and to
interrupt services. A religious demonstration on October 9 was
broken up by gunfire and the Archbishop found it necessary to
cancel all religious activities on the Day of the Dead
(November 2) because of additional mob actions against Church
services. A number of foreign priests allied with the
Archbishop were deported at the same time.
On the religious front, as elsewhere, the Sandinistas
apparently have in mind replacing an existing institution with
one under their own control. Priests who support the
Sandinistas have created a "popular church" where the radical
"liberation theology" -- a mixture of Marxism and Christianity
-- is preached, as well as loyalty to the FSLN. Two men of the
cloth who follow that theology, Fathers Miguel D'Escoto and
Ernesto Cardenal, hold posts in the GRN cabinet. The "popular
church" is well financed and includes a number of foreign
priests.
But the majority of priests in Nicaragua apparently
still remain loyal to the established Church hierarchy.
The symbol of free expression today in Nicaragua, as it has
been for more than 40 years, is the newspaper La Prensa.
It
has fared even vwrse under the current regime than it did under
Somoza. The paper was shut down by the authorities at various
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times in 1980 and 1981, its plant invaded by a mob and its
advertising, newsprint and circulation restricted.
From March
of 1982 until December of 1983 La Prensa was subject to
comprehensive prior censorship.--With the government's monopoly
of television and its effective control over all radio
broadcasting, La Prensa is the last remaining independent voice
capable of reaching a mass audience. That the paper survives
at all seems to be due to Sandinista sensitivity over the
regime's international image.
Democratic political parties also hold on to a precarious
existence. Twelve of them, including the traditional
Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats and the Social
Democrats have requested registration under a new political
parties law. They are prohibited for now from campaigning and
have access only to roadside billboards to disseminate their
messages. The FSLN Directorate continues to promise elections
in 1985, but for what offices and under what conditions is far
from clear. The recently passed law governing political
parties offers the opportunity to ban any party insufficiently
zealous in "defense of the revolution," which in Sandinista
terminology would seem to mean defense of the FSLN regime. The
Sandinistas' intentions became evident in a statement by
Comandante Humberto ortega, member of the FSLN Directorate and
Minister of Defense:
"there will not be elections to decide
who is in power, becuase the people hold power through their
vanguard, the Frente Sandinista."
In Eastern European style
the FSLN has put together a "Revolutionary Patriotic Front" of
satellite parties, apparently to give a pluralistic image to
any electoral campaign it intends to run. This front includes
the Marxist Nicaraguan Socialist Party and radicalized
breakaway groups of Christian and Social Democrats, in addition
to the FSLN.
The Sandinista drive to monopolize power is supported by
other institutions and practices characteristic of the regimes
in Eastern Europe and Cuba. An elaborate and increasingly
sophisticated internal security apparatus designed by East
Germans and Cubans has been established in the form of the
General Directorate of State Security (DGSE).
It promotes and
monitors the required "internal vigilance" of the neighborhood
Sandinista Defense Committees. Humberto Ortega has reportedly
called upon the people to draw up lists of "harmful or
potentially counter-revolutionary elements." The independent
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), itself the object
of continuing harassment, characterizes the situation as one of
the "institutionalization of human rights violations" through
such measures as the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order
and Security which gives the police sweeping powers to deal
with alleged "counter-revolutionary activities." The CPDH
reports 300 people missing in police custody, numerous cases of
torture and mistreatment of prisoners and more than 90 persons
allegedly detained last year by the security services who have
yet to reappear.
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In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, the
sandinista regime established special tribunals with summary
powers to try former National Guardsmen and others linked to
the Somoza dictatorship. About 3,000 of these remain in
prison. Another 2-3,000 persons have been arrested for
political offenses since the revolution. The regime last year
reinstituted special courts under the title of "Popular
anti-Somoza Tribunals," again with summary powers. There is no
provision for appeal of their sentences.
The most widespread human rights violations have been
perpetrated on the Miskito, sumo and Rama Indians of the
Atlantic Coast, who have all along refused to accept Sandinista
rule.
Entire settlements have been forcibly moved away from
what the Sandinistas consider sensitive border areas. The
security services have employed short-term arrest and intensive
interrogations on a massive scale to intimidate these
indigenous populations, as Amnesty International attests.
(It
should be noted that Amnesty states in a communication to the
Commission that it has found no significant evidence to
substantiate charges of torture and disappearances of persons
in Sandinista Nicaragua. This communication does not
specifically address the allegation of the Nicaraguan Human
Rights Commission.)
Among Nicaraguans who struggled for a democratic outcome in
their country, and among many Central Americans, there is a
fear that the FSLN will succeed in establishing an irreversible
totalitarian order. The pattern of developments this report
has just examined indicates that little now stands in the way
of that objective. Though many observers believe that popular
support for the FSLN has eroded, the Sandinistas can from all
accounts still rely on a substantial hard core of supporters
among the youth and the urban lower class. And there are
clearly enough enthusiasts for the Sandinista style of
revolution to man the leadership positions in the government
ministries, armed forces and mass organizations. With that,
the proven Cuban model of progressive militarization, mass
mobilization and tight security controls is likely to function
so as to permit the FSLN to achieve its objective. There is,
we recognize, debate as to whether that objective is a
totalitarian state in the Cuban mold.
But all nine of the FSLN
Directorate are declared Marxist-Leninists who in their
"fraternal" message of condolence to the soviet Communist Party
in November 1982 referred to Brezhnev as "companero" or
comrade. Humberto Ortega is reported to have said at one point
that "Sandinismo and Marxism-Leninism are inseparable." Our
examination of the Nicaraguan situation would support that
statement.
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The Military Buildup and the Export of Revolution
Immediately after marching into Managua, the Sandinistas
converted their fighting forces into the Sandinista Popular
Army (EPS) to replace the National Guard. They refused offers
of training assistance from Panama and Venezuela, turning
instead to the Soviet Union and Cuba. Military advisers
arrived in substantial numbers from Eastern Europe and Cuba.
The EPS has now become a regular military organization with
Army, Air Force and Navy components. These forces are
comprised of approximately 25,000 officers and enlisted
personnel, supported by up to 25,000 reserves and 30,000
militia. The new conscription law will at least in theory
permit the formation of a militia force of 200,000. The size
of this buildup can be put in perspective by recalling that
Nicaragua's total population is only 2.7 million and that
Somoza•s National Guard never exceeded 9,000. After 1977,
during the civil war, its number was raised to approximately
15,000. It is important to note that the EPS is a Sandinista,
not a national armed force.
Its formal allegiance is to the
FSLN, not to the Nicaraguan nation, just as the National
Guard's declared loyalty was always to Somoza, father and sons,
not to the state.
This dramatic buildup in manpower has been accompanied by
an equally impressive buildup in weaponry, most of it from the
soviet bloc. The EPS now deploys 45-50 Soviet T-54-55 tanks -the heaviest in Central America -- 1,000 East German trucks and
armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, assault
helicopters, anti-aircraft weapons, mobile multiple rocket
launchers, patrol boats, and amphibious vehicles. The first
delivery of sophisticated Soviet electronic gear of a type seen
previously in Cuba took place in December 1982, giving
Nicaragua the ability to intercept signals from throughout
Central America. The acquisition of these and other military
goods accelerated during 1983, with 14 deliveries arriving from
the Soviet Union between January and August, compared to 11
such deliveries in all of 1982. It is estimated that as much
as 15,000 tons of soviet bloc arms and equipment reached the
EPS in 1983, approximating the annual level of supply to Cuba
during that country's military buildup in the early 1970's-and, given the relative size of the two countries, representing
a far higher level on a per capita basis. Deliveries in the
past year included additional MI-8 helicopters, BM-21 rocket
launchers and other artillery, tanks and armored personnel
carriers.
Foreign military personnel have also arrived in
considerable numbers in Nicaragua. The most significant
presence is that of at least 2,000 Cuban officers and men, who,
in addition to carrying out advisory functions, could serve as
the nucleus of a larger Cuban force to be brought in should the
Sandinistas appear in danger of overthrow.
(The Sandinista
government asserts that the real number of Cuban military
advisers is only 200, but it concedes that there are some 4,000
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other Cubans in the country, purportedly on various
non-military missions.) Several hundred Soviet, East European,
Libyan and PLO advisers are on hand, as are representatives of
such terrorist movements as the Basque ETA and the Argentine
Montoneros. The foreign advisers have helped the EPS establish
36 new military bases. East German advisers have reorganized
Nicaragua's internal security apparatus and intelligence system
and set up a military communications network linking Managua
with Havana and Moscow, while the soviets are supervising the
reorganization and "Sovietization" of the Nicaraguan economy,
and while Bulgaria establishes especially close trade and
shipping relations with Nicaragua.
The Castro regime has sent in Cuban road construction
teams, a presence recalling the capability u.s. forces found on
the island of Grenada. The Cubans have constructed a major
strategic road between Puerto Cabezas on the northeastern coast
and the interior, facilitating the movement of troops and
supplies to suppress and remove indigenous Indian residents of
the region. They are also building one of the largest
airfields in Central America on the eastern (sparsely
inhabited) coast of Lake Managua; and they have supervised the
extension of the airfields at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on
the Atlantic Coast and Montelimar on the Pacific Coast to
accomodate advanced jet aircraft. Some 30 Nicaraguan pilots
who were trained in Bulgaria are now in Cuba, where it is
reported that about an equal number of MIG warplanes designated
for Nicaragua are based for eventual transshipment.
Nicaragua's extraordinary military buildup and the
substantial Cuban-Soviet bloc presence there are of grave
concern to neighboring countries. Nicaragua's armed forces are
far larger and much more heavily armed than those of its
neighbors. Democratic Costa Rica to the south has no army and
no military forces at all, except for small constabulary and
border-guard services. Honduras, the country that believes
itself in the most imminent danger, has an armed force of only
about 15,000, no significant reserves, no tanks and extremely
limited transport and communications capabilities. Its aging
Air Force does have the advantage, but one that would quickly
disappear if the Sandinistas were to acquire high performance
aircraft. The larger armies in El Salvador and Guatemala,
fully engaged as they are in combatting insurgencies, lack the
firepower, modern equipment and trained manpower to match the
Nicaraguan force.
We have found that Nicaragua's neighbors perceive this
formidable military machnine as jeopardizing their security
both in terms of a conventional military threat and as a means
of intimidation to facilitate the export of revolution.
(It
is, of course, questionable that the Nicaraguans could as yet
mount a conventional cross-border attack. But the buildup
points in the direction of acquiring that capability.) That
the Sandinistas are committed to the spread of Marxist-Leninist
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revolution has been apparent from the early days of the
regime.
The Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Committee
of the u.s. House of Representatives stated in September of
1982 that "there is -- persuasive evidence that the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua is helping train (Salvadoran)
insurgents and is transferring arms and support from and
through Nicaragua to the insurgents with bases of operation in
Nicaragua.
Cuban involvement in providing arms is also
evident." At this writing there are reports that the
Sandinistas, concerned for the security of their own regime,
may have cut back on such support, although the evidence is not
clear on that point. But nothing we are aware of would
indicate that their ultimate commitment to the cause of the
Salvadoran guerrillas has diminished.
Other Marxist-Leninist
movements of the region have, until at least recently, found
haven in Managua, establishing permanent headquarters and
planning their operations from there.
Foreign Ties
In the immediate aftermath of the Nicaraguan Revolution,
the Sandinista regime began to forge strong ties with Cuba and
the Soviet Union. Members of the governing junta and the
Sandinista Directorate journeyed to Havana a month after the
victory to receive Castro's praise for what he would later
describe as the creation of the "second country in Latin
America free of imperialism." The influx of Cuban military and
civilian personnel followed in increasing numbers.
The establishment of formal ties with other Soviet bloc
nations was another basic objective of Sandinista foreign
policy. Begininig in early 1980, several members of the FSLN
National Directorate traveled to the Soviet Union and the
Eastern Bloc countries, initialing a variety of economic,
technical, and trade agreements.
The Sandinista Front and the
Soviet Communist Party also agreed on future party-to-party
contacts, along the same lines pursued by the Soviets with
Castro and the revolutionary regimes in Angola and Ethiopia.
In addition to providing economic assistance, the Soviets began
to assist in the transfer of arms to Nicaragua, usually through
third parties. The strength of the Soviet connection was
demonstrated in the initial Sandinista decision against
establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of
China. As Arturo Cruz, who served on Nicaragua's governing
junta in 1980-81, has said, the FSLN from the outset identified
itself with the international agenda of the Soviet Union, from
the problems of Kampuchea to the stationing of missles in
Europe.
Cruz has also noted that Sandinista propaganda organs
draw a parallel between the democratic trade unions in
Nicaragua and Solidarity in Poland as fellow "agents of
imperialism."
Consistent with its "anti-imperialist" strategy, the
Sandinista regime has established formal ties with the PLO and
with Libya. The PLO has provided assistance, primarily in form
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of pilots and mechanics to the Sandinista Air Force. Libya has
granted both financial assistance, notably a $100 million loan
in 1981, and arms assistance.
The pattern of this assistance
became clear when the inspection of several planeloads of
"medical supplies" by Brazilian authorities in early 1983
yielded an extensive list of military hardware. The
Nicaraguans have sought and received assistance from North
Korea, South Yemen, and Vietnam. That the Sandinistas are
prepared to work with terrorist organizations became apparent
with the arrest in Costa Rica in September 1983 of a Basque
terrorist infiltrated from Nicaragua with the assigned task of
assassinating Eden Pastora.
The Armed Opposition
After Somoza's fall, small groups of former National
Guardsman appeared in Nicaragua's rugged northern region along
the Honduran border to harass operations of the Sandinista
army.
Until March of 1982 these activities were of little
consequence. Since then anti-Sandinista insurgency has taken
on significant proportions. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN) operates primarily in northwestern Nicaragua, reportedly
with about 7,000 troops. The FDN pursues standard guerrilla
hit-and-run tactics, attacking military outposts, staging
ambushes, engaging in occasional pitched battles and mounting
sabotage attacks on strategic port and airfield facilities.
The latter have been particularly damaging at the ports of
Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the northwestern coast where most
of Nicaragua's petroleum supplies enter the country.
Sandinista special forces and infantry reserves, as well as
poorly trained militia troops, oppose these guerillas in the
field.
The regime has so far not committed army regulars in
any significant numbers. They remain the strategic reserve and
backbone of the Sandinistas.
As previously indicated, the indigenous populations of
northeastern Nicaragua from the outset were suspicious of
sandinista rule. That area, in which the English language is
predominant, had through history developed its own culture,
largely in isolation from the rest of Nicaragua. The intrusion
of the Sandinistas with their measures of mobilization and
control was bitterly resented. The Misura Revolutionary Front,
with about 3,0000 guerrilla fighters under arms, has evolved
from that opposition. The Misura has proved an effective
guerrilla force but is limited to operating in the east coast
areas populated by the Miskito, Sumo and Rama tribes.
In southeastern Nicaragua the Revolutionary Democratic
Alliance (ARDE) has fielded several thousand combatants. The
military leader of this force is Eden Pastora, formerly a top
Sandinista military commander, known as "commandante zero,"
hero of the revolution and Vice-Minister of Defense in the FSLN
regime.
Pastora defected when he became convinced that his
comrades had betrayed the ideals of the revolution. The
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Revolutionary Alliance's political leader, Alfonso Robelo, a
member of the first junta of the Governmnet of National
Reconstruction, followed the same path, going into exile when
he concluded that the democratic pronouncements of the
Sandinistas were no more than empty promises. Pastora's forces
operate in the remote southeastern region of Nicaragua and as
yet pose no significant threat to the regime in Nicaragua. But
the presence in the armed opposition of Pastora and Robelo with
their impeccable anti-Somoza credentials and possible appeal to
Sandinista supporters has clearly concerned the FSLN
Directorate.
It is widely alleged that the United States Government
provides significant support to the guerrillas of the
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) in the form of arms,
training, supplies and finance, assistance that has purportedly
been an important factor in the FDN buildup and the expansion
of its activities in northeastern Nicaragua. According to
press reports, the objective is to pressure the Sandinistas to
end their involvement in the Salvadoran insurgency and
negotiate a regional political settlement acceptable to
Nicaragua's neighbors.
During 1983 the insurgency gained momentum. Although none
of the guerrilla forces has yet been able to break out into
Nicaragua's populous southwestern plain, the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force (FDN) in particular has continued to grow and
expand operations. The Sandinistas charge that its strength is
the sole result of u.s. support -- that it is an artificial
force created by the United States for the purpose of
reimposing Somoza-like rule.
But the fact that 10,000
Nicaraguans have voluntarily chosen the hardship and danger of
an arduous guerrilla campaign suggests otherwise.
That some of the guerrilla military commanders in the north
once served in the National Guard has been exploited by the
Sandinistas to support the charge that the entire movement is
"Somocista." Eden Pastora and his associates in the ARDE
guerrillas also denounce the FDN as relying on some Somocista
leaders.
But the FDN's most prominent political leaders were
jailed and tortured by the Somoza regime.
The military leader
of the FDN, Enrique Bermudez, enjoyed such wide respect within
the National Guard and among the moderate opposition that
Somoza exiled him abroad for the last five year of his reign.
The FDN guerrillas themselves insist that their objective is
the kind of democratic order to which the Sandinistas initially
pledged themselves. The other guerrilla groups similarly hold
out the goal of the revindication of the 1979 revolution.
The FSLN's Relations With the West
Somoza's fall and the victory of what promised to be a
democratic revolution were widely hailed in Europe, Latin
America and the United States. The FSLN already enjoyed the
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active support of governments and political parties in many of
the countries of the West.
The Carter Administration, although
concerned by the leadership's Cuban associations and
ideological rigidity, undertook a patient and concerted effort
to build a constructive relationship of mutual respect with the
new regime. Three days after the GRN took office the first
planeload of food from the United States arrived in Managua.
In the months that followed the u.s. Government furnished $8.8
million in emergency food assistance to help alleviate the
hunger and misery caused by the war. Total u.s. aid from 1979
to 1981 came to $117 million, including 100,000 tons of food
more than five times the aid provided the Somoza regime from
1974 to 1979. The u.s. actively supported disbursements to
Nicaragua of $102 million from the World Bank and $189 million
from the Inter-American Development Bank during this period.
President Carter, in September of 1979, received Daniel Ortega
at the White House for a meeting "to strengthen the basis for a
cooperative relationship." A distinguished congressional
delegation visited Managua two months later. One first-hand
observer has described Lawrence Pezzullo, the u.s. Ambassador
in Nicaragua at the time, "as the soul of patience and tact
with the Sandinistas." u.s. policy, as stated repeatedly by
Administration spokesmen, was to assist the new government in
the task of reconstruction and to encourage it in every way
possible to carry out its commitments to pluralism within the
country and genuine non-alignment without.
But ideology apparently did not permit a sandinista
response in kind. The FSLN's anthem contains the line "we
shall fight against the Yankee, enemy of humanity." This
perspective on the world evidently made it impossible, as
Lawrence Harrison, Director of the United States AID mission in
Nicaragua from 1979-81, has said, for the Sandinistas to accept
a positive image of the United States. Humberto Ortega, in
announcing in August of 1980 the postponement of elections for
five years, declared that when held they would be nothing like
the "corrupt elections" of the United States.
Barricada, the
official Sandinista newspaper from virtually its first edition,
launched a drumbeat campaign of propaganda against the United
States. The direction in which the regime was moving became
particularly evident when Nicaragua abstained in the United
Nations vote to condemn the soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
More serious for u.s. policy than this ingrained hostility
was the contempt the Sandinistas demonstrated for their earlier
commitments. By late 1980 it had become clear that the FSLN,
in partnership with the Cubans, was feeding the insurgency in
El Salvador with arms, communications facilities and advisers.
Nonalignment had become a dead letter. And the long deferral
of elections suggested that pluralism had suffered the same
fate.
The regime in Nicaragua continues to argue that its
relationship of "mutual respect" with the United States was
"fundamentally modified" by the Reagan administration when it
took office.
Yet the Carter administration, despite its
initial goodwill, had already decided by then to suspend the
u.s. aid to Nicaragua.
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The Sandinistas' democratic rhetoric and commitment to
improving the lot of the poor attracted broad sympathy in
Western Europe and Latin America.
Mexico and Venezuela
provided oil on concessionary terms, as they did to the rest of
Central America. But Mexico initially did not ask for payment,
creating what is now a de facto loan of over $300 million.
(Venezuela, on the other-hand, stopped shipments when bills
were not paid.) Assistance in development and humanitarian
projects came from virtually every country in Western Europe
from governments and private organizations alike.
Between July
19, 1979 and February 11, 1982 Nicaragua received about $1.5
billion in bilateral and multilateral loans, donations, and
lines of credit, a figure equivalent to almost 75 percent of
gross domestic product in 1980. By now the country has
received over $2 billion in foreign assistance, most of it from
western countries.
Despite this massive influx, real GNP per capita (measured
in 1980 dollars) was $761 in 1982, which was still lower than
1970's $1,020. As with the economies of the other countries of
the region, the world recession had its effect in producing
that poor record -- as did the enormous damage done by the 1972
earthquake and the dislocations created by the 1979
revolution.
But Nicaragua's neighbors have received
considerably less foreign assistance than that country.
Sandinista mismanagement, harassment of the shrinking private
sector and heavy military expenditures would thus appear to
have contributed to Nicaragua's deepening poverty.
The FSLN in 1980 was given observer status in the Socialist
International (SI), reflecting the strong sympathy for the new
Nicaraguan regime in the Social Democrat parties of Western
Europe and Latin America. The Mitterand government was
particularly supportive, even agreeing in 1982 to provide
helicopters and other military equipment. Resolutions adopted
by the SI during the period 1980-83 on Latin American issues
generally offered support for the FSLN's public positions on
Central American issues.
But impatience with the Sandinistas'
failure to carry out the revolution's initial commitments began
to appear in the attitudes of the democratic socialists and
Western European governments.
In July 1983, Willy Brandt,
President of the SI, Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain
and Carlos Andres Perez, ex-President of Venezuela, dispatched
a letter to the FSLN Directorate calling for the establishment
of an open political climate and the holding of elections in
1984 rather than 1985. We are unaware of what, if any,
response the FSLN made.
Conclusions
The FSLN still enjoys considerable sympathy in this
country, as well as generally in the western world, despite its
broken promises and increasingly totalitarian image.
Favorable
attitudes arise from the conviction that anything is better
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than Somoza, from the image of a government concerned for the
poor, and from the emotions aroused by the specter of u.s.
intervention in the region.
Yet it was precisely during the
1979-81 period of significant u.s. financial support and
repeated u.s. efforts to establish a policy of constructive
engagement that the Sandinistas began the massive buildup of
their armed forces, established close military ties with Cuba
and the Soviet Union, committed all-out support to the
Salvadoran insurgents and put in place the instruments of
internal repression.
It appears to us that ideology and the
inherent dynamics of an extremist revolutionary movement,
rather than foreign hostility, wrote that record.
some observers believe the Sandinista revolution may be on
the way to greater maturity and moderation.
It is pointed out
that the rhetoric from Managua is less strident, more cautious
in support of Central American revolution.
Nicaragua's
desperate economic condition is seen as tempering in time the
fervent Marxism-Leninism of the nine comandantes. The fact
that some semblance of opposition is allowed continuing
existence within the country and that after four years perhaps
40 percent of the economy remains in private hands is seen as
hopeful.
In this view, the regime may be moving for reasons of
self-interest toward a disposition to deal more pragmatically
with its neighbors -- and with the United States.
The Sandinistas, under military pressure from the contras
and diplomatic pressure from the international community, have
attempted of late to reinforce some of these assumptions.
In a
six-point peace proposal issued last July 19, they declared
that Nicaragua has "no expansionist ambition", and no intention
of imposing its "socio-political system on other countries."
The proposal also called for "non-interference in the internal
affairs of each country" in the region.
But the command center
directing the guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador continued to
operate near Managua and, at the very time the Sandinista
proposal appeared, an attack into Honduras by Nicaraguan and
Cuban-trained guerrillas was being launched from Nicaraguan
soil.
Subsequently, the regime announced measures apparently
designed to reassure its critics. An amnesty has been offered
to anti-Sandinista guerrillas -- excluding their leaders and
former members of the National Guard. The same offer has been
made to the Miskito Indian rebels -- again excluding leaders
and about 300 of their number were released from jail. The
Sandinistas also relaxed censorship of La Prensa somewhat,
entered into talks with the Roman Catholic hierarchy and
promised that the date and rules for the 1985 elections would
be announced early this year.
In addition, reports from
Sandinista sources in Managua held out the prospect of a
permanently reduced Cuban military presence and of diminished
support to other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups in
Central America.
(At this writing we have no confirmation that
either of these latter two developments has taken place or is
likely to take place.)
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The Sandinista regime has so far failed to address with any
precision two questions that greatly preoccupy neighboring
countries:
the military buildup in Nicaragua and the nature of
the political system being established there. As we have seen,
the Sandinista military buildup, far and away the most rapid
and extensive in Central American history, is regarded by the
surrounding countries as a threat and a chronic source of
instability and insecurity. With Cuban and East German
assistance this force has been equipped with a highly
scphisticated intelligence service employing modern electronic
devices.
Sandinista declarations of peaceful intent are
insufficient to quiet regional fears in the light of that kind
of military deployment.
Expansion of Nicaragua's military capability is perceived
in the region as closely related to the development of a
particular and now familiar model for use in structuring and
consolidating power. After four years the major elements of
that model are identifiable:
a vanguard political party which asserts on the basis
of a triumphant revolution the right to monopolize
power;
an ideology centered on the goal of a radical
transformation of society along Marxist lines;
an unremitting propaganda war conducted against the
United States as a means of converting nationalist
sentiments into broad popular support for the regime;
a foreign policy which, although described as
non-aligned, supports revolutionary movements
throughout the world and is ideologically linked with
the soviet bloc;
the creation of a network of sectoral organizations
manipulated from the center for purposes of
indoctrination and mass mobilization;
the establishment of a massive internal security
system reaching down to every neighborhood in the
country; and
the use of conscription to militarize and control
society.
The model gives every appearance of being Cuban. And
Central Americans recall all too well that the Cuban model is
"internationalist" in the Marxist sense -- dedicated to the
exportation of that brand of revolution.
It was Fidel Castro
who said "the duty of the revolutionary is to make the
revolution."
It is this internationalist commitment that makes
the regime in Managua so unique and threatening. Nicaragua'a
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neighbors fear that while it may temporarily for tactical
reasons draw back from the export of revolution, its
evangelical ideology will sooner or later impel it once again
to attempts to subvert its neighbors.

50.
EL SALVADOR

Size

8,260 sq. miles (roughly size of
Massachusetts)

Population
(1981)

4.7 million

Population Growth
(1970-81)

2.9 percent

GNP Per Capita
(1981)

$650.00

Adult Literacy
(1980)

63 percent of total adult population

u.s.

Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year 1983
(Development Assistance,
ESF, PL 480)

$246 million

Most of the region's problems are present on a magnified
scale in El Salvador. A single commodity, coffee, accounts for
more than 50 percent of exports and its fortunes on the world
market determine to a considerable degree the state of the
entire economy. Until the recent land reform, less than two
percent of the population controlled 60 percent of the land -and virtually all the good coffee and cotton land. At least
two-thirds of the population live in extreme poverty.
Illiteracy and malnutrition are widespread in the countryside.
Although the popular legend that El Salvador is controlled
by just 14 families is not correct -- one expert counts more
than 200 families as making up the elite -- there are few
countries where the disparity between the grinding poverty of
the majority and the ostentatious wealth of a small economic
elite has been more glaring. The military institutions have
generally -- although not always -- supported the status quo
and benefitted from it. Thus, the Salvadoran political
tradition of authoritarian military government has tended to
reinforce this inequitable social structure.
El Salvador's problems are compounded by severe
overpopulation.
It is the smallest nation on the Western
Hemisphere mainland (about the size of Massachusetts) and, with
close to 5 million people, the most densely populated. The
land-population ratio in the countryside comes out to less than
one acre of arable land per inhabitant. The rate of population
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increase at 2.9 percent annually continues to be among the
world's highest. One result has been emigration. The movement
of Salvadorans into Honduras set off the so-called "soccer war"
of 1969. And there could be as many as 500,000 Salvadorans in
the United States, the majority of them illegally.
RECENT HISTORY
There was little dispute among the witnesses appearing
before the Commission that, in the words of one of them, "El
Salvador needed a revolution" -- a democratic revolution.
In
1979 this was apparent to many Salvadorans, and to a
significant number of military officers, particularly the
younger ones.
Moderately reformist military regimes of the
1960's had given way after 1972 to increasingly repressive,
autocratic military governments.
Their capacity to deal with
the country's long-smoldering discontent steadily shrunk. El
Salvador's president in 1979, retired General Carlos Humberto
Romero, offered only a defense of the status quo and
increasingly brutal repression.
some in the military perceived
that this policy ultimately threatened their own institution
thut the rejection of reform strengthened the prospects for
radical revolution. The triumph of the Sandinistas and the
destruction of the National Guard in Nicaragua provided
powerfully persuasive evidence in support of that conclusion.
On October 15, 1979 a group of young officers overthrew
Romero and replaced him with a five-man civilian military junta
committed to reform.
(One of the members was the Social
Democrat Guillermo Ungo, now a leading spokesman in exile for
the guerrilla movement.)
The junta had as a major objective
putting an end to political turmoil and violence by cleansing
the army -- some 70 senior officers were dismissed -- and
enlisting the cooperation of the left in a program of reform.
The official Communist Party (PCS) did ostensibly cooperate,
but the principal Marxist-Leninist groups in arms, the Popular
Forces of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the
People (ERP), along with Marxist front organizations, rejected
the junta. Beginning in the mid-70's the Popular Revolutionary
Block (BPR), the political arm of the FPL, and the United
Popular Action Front (FAPO), made up of Marxist labor and
peasant organizations, had undertaken a campaign of mass street
demonstrations and occupations of public buildings, often
leading to violence. Despite the accession of the new
government these continued, as did terrorist acts by the armed
organizations.
Rather than abating, violence increased as the security
forces responded with their own excesses.
In early January of
1980 the junta dissolved when the three civilian members
resigned.
This was a crucial development in the contemporary
history of El Salvador and its causes have been the subject of
much debate.
On one side it is argued that the government of
the "first junta" -- others were to follow -- failed because it
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was unable to control the security forces and to put an end to
their brutal methods of repression. There is undoubtedly
substance to that charge. But it also seems evident that the
refusal of the so-called "popular organizations" of the left to
lay aside their revolutionary tactics and to give the promises
of reform a chance played into the hands of the extreme right
and sabotaged the junta from the outset. This response from
the radical left lends weight to the argument that power rather
than reform was (and is) the real goal of the leaders of these
movements.
Following the fall of the first junta, the Christian
Democrats (PDC), El Salvador's principal reformist political
party, reached agreement with the military high command on a
new government. This agreement essentially remained in force
through various changes in the governing junta until the
constituent assembly elections of March 28, 1982. Jose
Napoleon Duarte, the leader of the PDC, was the dominant
civilian figure and in time became president of the junta.
Beginning in March 1980 the government launched an ambitious
program of land reform, nationalized the banks and took control
of the marketing of coffee and sugar.
In concept El Salvador's
agrarian reform is the most far-reaching in non-communist Latin
America.
It has already affected 20 percent of the arable
land. The program claims more than 136,000 principal
beneficiaries. When their families are included in the
calculation the program has benefitted over 20 percent of the
population.
The period leading up to the 1982 elections was thus one of
both reform and escalating political violence. The guerrillas,
now organized for combat in the countryside and well equipped
with Nicaraguan and Cuban supplies, launched their "final
offensive" in January 1981. The expected popular rising did
not occur and the offensive failed.
But death squads of the
extreme right, determined to wipe out reformists as well as
revolutionaries, multiplied their activities. More than 90
Christian Democrat mayors and other officials had been murdered
by mid-1982. Elements of the security forces practiced
indiscriminate violence as a means of asserting control,
particularly in the countryside. Terrorists of the Marxist
left built their war chests and spread intimidation through
kidnappings and murders. We see here the continuing
characteristic of the Salvadoran conflict: murderous violence
from the exteme left and extreme right, with the victims in the
political center and among the mass of ordinary, uninvolved
Salvadorans-- violence that has created the country's
overriding problems of the abuse of human rights and the threat
to the nation's security from outside forces.
The March 1982 elections revealed the aspirations of those
ordinary Salvadorans. About 80 percent of the eligible voters
participated, despite the threats and violence of the Marxist
left. The guerrillas intensified their attacks all across the

53.

country in an attempt to disrupt the elections. That large
turnout under the most difficult conditions can only reasonably
be explained as a demonstration of the desire for peace and a
democratic order.
But the results were less decisive. The
Chri~tian Democrats led with about 40 percent of the vote, but
the rest went to four smaller parties ranging from the extreme
to the moderate right. These coalesced in the Constituent
Assembly to form a majority. A political independent, Alvaro
Magana, was chosen as president with the military's backing
when it appeared that rightist parties in the new assembly
would attempt to install as president Roberto D'Aubuisson, long
associated with the violent right. The lineup of forces in the
Constituent Assembly and President Magana's lack of a solid
power base has made the government's task difficult. Economic
deterioration has struck the emerging middle class particularly
hard.
Employment in the small Salvadoran industrial sector is
down substantially, throwing many skilled workers out of their
jobs. The shrinking economy has forced a number of small
shopkeepers and wholesalers to close their business.
Restricted national budgets have meant economic hardship for
teachers and government workers. And they have led to a
deterioration in social services -- in education, health and
nutrition -- already severely inadequate, particularly in the
rural areas.
LAND REFORM
Land reform in many respects is at the center of El
salvador's internal conflicts.
Its objective is to produce
fundamental change in the country's social and political
structures by breaking the grip of the landholding oligarchy on
economic and political power, while giving a significant number
of the rural poor a sufficient stake to resist the appeal of
Marxist revolution. The first phase of the program is
virtually complete, with almost all the large properties of the
wealthy (those over 1,234 acres), now in the hands of
cooperatives. Phase II, designed to distribute medium-sized
holdings, has not yet been implemented. Phase III, called
"land to the tiller," offers renters and share-croppers the
right to claim the land they work up to a maximum of 17.3
acres.
It has moved forward:
more than 53,000 small farmers
have filed for their plots.
The program has suffered from various political,
institutional and economic problems -- and most especially from
El Salvador's pervasive violence. The first chief of one of
the two land-reform agencies was murdered, along with two u.s.
advisers from the American Institute of Free Labor
Development. Guerrillas have threatened and attacked peasant
cooperatives set up under the Phase I program. Landlords, at
times employing members of the government security services,
have carried out acts of violence, including killings, in
efforts to drive peasants off plots claimed under the Phase III
program.
In areas affected by the insurgency properties
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formally conveyed to new owners have been abandoned. The
Government of El Salvador lacks the financial resources in most
cases to make prompt and effective payment to expropriated
landowners. This may well be a factor contributing to the
violence, and certianly accounts in part for the intense
political opposition to the program.
The cooperatives formed among the agricultural workers on
the large estates do not have in a number of instances the
timely credit, management and the technical skills necessary
for the efficient operation of their properties.
Cumbersome
institutional arrangements, including separate agencies to
administer the two phases now being carried out, have created
an unwieldy land-reform bureaucracy.
Beneficiaries under Phase
III are prohibited from selling their plots for 30 years, a
restriction seen as helping to prevent the development of a
free market in agricultural land.
In the Constituent Assembly
attempts were made by the political right to gut the program
and a provision in the new national constitution raises the
upper limit on landholding to slightly over 600 acres, reducing
the amount of land potentially available for distribution under
Phase II to less than half of that originally programmed.
Whatever the faults the program may have, it is a
remarkable accomplishment.
Land reform vvas hastily planned in
response to the crisis of 1979-80.
It has been implemented in
the midst of a violent insurgency and against the opposition of
strongly entrenched local interests by a weak, transitional
government. Progress has been slow and painful, but progress
has been made.
Crop yields seem to have held up remarkably well and are
reportedly now better in the reformed sector than in the
traditional sector, except for cotton and rice. (Cotton
cultivation in particular takes place in areas of high
guerrilla activity.) It is, of course, too early to foresee the
lasting economic effects of land reform.
But the program does
promise dramatic changes in the vvay Salvadoran society has
functioned -- and, as we have seen, change has been badly
needed. Adjustments in the program and its implementation will
no doubt be needed, but its reversal at this point seems
inconceivable.
THE ECONOMY
This political evolution is taking place against the
backdrop of an economy in agony.
Nowhere in Central America
has the crisis cut so deeply as in El Salvador. Nowhere is the
need to arrest economic decline and restore growth more
urgent.
The prolonged war waged by the guerrillas has had a
shattering effect on the economy. The cumulative direct cost
of the war to the economy has been estimated at more than $800

55.

million, with indirect costs far higher. The insurgents
themselves acknowledge that economic destruction is a key
ingredient in their strategy to bring down the government.
Their priority targets are hydroelectric dams -- of which El
Salvador has quite an extensive network -- power stations and
tranmission systems, and the buses and trucks on which
transportation in the country depends. There have been more
than 400 sabotage attacks against the electric grid systems,
shutting down power for prolonged periods, particularly in the
central and eastern sections of El Salvador. Up until July of
1983 the guerrillas had destroyed 60 bridges, including in the
fall of 1981 the key Puente de Oro span linking eastern and
western El Salvador. Of late the guerrillas have, with
disturbing success, turned their attention to attacks on the
key agricultural sector which accounts for a quarter of gross
domestic product, nearly half of employment and two-thirds of
the country's exports. They assault farms, disrupt planting
and harvesting, cut roads and destroy rural electricity and
other power systems -- all at high cost in both human and
national terms. Such is also the case with the large number of
persons displaced from their homes by the war-- i.e., human
suffering and economic cost. The number of these still within
El Salvador is estimated to be several hundred thousand.
Real per capita income in El Salvador has declined from
$753 in 1980 to $604 in 1982. The country's real gross
domestic product fell by about 35 percent from 1978 to 1983.
El Salvador is now, with Honduras, one of the poorest countries
in the region and in the hemisphere.
Largely as a result of
U.S. foreign assistance the decline in real income has slowed
but will still fall between two and three percent in 1983,
according to the Central Bank of El Salvador.
(Because of the
rate of population increase, the country's economy must grow by
more than three percent annually to stay even.)
Declining
coffee prices and excess stocks of that key commodity have hit
the country particularly hard. The amount of coffee needed to
buy one barrel of oil went from five pounds in 1977 to about 26
in 1982. Guerrilla attacks in the growing areas and the
uncertainties created by agrarian reform have reduced the
acreage devoted to cotton, El Salvador's second most important
export crop, by more than 50 percent from the pre-war level.
War, poor prices for export crops and general uncertainty
about future government policies have dried up private
investment and credit, foreign and domestic. The u.s. Embassy
estimates the contraction of foreign private credit at about
$250 million between 1978 and 1982. This has had a
particularly depressing effect on imports of spare parts,
machinery and raw materials. Capital flight has been heavy.
No reliable figures exist, but estimates range up to more than
one billion dollars. But the President and his colleagues have
held the government together. They have struggled to prevent
the collapse of the economy in the midst of a cruel civil war
and the systematic destruction of the nation's infrastructure
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by the guerrilla forces.
And they have persisted in the
program of land reform and in their intent to lead El Salvador
to elections and a constitutional government.
El Salvador is poor in natural resources, but not in human
resources.
Its people are industrious and talented, renowned
throughout the region for their hard work and productive
skills. Salvadoran entrepreneurs demonstrated impressive
vision and adaptability in taking advantage of the
import-substitution opportunities offered by the Central
American Common Market. Manufacturing of light consumer goods
developed rapidly during the 1960's and 70's. A dynamic and
independent private sector began to take form.
Salvadoran
industrialists and their foreign partners moved in the decade
of the 1970's into re-export assembly operations of the kind to
be found in Mexico along the u.s. border. The foundation of
this nascent industrialization and the key element in
attracting foreign investment was the extraordinary
productivity of the Salvadoran worker. Civil war and recession
have reversed these advances; and in many other respects the
outlook in El Salvador is grim. But this demonstration of
capabilities in an area of promising economic growth should not
be overlooked in assessing the country's prospects.
THE VIOLENT LEFT
Today's insurgency can be traced back to 1970 when Salvador
Cayetano Carpio, a long-time communist leader, broke away from
the Communist Party (PCS) to form the Popular Forces of
Liberation (FPL).
Contrary to orthodox communist doctrine in
Latin America at the time, Carpio insisted that armed struggle
was feasible and offered the only route to power for
Marxism-Leninism. Other groups broke away from the PCS to form
small bands of armed terrorists.
Finally in 1979 the
communists themselves, inspired by the Sandinista victory in El
Salvador, launched an armed force of their own. There are now
five guerrilla organizations in the field:
the Popular Forces
of Liberation (FPL) and the Revolutionary Army of the People
(ERP) we have previously mentioned, the Armed Forces of
National Resistance (FARN), the communists' Armed Forces of
Liberation (FAL) and the Revolutionary Party of Central
American Workers (PRTC).
The FPL and the ERP are the largest
and most active.
During the early and mid-1970's the emerging guerrilla
groups began to build the structures of their movements by
establishing parallel military and political organizations.
The latter evolved into such mass movements as the FPL's
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR) and the FARN's United Popular
Action Front (FAPU). Leadership for the most part came from
the universities, unemployed professionals and other
disaffected members of the middle class. Recruiting among the
young, particularly the young unemployed, for what were
ess~'ntially protest organizations with a somewhat disguised
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ideology, was quite successful. (The fraudulent elections of
1972 and 1977 provided an important recruiting incentive.) The
leaders of these movements then turned to terrorism, staging a
spectacular series of kidnappings, bank robberies and other
acts in the late 70's. One authority estimates that the
guerrillas collected a war chest of about $65 million from the
ransom received for ten wealthy Salvadorans and several foreign
busii,essmen.
The transition to full-blown rural insurgency clearly
called for coordination and at least a measure of unification
among the five armed groups. The differences among them
centered on tactical and theoretical issues, not on the
ultimate goal of a Marxist-Leninist El Salvador to which the
leadership of all five has consistently been committed. In
particular, Carpio's FPL maintained that a prolonged war of
attrition in the Mao style was the correct route to victory,
while Joaquin Villalobos's ERP advanced the doctrine of the
sudden victorious blow delivered by a mass uprising. (This
argument paralleled that between the "prolonged popular war"
and "proletarian" factions of Nicaragua's Sandinista
movement.) In practical terms these differences have been
reflected in recent times in quarrels over the tactical utility
of negotiating with the government of El Salvador.
The first priority of the Cuban supporters of armed revolt
in El Salvador was to unify these five factions. Fidel Castro
made such unity a formal prerequisite for his support and, as a
result, representatives of the factions met in Havana in
December of 1979 to reach a preliminary agreement. In May of
1980, again in Havana, they formed the Unified Revolutionary
Directorate (DRU) to oversee the military political alliance.
The DRU in turn in November of 1980 created the Farabundo Harti
National Liberation Front (FMLN), named after the executed
communist leader of the 1932 peasant uprising in which
thousands were killed. The FMLN is headed by a general command
made up of the leaders of the five factions. This joint staff
established itself in Managua, from where it exercised command
and control over the guerrillas in the field. Starting in
1980, logistic and training support for the FMLN was also
buttressed from Nicaraguan soil by Cuban and other soviet bloc
assistance. The five factions continued -- and continue to
this day -- to maintain their separate identities under the
FMLN umbrella and to operate separately in the field.
But coordination and cooperation among them has steadily
improved. The FMLN initially pursued a classic guerrilla
strategy of hit and run from bases in El Salvador's remote
mountainous regions. The guerrillas gradually expanded their
areas of operations and now operate widely, particularly in the
eastern part of the country. Estimates of the combined
strength of the five groups in the FMLN range from 6,000 to
12,000 full and part-time fighters. Many of these are
youngsters in their early and mid-teens, recruited -- or in
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some cases abducted -- from the fertile field offered by El
salvador's army of unemployed young.
The FMLN is competently led in military terms, increasingly
well-trained with the help of the Sandinistas and the Cubans,
and now adept at guerrilla warfare after four years of
experience. Its forces have adequate supplies, obtained
through clandestine shipments or within El salvador from
sympathizers or by coercion or corruption. They enjoy
sanctuary and command and control facilities in Nicaragua. The
FMLN thus presents a formidable military threat in the terms of
El Salvador's war.
It is usually calculated that the defense
requires a ten-to-one manpower ratio to counter successfully a
guerrilla insurgency. The Salvadoran armed forces have
increased their troop strength rapidly but have yet to reach
half that margin. The guerrilla forces, nevertheless, have
been unable so far to make a decisive breakthrough, as the
failures of their successive offensives attest. To date they
have neither worn down the resolve of the government's military
forces nor attracted the substantial popular support necessary
for such a breakthrough.
But their recent successes in
widespread engagements appear to have reinforced the FMLN's
faith in ultimate victory. Meanwhile, the insurgents continue
to damage the economy severely, while preventing the
consolidation of the government's reform program and
encouraging terror and counter-terror.
The FMLN also campaigns on the international political
front through the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), a
coalition of communist and non-communist political parties and
other organizations. The leaders, including the Social
Democrat Guillermo Ungo and the dissident Christian Democrat
Ruben Zamora, are active in promoting the guerrilla cause in
this country and Europe. They also participate with
representatives of the FMLN in a joint political-diplomatic
commission, apparently established principally to coordinate
the various positions on negotiations.
It is the alliance of elements of the non-communist left
with the FMLN more perhaps than any other factor that makes the
possibility of government negotiations with the guerrillas
attractive to a variety of opinion groups in the u.s., Western
Europe and Latin America.
It is to be noted, however, that the
non-Marxist political groups in the FDR have yet to demonstrate
significant popular support. Except for a tiny group of
professionals and technicians, the other organizations in the
FDR are Marxist-Leninist fronts for the guerrilla factions. The
latter clearly control the FDR -- as they control the vast
majority of guerrilla combatants.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The most fundamental rights of many thousands of individual
Salvadorans have been victimized in the climate of conflict and
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death in that country.
Since 1979 over 30,000 non-combatants
have been killed.
(That seems to be a generally accepted
minimum figure.
There is heated debate about numbers and
trends in the controversy over the Salvadoran human rights
situation. This report does not enter that debate, only noting
that the lowest numbers are sufficiently appalling.) Several
thousand more are reported as "disappeared." Torture,
arbitrary arrest and kidnappings add to this grim picture.
Both sides to the conflict engage in these practices. One of
the principal guerrilla groups, the FPL, claims credit for
several assassinations, including those of a member of the
constituent assembly and the deputy commander of the United
States Military Group.
FMLN units in the field seek to
intimidate and coerce local populations with shootings,
abductions and other strong-arm tactics.
In one attack on the
small town Cinquera last May the guerrillas summarily executed
ten captured soldiers and civilians.
In addition, as we have
seen, the key groups in the insurgent front have resorted to
kidnappings as an important means of financing their operations.
On the other side, the government•s security forces and the
right-wing paramilitary groups associated with them bear
responsibility for thousands of murders. These atrocities take
two general forms:
killing of specifically targeted
individuals for political reasons -- as in the 1980
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero -- and the
indiscriminate shooting in the combat zones of peasants
suspected of collaborating with the guerrillas. The Minister
of Defense has now issued detailed orders designed to prevent
these latter abuses and there are indications of improvement in
that respect.
Politically-motivated murders attributable to
death squads continue, however, as in the recent assassination
of four labor leaders. Targets include persons associated with
reformist civic, political and religious movements, as well as
those suspected of harboring sympathies for the insurgents.
The precise relationship between the death squads of the
extreme right and the security forces is a matter of some
dispute. But it is scarcely conceivable that they could operate
as they do with seeming impunity in the absence of protection
from elements of those forces.
Furthermore, there is
considerable evidence that members of the security forces make
up some of the death squads and participate with civilian
mercenaries and right-wing fanatics in others.
(Reportedly,
wealthy Salvadorans living in this country finance these
activities.)
The problem of the death squads is complicated by
blurred lines of authority among a proliferation of security
forces -- Army, National Guard, National Police, Treasury
Police and Customs Police -- and the lack of a firm chain of
command to control them.
Leadership of the armed services is
characterized by a collegial style in which authority is
diffused. The need to establish a clearly defined and
centralized structure of command appears obvious.

60.

A further complication arises from the virtual collapse of
El salvador's system of criminal justice.
Judges and
prosecutors have been terrorized by the agents of the extreme
left and extreme right.
Corruption and cumbersome, virtually
unworkable, rules of evidence further undermine the system.
Currently only about 20 percent of those charged in criminal
cases are convicted. The most glaring deficiencies are
dramatically evident in t\vO highly-publicized cases involving
the killing of u.s. citizens. Three years after the murder of
four u.s. churchwomen the case is still in the courts, despite
what is reported to be abundant and unambiguous evidence. The
triggermen in the killing of two employees of the American
Institute of Free Labor Development in early 1982 have
confessed, but the officer they identified as having ordered
the crime has yet to be indicted.
Last June President Magana
appointed a commission to make recommendations on the subject
and has since announced a follow-up commission to revise
criminal codes and procedures. No aspect of El Salvador's
complex of problems merits higher priority.
Reform of the legal system will, however, only prove
effective to the degree that El Salvador's government and
military authorities are determined -- and are able -- to curb
the death squads and the brutal activities of the security
services. These practices are both repudiated by the
international community and gravely damaging to the war against
Marxist insurgency.
On the other hand, it is precisely that
insurgency that contributes so materially to the climate of
violence in which the death squads have flourished; and it is
the insurgency, with the fear and passion it creates, that
helps make the rule of law so difficult to impose.
Reform of the country's election laws and procedures is
also under way in preparation for the presidential election to
be held March 25, 1984. A commission made up of
representatives of the five political parties in the
Constituent Assembly is developing a new system of voter
registration which for the first time in the nation's history
should result in real barriers to fraud.
Completion of
nationwide registry is promised by next February or March,
although as this is written further delay in completing that
complicated task appears possible.
Also of importance to the preparations for elections have
been the activities of the government's Peace Commission. This
body, made up of a bishop of the Catholic Church and two
respected laymen, is charged with formulating and recommending
measures to encourage all sectors of Salvadoran society to
participate in the democratic process. The Commission took a
step forward last year by drafting an amnesty law and
submitting it to the Constitutent Assembly, where it was passed
unanimously.
Before the expiration of the law in August of
1983, 1,159 political prisoners, guerrilla combatants, and FMLN
supporters had taken advantage of the amnesty offer and been
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released from jail or otherwise allowed to return ~o a normal
life.
The Peace Commission has also met twice in Bogota, Colombia
with representatives of the FMLN/FDR to discuss participation
of the insurgent left in the 1984 election. This effort has so
far produced no results, the guerrilla forces continuing to
insist that negotiations over an interim coalition government
must first take place.
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE WAR
The regular armed forces of El Salvador, now numbering
about 37,500, including police and security services, have had
to cope with difficult problems in meeting the FMLN challenge.
The military tradition there has been one of preoccupation with
the country's internal political affairs and concern for
institutional privileges rather than national defense. Not
surprisingly, given this background, the high command has not
always provided effective leadership in the conduct of the
war. Authority in the armed forces is exercised collegially
rather than in the hierarchial fashion demanded by wartime
conditions. Command relationships are less than clearly
defined and the force structure has yet to be satisfactorily
adapted to a guerrilla war. The Minister of Defense recently
responded to these problems by replacing a number of the key
commanders.
These problems have been compounded by a 200 percent
expansion of the army in four years. Despite significant u.s.
training support, a shortage of commissioned and
non-commissioned officers still hampers operations. Limited
national budgets and uncertainty about levels of U.S. security
assistance have complicated logistics and reinforced a tendency
to husband ammunition and stay on the defensive. This in turn
creates a vicious circle of guerrilla initiative, further
damage to the economy and the reaction of brutal
counter-terrorism. Unsatisfactory relations between the
uniformed forces and the civilian population have also hampered
the war effort.
The government's forces have taken high casualties.
In the
12 months ending last June 30, 2,292 Salvadoran troops died in
action, almost twice that number were wounded or missing.
These figures represent about one-fifth of the total Salvadoran
forces and are approximately double the count for the preceding
12 months. They attest both to the combat efficiency of the
guerrillas and the bravery of the Salvadoran soldier.
As with most guerrilla wars, trends in the Salvadoran
conflict in terms of increasing military advantage on one side
or the other are difficult to perceive until well after they
are over.
It does appear that in recent months the forces of
the FMLN have managed to seize the initiative. Clearly, the
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guerrillas have the capacity and the determination to continue,
but as yet not the power to prevail absent an internal collapse
on the other side.
For their part, the Salvadoran armed forces
do not as yet have the leadership, trained manpower, firepower
and mobility required to win conclusively on the battlefield.
The aspect of the war that has attracted particular
international attention is the issue of outside support to the
guerrillas. That the Sandinistas and Cubans have assisted the
FMLN with arms, training, communications equipment and other
supplies is generally acknowledged.
But the extent of that
support and its importance to the FMLN's efforts is perhaps not
so clear.
In the background is the question of the nature of
the Salvadoran insurgency.
Is it an indigenous phenomenon
sustained by local conditions, or is it a movement shaped and
kept alive by outside forces? As we have seen, the groups
making up the FMLN first appeared as a result of the internal
evolution of El Salvador's radical left. Domestic political
and economic grievances helped create the conditions necessary
for insurgency. The evidence also indicates that, as in most
guerrilla wars, the revolutionaries do obtain arms and supplies
from their adversaries through corruption and in military
operations.
But it is also the case that Fidel Castro played a key role
in the unification of the five guerrilla groups, that the
Soviet Union facilitates arms procurement for them and that the
Sandinistas provide them sanctuary and permanent
command-and-control communications in Nicaragua. How important
this outside support is to the combat effectiveness of the FMLN
forces we find difficult to determine. But that it changes the
nature of the insurgency in El Salvador is clear. A conflict
with roots in the indigenous conditions of the country becomes
internationalized with the intromission of the Soviet Union and
its agents. A struggle for reform in a small, impoverished
country becomes a contest in the context of world politics.
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HONDURAS

Size

42,300 sq. miles (roughly size of
Ohio)

Population
(1981)

3.8 million

Population Growth
(1970-81)

3.4 percent

GNP Per Capita
(1981)

$600.00

Adult Literacy
(1980)

60 percent of total adult population

u.s.

Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year 1983
(Development Assistance,
ESF, PL 480)

$102.7 million

The difficult topography of Honduras with its long
stretches of mountainous terrain hindered the integration of
the nation and the development of the agricultural export crops
central to the economies of the region.
Coffee cultivation,
historically the primary source of capital accumulation in
Central America, came late and on a relatively small scale.
The banana industry, the country•s most important, was in large
part established and until recent times controlled by U.S.
companies. These conditions forestalled the development of a
powerful landowning elite of the type associated with the
histories of El Salvador and Guatemala. The social structure
of Honduras has consequently tended to be more open and freer
of conflict than those of its neighbors.
The country•s leading economic and military classes have
also proved more disposed to accept moderate reform. During
the decade of the 1950 1 s, following the overthrow of the
dictator Carias, a national labor movement began to emerge,
progressive labor legislation was enacted and the government
established several institutions to provide social services in
such fields as housing and child care. The government of Ramon
Villeda Morales, elected in 1957, expanded the area of reform
with Honduras•s first agrarian reform law, the establishment of
a social security institute, a national water service and other
measures. After the military overthrow of that government in
1963, progress on the social front slowed for a time but no
serious attempt to turn back the clock occurred as in
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Guatemala. In the early and mid-1970's a de facto government
dominated by the military promoted agrarian reform. By 1980,
approximately ten percent of all farm land, much of it
previously owned by the state, had been redistributed to
peasants.
Military officers headed the regimes in power in Honduras
for all but brief interludes between the coup of 1963 and the
assumption of the current constitutional government in 1982.
This period was characterized by joint military-civilian rule.
Ultimate power resided with the military but civilians, often
with ties to political parties, managed the economy, held key
cabinet positions and predominated in the bureaucracy.
Corruption at times was a serious problem but the use of
violence for the purpose of political repression was relatively
rare. The country's strong labor unions continued to exert
influence. Support for a full return to constitutional
democracy grew during these years, finally becoming predominant
in the armed forces. Honduras thus entered the years of crisis
with a legacy of accommodation and relative social peace,
unlike its near neighbors.
The return to constitutional government was an important
contribution in this context. The elections of November 29,
1981 were by all accounts entirely honest and the results
unchallenged to any significant degree. The reformist Liberal
Party returned to power for the first time since the overthrow
of Villeda Morales in 1963. Roberto Suazo, a respected
physician, became president and his party achieved a majority
in the unicamaral congress. Honduras now displays good
democratic credentials. The press is free, the courts are
respected and the congress functions freely. The military
retain an important voice in the nation's affairs, particularly
with respect to security issues. General Gustavo Alvarez,
Commander of the Armed Forces, has repeatedly affirmed his
support for constitutional government.
Several factors in addition to the political opening help
to explain the absence in large part of violent political and
social turmoil from the recent history of Honduras. The
pressure on the land there is not as severe a problem, as in
other Central American countries. Population density is
relatively low, though increasing: about 69 inhabitants per
square kilometer of arable land as contrasted with 334 in El
Salvador. Substantial tracts of fertile land remain to be
developed, although the population explosion will probably put
an end to that opportunity before too long. An effective labor
movement -- Central America's most deeply-rooted and committed
to democratic values -- has helped to channel dissatisfaction
and dissent constructively. Although Honduras is desperately
poor, disparities in income are less extreme than in El
Salvador or Guatemala. Two traditional parties -- the Liberal
and National -- dominate the political scene and impede the
growth of extremist movements. Finally, Honduras is the least
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urbanized of the Central American countries and, as a
consequence, less vulnerable to the radicalizing pressures
Central America's crowded urban centers so clearly breed.
But Honduras, blessed by a greater measure of internal
peace than its neighbors, is also extremely poor. Per capita
income is just over $600 and in the countryside is probably
well under $200. According to the government's own figures, 57
percent of Honduras's families live in extreme poverty, lacking
sufficient income to cover the cost of the basic basket of
food.
Two-thirds of the population live in the countryside.
About 50 percent of this rural population is illiterate; 54
percent don't have access to safe water; and over 70 percent of
the children under five years of age are believed to suffer
from some degree of malnutrition. Life expectancy is under 60
years, one of the lowest in the region. And social conditions
are deteriorating further.
Private per capita consumption
actually declined in Honduras by more than 5 percent in
1981-82. The housing shortage has tripled over the last 20
years.
Underlying these problems is an extraordinary growth in
population, currently about 3.4 percent annually. Between 1960
and 1982 the number of Hondurans rose from 1.9 million to 4
million.
It is now an extremely young population: about 48
percent are below the age of 15. As in the other Central
American countries, unemployment is difficult to measure. The
government's figure of 20 percent includes only those who
failed to work as much as one hour in a given week. Probably
half the population of Honduras is unemployed or
underemployed. This mixture of extreme poverty, high
unemployment, steadily deteriorating social conditions and a
young population clearly is potentially explosive. Honduras
finds itself on the "edge of a precipice," as a spokesman for
the government put it.
·
Economy
Honduras, as the least developed of the five Central
American states, registered the lowest economic growth during
the area's three decades of expansion. Per capita gross
domestic product grew 27 percent from 1950-1978, less than
one-third of the average for all of Central America. With the
weakest industrial base of the member states, Honduras profited
least from the economic surge produced by the Central American
Common Market. However, for a brief period during the mid- and
late 1970's the economy spurted, in part because of substantial
new sugar and coffee production and in part because of sharply
increased government borrowing and spending. The overall
economy grew on an annual basis of between 7 and 8 percent in
those late years.
Weakness in the international commodity markets, the higher
cost of imported petroleum, regional instability leading to
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capital flight and problems in marketing its principal exports
carne together to put an end to economic growth. Real GDP fell
by approximately 8 percent between 1979 and 1982. Balance of
payments deficits grew, reaching almost $228 million on a
current account basis in 1982. Servicing Honduras's public
external debt of more than $1.5 billion became increasingly
difficult. President Suazo pledged his government from the
outset to a program of fiscal austerity, a reduction in public
sector employment and in government participation in the
economy.
A stand-by agreement of $104 million was negotiated
with the International Monetary Fund and has imposed strict
conditions, require a ten percent reduction in government
expenditures and tax and tariff increases.
President Suazo has described the situation of Honduras's
economy as the worst in the country's history. Although the
decline in per capita income seems to have been checked last
year, in part because of increased assistance from the United
States, the restoration of growth will be difficult to
accomplish.
The economy is highly dependent on the export of
agricultural commodities: bananas, coffee, sugar and meat.
Quotas allocated to Honduras by the International Coffee
Agreement and for sugar under current u.s. legislation are
highly unfavorable.
(Such quotas are calculated on the basis
of historical data. They penalize Honduras because of the
significant expansion of coffee and sugar production in very
recent years. Thus, Honduras had the capacity to export
121,000 tons of sugar to the United States, but was permitted
to sell only about 28,000 tons here last year.)
Coffee
production, on which 50,000 families depend directly and many
more indirectly, is down approximately 25 percent and continues
to be plagued by the spread of coffee rust, particularly
affecting the small producers.
The process of development has been arduous for the
Hondurans. During the era of economic growth between 1960 and
1980 population increase largely offset the economy's expansion
of about four percent annually. Thus, close to 80 percent of
the population remained in poverty after 20 years of difficult
effort.
But there is a widespread commitment in Honduras to
national development -- a determination to achieve economic and
social progress. One obstacle -- the drain imposed by the high
cost of imported oil -- is being attacked by the construction
of the El Cajon hydroelectric plant. This project, financed by
the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, will
come on stream in two to three years and will take care of all
the country's electricity requirements. Additional major
projects in forestry and the opening of new agricultural lands
are going ahead.
The government has developed an ambitious plan of
development for the period running to 1995. An urgent
objective of the first stage is to improve the lot of the poor
rural population by dramatically increasing the production of
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food crops through the introduction of modern methods of
cultivation, fertilizers, storage facilities, distribution and
commercialization networks.
The second stage of the plan would
focus on the larger agricultural units, promoting
diversification into new export crops, the establishment of
agro-industries, industrial production for the agricultural
sector and development of Honduras's extensive forest resources.
This vision of the future extends to the beginning of the
next century when broad industrialization would complete the
transformation of a poverty-stricken nation.
It is a vision of
hope and daring. Two conditions would seem necessary to its
fulfillment:
a significant flow of outside assistance and a
climate of peace and stability in the region.
The Price of Security
An exposed geographic position, with El Salvador, Guatemala
and Nicaragua on its borders, traps Honduras in what has
appropriately been called an "arc of fire."
From the beginning
of the insurgency in El Salvador, guerrillas have used the
border area between the two countries for sanctuary and
basing. Nicaraguan insurgents -- first the Sandinistas
fighting against the Somoza regime with Cuban support and then
the so-called contras attacking the Sandinista regime with u.s.
support -- have deployed from the rugged territory on that
border, as did Augusto Sandino half a century ago. During the
1960's much of the violent struggle in Guatemala took place in
the Zacapa region close by the Honduran frontier.
Today's
conflicts in that country are farther away for the time being,
but the threat of a spillover persists.
The accession to power of the Sandinistas and their
decision to assist the guerrillas in El Salvador posed a
fundamental challenge for Honduras. The Sandinistas with their
Cuban and Salvadoran allies set up clandestine routes for the
transshipment of arms and other supplies from Nicaragua. They
established undercover support groups in Tegucigalpa and
elsewhere to further these activities. Honduran authorities
began to detect the presence of foreigners infiltrated for the
purpose. Raids on safehouses in November 1981 revealed the
presence of a subversive group which included several
Nicaraguans. Captured documents and statements by those
detained revealed that the group had been formed in Nicaragua
at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders, that its
chief of operations resided in Nicaragua, and that members of
the group had received military training in Cuba.
Honduran efforts to close down the clandestine supply
routes beginning in late 1981, and intensifying during 1982
after the inauguration of the new constitutional government,
were met with terrorist bombings, kidnappings and armed
assaults, for the most part in Tegucigalpa. The most
devastating of these was the July 1982 bombing of that
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capital's major electric plant, resulting in damage estimated
at $10-20 million. The timing, targets and accompanying
propaganda indicated that these attacks were orchestrated from
outside for the purpose of intimidation. Furthermore, captured
Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists admitted that explosives
used in bombings in Tegucigalpa were obtained in Nicaragua.
The Salvadoran insurgents and their Cuban and Nicaraguan allies
seemed to be offering the government of Honduras a choice:
stand aside while we use your territory in our war against the
government of El Salvador or suffer the same violent subversion
at work in that country.
But the evidence suggests that no real choice was being
offered. The ground had already been laid for an armed
insurgency in Honduras by the creation with Cuban and
Sandinista backing of the Morazanista Front for the Liberation
of Honduras (FMLH) in the familiar pattern of the FSLN in
Nicaragua.
A founder of this new Honduran counterpart
described it for a Honduran newspaper as a political
military-organization formed as part "of the increasing
regionalization of the Central American conflict." Statements
from the insurgent leaders in El Salvador, the Sandinistas and
from Havana emphasized the theme that the era of revolution had
dawned not just for Nicaragua and El Salvador, but for the
entire Central American region. Under the circumstances the
conclusion reached in Tegucigalpa that Honduras \vas high on the
target list does not seem unreasonable.
In March 1983 the effort to destabilize Honduras took a new
turn with the announcement from Havana that four extreme left
groups had formed a Unified Revolutionary Coordinating Board
along the same lines as those of the umbrella guerrilla fronts
previously formed under Cuban aegis by the Salvadoran and
Guatemalan insurgents. The April 21 issue of Barricada, the
Sandinista organ, published the new group's declaration of
"popular revolutionary war" which called on the Honduran people
to rise up against the government and armed forces and against
"U.S. imperialism."
Subsequently, on July 19, about 100 Honduran guerrillas
launched a raid from Nicaragua into Olancho Department. The 24
guerrillas who deserted or were captured told a fairly
consistent story of their recruitment and training.
In almost
all cases they were recruited by deception, having been told
that they would receive some type of training in mechanics or
agriculture. They were not told that they would be sent to
Cuba. The training there took up to two years and included
four to six months at the guerrilla training school in Pinar
del Rio.
There they received instruction in ideology, weapons,
intelligence, and military tactics. At the same camp were
guerrilla trainees from other countries, including El Salvador
and Guatemala.
Following their stay in Cuba, they were sent to
Nicaragua for additional training before their entry into
Honduras on July 19.
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This guerrilla invasion was rapidly subdued by the Honduran
Armed Forces. The leader, Jose Reyes Matta, a Honduran
revolutionary long resident in Havana, was killed along with
many of his followers.
Other members of this ill-prepared
insurgency deserted. Reyes Matta and his followers did not
directly threaten the stability of the Honduran state. But
theirs may well have been only the first attempt. Reports from
Havana and Managua have indicated that the effort to mount
rural insurgency in Honduras can be expected to continue.
The Hondurans perceive across the border in Nicaragua a
conventional military as well as a subversive threat. The
Sandinistas are engaged in a rapid military buildup. Their
regular army is now more than twice the size of that of
Honduras and is supported by reserve infantry battalions and
militia manned by more than 50,000 men. The flow of arms to
the sandinistas from the Soviet bloc leaves the Hondurans far
out-gunned. The Honduran armed forces consist of an 11,500-man
Army, 300-man Navy, and 1,200 Air Force personnel.
Most of the
basic military equipment is 10-20 years old; there are also
substantial weaknesses in communications and transport.
Honduras has relied on its Air Force, the region's most
professional and capable, as the major deterrent to outside
attack.
There are over 100 aircraft in its inventory,
including 14 Super Mysteres (vintage 1952), the mainstay of the
force.
The deterrent capacity of the Air Force is increasingly
in question in light of its aging inventory and Nicaragua's
acquisition of Soviet-built anti-aircraft systems.
Up until late 1982, as the Sandinistas pursued their
efforts to exploit Honduran territory for the support of the
Salvadoran insurgency, and as they attempted to introduce armed
subversion into Honduras, anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity
along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border was sporadic, of low
intensity and posed no threat to the regime in Managua.
Subsequently, there has been a substantial expansion of their
activities, as described in the paper on Nicaragua.
Numerous
incidents along the border have occurred, including armed
Sandinista incursions and threats from the Nicaraguan regime to
retaliate across the frontier.
A high degree of tension exists
between the two countries.
Honduras has sought to strengthen its security through a
closer military relationship with the United states. Military
assistance from this country increased and is now running at
about $37 million, or approximately one-third of all u.s. aid.
The u.s. and Honduras have conducted joint military exercises
with the participation of up to 5,000 u.s. troops and the two
countries have established a Regional Training Center in
Honduras at which instruction is provided to Salvadorans, as
well as to Hondurans. Fleet maneuvers by the u.s. Navy off
both Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Central America have
demonstrated u.s. concern for the security of Honduras.
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The available evidence indicates that these maneuvers, the
military exercises and the presence of u.s. troops in Honduras
have had an effect in curbing to some degree the use by the
Sandinistas of Honduran territory for the transshipment of arms
to the Salvadoran insurgents, as well as exerting pressure on
the regime in Managua to respond more positively to regional
peace initiatives. The u.s. military presence in Honduras is
also seen there as a tangible commitment to the nation's
security, although only about 200 officers and men are in the
country on a permanent basis.
This relationship of security to an outside presence,
particularly in the form of relatively large-scale military
exercises, poses potential problems in terms of the possibility
of excessive dependency and the impact on a small, agrarian
society of foreign troops from another culture.
But in the
absence of a regional peace settlement, there would appear to
be little choice for the Hondurans but to look to the United
States for such support. We note that relations between the
Honduran civilian population and the u.s. military are reported
as largely free of tension and that the work of u.s. Army
medical teams among the rural population has been particularly
welcomed.
The Honduran security situation is further complicated by
border problems with El Salvador. Differences over demarcation
of the boundary line go back to the colonial era and in 1969
led to the so-called "soccer war." Although the OAS succeeded
in putting an early end to that conflict, the underlying
dispute has yet to be resolved. A 1980 agreement on joint
demarcation has so far produced few results.
As previously
noted, Salvadoran guerrillas have long used the border for
bases and supply, making particularly effective use of
contested pockets in the line.
It is alleged that they have
also infiltrated Salvadoran refugee camps on the Honduran side
for purposes of gathering intelligence and providing protection
for some of their forces from regular Salvadoran troops
operating in the area.
The Initiative for Peace
Honduras has sought above all to ensure its security by
promoting the concept of a comprehensive regional peace. As
the government of Honduras stated to the Commission, "the
internal conflicts (in the region) have altered the basis of
equilibrium in bilateral relations and have shattered the terms
(on which) regional security previously existed." These
conflicts "have spilled and spread over the other countries of
the region-- creating a global crisis", requiring a global
solution for the region.
Thus, bilateral arrangements on a
narrow range of state-to-state issues, as the Sandinistas
insistently proposed in the past, would leave the essence of
the crisis untouched and Honduran security still very much in
jeopardy.

71.

It is the Honduran thesis that the search for peace must
comprehend the internal conflicts, bilateral problems and "
multilateral, regional security. These three elements cannot
in the Honduran view be separated.
Honduras was the first
nation to put forward a general plan of peace for the region.
Foreign Minister Paz Barnica announced it in a speech to the
Organization of American states on March 23, 1982 and later
submitted it to the United Nations. The plan called for
agreement on six basic points:
an end to the arms race and significant reductions in
existing armaments and numbers of military personnel;
reduction in the numbers of foreign military and other
advisers;
an end to the clandestine traffic in arms;
absolute respect for traditional national boundaries;
provisions for verification of all such obligations through
international inspection and supervision within and among
the countries of the region;
a permanent multilateral dialogue leading to political
arrangements designed to ensure democracy, pluralism and
human rights in the area.
Two elements of this plan are of particularly critical
importance to Honduras:
airtight provisions for verification
of the obligations undertaken and measures to ensure
pluralistic political systems in the region. Verification of
commitments on armaments and arms trafficking is seen as
essential, given the long Sandinista record of covert
introduction of arms into the region. In the Honduran view, a
closed, totalitarian political system in Nicaragua with its
underlying commitment to the export of revolution would pose a
permanent threat to Honduras's own democracy.
The conclusion
there is that peace in Central America in the long run depends
on the existence of generally compatible political systems in
the five countries and that these systems should be essentially
democratic.
The Honduran plan was the forerunner of subsequent
initiatives more elaborately developed but with the same
general thrust. These include the various proposals of the
so-called Contadora group, which for the most part cover the
Honduran six points.
For more than a year following the
Honduran proposal, the Sandinistas continued to insist that
such issues as border security and arms trafficking could only
be addressed on a bilateral basis with Honduras. They
ostensibly modified this position somewhat in July of last year
in response to the 21-point proposal of the Contadora group.
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The course President Suazo and his government have followed
in pursuing national security through closer military ties with
the United States, while rejecting bilateral negotiations with
the Sandinistas in the absence of a regional framework, has not
gone without challenge in Honduras -- or in this country for
that matter.
It is argued that Honduras is being "militarized"
and has abandoned neutrality to take sides in a dangerous
military and ideological struggle. That choice, according to
this line of reasoning, puts the democratic experiment in
Honduras at risk, threatening a return to military goverment,
polarization within the society and, eventually, a situation of
internal violence of the Salvadoran type -- if not open warfare
with Nicaragua.
In the ruling Liberal Party, as well as in the
opposition and among the military, there have been those who
questioned the wisdom of this policy.
The debate has, as far as we can determine, for the most
part died down this last year. As we have seen, the appearance
of a putative Honduran guerrilla front, Cuban and Nicaraguan
propaganda targeting of Honduras for "liberation," terrorist
attacks in Tegucigalpa and the incursion of the Reyes Matta
band from Nicaragua indicated that the purported choice was
illusory. In addition, incidents along the border, including
the gunning down of two u.s. journalists in June of 1983 by
Nicaraguan troops, conveyed the clear impression of an
aggressive Sandinista military posture. The announcement last
year in Managua of Nicaraguan claims to Honduran territory in
the remote Mosquitia region reinforced that impression. As we
have noted, the Sandinistas refused for more than a year to
respond seriously to the Honduran call for a comprehensive
regional approach to the problem of establishing peace in the
area.
That too served to dampen down the debate in Honduras
over the policies of the Suazo government.
On the other side, the Sandinistas continue to insist that
the alleged Honduran and u.s. support to what they call the
contras and the purported use of Honduran territory by those
forces constitute the primary threat to the peace of the
region. As discussed in the paper on Nicaragua, the
anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan Democratic Force deploys about
10,000 troops in the frontier area of northwestern Nicaragua.
According to press reports, these guerrillas at times stage
from Honduran territory where they are said to maintain base
camps.
It is worth reiterating that this guerrilla activity
was of little consequence before March of 1982. By that time
the Sandinistas had long since established routes and bases on
Honduran territory for the transshipment of arms to the
Salvadoran insurgents.
Human Rights
Understandably, there has been fear in Honduras that, with
the appearance of terrorism and the threat of insurgency, the
brutal counter-terror and repression seen elsewhere in the
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region would follow. In its report covering 1982, Amnesty
International reviews denunciations it received of a number of
alleged arbitrary arrests, cases of torture, disappearances and
extrajudicial executions. Amnesty International has submitted
cases involving disappeared persons in Honduras to the United
Nations Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary
Disappearances. Many of these involved foreign nationals
purportedly suspected of entering Honduras to conduct
subversive activities. Another concern of Amnesty and other
human rights organizations has been reported harassment and
abduction of Salvadoran refugees by the Salvadoran military,
allegedly acting with the cooperation of the Honduran
military. Friction between the Honduran authorities and
personnel of the relief agencies over these and other charges
of unsatisfactory conditions in the refugee camps has also been
a problem.
The spillover from the neighboring conflicts and the threat
of terrorism and subversion introduced from Nicaragua create
grave difficulties for Honduras. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are more than
40,000 refugees in the country, including Salvadorans,
Nicaraguans -- many of them Miskito and suma Indians -- and
Guatemalans. This figure is probably understated. Refugee
camps are located close by the Salvadoran border and, as we
have noted, allegedly provide shelter for active supporters of
the Salvadoran insurgency. (The Government of Honduras and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees are currently
discussing proposals to move the camps inland away from the
border.) It does appear that the Honduran security forces may
well have tried at times to deal with this difficult situation
without due regard for the well-being and physical integrity of
the refugees. It also may be that those services engaged in
unacceptable practices in attempting to meet an outbreak of
terrorism and subversion for which the country's relatively
peaceful past ill prepared them.
But Honduras's open political system and climate of freedom
have permitted the opposition to publicize charges of human
rights violations, thus inhibiting tendencies to use
extra-legal methods. It is our understanding that the security
forces have demonstrated a growing capability to locate and
apprehend terrorists without using the illegal and inhuman
methods of some of their counterparts in the region. Although
problems continue to plague the refugee camps, relations
between the relief agencies and the Honduran authorities are
reportedly now more cooperative. There is thus hope that
Honduras can escape the brutal struggle of terror and
counter-terror afflicting its neighbors. But there must be
fear that the exporters of revolution will raise the stakes by
testing further the capacity of the undermanned and
undertrained Honduran security services to respond within the
law. As in so many other countries of the world, the purpose
would be to provoke the repression on which radical
revolutionaries hope to feed.
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Outlook
Honduras faces the difficult challenge of maintaining its
new democracy, weathering its economic crisis and launching a
renewed drive for development in the shadow of the perceived
threat to its security from a militarized and radicalized
Nicaragua. Historically, the dynamics of situations in which
security considerations -- particularly internal security
considerations -- become overriding have tended in Latin
America to work against civilian political control and the free
play of political competition, even where democracy has had
deep roots.
(Uruguay provides perhaps the most dramatic
example.) Firm protection for human rights is bound to be
difficult to sustain in an atmosphere of regional violence and
in the context of the threat of subversion from abroad. But
evident commitment to a democratic order on the part of the
Honduran military high command is encouraging, as is the spirit
of close cooperation which seems to animate the relationships
between the armed forces and the civilian government.
As with other countries in the region, Honduras will need a
greater sense of security in order to devote its full energies
and resources to the tough job of development. Honduras's own
proposals for a regional settle~ent based on pluralistic
political systems and verifiable measures to end violence,
Cuban-Soviet intervention and export of revolution would seem
most clearly to point the way toward that security.
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GUATEMALA

Size

42,000 sq. miles (roughly size-of
Tennessee)

Population
(1981)

7.5 million

Population Growth
(1970-81)

3.1 percent

GNP Per Capita
(1981)

$1,140.00

Adult Literacy
(1973)

46 percent of total adult population

u.s.

Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year 1983

$27.8 million

Historical Perspective
Guatemala, roughly the size of the state of Tennessee, is
the most populous of the countries under study -- and is a land
of great physical beauty and potential wealth.
Its economy is
the largest and the most diversified in Central America.
Its
long border with Mexico endows it with special strategic
significance in the region. And the presence of a large and
culturally unassimilated Indian population sets it apart from
its neighbors.
During much of Guatemala's history prior to 1944, national
government was dominated by Liberal Party strongmen, including
notably Manuel Cabrera Estrada (1898-1920) and General Jorge
Ubico (1931-1944).
The exercise of executive authority was
both centralized and arbitrary. Government policy was designed
to develop Guatemala economically through the promotion of
agricultural exports.
Labor costs were kept low, the work
force kept under control, and the privileges of the landholding
elite protected. Threats of revolution were easily contained
because of relative international isolation, the limited
interplay of ideologies and the personalistic nature of the
government with its firm control of the police and the
military. The Indian masses, pure-blooded descendants of the
great Mayans, were regarded as wards of the Ladinos (Latin or
white population); the Indians performed physical labor in
return for a minimum of care and protection.
Modern Guatemalan political developments are generally
traced to the so-called "decade of revolution," the period from
1944 to 1954.
In the former year a coup d'etat, engineered
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primarily by middle class intellectuals and junior army
officers, brought down General Ubico.
The successor junta,
promising to modernize and democratize Guatemala, held
elections and turned over power to the new president, Juan Jose
Arevalo, a university professor who had spent years in exile.
Arevalo proclaimed a program of "spiritual socialism" designed
to encourage reforms in education, health, labor and
agriculture.
New freedoms were granted for organized political
and labor activities.
In 1947, a social security institute was
created. An initial step toward agrarian reform was taken with
the passage of a law requiring the rental of unused land.
Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, Arevalo's successor, channeled "the
revolution" in a more radical direction.
In 1952, an agrarian
reform law passed the Congress.
It called for the
expropriation and redistribution from large estates of
uncultivated lands. The Guatemalan Labor Party, Guatemala's
communist party, was granted legal status in the same year.
The extent of communist influence in the Arbenz period remains
a subject of debate.
The communists did dominate the emerging
labor movement, developing a lever to manipulate the political
process.
But they lacked influence in the armed forces and
were only a vocal minority in the Congress and in the
population at large.
With arms from the United States embargoed, Arbenz turned
to the Eastern Bloc, arranging for the purchase of 2,000 tons
of Czech-made small arms -- an unprecedented acquisition by the
Central American standards of the time.
The regime also
undertook plans to create an armed peasant militia, greatly
alarming the armed forces.
Concern over these developments led
the Eisenhower Administration to provide arms, air support and
other assistance to Colonel Castillo Armas, who at the head of
other dissident Guatemalans, invaded the country from a base in
Honduras. Without the support of the army and unable to
galvanize popular resistance, Arbenz fell in June of 1954.
These events have colored U.S.-Guatemalan relations ever
since. The reactionary nature of the succeeding military
regimes opened the United States to the charge of having
frustrated reform.
And the sense of humiliation over outside
intervention remained strong within the Guatemalan army for
many years.
Under Castillo Armas and his immediate successors agrarian
and other reform measures v~ere repealed, trade union activity
curtailed and dissident political movements repressed.
The
military as an institution, rather than at the service of a
single leader, began to play a primary role in politics. The
officers forged alliances with powerful private-sector
organizations, representing industrialists, coffee and cotton
growers, and with rightist politicians.
The system served to
bring occasional periods of stability and fostered economic
growth, if not social reform.
However, divisions within the
army continued to manifest themselves.
In 1960 younger
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officers staged an unsuccessful coup in an effort to oust their
corrupt superiors.
Pressures from within the military and from
other quarters resulted in the drafting in 1965 of a liberal
constitution and the election of a civilian president, Julio
Mendez Montenegro.
He was Guatemala's last civilian president
to date.
With the formation of the Central American Common Market
and the advent of the Alliance for Progress, Guatemala
developed important regional markets and registered high growth
rates.
In overall output, as measured by per capita GNP of
over $1,000, Guatemala raised itself to a place within the
middle ranks of the developing countries. Growth, however, was
not reflected in an improved distribution of national income.
Striking contrasts between the urban and rural sectors
remained, the latter sector receiving only a limited share of
the benefits of economic expansion. While the rural labor
market became more complex, reliance on inexpensive and
unorganized labor remained the cornerstone of commercial
agriculture.
In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution insurgency struck
Guatemala.
The Rebel Armed forces (FAR), founded by some of
the officers who staged the aborted 1960 coup, appeared in the
field, to be followed by the MR-16.
The insurgents, many of
whom at the time were non-Marxists, declared themselves the
heirs to the "decade of revolution", commenced guerrilla
activity in the countryside and mounted terrorist attacks in
the urban centers.
Some were financed and supplied by the
Cubans and established links with the underground Guatemalan
Labor Party.
From 1966 to 1968 the violence escalated.
A u.s.
Ambassador and two senior u.s. military advisers were murdered
in Guatemala City.
The guerrilla threat began to diminish
when, as we have seen, Fidel Castro withdrew his support, and
as the Guatemalan Army's counter-insurgency campaign in the
Zacapa region along the Honduran border Jnade headway.
By 1970
the insurgent threat had largely been contained, although at a
high cost in terms of human rights violations.
This struggle had a profound impact on political
developments and attitudes during the ensuing years.
The army
acquired experience and confidence in its counter-insurgency
capacity.
But the dominant groups in the military and among
their civilian allies increasingly perceived dissent in
virtually any form as subversion. The conviction that brutal
repression was necessary to meet the threat of Marxist
revolution took hold.
The use of violence for political ends,
always present in Guatemala, became endemic.
The political
system became progressively more closed and oppressive.
During the 1970's, the army played an even greater role in
the management of the state. Between 1970 and 1982, a series
of military officers became president, each of whom had served
his predecessor as Minister of Defense.
Intricate political
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maneuvers and arrangements with various political parties
guaranteed "continuismo", or political continuity. Unlike the
case in El Salvador, there was no single party associated with
the military.
Instead, a multiplicity of party organizations
existed, conducting separate negotiations with the army.
Access to political participation by opposition groups was
often limited by the denial of legal status (personeria
juridica) to a party, or by intimidation. Regular elections
were held, but in conditions that effectively guaranteed
results satisfactory to the military high command. The
government's control of the vote count in 1974 forestalled an
apparent electoral victory for the coalition led by the
Christian Democratic candidate, General Efrain Rios Montt.
In
each succeeding election, voter apathy increased as the range
of electoral alternatives diminished.
In short, the system
preserved the political status quo but did little to address
underlying discontent.
A second generation of Marxist insurgents, once more with
Cuban support, emerged in 1972. Beginning with a nucleus of 12
men, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor initiated operations in the
remote northwest region of Ixcan.
The new insurgents declared
that the struggle would be waged through a "prolonged popular
war."
Bases were established and a political infrastructure
developed in the countryside. During the previous period of
guerrilla activity, the insurgents had largely ignored the
Indians. The Guerrilla Army of the Poor switched tactics and
exhorted the Indian population to join the armed revolutionary
struggle, promising land and freedom.
An additional element of
the new strategy was the attention devoted to the
"international front" through the use of propaganda and
solidarity organizations aimed at developing external support
for the guerrillas.
The government responded by intensifying its
counter-insurgency actions, employing force, and often terror,
against both insurgents and political moderates. The leaders
of a number of independent or opposition organizations who
could not be co-opted or frightened into exile were murdered.
The integrity of the judicial system was impaired as judges,
witnesses, and defense lawyers were either intimidated or
murdered. Under the presidency of General Lucas Garcia
(1978-1982), the number of deaths from politically related
violence climbed dramatically.
Government security forces and
leftist guerrillas murdered their enemies -- real or perceived
-- with impunity.
caught in this war of attrition were
politicians, union and campesino leaders, students and
professors, and some members of the catholic clergy, many of
whom fell victim to the violence.
By 1982, the situation in Guatemala appeared to have
reached crisis proportions. The number of
politically-motivated killings rose from a monthly rate of
between 70 and 100 in 1981, to what u.s. Government sources
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estimated to be 250 to 300 a month in 1982. The guerrillas
also intensified their activities, employing a more
sophisticated array of weapons obtained from their Cuban
sponsors. The possibility that the armed left could prevail
began to be taken seriously in Guatemala.
The March 1982 presidential elections took place in a tense
atmosphere. Although General Anibal Guevara was proclaimed the
victor as expected, amidst charges of massive fraud, junior
army officers, in particular, were alarmed at the prospect of a
continuation of the unsuccessful policies of the Lucas regime.
On March 23 a group of young army officers staged a coup
d'etat.
(Again, as in El Salvador, the fate of Nicaragua's
National Guard undoubtedly impressed these officers with the
need for change.)
General Efrain Rios Montt was asked to lead
a new governing junta. The 1965 constitution, previously
observed only in the breach in any case, was suspended.
Rios
Montt's government set out to build popular support and restore
stability.
Its first priority was the campaign against the
insurgents.
The new government declared that it would give
priority to ending human rights abuses, preparing for a return
to constitutional government and eliminating government
corruption. Employing the tactic of "beans and bullets," the
army attempted to reduce support for the insurgents by
distributing supplies of food, medicine, and building materials
in rural areas.
Civic action, which had worked well in the
counter-insurgency of the 1960's, was again a part of the
government's strategy. The national development program was
redirected from large-scale projects to smaller undertakings to
strengthen economic and social infrastructures in the
impoverished highlands.
On the security front, the military
began arming civil defense units.
Government amnesty programs
were also instituted to draw support away from the guerrillas.
In April 1982, Rios Montt, presenting his "Fourteen Points
of Government," called for national reconciliation, judicial
reform, and an improvement in the standards of living.
A
return to constitutional government was promised, although no
specific timetable was developed.
A most significant step was
the creation of the Council of State as a policy advisory body,
with ten representatives of the Indian population among the 30
members.
This was the first time since 1954 that the
indigenous peoples had had an opportunity to participate in the
making of nation~l Guatemalan policy.
The Rios Montt
government also proclaimed campaigns against government
corruption and the extra legal use of violence by the security
forces.
Under Rios Montt there was a significant decline in open
violence in Guatemala City.
But human rights organizations
charged that the security forces continued to kill large
numbers of non-combatants in rural areas for suspected
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involvement with the guerrillas or simply for reasons of
intimidation. Secret tribunals were set up in Guatemala City
and death penalties were meted out. Hhatever the shortcomings
of the Rios Montt regime, however, it did show a greater
awareness than predecessor regimes to the serious problems
confronting Guatemala.
The Rios Montt experiment ended on August 8, 1982.
In a
new coup, Brigadier General Oscar Mejia Victores, Army Chief of
Staff, assumed the position of chief of state. This action,
the government maintains, forestalled other more
politically-based coup plots and protected the unity of the
armed forces.
General Mejia has stated that his government's
objective is to conduct the transition to a constitutional
order. The first step, elections for a Constituent Assembly,
is now scheduled to take place on July 1, 1984. Roughly 36
putative political parties are preparing to register and
participate in the Constituent Assembly elections. Potentially
of greatest importance is the public commitment of the armed
forces to a policy of strict non-intervention in the
elections. However, the reported resurgence of urban death
squads darkens the political climate.
Social Problems
In terms of meeting human needs, the Guatemalan record is
not encouraging.
In rural areas -- where almost two-thirds of
the population are to be found -- living conditions remain
primitive. Life expectancy in 1980 was only 59 years, little
better than that in Honduras, the poorest country in the
region. Adequate sanitation, potable water and proper shelter
barely exist outside the cities. More than 50 percent of the
adults remain illiterate, a poor educational record for a
country with a per capita income of over $1,000.
overshadowing all social issues in Guatemala is the
presence of a large, unassimilated, mostly illiterate, and
culturally distinct mass of peasantry composed of Indian
campesinos who represent between 45 and 60 per cent of the
population.
Historically, the isolation of the Indians has
been in part voluntary; their cultural traditions, language and
way of life seemed to render them impervious to Hestern
influences. National authorities thus tended to assume that
what they took to be the fatalistic, introspective nature of
the Indians made them impenetrable to radical subversion.
In
the past, political and social conflict seemed to be confined
to the ladino (mestizo) population.
This situation has changed.
In recent decades, increasing
population pressures have weakened the traditional agricultural
economy of the Indian, making it more difficult for families to
eke out even a subsistence living. At the same time, growing
exposure to modern culture -- through missionaries, relief
workers, the transistor radio and other influences -- has
undermined traditional Indian attitudes and behavioral

81.

patterns, provoking a strong desire, especially among young
Indians, to enjoy the benefits of participation in the cash
economy. Discontent and change can be measured in the
willingness of the Indians to accept evangelical Protestanism
and to break away from the syncretist blend of Roman
Catholicism, traditional Mayan religious beliefs and communal
organizations which characterized their lives for centuries.
New more independent and modernistic attitudes have begun to
take hold. The simple appurtenances of modern society have
become powerful instruments of change.
An annual population growth of over 3 percent is at the
root of much of the Indian problem. Although Guatemala is not
overpopulated in absolute terms, the high concentration of
population in the western highlands has generated severe land
pressures. More people has meant progressive sub~division of
plots on mountain sides which were barely adequate in the first
place for family subsistence. For example, the microfinca
(farms of less than 3.5 acres) accounted for 21 percent of all
farm units in 1950, but 41 percent in 1979. The search for
more land to till has brought the progressive destruction of
Guatemala's extensive forest cover. And, as the population
expansion continues, underemployment grows in both rural and
urban areas. swelling migration to the cities has been the
inevitable result. Others seek to supplement incomes through
seasonal and migratory agricultural labor. Overall low ~vorld
prices and weak demand for export crops have limited
opportunities for Indians to participate in the cash economy.
For the most part, government social policy has been
passive with respect to the problems of the indigenous
population. No legal barriers to cultural change or social
mobility have been erected, but programs to promote
modernization and qualitative improvements in living conditions
are limited and depend greatly on external assistance, as has
particularly been the case in the teaching of the Spanish
language. One government action with a significant potential
for benefitting poor rural laborers was the tripling of the
minimum wage in 1980 following an almost unprecedented strike
among cotton and sugar workers.
But declining employment
opportunities due to the current recession have largely offset
that gain in terms of the poorer segment of the population as a
whole.
(In addition, studies have been published indicating a
stagnation or even decline in real urban wages since the early
1970's.)
This complex of interacting problems in recent years has
evidently increased the sense of discontent and alienation
among the Indian population, offering a significant opportunity
to the Marxist-Leninist insurgents. As we have seen, they have
for the first time mounted a campaign of active proselytizing
in the Indian commmunities of the highlands.
The Rios-Montt
counter-insurgency program succeeded in blunting this
campaign.
But the contest for the allegiance of these
long-isolated people will continue.
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Human Rights
As we have indicated, Guatemala has been the scene for a
number of years of gross violations of human rights.
Amnesty
International estimates that 12,000 civilian non-combatants
were killed by the security services between 1978 and 1982.
Death squads, reportedly made up of members of those services,
murdered labor leaders, religious personnel, political leaders
and journalists and others identified with dissident points of
view.
A recent outrage was the apparent murder of four
contract employees of the u.s. Agency for International
Development. On the other side, Guatemala's insurgent groups
have long practiced urban terrorism to a greater extent than
their counterparts elsewhere in the region. Kidnappings and
assassinations continue to be their stock in trade.
During recent years, the bulk of the killings in Guatemala
have occurred in the rural areas in the context of a violent
insurgency. Government forces have been charged with massacres
of entire Indian villages. Guerrillas are reported to execute
non-combatants suspected of collaborating with the army. These
atrocities on both sides take place in remote areas where
independent access and verification is often impossible.
Documentation in support of such charges is necessarily
sketchy. There are no well-organized human rights groups in
Guatemala. But, at the government's invitation, both the
Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Chairman of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission visited Guatemala during
the last year.
The dimensions and realities of that war in the backlands
are only dimly perceived from the outside. But its impact can
be seen in the tragedy of the displaced person and the
refugee. There are perhaps one million persons within the
country who have been driven from their homes by war and
economic hardship. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 40,000 Guatemalan Indians are lodged
in refugee camps just across the border in Mexico, and there
may be many more outside the camps.
The Government of Guatemala professes a determination to
curb violations of human rights. And, according to u.s.
Embassy figures, there has been a steady decline in civilian
deaths attributed to the violence:
493 a month in 1981 on the
average; 365 in 1982; and 140 in 1983. The Government has
lifted a state of emergency (known as a "state of alarm"),
abolished the secret tribunals set up under Rios Montt and
promulgated a 90-day amnesty program in August of last year.
But several recent disappearances of students and faculty
members of San Carlos University and the murders of the AID
contract employees referred to earlier raise doubts as to how
much permanent progress has been made.
Clearly, firmer
government action will be required to establish confidence in
its intentions.
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The Loss of Economic Growth
As the largest country of the region with a strong export
base in coffee, bananas, sugar and meat, and with an aggressive
entrepreneurial class, Guatemala was well positioned to take
advantage of the dynamic development of the Central American
Common Market.
Industrialization for export within the market
was the most extensive in the region. Gross Domestic Product
grew during the 1960's at a rate of 5.5 percent and between
1970 and 1977 at around 5.4 percent equaling the highest rate
in Central America. Government policies, particularly low tax
rates and prudent fiscal management, encouraged economic
expansion, led by the private sector.
But coffee exports remained the key economic factor.
Historically they have accounted for about 70 percent of the
country's foreign exchange earnings. Hith the decline in real
prices for that commodity and over-production around the world,
Guatemala's economy began to suffer. Difficulties in marketing
the country's other commodity exports-- bananas and sugar in
particular -- contributed to the decline. The troubles of the
Central American Common Market also had a significant impact.
Over 80 percent of Guatemala's manufactured goods are normally
sold in the Common Market and are not competitive outside it.
The insurgency has also had its effect. Property damage from
the fighting for the 1981-82 period has been estimated at $22
million.
But losses in terms of production and investment have
undoubtedly been much greater. Both the agricultural and
industrial sectors have been hard hit by capital flight and the
drying up of external credit to Central America. Along with
the other countries of the region (except for Nicaragua),
Guatemala has turned to the International Monetary Fund for
stabilization assistance, but is having great difficulties in
carrying out the program.
The u.s. Embassy estimates a four percent decline in
Guatemala's overall production in 1987. Unemployment according
to Guatemalan government figures is now 20 percent; including
underemployment would probably double that figure.
Population
growth of over three percent a year makes the restoration of
economic growth an especially urgent requirement.
In current
international conditions, Guatemala cannot look for rapid
expansion of world markets for its traditional cash crops.
Revival of the Central American Commmon Market and
intra-regional trade would obviously be of great benefit. An
end to insurgency and urban violence could restore a tourist
industry that showed great promise in the early and mid-1970's.
But, as World Bank studies show, Guatemala must develop new
products and markets.
Potential does exist in such
non-traditional exports as rubber, sesame and other oil-bearing
crops, as well as in agro-industrial production. Projections
of petroleum production of perhaps 30,000 barrels a day by 1986
add a note of optimism. The greatest opportunities would seem
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to exist in more efficient use of the land.
As much as onehall of Guatemala 1 s usable land is uncultivated and could be
developed for food crops or pasture.
Substantial investment
will, however, be required.
The drastic shortage of capital
within the country means that foreign sources of financing will
be needed if satisfactory growth is to be restored.

u.s. foreign assistance programs in Guatemala declined
appreciably over recent years.
Anticipated increases for the
current fiscal year may not materialize given restrictive
legislation passed in the Congress and directed at the
country 1 s poor human rights situations.
Support for Guatemalan
development from the United States has long concentrated on the
rural poor whose needs are now greater than ever. The prospect
of elections and the establishment of a democratic order in
Guatemala hold out promise that the substantial u.s. aid so
greatly needed may yet be possible.
The Search for a Democratic Alternative
In no country of the region has the three-sided contest
among a rigidly traditional social order, the movement for
democratic reform, and Marxist-Leninist insurgency developed
over a longer period.
From 1944 to 1982 Guatemala 1 s history
was one of the rise and repression of moderate reform, of
cycles of intense political violence and Marxist-Leninist
insurgency, and of the growing brutality of military
government.
The Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua induced, as in
El Salvador, the overthrow of a particularly oppressive group
of ~ilitary leaders associated with the regime of President
Lucas Garcia. Those who replaced them have promised a return
to constitutional and civilian rule and the way may now be open
for another effort at democratization.
The central problem has been ~- and will continue to be -the need to create a stable government with popular legitimacy
and capable of adapting to changing economic and social
realities.
For the past 30 years Guatemala 1 s successive
governments have for the most part been narrowly based and
under the domination of the military.
The challenge now is to
open the political process and lay the foundation for
government widely perceived as legitimate and representative.
That will require the active support of the military
institution. As we have seen, the officer corps has not over
these three decades always been either monolithic or an
unchanging defender of the status quo.
Military men have at
times been at the cutting edge of political change. The young
officers who organized the coup in ~1arch of 1982 sought a
government free of administrative corruption and capable of
developing a counter-insurgency strategy that did not rely on
the force of arms alone.
The armed forces have pledged themselves to
non-interference in the electoral process. But they can be
expected to continue to regard their institution as the
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ultimate guarantor of the integrity and security of the nation,
above and apart from the normal structure of government. This
deeply ingrained attitude can lead to interference and
domination in the process of government.
Guatemala's strong private sector has been able to exert
considerable political influence in recent times, particuarly
over the framing of economic policy. As with the military, its
commitment to democratization will be important. The turbulent
politics of Guatemala, its violence and susceptibility to
extremist formulas, have to all appearances made the country's
leading economic groups wary with respect to the transition to
a freely competitive political environment. The Council of
Growers, Businessmen, Industrialists and Financiers (CACIF), an
umbrella organization of the private sector, has been
particularly concerned to maintain the contemporary Guatemalan
tradition of a small public sector, low taxes-- the lowest in
Latin America -- and resistance to schemes for land reform.
The private sector's views will be well represented by several
conservative political parties in the forthcoming campaign.
Guatemala's labor movement is relatively weak. Only 10-15
percent of the work force has been unionized.
After
substantial growth in the "decade of the revolution" (1944-54),
organized labor met strong government resistance and, in the
1970's, brutal government repression.
In the last years of
that decade a number of strikes for collective bargaining
rights and wage increases won some concession, but also led to
the perpetration of even more systematic violence against union
leaders and organizers.
In the past year there has been a
resurgence of activity in the labor sector.
Two new democratic
federations appeared:
the National Campesino Coordinating
Board in representation of rural vvorkers and the Syndicated
Unity Confederation of Guatemala.
The latter achieved legal
status last year, an encouraging development in an
administrative system that has often managed to block such
recognition.
Labor can have a significant role to play in a
freer political climate.
Political parties in Guatemala have had difficulty in
sinking deep roots.
The National Liberation Movement, a
right-wing party, the centrist Christian Democrats and the
Revolutionary Party do, however, have relatively long records
of participation in government in cooperation with the
military.
Other parties, generally of a social-democratic
tendency, made little headway in past decades, in good part
because of violence directed at their potential leaders by the
security services. As previously noted, there are now more
than 30 putative political parties vying for attention. A
Supreme Electoral Tribunal has been established to plan and
supervise the projected elections.
But the principal obstacles
to democratization are not organizational or administrative.
They are to be found, rather, in the violence created by the
insurgency and terrorism of the left and the counter-violence
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of the security forces.
Progress on both fronts will be
important to the realization of a democratic future in
Guatemala.
The Insurgency
Guatemala has now undergone more than 20 years of prolonged
Marxist insurgency, rural and urban. There have been cycles of
both growth and decline, coinciding to an important degree, as
we have noted, with the relative level of Cuban interest and
support. Thus, the resurgence of rural insurgency between 1979
and 1982, reaching in the latter year a peak of over 3,000 men
in the field, was related partly to worsening economic
conditions, partly to a reaction to government repression in
rural areas, and partly to new opportunities Castro saw in
Central America with the emergence of a victorious Sandinista
movement in Nicaragua. As in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran
cases, it was Cuban pressure that brought rival guerrillas
together in an umbrella political-military front organization.
The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) was
established in Managua in 1982.
The components of the UNRG include the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), the oldest of the insurgent organizations, dating from
1962; the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the largest of
these groups; the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms
(OPRA); and two armed labor parties. The various groups
operate on a number of fronts in the western highlands, the
south-central regions of the country and the northern Petan.
The EGP, for example, claims six fronts -- named for "Che"
Guevara, Augusto Sandino, and Ho Chi Minh, among others.
Operational guidance, logistical supply, and training for each
of the organizations comes from the outside, notably from Cuba
and Nicaragua. About 300 Guatemalan immigrants were trained in
Cuba in 1982; and Cuban-supplied arms reached these groups
through Belize and Mexico, and indirectly from Nicaragua.
As with other Central American guerrilla organizations,
there are differences of views on tactics and strategy among
the groups of the UNRG. The EGP emphasizes the strategy of a
prolonged popular war of the Mao-style, gradually rising in
stages to a final armed confrontation.
Its propaganda is
directed at grievances among the Indian population and at urban
workers. The FAR advocates classical Marxist-Leninist
strategies of combining political organizations with armed
action. OPRA, on the other hand, makes less of its Marxist
ties and seeks to build an efficient fighting force with Indian
combatants.
For all groups, however, the ultimate goal remains
a process of mass mobilization and armed confrontation aimed at
the conquest of political power and the establishment of a
Marxist-Leninist political order. There is still some question
as to the ability of the UNRG national command to coordinate
the activities of these diverse groups in the field.
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The Guatemalan Army has developed confidence through 20
long years of experience in its capacity to mount effective
counter-insurgency operations. As has been seen, the campaign
mounted in 1982 by the Rios Montt government combined military
force with civic action-- the "beans and bullets program."
The theme was sounded by Rios Montt himself who said "to fight
against subversion does not consist in killing a guerrilla; it
consists in killing the hunger of the peasant."
Civil defense
forces were recruited from rural communities and provided with
a few arms.
The campaign, fought brutally, succeeded in
blunting what looked to be a dangerous insurgent offensive.
The Guatemalan forces have demonstrated the ability to
contain the insurgency in that country.
But it appears
unlikely that they can eliminate it in the forseeable future,
unless important changes are introduced in the political,
economic and military fields.
The groups of the Guatemalan
Revolutionary Union still have significant numbers of
well-trained cadres, as well as experienced leadership and
important foreign allies in the cubans and Nicaraguans.
For
the army, resources are short, adequate logistics are
increasingly difficult to maintain, equipment is old and in
short supply and mobility has been curtailed by difficulties in
replacing and servicing helicopters.
Until the recent
authorization of a cash sale of helicopter parts, the United
States Government had provided no military assistance or
permitted any military sales to Guatemala since 1977.
Guatemala and the United States
Guatemala's relations with the United States have in recent
years been considerably more distant than those of El Salvador,
Honduras or Costa Rica. Attitudes in the politically powerful
officer corps have been characterized by strong nationalism and
resentment over perceived u.s. interventionism in the country's
internal affairs, ranging from the Arbenz episode and the use
in the early 1960's of Guatemala as a base for the Bay of Pigs
invasion to our human rights policies of recent years.
The
cutoff of u.s. military assistance and sales deepened those
feelings of resentment.
The Guatemalan government and military
pride themselves on their toughness, independence and
self-sufficiency in the face of tvvo decades of armed subversion.
On the other side, United States policy objectives in the
relationship with Guatemala produce dilemmas.
It is very much
in the interest of the United States to support resistance to
Marxist-Leninist insurgency in Guatemala, as elsewhere in
Central America.
Tl1is country must also, however, be deeply
concerned about the brutal violations of human rights in
Guatemala.
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COSTA RICA

Size

19,700 sq. miles (roughly size of
West Virginia)

Population
(1981)

2.3 million

Population Growth
(1970-81)

2.8 percent

GNP Per Capita
(1981)

$1,430.00

Adult Literacy
(1980)

90 percent of total adult population

U.S. Economic Assistance
Fiscal Year 1983
(Development Assistance,
ESF, PL 480)

$210 million

A long and stable democratic tradition sets Costa Rica
apart from the other nations of Central America; and the fact
that it has no army makes Costa Rica unique in Latin America.
The country's democratic system is deeply rooted. Only
twice since 1899, and then for only brief periods, has the
democratic order been interrupted. There have been nine
successive presidential elections since 1949, all as called for
by the constitution and all by every account available to us
conducted freely and honestly.
The Formation of Democracy
Costa Rica's national character was largely determined
during the colonial period -- more so even than was the case
with the rest of the isthmus.
Its history is remarkably
parallel to the American frontier experience -- a comparison
known to many Costa Ricans, whose sympathetic feelings for the
U.S. are grounded in the common historical concept of
Jefferson's small-farmer agrarian democracy.
What is now Costa Rica was in the 16th century the most
distant and backward of backwaters. The Spanish "conquerors"
of Costa Rica were seeking opportunities removed from the
centers of viceregal power.
They found on their arrival not an
advanced Indian civilization -- ironically, the easiest to
manipulate and then enslave -- but a less organized, more
primitive, uncooperative population. The Indians were killed
or driven off the better lands, leaving the settlers to
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cultivate only what they could farm by themselves without
forced labor.
In contrast to the Spanish-American experience elsewhere,
where small colonial aristocracies owning and managing
large-scale holdings exploited indentured native labor, the
family farm became the model in Costa Rica. Whereas other
Spanish colonial societies became highly stratified with
economic and political control in the hands of a few families,
the Costa Rican society from the beginning was more
egalitarian. On the marches of colonial rule, but
comparatively unthreatened by either organized Indian hostility
or English depredations, the Costa Rican settlers saw little
need for a standing army that had to be supported by taxes sent
to distant Guatemala. The raising of local militia reflected
their reliance on mutual cooperation and gave it further
impetus. Other Spanish-American societies were characterized
by the struggle for power and wealth, but early Costa Ricans
displayed an overriding preference for compromise to bloody
confrontations.
Finally, the weaker class barriers of Costa
Rican society inspired visions of personal advancement.
Opportunities for education were looked upon by the poorer
elements in society as the key to a better life and not as a
privilege of the wealthy.
Progress in providing such
opportunities was slow, but this attitude underlies Costa
Rica's impressive educational accomplishments in modern times.
Costa Rica obtained its formal independence in 1821.
Subsequent economic development, however, was the source of the
most profound changes in the country. The so-called "coffee
miracle" of the mid- and late 19th century transformed Costa
Rica from one of the poorest states in Central America to one
of its richest and most progressive.
This transformation conformed to a considerable degree to
the country's traditional pattern of small land holdings.
Even
today there are 70,000 individual coffee plantations. But the
coffee boom and the development of railroads and a banana
industry around the same time did tend to concentrate the land
in fewer hands, at the expense of the ideal of agrarian
democracy.
In 1889, Costa Rica held elections -- the first
free and honest ones in the nation's history-- and began a
trend maintained with only a few lapses since then.
The most important formative period of modern Costa Rica -especially in terms of social welfare and electoral reform -occurred during the 1940's. Under President Rafael Calderon
the creation of a modern welfare system began.
In 1941, the
Office of Social Security was established.
This was followed a
year later by proposals to provide legal guarantees of social
rights for all Costa Ricans, including accident, sickness,
disability and unemployment compensation, in addition to the
8-hour day, a minimum wage, and the right to organize. Many of
these protections were embodied in the comprehensive labor code
of 1943.
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While Calderon's social program met with wide approval, he
came under increasing attack for his efforts to perpetuate his
hold on power and for his alliance with the communists.
Following attempts in 1948 by his governing party to perpetuate
fraud in the presidential election, Jose Figueres, a coffee
grower, founded an amateur army and rose in rebellion.
In a
brief civil war Figueres and his forces defeated the regular
armed forces and armed bands of banana workers assembled by the
Communist Party. A junta headed by Figueres took over,
promising to stay in power no more than 18 months.
The promise
was kept, the government turned over to the legitimate winner
of the 1948 election and Costa Rica's democratic order solidly
established.
Figueres's National Liberation Party has since
played a pivotal role in Costa Rican politics, alternating in
power with opposition coalitions.
The reforms introduced by the Calderon government were
maintained after 1948 and broadened through a series of
institutional measures designed to build a more egalitarian
society.
These included bank nationalization and sharply
increased property and income taxes. At the same time,
safeguards against communist penetration of unions were
adopted.
Most significantly, Figueres, in the wake of his
successful revolution, abolished the armed forces, which by
then had become both politicized and discredited. To all
appearances, a national consensus against the reestablishment
of a professional army persists to this day.
Since 1949 Costa Rica has followed the course laid down by
the 1948 revolution. Alternating coalitions elected to power
have promoted the welfare state, expanded education and health
care and preserved democratic rights.
The electorate has
remained anti-communist but left-of-center.
The two major
candidates in the 1982 elections ~~ere both active heirs of the
tradition of social reform: Luis Alberto Monge of Figueres's
National Liberation Party and Rafael Angel Calderon, the son of
the reforming president of 1940-44.
By any statistical measure it is clear that Costa Rica's
citizens have benefited from a tradition of stable democracy
and reform.
Costa Rica's standard of living is superior to its
four Central American brethren in every category:
literacy,
(90 percent in Costa Rica versus 65 percent in the other
Central American countries); medical care, (one doctor per
1,470 persons compared to one per 2,762); life expectancy, (70
years versus 59.6); and per capita income ($1,430 in 1981
versus $812). One of the most telling yardsticks is the
composite of major social indicators compiled by the overseas
Development Council as an index of tl1e physical quality of
life.
Costa Rica is rated 89 on a scale of 100. The North
American (U.S.-Canadian) average is 96. Other Central American
states are rated in the GO's.
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As the Commission learned on its visit to San Jose, most
Costa Ricans are understandably proud of a system of government
unique in Central America.
They are committed to the continued
development of a western democracy in their own country and,
while sometimes skeptical about political development in the
rest of Central America, are naturally sympathetic to
democratic movements elsewhere.
If criticism is to be directed at Costa Rica, it is that
the country's economic achievements are still rather modest
when taken out of the Central American context. And it may be
that the welfare state has expanded beyond the capacity of the
Costa Rican economy to support it under current economic
conditions -- a difficulty a number of more advanced nations
have recently encountered.
Some observers find the government
bureaucracy to be excessive; and, as elsewhere in Latin
America, some semi-autonomous government institutions at times
appear to be operating beyond the effective fiscal control of
the central government.
Reports of corruption have also become
more frequent in recent years.
The need to establish consensus
in a society with such broad political participation tends on
occasion to force delays in important national decisions.
These, however, are clearly problems of a far different
magnitude and nature than those one encounters elsewhere in
Central America.
An Economy Under Siege
During the period 1960-1979, Costa Rica enjoyed a period of
sustained growth with a relatively low and stable rate of
inflation and with limited unemployment. The Central American
Common Market with its opportunities for import substitution
and intra-regional trade produced much of this growth.
Average
annual real per capita gross domestic product increased on the
order of 3.1 percent annually.
The poverty rate was brought
down to 25 percent of the population (compared to 67 percent
for the rest of Central America).
The government financed a
generous expansion of medical care, social security, housing
subsidies and community development projects for the middle and
lower classes during this period.
Educational opportunities
were broadened significantly.
Income for the 30 percent of the
population below the median grew during these years at double
the rate of that for the 10 percent in the most affluent
stratum.
In the late 1970's, however, Costa Rica's economic
situation began to deteriorate due to global, regional, and
internal problems.
The first round of oil price increases and
higher prices for imports brought on an inflationary spiral and
the beginning of stagnation in economic expansion.
In 1978-79
the price of coffee dropped while the country was forced to
absorb additional increases in the price of imported oil.
The
terms of trade between 1978-1982 deteriorated by a crushing 34
percent. Although decreased agricultural production and a drop
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in tourism and intra-Central American trade because of
deteriorating regional political and economic conditions also
affected Costa Rica, stable terms of trade alone during this
period would have assured it an average 2 percent annual
increase in GDP.
Instead, the deterioration in the balance of
payments, which caused the value of the Costa Rica colon to
decline against the dollar by 370 percent, was accompanied by a
general weakening of the economy. Economic growth averaged 6
percent annually during the 1970's, but declined by 20 percent
during the 1980-82 period. And per capita income decreased.by
over 30 percent within the three-year period.
Uncontrolled
foreign borrowing by the autonomous agencies ran up 75 percent
of Costa Rica's foreign debt without legislative sanction.
Since taking office in May 1982, President Monge has
implemented a politically painful austerity program to reduce
public sector spending.
He has increased public utility and
fuel prices, raised taxes, and sought to impose government
hiring freezes.
These measures led to a standby agreement with
the IMF in December 1982. While commited to these austerity
programs, the Monge Administration appears determined in so far
as possible to preserve the social programs that have made
Costa Rica a unique example for the region.
Despite recent improvements, Costa Rica's economic problems
remain severe.
Financial difficulties are exacerbated by the
burden of the large-scale external borrowing in the late 1970's
and early 1980's-- borrowing directed at maintaining the
country's standard of living and welfare programs in the face
of sharply deteriorating terms of external trade.
Costa Rica's
total debt to international multilateral and commercial lenders
(principally u.s., European, and Japanese banks) is now over $3
billion, extremely high in per capita terms.
The government
has been forced intermittently since July 1981 to suspend debt
service payments and at this writing is about $1.1 billion in
arrears.
Debt service payments, that is interest alone, came
to about $500 million in 1983, or 58 percent of expected export
receipts.
The government recognizes the need to address the country's
economic shortcomings over the next few years.
In order to
reduce vulnerability to unstable commodity prices and energy
costs, programs are to be developed for the longer run to
promote alternative exports, find new markets and produce more
nontraditional exports.
Ventures in this field are under way
in such diverse areas as macadamia nuts, quail eggs, cut
flowers, fresh fruit and vegetables, fisheries, and oil
exploration.
Costa Rica also needs to attract foreign risk
capital for investment, a task which may be facilitated by the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.
But general regional as well as
domestic economic and political conditions will continue to
affect investment decisions and the turbulence elsewhere in
Central America remains a negative factor.

93.

Both foreign and domestic capital investors are also wary
of what they sometimes see as an overemphasis on the public
sector in Costa Rica.
The growth of the public sector is
reflected in the fact that its share of total employment
increased from 5 percent in 1950, to 15 percent in 1970, to 20
percent in 1980. Total expenditures of the non-financial
public sector as set forth in the 1982 budget amount to 41
percent of GDP, a high figure by most standards.
Public sector
growth in Costa Rica as elsewhere has had an impact on the
economy through both regulation and sharpened competition for
available resources.
The public sector has increased its share
of total credit in the country from 18 percent in 1970 to 47
percent in 1981, severely squeezing the private sector's access
to lending.
Corrective efforts by the Monge Administration to
reform the exchange rate system, to cut bureaucratic
expenditures and bring the finances of the autonomous agencies
under the control of the central government are under way.
One
important consequence of these measures was an end to capital
flight in 1983.
In order to achieve a return to pre-1979 prosperity, Costa
Rica seeks over the next few years both to increase investment
in productive enterprises and to show significant export
growth.
In view of fiscal austerity in the public sector and
uncertainty in the private sector, the first goal will be
difficult to reach.
And even if the balance of trade is
corrected, the debt service problem is such that in order to
achieve investment goals, Costa Rica will require gross
external financing of approximately $600 million by 1986.
Because of the external debt situation, private foreign
investment may lag, and new inflows would probably have to come
from bilateral and Inultilateral sources.
The Threat to

Democr~tic

Stability

Tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua are not new.
What is new and what deeply concerns Costa Ricans is the
conjunction of economic recession and the coming to power of a
radical Marxist regime on its northern border.
The anxiety of
the Costa Ricans about the future of their democracy under
these circumstances is understandable.
When Costa Rica abolished its regular army in 1949, it was
realized that Somoza's Nicaragua could constitute a threat to
the country's security.
But the decision was taken to rely on
international mechanisms, particularly the inter-American
security system, to counter any such threat.
This was a bold
decision.
Somoza had conspired in 1948 with the deposed
President Calderon to launch an invasion from Nicaraguan soil
and relations between the two countries were tense at the time
of Costa Rica's armed forces were dissolved.
Another type of
tension came in 1955 when a border dispute escalated into an
open Nicaraguan attack.
Reliance on collective security worked
in practice as the OAS, backed strongly by the U.S., restrained
Nicaragua.
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In turn, Costa Rica served as a base for numerous dissident
groups aimed at toppling the Somozas.
Figueres gave direct
assistance in 1959 to a failed guerrilla invasion of Nicaragua
led by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Somoza's implacable foe.
During
the 1978-79 civil war in Nicaragua the Carazo government
permitted Costa Rica territory to be used in the transshipment
of supplies to the Sandinistas while providing sanctuary and
other assistance to the anti-Sandinista forces.
The emergence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua in
1979 has posed an entirely new order of problems.
First,
Nicaragua is seen as presenting a much more serious threat in
terms of military and intelligence capabilities than ever
before. Against an increasingly heavily-armed standing
Nicaraguan army of more than 25,000 with its massive militia
reserves, Costa Rica has a Civil Guard of 4,000 men and a
3,000-strong Rural Defense Force.
These are non-military
constabulary entities which neither offer any threat to
Nicaragua nor are in a position to deter armed aggression.
In
an effort to obscure this enormous imbalance, Radio Sandino and
Radio Havana have made much of the existence in Costa Rica of
several hundred men enrolled in the ranks of self-styled and
self-armed militia, usually attached to political parties.
This propaganda campaign features the accusation that Costa
Rica (and the United States) is harboring "secret armies."
In
truth, Costa Rica's Marxist parties support similar groups, and
these are predictably better armed and trained than those of
the non-communists.
Costa Rican leaders have not wavered in their trust in
international security mechanisms as the country's principal
line of defense.
Their responses to what are considered in San
Jose as Nicaraguan provocations have been calm and measured.
But by all accounts, public concern with respect to the
country's security situation remains strong. An issue of
particular sensitivity in terms of public perceptions in Costa
Rica has been the Sandinista challenge to Costa Rican
navigation rights on the San Juan river.
The disputes between
the two countries over the border along that river go far back
in history.
The navigation issue was, however, seemingly
settled by an 1888 arbitration award.
But Nicaraguan forces
reacting to anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity in the area
began detaining Costa Rican tourist craft on the river.
The
issue has for the time being died down, but has left an
impression of Sandinista arrogance and contempt for Costa Rican
sovereignty. Such was also the case in an incident last year
in which Nicaraguan troops patrolling near the border against
insurgents shot up a Costa Rican customs post, apparently with
deliberate and vindictive forethought.
The northern part of Guanacaste province on the
Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border poses a special problem for Costa
Rica.
It was once part of Nicaragua and an area in which
Nicaraguan governments have regularly registered political and
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economic interest.
Many of the inhabitants long settled in the
area are of Nicaraguan ancestry and to these have been added
thousands of recent Nicaraguan refugees.
The area has become a
natural target for Sandinista proselytization, infiltration,
and training for subversion. There is also a Salvadoran
refugee camp in Guanacaste which has been suspected as a source
of arms transshipments to the FMLN in El Salvador and as a
Salvadoran guerrilla rest and recuperation sanctuary. The
Costa Rican Government has recently sought international
assistance to promote Costa Rican colonization in the province
and to establish a transport and communications infrastructure
there.
Anti-Sandinista guerrilla activity in the border region is
a principal issue in the relations between the two countries.
As detailed in the paper on Nicaragua, several thousand men
under the command of the former Sandinista leader Eden Pastora
operate against targets in southern Nicaragua, allegedly at
times staging from Costa Rican territory. Pastora's
unquestioned anti-Somoza and democratic credentials have
elicited a good deal of sympathy for his cause among Costa
Ricans. At the same time, the government in San Jose simply
does not have the security forces or other resources necessary
to police the border region.
The Sandinistas with the assistance of their Soviet and
Cuban patrons have responded in part to this situation by
organizing an international propaganda campaign designed to
blacken Costa Rica's good name.
Costa Ricans, accustomed to
the respect their country enjoys abroad, have been shocked to
find their government and their institutions vilified in
Mexican and West European publications.
Crude threats have
been added to the propaganda. A member of the Sandinista
Directorate told a third-country statesman in 1982 -- and
before Pastora's guerrillas had appeared in the field-- that
if provoked by Costa Rica, the Nicaraguans would stop only when
they reached the Panamanian border.
But the deepest concern of the Costa Rican leadership is
not the specter of armed invasion but the longer-range threat
posed by the ideological persistence and aggressiveness of a
Marxist-Leninist Nicaragua bent on propagating its creed. Hany
Costa Ricans initially sympathetic to the Sandinista revolution
have been appalled by the Leninist system they perceive
consolidating across the border. They fear that the
Sandinistas consider their revolution to be inevitably
exportable through political pressures, the support of an armed
Costa Rican insurgency, or through a fifth column in the years
ahead. This long-range concern is heightened by Nicaragua's
ties to Cuba, the Soviet Union and its bloc. While a friendly
United States was the sole world power to exert influence on
the isthmus, Costa Rica could afford to take a reasonably
detached view of the aggressive posturing of Somoza's
Nicaragua.
But now that Nicaragua has forged such strong ties
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to the Soviet Union and its allies, Costa Rica finds itself on
the front line of the East-West struggle. The problem is no
longer one of periodic Nicaraguan muscle-flexing, but of
becoming the target of Soviet-Cuban geopolitical strategy, and
of being exposed to the possibility of externally supported
subversion backed by a huge military and intelligence
apparatus. There is increased anxiety that this predicament
could well persist for a long time to come.
Indications have appeared to support Costa Rican fears of
being targeted for subversion. During the 1978-79 Sandinista
campaign a number of third world revolutionary groups sent
representatives to Costa Rica to aid in the fight against
Somoza. These included the Montoneros of Argentina, the
Tupamaros of Uruguay, and the M-19 of Colombia. Following the
overthrow of Somoza, some revolutionaries stayed on to train
Costa Ricans in subversive techniques, as evidenced by the
documented Montonero connection with the Costa Rican terrorist
group that blew up a u.s. Embassy van in 1981.
(Individuals
with Montonero and Tupamaro connections operated a shortwave
radio station near San Jose for a time, broadcasting programs
with a high content of revolutionary rhetoric and intelligence
information for insurgent groups. The station was closed in
1981 and its equipment removed to Nicaragua where it is now
suspected of being utilized for Radio Venceremos, the
mouthpiece of the Salvadoran insurgents.)
The refugee influx of about 20,000 Salvadorans and up to
200,000 Nicaraguans has offered opportunities for infiltration,
terrorism and espionage. Since 1980 Nicaraguan and Salvadoran
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary operatives have made use
of Costa Rican territory to harass one another, on occasion
staging terrorist acts.
In mid-1983 members of the Basque
terrorist group ETA were apprehended by Costa Rican security
and accused of attempting to assassinate anti-Sandinista
elements in Costa Rica. Accompanying the terrorism has been
increased agitation by communist-dominated labor unions. The
banana workers staged the longest strike in their turbulent
history during 1982. Observing that the strike had no
plausible economic purpose, the government accused the union of
attempting to destabilize the country.
The Nicaraguan challenge and the threat that the vicious
conflicts elsewhere on the isthmus will increasingly embroil
Costa Rica pose difficult policy choices for the country's
leadership. But President Monge and his administration have
held fast to the country's traditional approach to security
problems. On November 10, 1983 President Monge issued a solemn
proclamation of absolute Costa Rican neutrality with respect to
Central America's armed conflicts. And the government has
flatly rejected any suggestion that it might reverse the policy
of 35 years and reestablish professional armed forces.
In this
the Monge government has the strong support of the people,
although the need to strengthen and improve the existing
constabulary forces is widely recognized.
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Neutrality, however, does not mean in the Costa Rican
scheme of things indifference to the struggle for freedom in
Central America. President Monge has explained that while his
country remains militarily neutral, it will continue to be a
political belligerent on the side of democracy. Certainly in
this context Costa Rican democracy with its dedication to the
dignity and liberty of the individual stands as a rebuke to the
Sandinista doctrine of the incompatibility of the practices of
democracy with the establishment of social justice.
The Future
Costa Rica's democratic system is deeply rooted and retains
the faithful allegiance of the vast majority of the nation's
citizens. But the months and years ahead are likely to test
the strength of that system. Reconciling economic recession,
financial crisis and resulting austerity with the requirements
of a welfare state is already proving most difficult, as it has
in recent times for so many countries. The Monge
administration is prepared to accept greater austerity and to
promote a larger role for a dynamic private sector. But
understandably it will not abandon what Costa Ricans regard as
essential social services. The result is and will continue to
be severe strains on the system until economic growth is
restored -- and that will require substantial external
assistance.
The threat of subversion and of further Nicaraguan assaults
on the country's sovereignty and dignity produce equally severe
strains. Preserving the national consensus necessary to
safeguard democracy in the face of such challenges is not
likely to be a simple task. Thus the importance to Costa Rica
of a regional security arrangement based on internal pluralism
in all countries, verifiable commitments to non-intervention,
an end to the arms race and to soviet-Cuban intromission.
Costa Rica will work for such an outcome and will look to its
friends for support. Its citizens believe that the
preservation of its democratic institutions is a cause meriting
the interest and assistance of democratic states everywhere -a proposition those who uphold freedom around the world should
find difficult to dispute.
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INTRODUCTION
Background of AFL-CIO/ AIFLO Central American Activities
The involvement of the U.S. labor movement in Latin America dates from the
turn of the century.

As far back as 1916, Samuel Gompers, the architect of the

modern American labof movement, was instrumental in establishing the Pan-American
Confederation of tabor, which sought to defend the dignity of the Mexican Revolution
and served as the first important platform to protest the actions of despotic regimes
(as well as exploitative corporations) south of the U.S. border.
Both institutional and informal relationships were maintained with Latin
American trade union movements and progressive political leaders over the years.
American labor has consistently given moral and material support to the democratic
victims of dictatorships, often when U.S. foreign policy was supportive of these
regimes. For example, while the U.S. government enjoyed a comfortable relationship
with the notorious dictatorship of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela in the 1950's, it was the
AFL-CIO which intervened to support the visa application of Romulo Betancourt to
live in exile in the United States. Betancourt, of course, later returned to Venezuela
and became the elected President of his country.
In the early 1960's, the AFL-CIO formed the American Institute for Free tabor
Development (AIFLD) to intensify the solidarity and friendship with the workers and
campesinos of Latin America, which had been initiated more than a half century
earlier.

Specifically, the AIFLD was founded to support and encourage the

participation of free and democratic unions of this hemisphere in the political,
ecqnomic, and social development of their countries. For over 20 years, the AIFLD
has supported the development of Latin America and Caribbean union movements with
programs of education and social development.
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AIFLD Activities in Central America
In Central America (including Panama), more than 93,000 trade unionists have
received instruction in AIFLD in-country courses.

AIFLD graduates hold a large

percentage (at least 70%) of the executive board positions of Central American free
trade unions. They thus constitute a strong force for democratic change in the region.
A Department of Social Projects has been active in the development of workers'
housing, cooperative development, and union-sponsored community projects designed
to provide services to union members and to the general public. In housing, slightly
more than 18,000 units have been constructed at a cost of $77,000,00.

Of these

amounts, 1,313 houses valued at $4,288,000 were built in Central America with AIFLD
technical assistance; 128 units in Costa Rica ($320,000) and 1,185 units in Honduras
( $3, 968,000).
Smaller social projects, such as school repairs, support of union-operated
medical facilities, and construction of community centers, have been supported by two
funds:

the AFL-CIO financed Impact Project Fund for projects costing less than

$5,000 and the AID-funded Regional Revolving Loan Fund (RRLF) for projects valued
up to $50,000. Impact Projects can be either grants or interest-free loans, depending
on type of the project. The RRLF provides loans (not grants) that carry a minimum
interest charge of two percent. The highest interest charged to date is six percent.
For Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, there have been a total of 588
Impact Projects totaling $1.25 million financed from multiple AFL-CIO donations
totaling $880,000. The projects were roughly two-third grants, one-third loans.
RRLF has financed
million.

The

82 projects valued at $7.9 millionl/ through loans totaling $2.3

Projects financed by either fund

require substantial local self-help

contributions. All such grass roots projects have been designed to improve the popular
image of the trade union movement as a positive social instrument for progressive
change.

!/

Please see Attachment Ill for breakdown of RRLF Projects.
Central American projects bear an asterisk.
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Rural

Pr~grams 21
The AIFLD has developed a special Agrarian Union office within the Social

Projects Department for the purpose of working with campesino unions throughout the
hemisphere.

Thus far, support for campesino organizations has resulted in projects

involving Operating Program Grants (OPG's) from AID ($1 ,500,000) in fields such as
agricultural credit and marketing services, and large-scale organizing campaigns in the
Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras and Ecuador. Of special interest is the
crucial role being played by the AIFLD in El Salvador in support of the land reform
programs.

El Salvador Land Reform·Y

Since early 1980, in El Salvador, the AIFLD has provided key technical
assistance

to

several

campesino

organizations

which

have

spearheaded

the

development of the land reform programs. This was possible only because of more
than a decade of AIFLD training and support for these organizations, without which
there would have been no base for the reforms.

Thus far, 64-,874 applications

representing 306,534- family members have been submitted under the land-to-the-tiller
phase of the program.
larger cooperatives.

There are an additional 32,000 beneficiary families on the

Altogether, this represents nearly 500,000 people, (including

family members of beneficiaries) who have benefited from the program. Despite these
successes, the land reform program is currently less than one-half completed and is
under attack from both left and right wing forces.

~I Please see Attachment 112 for more detailed discussion of Central America's
agrarian situation.
America.

Paper entitled Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Central

~./ A more detailed review of the status of the El Salvador land reform program is to
be presented orally to the Commission.
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RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION'S QUESTIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA

The Commission, in preparation for this session, has circulated a list of 20
inter-related questions on the social, political and economic problems of the area.
Many of the questions dealt with the same problems addressed in the recent Survey of
Views of Democratic Labor Leaders in Central America, which is as an attachment to
this presentation.

Economic Development Needs and Programs
The tiunger, malnutrition, and

illiteracy of Central America are well-

documented realities. Programs of USAID can, and have, been instrumental in helping
countries of Central America to combat these serious problems, but there is still a
long way to go. To do so is in our long-term national interest because these are part
of the so-called "root problems."

The creation of employment possibilities is,

however, more important to the solution of these problems than are the short-term
palliatives of providing food.
No single approach to economic development, and consequently our aid effort,
can solve all the social problems of the area.

The solutions call for measures as

drastic as are the problems. They will require a massive and lengthy and diversified
approach to development which includes everything from infrastructure development
to baby-feeding programs.

Certainly we must support and encourage those worker

organizations such as rural cooperatives and credit facilities. Only by expanding the
economic opportunity of the masses of the people of Central America will they be able
to solve their social problems. Nothing less than the future peace of the area depends
on our support of these grass-roots organizations which together form the democratic
center and which will eventually break the stranglehold on the economy by the
oligarchy.

These very same organizations are the primary targets of the communist

revolutionary groups which would typically use them en route to power and abuse them
thereafter.
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Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of labor movements in country
development, as well as in improving the social and economic well-being of working
men and women. A primary objective of U.S. assistance programs should be to assure
that economic benefits of development are shared equitably, and this requires
development strategies which are employment-oriented and support for trade unions
through which workers are able to protect their legitimate rights. We need to enlist
free urban and rural labor movements as partners in our assistance programs.
However, we cannot hope to gain the wholehearted support of workers in the
difficult and burdensome task of national development if they are without .rights,
without freedom, without justice, without bread.

In providing assistance, a major

consideration should be the adherence of recipient governments to the conventions of
the International Labor Organization, especially those relating to freedom of
association, discrimination and forced labor.

Role of the International Monetary Fund
The role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is controversial, not only to
political leaders, but also the region's trade union leaders.

In cases of economic

emergency, organized labor in Central America, as in the United States, stands ready
to do its part to solve the problem.

However, when "belt-tightening" policies are

required by the IMF, further restrictions on wages and harsher working conditions
usually result, particularly if the interpreters or implementers of these policies are the
economic elites in Central America.

Under these circumstances, the trade union

movements, not unexpectedly, reject the notion that their members should suffer
further for conditions created by the oligarchy. Capital flight provides one example:
it is not the workers of El Salvador who have taken their money to the safe haven of
Miami.
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Soviet Influeoce in Central America
Central America, in our opinion, should be considered an area of vital interest
to the United States. Therefore, we should not give away any policy option, including
direct military action, even though such drastic measures should be used only as a last
resort- one that, we would hope, never has to be exercised. We believe that the heavy
hand of the Soviet Union is significant, through their surrogate stateS of Cuba and
Nicaragua, in the insurgencies in Guatemala and El Salvador.

We believe that their

goal is to ultimately create more "Cubas" close to the United States.

The Soviet

Union certainly stands to benefit if our attentions are drawn away from Europe to the
problems of our own security occasioned by hostile countries affording the possibility
of threatening military bases in Central America.
There are those who contend that a strategy for containing Soviet exploitation
is to eliminate its breeding ground, namely political, social, and economic oppression.
We, however, contend that poverty, social injustice, and closed political systcns are
realities which must be dealt with in any case, and we should hope, primarily for
reasons of human rights rather than only as a "strategy" for containing Soviet
influence.

In any case, whether the roots of the problem lie in social injustice or

Soviet interference is an idle argument.

If economic development programs. to deal

with poverty and social injustice are to succeed, we must concurrently with our
economic

assistance

efforts

also

be

prepared

to

cooperate with democratic

governments regarding the threat they face from guerrilla movements influenced and
supported by Moscow. The post-World War II period clearly indicates that the Soviet
Union will use its influence to prevent the correcting of social injustice by reforms,
elections and economic assistance, since these solutions would stand in the way of its
objective of one-party communist rule.
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Economic Interests and National Security
Our vital interest in Central America, therefore, has a great deal more to do
with our national security than it does with economic interests.

Central America

produces little or nothing that we absolutely need economically.

But we do need

neighboring states that share and benefit from our democratic principles and beliefs.
The development of democracy and open societies in Central America are our best
security defense. Without participatory democracy, responsive to the needs of their
citizens, the countries of Central America constitute a potential danger to us.

U.S.. Role in Developing Free Non-Governmental Institutions
By strengthening free trade unions, the AFL-CIO/AIFLD has long been involved
in the development of "free and democratic non-governmental institutions". There is
no reason that more social and political organizations in the United States could not
play a similar role in the support of counterpart organizations in Central America. We
would encourage such participation and believe that the U.S. government should
support their activities as it does ours. Our programs are a matter of public record
and we offer to share our experience of the problems of "institution building" with any
other private organization which chooses to provide assistance in Central America.
We applaud the concept of the Democracy Foundation which we view as an important
ingredient in the solution of the political problems of Central America.

Role of Other Groups and Organizations to Achieve Peace
The U.S. government should use any and all available channels to promote peace
currently in the region.

The Contadora Group and the Organization of American

States come immediately to mind, and the mediation efforts of individual democratic
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countries such as Costa Rica are useful.

In the long-run, however, the political

solutions required must be found through free and honest elections.

International

organizations such as the OAS might usefully oversee electoral processes in an effort
to guarantee their honesty to the satisfaction of the citizens of the Central American
countries.

Military Aid to El Salvador
Specific reference must be made regarding El Salvador and the U.S. provision of
military aid. The AFL-CIO position is that such aid should be suspended until there is
progress in the case of the murders, directed by Army officers, of Michael Hammer
and Mark Pearlman, former AIFLD employees, and of Rodolfo Viera, a Salvadoran
trade union lea.der,

and until the Salvadoran judicial system is reformed and

restructured so that it protects the rights of all Salvadoran citizens.

This policy

position was not hastily arrived at and, in a very direct way, is illustrative of the
dilemmas faced by policy makers in the U.S. government on a variety of issues. The
AFL-CIO obviously would not like to see a guerrilla victory nor would the democratic
trade union movement of El Salvador.

However, neither we nor our Salvadoran

brothers (more than 30,000 of whom have been killed in the last three years) can
accept the corruptness of the judicial system and the Army which considers itself
above the law. We believe that, in this case, military aid should be used (or not used)
to assure that absolutely necessary changes in both the judiciary and the military
forces take place.

A democracy cannot function under these conditions of corruption

and violations of human rights.

The restriction of military aid would force

fundamental changes which, in turn, would foster a more just, humane, and democratic
system.
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~::~ossibility

of Building a U.S. Public Consensus

We cannot ask the American public to understand and accept a policy of support
for the status quo in El Salvador and elsewhere on the assumption that the only other
alternative is a Marxist-leninist guerrilla victory. Only by taking firm stands against
the oligarchy and their traditional military allies; by thus standing up for the poor and
oppressed in Central America, can we hope to build a U.S. public consensus which
supports U.S. policy. We must choose whom we will support in each country of the
area, and if it is the wealthy and corrupt elite, the American people won't buy it! We
cannot make the mistake of identifying the status quo with stability.

Importance of Supporting the Democratic Cmtu
The AFL-CIO/ AIFLD is convinced that the free trade union movements of
Central America represent one of the most cohesive force for democracy in the area.
They represent the voice of the working people. Unless this voice is heard, economic
development alone will not staunch the advance of radical authoritarian solutions, or
the totalitarian solutions of the Marxist-Leninist left, to the social problems created
by the current political structure.

To change the structure without resorting to

revolutionary violence requires that the d ernocratic center, including trade unions, be
effectively supported and encouraged so as to significantly change the society within
each country. To do less is to leave the field open to the political extremists.

The

AFL-CIO/ AIFLD believes that support of a pluralistic center and the development of
open societies is both our moral right and duty and in our long-term security interest.
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OPINIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN TRADE UNION LEADERS

The AFL-CIO/ AIFLD has intimate and sympathetic knowledge of the trade
union and political life of Central America. Daily contact allows us the privilege of
understanding how Central American workers and campesinos view the political,
social, and economic issues which confront them, and we are pleased to be able to
reflect their opinions to this distinguished Commission.

In fact, during the week of

August 22, 1983, a team from the AIFLD conducted a survey of leadership opinion to
insure the accuracy of our comments.Y The current perceptions of trade union and
campesino organizations· of their own political, social and economic structures are
revealing.

PANAMA

In Panama, the leaders of the democratic trade union movements, the
Confederation of Workers of the Republic of Panama, indicated a basic faith in the
social systems of that country and are prepared to participate actively in the
forthcoming

presidential

and

congressional

elections

by

supporting candidates

perceived to be friends to labor's goals. The union leaders also view the military as a
positive force in the Panamanian society, a force which has greatly improved the
social, economic and political opportunities of the workers and campesinos by
implementing reforms and creating a climate for the development of trade unions and
other popular sectors.

The CTRP will actively participate in this year's next

presidential campaign seeking representation in elected bodies and in the autonomous
administrative institutions. They believe that while reform and modernization of the
social systems are necessary, they can be achieved by working within the structures.

'!f

Attachment 113 is the result of the leadership survey. Questions and responses are
broken down by country.
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Chief economic factors affecting workers in Panama are unemployment, lack of
competitive manufacturing capabilities, and low agricultural production.

The CTR P

welcomes foreign investment and international aid programs, but under the conditions
that transnationals respect the right of the workers to form unions and bargain
collectively and that development projects reach the popular social groups and that
they be planned and executed in conjunction with representatives of those sectors.
In conclusion, the CTRP feels that the last years of Torrijos' government have
strengthened the labor movement and contributed an opportunity for the majority of
the workers and campesinos to begin to play a more significant role in the
development of

th~ir

own society.

COSTA RICA

The leaders of the democratic labor movement in Costa Rica while also
expressing trust in the basic state social services and political structures of the
country were less optimistic about future political participation.

The experience of

various democratic elections, which has resulted in little opening for trade unionists in
the political parties, make Costa Rican leaders more cautious despite the fact that in
the last election one "labor deputy" was elected and the president of the country is an
ex-labor leader.
As in Panama, Costa Rican leaders view income distribution as unfair and state
service systems antiquated, but believe the problems can be remedied peacefully by
working within the system.

They do not believe that corruption is generalized, but

attribute waste to inefficiency.
Unemployment is seen as the most serious problem coupled with the lack of
agricultural credit which hampers production.
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The only major criticism of international investment is that local managers
with traditional concepts of trade unions make the organizing of workers of
international firms difficult.
Past aid programs were generally said to have benefited Costa Rica, but the
lack of participation in the planning was seen as retarding the impact of these projects
in the social sectors.
Costa Rican labor leaders would like aid programs channeled more through
popular organizations in order to stimulate the growth of worker-owned industries and
cooperatives.

HONDURAS

The leaders of the Confederation of Workers of Honduras are not optimistic
over labor participation in the electoral process, despite having just returned to a
constitutional government via democratic elections.

They feel that they have

traditionally been locked out of the decision making processes which are monopolized
by an alliance of oligarchy and corrupt military commanders which has always
dominated the Honduran political structure.

While acknowledging some social gains

made by organized labor over the past 30 years through pressure on the government or
through collective bargaining process, they maintain that the workers and campesinos
are largely on the outside of the system which has to be radically altered in order to
let the majority participate.
Economic problems most affecting the workers are unemployment and a rising
cost of living.

A lack of foreign reserves, which restricts the importation of raw

materials for manufacture, is forcing small factories to close. A lack of agricultural
credit and a concentration of land in large commercial estates which are estimated
40% unproductive is forcing rural workers to abandon their farms and join their
unemployed urban brothers on the streets of Tegucigalpa.
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The CTH sees foreign investment as necessary for development;

however,

because of bitter past experiences with U.S. fruit companies, is fervently convinced
that all transnationals should subscribe to a "code of conduct" which would require
strict adherence to labor laws and inhibit corrupting influence by these companies on
Honduran government officials.
As well CTH leaders feel that an effective land reform based primarily on
expropriation on non-productive private land is a fundamental part of developing and
democratizing the Honduran society and economy. The current land reform, according
to a leader of ANACH (largest campesino organization in Honduras) is effectively
breaking up national campesino organizations by forcing beneficiary coops to obtain
individual legal status which results in their separation from the national parent
bodies.
They also maintain that any future international aid programs, if they are to
directly improve the human rights and economic status of the majority of Honduran
citizens, should concentrate on rural areas which currently contain 78% of the
country's population.

Aid programs should promote basic changes in all government

structures and should be planned in consultation with the popular sectors. Honduran
labor leaders feel that international pressure can be particularly effective in
influencing change.

EL SALVADOR

Despite the ongoing guerrilla war and the gross violations of human and trade
union rights in El Salvador, trade union leaders, both rural and urban, are enthusiastic
over upcoming elections and their role in them. They quickly say that their judicial
system is almost inoperative, is often used to obstruct rather than dispense justice,
that the military has always been in blatant collusion with the power elite, stopping at
no

measure, no

matter how grotesque, to

intimidate worker and campesino
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organizations.

They maintain that structures must be radically altered before the

majority of the population has any direct participation in the development of a truly
democratic society.
Nonetheless,

possibly

because of past

recent successes at occasionally

influencing policy makers and politicians or possibly because of the success of the 1979
reforms, the trade union and campesino leaders are actively planning to participate in
the next year's elections which obviously indicate that they feel the process will be
relatively honest and that their participation will be significant.
Economic factors affecting the workers are listed as unemployment caused by
economic sabotage and world recession. Reviving the economy and ending the war are
given as obvious solutions.

Foreign investment is rated as necessary, but again

conditioned on respect for trade unions.
example of transnational abuse.

The Acajutla Free Port is given as an

Military security forces have consistently inhibited

organization at Acajutla. The San Bartolome Free Port was the scene of bitter labor
strife in 1977 and 1978.

Capital flight is listed as another factor depressing the

economy as are deliberate guerrilla destruction of economic targets.
Land is considered as still too concentrated in the hands of a few, and true
reform will not be accomplished until Phase 2 is complete.
As in Honduras, the Salvadoran leaders consider that radical changes must
occur in the entire structure of the government and the military. They believe that
such changes can be accomplished peacefully, particularly if aid programs are
conditioned "up front" on guaranteeing trade union and human rights and are designed
to directly benefit the workers and campesinos.
government alone to plan and execute.

Programs must not be left to the

Some leaders suggested a tripartite

(government, labor and business) commission to oversee all projects. Others distrusted
private sector participation as simply fortifying the government-oligarchy alliance
against the workers.
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GUATEMALA
The leadership of the Trade Union Confederation of Unity of Guatemala (CUSG)
were the least positive over the possibility of change or political participation. They
viewed the Rios Montt government, which stopped right wing violence in the cities and
briefly allowed relative trade union freedom, as a positive change.

They are very

uncertain about the policies of the new government. They expressed little enthusiasm
for becoming involved in elections, if they are held. The rural leaders said that their
membership doesn't believe any candidates any more, and points to the abstentionism
in the last elections as an example of apathy caused by repeated disillusionment.
Labor leaders a(e convinced that traditional political parties remain closed to
the labor movement and offer no real alternative to the electorate.
Uniformly aU condemned the courts as being non-functional or as instruments
of repression.

Official corruption is viewed as being pervasive throughout the

government system and any government project as simply another scheme by those in
power to further enrich themselves.
According to Guatemalan urban and campesino leaders, the military officer
corps is trained to view them as communists or potential guerrillas.

The military is

seen as an institution designed to protect the privileges of the few while ready to
ruthlessly stamp out any threat to the traditional social order.
The main economic factors affecting the workers are unemployment and lack of
purchasing power. Agricultural credits are lacking or inefficiently provided. There is
a lack of infrastructure to facilitate marketing. CUSG leaders maintain that 70% of
Guatemalans are living outside of the economy.

113.

Controlled foreign investment is needed, but past transnational corruptive
practices must be eliminated.
The leaders feel that theirs is a closed society and few or no state education or
health facilities are available to the mass of workers.

The perception of past aid

programs is that they have only enriched the ruling elite.
Regarding land tenancy, campesino leaders believe too few have too much, and
that 25-50% of fertile lanci in private hands isn't producing, and recommended that the
large estates be expropriated.

INT A, the government land reform agency, typically

takes six or seven years to process a claim.
Guatemalan labor leaders say that the majority of international aid programs
must go directly to popular organizations, and that urban and rural labor movements
are the only organizations in Guatemala capable of combating abuses.

NICARAGUA

Interviews with the leadership of the Trade Union Unity Confederation (CUS) in
Nicaragua were not possible since the Sandinista government refuses to allow visas to
representatives of the AIFLD or the AFL-CIO.

However, a good idea of how these

trade union leaders perceive the current structure can be understood by reviewing
their latest protest to Commander Bayardo Arce Castano, Coordinator of the Political
Committee of the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) in 1982.
The CUS letter requests:

(1) that CUS organizers not be threatened or

imprisoned by the police or army; (2) that workers not be laid off simply because they
belong to the CUS; (3) that workers be permitted to negotiate collectively and not
have to accept contracts dictated by the FSLN Ministry of Labor; (4-) that the CUS be
allowed to receive support from international labor organizations;

(5) that CUS

organizers be allowed to travel freely within the country, and (6) that the CUS be
permitted to exercise its right to act as a free labor organization without being
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labeled by the FSLN-controlled press as "counter revolutionary," "destabilizing" and
"conspiratory."
Since this letter was written, CUS officers and those of the other independent
workers' confederation, CTN, continue to be the victims of official harassment,
beatings and jailings.

In 1983, seven port workers from Corfnto were jailed for

attempting to lead their union out of the official Sandinista workers' central. Fortyseven CTN union leaders are currently under arrest.
CUS leaders would most likely view their current social systems as being
unfunctional, repressive .and in need of radical change, an opinion shared by other
trade unionists in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

BELIZE

Traditionally, Belize, because of its language and cultural differences and
because of its lack of independent status, has been isolated from Central America.
Nevertheless, Belize is a physical part of the Central American isthmus, and its long
range economic interest will be related more and more to its geographic neighbors.
The same political and social upheavals confronting the rest of Central America could
also one day affect Belize.
The workers of Belize are organized in various confederations, of which the
Trades Union Congress of Belize is the most important.

The TUC is the voice of

democratic worker concern for the developmfflt of a just and stable society.
Any international aid plan for the economic and social development of Central
America should include Belize.
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CONCLUSIONS
Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy

Economic development and democratic political stability are related, but not
necessarily interdependent goals that must drive U.S. foreign policy in Central
America. Economic growth, which averaged a very respectable 5 percent per annum
for a recent 20-year period did not result in political stability.

Nor is political

stability a guarantee of economic progress.
The formation of U.S. foreign policy must be based on the changing realities in
the region and exhibit the necessary flexibility to adj.ust for future changes in a way
that reflects our national interests. The key, therefore, is to identify what our national
interest is in Central America. There are forces in the United States which may argue
that the "national" interest is to create conditions conducive to free enterprise or to
guarantee the security of our borders and/or the sea lanes from attack by a foreign
power.

The AFL-CIO does not disagree that these are elements of our interest in

Central America, but would argue that it is more important in our long term interest
to have prosperous democratic societies as our neighbors in this hemisphere and
especially, because of the geographic proximity of the area, in Central America. This
Commission, it seems to us, must listen attentively to all views that portend to define
our national interest (which must consequently be bi-Qartisan if the interest is indee£
national) and present a well-defined foreign policy to the Administration, the
Congress, and to the American people. Without the support of the American people, a
foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, is doomed to failure.
It is tempting, but erroneous, to claim that we have no foreign policy toward
the region or that the approaches have been absolutely partisan.

Changing

circumstances have elicited different responses from this Administration and its
predecessor in meeting the challenges of Central America, but threads of a policy
have remained constant. Generally, we as a nation have supported the development of
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democracy and democratic institutions, an adherence to human rights, and an
elimination of social injustice to the extent that we have the power to effect change.
Often, our actions have not measured up to the principles of our policy.

Rhetoric,

changes in emphasis, and rapidly changing situations account, in large measure, for the
perception that we have no cohesive policy in Central America.

Having said this,

however, the United States must strive to put in place better aid delivery systems and
foresighted diplomatic initiatives which will allow us to obtain our overall foreign
policy objectives.

Qual R egiooal and Bi-lateral Policy Needed
We must understand more profoundly the exact nature of the problems of
Central America.

They vary from one country to another to such an extent that

primary emphasis should be placed on a bi-lateral aid and diplomatic approaches.
Since, however, some serious problems are regional, rather than national in nature, a
related effort should be maintained on a regional level. Examples of regionalization
are the current activities of a roving Ambassador, and the revitalization of· the
Central American Common Market.

This dual approach of bi-lateralism and

regionalization, on both aid and diplomatic levels, will serve to give maximum
flexibility to our foreign policy.

The Need to Change Social and Political Structures
Even given the fact that many differences exist
America, some generalizations are in order.

between the countries of Central

Rigid social structures, ruling elites

unwilling to share political power with the masses of the population, and the military
establishments of the region have combined to block the democratic aspirations of
Central Americans.

U.S. foreign policy should be designed to change this situation.

Indeed, if one word is used to describe what our policy in Central America should be,
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that word is "change." Our policy, as previously stated, is all-too-often thought of as
defending the status-quo and thus opposed to the interests of millions of Central
Americans striving for their share of economic opportunity and political power.
The effectiveness of our efforts to require change depends, in large measure, on
the amount of aid resources which we are willing to put into Central America, and
agreement with the host government on the use of these resources. We believe that,
for example, for the cost of one nuclear aircraft carrier, during the next few years,
significant economic, social. and political developm ~-r c:1.n take place in the region ..
The· current government-to-government approach should be conditioned significantly
Flnd a major role should be given to direct support for indigenous popular democratic
organizations. The "trickle-down" theory of ·improving the quality of life (much less of
effecting necessary and desirable political change) simply has not worked.
It should be noted that the required political, economic and social changes
imply a long term commitment from the United States. What is being suggested here
is nothing short of a peaceful long-term democratic revolution - the changing of
political systems and overcoming social injustice that have plagued the masses of
Central America for centuries.
overnight.

It cannot, and should not be expected to, occur

But the time has come to take the first aggressive policy steps in that

direction and, in so doing, to change a common ill-informed perception of the United
States as a defender of the status guo.

We must openly declare our dedication to

democracy and social justice in the Americas.

The current governing elites are not

going to easily give up their power, wealth, and prestige. Our point is that U.S. policy
should actively support those democratic forces within each Central American society
who are striving for a voice in their own political future.
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Marxist-Leninist Influence and Military Governments
The AFL-CIO is profoundly aware of the dangers from Marxist-Leninist led
insurgencies in the area.

We are also aware that these insurgencies are aided and

abetted by forces from outside the region and, indeed, from outside the hemisphere.
We support the provision of a military "shield" against the potential takeover of
countrie..s by these totalitarian fore es.

But we do not endorse, carte blanche, the

continuation of military regimes who, consistently disregarding the rights of their own
citizens, use the so-called "national security" argument to maintain themselves in
power.

Rather, we see such regimes as a contributing factor to the violent

insurrections in the area. Military dictatorships must not be made to feel that they
are comfortable allies of the United States. The provision of a military shield does not
preclude the Army being subordinate to a democratically elected civilian government.
Every U.S. action and policy statement should be designed to encourage civilian
control and the Armies' return to the barracks.

Changes in Structure of Aid Mechanisms Required
The AFL-CIO has noted over the years the relative ineffectiveness of our aid
programs, i.e., trickle-down development, in changing the well being of the average
citizen of Central America.

We therefore suggest that the structure for the

transmittal of resources be changed in a way which will broaden the basis for
determining how the aid can be most effective.

While the details of this approach

remain to be developed, and while we feel that existing development agencies such as
USAID, IDB, and other Central American regional organizations are adequate to plan
and program this additional social development package, we would also propose that
this commission recommend the creation of a Watchdog Committee as a regulatory
body that would oversee all of the planning and programming of social and economic
development projects.

(We applaud the efforts of the IDB meeting scheduled in
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Brussels next week, but we are not convinced that these traditional approaches to
economic development will have any significant impact on the popular sectors). The
committee would be composed, much as is this National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America, of leading representatives of government, religious, labor, business,
and academia.

Further, to guarantee that the popular sectors of Central America

have an adequate and influential voice in their own development programs, we would
also propose that counterpart watchdog commissions be formed in each of the
recipient countries, to agree on and approve the areas where aid programs can be most
beneficially utilized for the welfare of their entire societies.
The U.S., and other donor countries must also have a strong voice, obviously, in
the aid granting process.

The volume of bi-lateral aid, or the curtailment of aid,

should be conditioned on the degree of freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of the host
country.

Priorities should be given to democratic countries.

Violations of

internationally accepted standards of human rights, of freedoms of expression, of the
freedom of the media, of the right of assembly and of trade union rights would incur
aid restrictions or curtailment.

We must rem ember that unqualified aid to non-

democratic countries simply reinforces their illicit use of power.

Priority R ecommendatioos
We would propose in this regard a U.S. bilateral assistance program to the
countries of Central America in the range of $7.5 billion over a five year period. Of
course, the effectiveness of an aid program of this magnitude depends greatly on the
structure through which the aid is dispensed. This fund would be used for grants and
concessionary loans at 2% over forty years to improve educational and judicial
systems, urban and rural infrastructure, construction of low cost housing, apprentice
and vocat.ional training, agrarian reform and agricultural production, and where
appropriate, private sector development.

These essentially economic programs must
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serve to strengthen popular institutions s'uch as civic organizations, cooperatives,
credit unions, and trade unions, which are seeking to obtain social change.
We would propose that the local currency repayments of the loans generated by
this fund be deposited into an account to be known as the U.S./Central American
Social Economic Development Revolving Fund which, by continuing to finance future
programs, would serve as a demonstration of our· long term interest in the development
of Central America.
The AFL-ClO continues to feel that greater attention should be paid to the role
of labor movements in Central America in their countries' development. ·They have
long been in the front lines of the struggle for the types of economic, social, and
political changes that should be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy.

They have

opposed dictatorships of both the right and left. They have organized for social and
economic change in the rural areas and negotiated with business and government in the
interests of their urban members. Most importantly, perhaps, they are the leaders in
the fight for political participation and social justice in their countries.
especially deserving of our support.

They are
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LOCAl
CONTRIB

TOTAl
COSTS
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TO
nus
DATE
PERIOD

AMOUNT
DISBURSED

AMOUNT
Of lOAN

DESCRIPT

£!!!X

DATE
APPRVD

Land Urban

Ecu

06/2)/69

n, )69.08.• S

0.00

Supmkt Cons

Hond

10/18/68

72,500.00

22,)00.00

)0,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

0.00

16,96'i.05"
17 • 758. 'j3.

0.00
0.00

50,000.00
7,687.77.

0.00
0.00

$

18,200.00

$

2,200.00

$

16,000.00

$

16,000.00

$

AMOUNT
IN
AHREARS

$

0.00

OUTSTANDING
BALANCE

LAST
PYMT.
DATE

0.00
0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

$

N/A

5

Comm

Braz

01/1 5/69

110,000.00

23,363.03

Social Assist

Arg

Olt/16/69

n,ooo.oo

86,636.97
5,000.00

23,163.03

7

30,000.00

30,000.00

10

Prod Coop

Peru

03/03/70

300,000.00

250,000.00

)0,000.00

50,000.00

II

Credit Union

Col

12/29/69

38,000.00

28,500.00

9,500.00

9, 500.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

13

Housing Proj

Hond

01/21/70

ltlt,l66.00

4,166.00

40,000.00

40,000.00

40,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

Cer~ter

D

Credit facil

D.R.

01/16/70

6'i,OOO.OO

D,OOO.OO

50,000.00

50,000.00

28,592.00"

16

Print Equip

1\rg

03/ll/70

16,)71.00

1,656.00

14,9D.OO

14·, 9U.OO

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

17

Gym Cons

Braz

06/29/70

58,000.00

17,209.00

ti0,791.00

40,791.00

4,550.0)"
30,167 .02.

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

Ill

Credit Coop

Arg

04/28/70

118,429.00

92,179.00

26,2'j0.00

26,250.00

7,251.63.

19

Tech School

Arg

05/22/70

18,429.00

8,429.00

10,000.00

10,000.00

4 ,688. 39.

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

20

Constr loan

1\rg

05/11/70

46,750.00

9,250.00

17,500.00

37' 500.00

I ,671. 21 •

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

21

Mut Aid Fnd

24

Social Center Guat

H

Sp Auto Parts Ecu

Arg

06/09/70

84,000.00

46,812.)0

02/19/71
09/06/70

~9,663.00

29,063.00

37' 187. 'j0
10,600.00

37' 187.50
10,600.00

17.205.06.
10,600.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

166,000.00

116,000.00

)0,000.00

)0,000.00

111,002.82

la6. 57
0.00

8, 997.18

8,997.18

0.00

0.00

276.63

2,606.95

2,606.9)

.·

9, 519.48"

N/A

O'J/04/<jl

27

Social

03/23/71

11,000.00

1,000.00

12,000.00

12,000.00

28

Comm Center Antig

06/25/71

90,000.00

75,000.00

D,OOO.OO

15,000.00

12.393.0-5

29

Cooperative

09/29/71

100,000.00

50,000.00

)0,000.00

50,000.00

24, 580.49"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

30

Cornm

50,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

31

Photo Equip

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

~~3.20

$ !! ,§()~'! ~

$ ! 1,604.13

Cer~ter

SUBTOTALS

Cer~ter

Bol
Col
liond

09/29/72

58,000.00

8,000.00

)0,000.00

50,000.00

Braz

09/16/72

~(),()()0,00

40,047.44

9,9g.)6

9,952. 5~

$!,541,708.()()

$

90~,§~~,9!

i- 61~,()59. 09 $

6H,()~~,()~

6,809.48"

i_ ~~~,_Q!_!,!!

$

N/A

06/17/83

>

!

3 ....

!!r+·~
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TOTAl
COSTS

AMOUNT
IN
ARREARS

OUTSTANDING
BALANCE

lAST
PYMT.
DATE

£!!rr

DATE
APPRVD

*32

Credit Union

Col

06/01/72

30' 182. 71 * $

0.00

H

Supermarket

Urug

06/2 3/72

80,000.00

30,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

20,583. 59"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

34

Dental Clinic Braz

06/12/72

41 , 5 58.24

35,810.66

5,747.58

5,747.58

4,582.44"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

$

50,000.00

lOCAl
CONTRIB

REPAYMENTS
TO
THIS
DATE
PERIOD

llRlf
NO. DESCRIPT

$

9,500.00

AMOUNT
OF LOAN

$

40,500.00

AMOUNT
DISBURSED

$

40,500.00

$

$

0.00

$

0.00

N/A

35

land Purchase Bol

06/28/73

10,000.00

2,000.00

8,000.00

8,000.00

7 ,885.00*

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

36

Hasp Bldg

Braz

03/28/74

148,090.41

140,415.82

7,674.59

7 ,674. 59

5,287.63"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

37

labour Col

Barb

05/18/73

460,000.00

410,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

38

Vacation Ctr

Braz

06/24/74

184,189.20

169,580.00

14,609.20

14,609.20

11,150.50"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

39

Hocar Bldg

Col

02/04/74

184,027.00

134,027.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

36,632.96"

0.00

0.00

0.00

40

Island Coop

Berm

03/22/74

46,328.00

26,828.00

19,500.00

19,500.00

9,017.99

3,000.00

10,482.01

10,482.01

>f42

Credit Coop

Hand

10/09/74

1,050,000.00

1,000,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

43

HomeCnstr

Barb

03/10/75

22,500.00

7,500.00

15,000.00

15,000.00

15,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

45

Housing Proj

Bol

08/13/7')

197,692.00

147,692.00

:;o,ooo.oo

50,000.00

45,783.75"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

46

Tel Coop

Braz

02/13/76

22,665.89

2,697.84

19,968.05

19,968.05

13,001.95"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

47

flee & Plumb Braz

02/13/76

37,044.73

29,057.51

7,987.22

7,987.22

5,280.95*

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

41!

Hotel Wkrs

Braz

09/08/76

25,573.52

15,043.25

10,530.27

I 0, 530.27

7 ,834.77"

0.00

0.00

0.00

49

Educ Center

Col

11/01/76

100,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

13,662.67

0.00

16,331.74

36,337.33

*50

Constr Mat

Guat

03/10/76

30,000.00

10,000.00

20,000.00

20,000.00

18,000.00"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

*H

Constr Mat

Guat

03/10/76

20,000.00

0.00

20,000.00

20,000.00

17 ,no.oo•

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

*52

Constr Mat

Guat

03/10/76

20,000.00

0.00

20,000.00

20,000.00

12,600.00*

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

*53

Disaster Rei

Guat

04/15/76

8,000.00

0.00

8,000.00

8,000.00

8,000.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

*55

Seed Coop

El Sal

06/21/76

155,990.00

105,990.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

10,000.00

0.00

40,000.00

40,000.00

$4,435,366.99

$3,234,790.99

$1,200,576.00

$1,200,576.00

SUBTOTAlS

N/A

05/10/83
N/A

N/A

08/13/80

N/A

11/28/77

$ 837,268.02 ,$ 3;463.20 $ 78,417.88 $ 98,423.47

f-1

N
N

R~l_F
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NO. DESCRIPT

CTRY

56

Credit Coop

58

Sugr Mill Wkrs Ecu

D.R.

DATE
APPRVD

TOTAl
COSTS

09/08/76

$ 116,000.00

02/14/77

12,513.26
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lOCAL
CONTRIB

s

96,000.00
965.00

AMOUNT
OF lOAN

$

20,000.00
11,548.26

R EPA YMElNTS
TO
THIS
DATE
PERIOD

AMOUNT
DISBURSED

$

20,000.00

$

$

20,000.00

0.00

11,548.26

8,799.82"

316.43

AMOUNT
IN
ARREARS

$

0.00
0.00

OUTSTANDING
BALANCE

$

LAST
PYMT.
OATE

0.00

N/A

0.00

04/19/83

59

Credit Coop

Trin

I 2/01/76

65,981.15

41,828.26

24' 152.89

24,152.89

24,002. 38"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

60

Bus Coop

D.R.

02/01/77

440,087.00

392. 087.0.0

48,000.00

48,000.00

14,441. 52"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

61

Housing Proj

Col

03/21/77

28,121.47

0.00

28,121.47

28,121.47

24,204. 97'~

62

Sm Proj (new) Braz

06/23/77

39,131.14

0.00

39,131.14

39,131.14

I 5,139.82

62B

Sm Proj (oid)

Braz

06/15/77

41,928.51

0.00

41,928.51

41,928.51

63

Rural Wkrs

Braz

05/26/77

27' 568. '52

14,000.00

13,568.52

64

Credit Coop

Col

09/07/77

50,402.00

42,182.00

65

Educ Center

Col

09/07/77

26,022.4!

66

Credit Coop

Ecu

01/04/78

22,780.00

67

0.00

0.00

0.00

106.71

0.00

23,991.32

28,992.39"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

13,568.52

8, I 57.56 •

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

8,220.00

8,220.00

7,605.68"

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

7,693.00

18,329.41

18,329.41

13,259.38.

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

2,780.00

20,000.00

20,000.00

15,934.13

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

Health Center Braz

04/17/78

7,341.40

I ,713.94

5,627.46

5,627.46

Cr IJn fed

Pan

06/14/78

250,000.00

200,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

69

Market Coop

O.R.

08/02/78

69,200.00

19,200.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

71

School Conslr Col

11/21/78

129,000.00

82,287.79

46,712.21

46,712.21

i168

72
lf7}

N/A
05/13/83

0.00

0.00

0.00

I ,718.76

0.00

38,155.14

06/01/83

11,223.88

0.00

24,333.00

38,776.12

03/10/82

28,158.07

1,087.76

18,554.14

18' 554. 14

05/03/83

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

3,703.85

0.00

13,164.99

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

2,912.46"
11,844.86

Med Equip

Braz

01/03/79

26,891. H

21,116.75

5,774.78

5,774.78

2,589.79*

Print Press

C.R.

01/25/79

23,000.00

17,004.68

5' 99 5. 32

5,995.32

1,347.36*

45,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

36,835.01
27 ,830.79*

N/A

74

Seed Capital

Urug

02/08/79

95,000.00

75

Mut Aid fnd

Chile

02/08/79

95,000.00

65,000.00

30,000.00

30,000.00

76

Transp Center Boi

09/29/79

39,993.70

14,993.70

25,000.00

25 '000. 00

0.00

0.00

·25,000.00

25,000.00

N/A

77

Educ Center

09/14/79

250,000.00

200,000.0()

5(),000.()()

~0,0()().()()

~2,!74.37

~' 7()2. ~!

0.00

27,825.63

06/06/83

~§,291,329.08

$4 ,498, 64 3. II

~~ .?2~,§~5~~?

~L_79~,~85~

i!.t! 62,722.26

~!l.t!06.02

~~§,30~,()2

~?83,890.82

SUBTOTALS

Barb

06/28/83

1-'
I\)

w
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NO. DESCRIPT

CTRY

TOTAL
COSTS

DATE
APPRVD

$

78

Health Center Braz

10/12/79

79

Bealth Center Chile

06/14/79

105,088.00

50,217.00

80

Health Center Col

11/19/79

81

tieaith Center Braz

09/10/79

LOCAl
CONTR!B

$

25,523.23

AMOUNT
DISBURSED

AMOUNT
OF lOAN

$

24,6'H.77

$

24,693.77

55,088.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

157,986.79

114,046.00

43,940.79

43,940.79

!31 '108.00

113,978.85

17,129.15

17' 129.15

-

$

REPAYMENTS
TO
THIS
DATE
PERIOD

AMOUNT
IN
ARREARS

OUTSTANDING
BALANCE

LAST
PYMT.
DATE

0.00

$ 18,080.91

06/27/83

8,787.29

0.00

13,600.00

41,212.71

!0/05/81

0.00

0.00

12,727.24

43,940.79

0.00

0.00

0.00

6,612.86

$

8,970.83"

223.43

$

None
N/A

Agri Dev

C.R.

08/06/80

8,712.05

l ,000.00

7,712.05

7,712.05

37.03

0.00

5,119.00

7,675.02

09/23/82

84

Credit Coop

Col

08/06/80

30,605.00

10,163.46

20,441.54

20,441.54

10,101.41

368.92

4,344.00

10,340.13

06/13/83

85

Health Center Peru

12/18/80

60,000.00

10,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

I, 292.84

553.70

0.00

48,707.16

06/06/83

*83

86

Motorcycle

D.R.

0)/02/81

5,179.00

1,000.00

4,179.00

4,179.00

4,179.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

87

Credit IJnion

Guy

03/02/81

35,000.00

6,618.73

28' 381.27

28,381.27

857.65

286.36

0.00

27,523.62

04/07/83

88

Credit Union

Ecu

06/08/81

200,000.00

170,000.00

30,000.00

30,000.00

5,091.19

767.58

0.00

24,908.8!

06/09/83

89

Health Center Braz

05/22/81

58,275.00

40,793.00

17,482.00

17,482.00

5,928.03

921.68

0.00

11,553.97

06/24/83

90

liealth Center Braz

01/06/82

20,458.44

8,155.23

12,303.21

12,303.21

1,957.49

613.73

0.00

10,345.72

06/24/83

91

Credit Union

04/01/82

70,000.00

40,000.00

30,000.00

30,000.00

2,934.00

0.00

6,168.00

27,066.00

03/28/83

Urug

N/A

92

Educ Research T rin

04/01/82

158,000.00

108,000.00

50,000.00

50,000.00

0.00

0.00

4,740.00

50,000.00

N/A

93

Credit Union

05/19/82

204,854.43

174,854.43

30,000.00

30,000.00

2,263.09

I ,031.03

0.00

27,736.91

06/21/83

94

Health Center Braz

04/01/82

44,741.00

23,141.00

21,600.00

21,600.00

I, 817.17

404.57

500.00

19,782.83

04/29/83

95

Credit Union

10/07/82

148,000.00

118,000.00

30,000.00

30,000.00

340.11

340.11

0.00

29,659.89

06/21/83

23,439.34

1,320.04

1,320.04

0.00

22' 119. 30

06/27/83

Ecu
Ecu

96

Health Center Braz

06/08/82

78,655.39

54,790.39

23,439.34

97

Arch. Bldg.

01/06/83

69,286.00

55,000.00

14,286.00

14,286.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

14,286.00

N/A

06/22/83

16,557.28

2,905.40

13,651.88

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

N/A

$7,944,052.46

$5,631,700.83

$2,3jl ,925.97

$2,298,274.09

$1,22.5,212.29

$19,937.17

$193,503.26

$718' 8 30. 58

9&

Col

llealth Center Braz

TOTALS

"Loan amount in local currency fully paid. Difference due to exchange rate variation written off.

FD: 07/13/83
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~
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Attachment 112

AGRICUL TIJRE AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Population and Economic Growth
In 1982, five of the six Spanish speaking nations in Central America had over
forty (40) percent of their labor force engaged in agriculture. Costa Rica, the one
exception, had 36 percent of its labor force in agriculture. The prevailing vocation in
Central America clearly remains rural and agrarian in character.
Second, population growth rates continue to be excessive: in 1982, excepting
Panama, all Central American countries were growing at an annual rate of 2.5 percent
or more. (Population "doubling time" for a country growing at 2.5 percent per annum is
twenty-eight (28) years.) These population growth rates are one of the central factors
explaining the severe land pressures which exist in Central America today.
Third, growth rates in the national economies of Central America from roughly
the end of World War II to the later years of the last decade were quite impressive ·averaging about 5.3 percent in GNP growth per annum. However, the incremental
wealth generated by this growth generally has not been well-distributed. Development
strategies which favored import substitution and low labor absorptive industrialization
inordinately benefited the small commercial monied classes; and within the rural
sector, government taxation, investment, monetary and fiscal policies markedly
favored the interests of cash crop, export-oriented commercial agriculture. With few
exceptions, the bulk of small primary producers involved mainly in the production of
basic grains, far-and-away the largest segment of the agricultural sector, benefited
much less from this extended period of economic growth.

The Role of Commercial Agricul.ture
With the increases in energy costs and continued low international market
prices for products such as cotton, sugar and coffee, commercial agriculture in the
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countries of Central America generally has been depressed for the past four or five
years. However, it is the centuries-old development, expansion and diversification of
this large scale commercial agriculture which is another major factor in explaining
contemporary land-man conditions in Central America, particularly the plight of the
growing legion of landless and near landless. The fact is that commercial agriculture
has gradually absorbed most of the better land over the past 150 years, displacing and
fragmenting the other agrarian production system in the countries of Central America
of small parcel, largely subsistence agriculture which. as yet has not _gone through a
sustained process of modernization. This characterization of the competing production
systems and the long struggle between them is particularly apt with respect to El
Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras.

Closed Political Systems

A third major factor defining the character of the land problems in Central
America are the more or less dosed political systems dominated by traditional elites
and their military allies, which resist and inhibit social and economic change.
Effective political outiets for campesinos to express land grievances and seek redress
have generally been conspicuous by their absence. This has been especially true of
Guatemala and E1 Salvador.

The landless and Ner landless

When excessive population growth rates, the expansion of land extensive
commercial agriculture, and political institutions unresponsive to the problems being
generated are put togethe-, a causal pattern of the present !and-man conditions in
Central America begins to emerge. These conditions concern primarily the landless tenant farmers, sharecroppers, agricultural laborers -

and near landless -

those

small farmers who own or use a plot of land too small in size or too meager in
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resources to support their households. The number of landless campesinos has
increased virtually across the board in Central America over roughly the last two
decades. In El Salvador, in 1980 before the present land reform programs took effect,
there were roughly 480,000 rural six-person households, of which 300,000 were
landless.

In Guatemala, the estimated number of economically active landless

agricultural workers in 1980 was 309,000. In Costa Rica, the bulk of the peasantry is
now also landl.ess. A rural proletariat of growing size, faced with land scarcity and
dim-to-hopeless employment prospects in other sectors, is indeed an omnipresent and
depressing reality in much of Central America today.
From the vantage point of the near-landless, the problems appear to be equally
severe. For example, 88 percent of all Guatemala's farms in 1979 were of sub-family
size (i.e. too small to provide for the needs of a family). Indeed, land use patterns
suffer from distributional inequities of major dimension. A common pattern in
Guatemala,

Costa Rica,

Honduras and pre-reform

El Salvador has been land

concentration in the hands of the few large landowners at the upper end of the size of
holdings,

and increasing fragmentation at the lower end for the mass of small

farmers. To use the Guatemalan example again - where we have reasonably current
and reliable figures -- 78 percent of all farms are under 3.5 hectares (1 hectare = 2.5
acres), while occupying but 10 percent of the land in farms. On the other end, land
concentration is e<:jUaUy dramatic with farms of 450 hectares and larger constituting
less than one (1) percent of the farms, but containing 34 percent of the lands in farms.
This pattern of land concentration in Guatemala, as well as in other Central American
countries, is further intensified by the fact that the farms which have the high quality
lands under cultivation generally are found where land concentration is the greatest.
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Land Reform Efforts in Central America
With the exception of El Salvador, the agrarian reform efforts of the noncommunist countries in Central America·* over the last thirty (30) years have been
inadequate in addressing the scope and complexity of the land issues involved. In
Honduras, until recently, in Guatemala and in Costa Rica, primary reliance has been
placed on piecemeal and expensive land colonization programs in considerable part on
marginal or undeveloped lands. These programs have been insufficient in size,
administratively troubled from the beginning and generally have fallen far short of
expectations.

Meanwhile, land invasions and squatting by the landless have become

almost a way of life,

with the land reform agencies having to spend an exorbitant

amount of time adjudicating land conflicts.
Only in El Salvador has there been a major effort to address wholesale the
structural problems of land distribution, specifically with the two new programs which
the government began in 1980: the Phase I cooperative program which expropriated all
land holdings above 500 hectares, and distributed them to newly formed cooperatives
composed mostly of the agricultural laborers already working on the large estates; and
the Phase III program, commonly called the land-to-the-tiller program, which allows
tenant farmers and share croppers to file title for the small parcels (up to seven
hectares) which they work. Owner-operated land cannot be claimed. (We shall discuss
both of these programs in more detail in our oral presentation)

*

We will discuss the Sandinista land reform program in Nicaragua in our oral
presentation. We would only note here that the program does not approach in
scope or comprehensiveness the agrarian reform programs in El Salvador. The
former essentially nationalized Somoza lands which are now being administered
collectively as State Farms. Primary emphasis has been placed on food
production, while production in the private small farm sector, which as yet has
not been collectivized, is being encouraged by government subsidized credit and
fixed prices.
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In Honduras, there is a hopeful new and ambitious program of land titling of
small producers largely on public lands. Fully 7 5 percent of all farms in Honduras are
occupied and cultivated by small farmers whose tenure is insecure. The goal of the
program is to issue an estimated 100,000 new land titles over a four-year period. Given
the apparent political will of the Suazo government to carry out this program and its
recognition of the fact that falling agricultural productivity is inextricably linked to a
land tenure system in disarray, there is reason for optimism that constructive social
changes in man-land relations are ln the offing in Honduras.

The Complenmtarity _2f Political

an~

Economic Effects

The need for agrarian reform programs fitted to the varying circumstances of
the different countries of the region is indeed manifest, as is the requirement for
cooperation and financial and technical support by the U.S. Government. Both the
programs in El Salvador and Honduras are now fully supported by the Agency for
International Development (AID), but this support must involve a

long

range

commitment beyond the initial stages of land redistribution and stabilizing tenure
rights.

For

example,

agrarian

reform

programs

must

involve not

only

land

redistribution to the actual tillers and fair compensation to the ex-landowners, but
also the long-term expansion and modernization of vital agricultural services to the
new

owner-operators,

e.g.

credit

and

production

inputs.

The

key

factor

in

comprehending the significance of these programs is the complementarity of the
political and economic effects of the reform. Agrarian reform, appropriately designed
to local conditions, can have the mutually reinforcing effects of politically stabilizing
and democratizing the countryside while increasing agricultural productivity, or more
broadly, establishing the base of agricultural modernization. The post World War II
experience with agrarian reform programs in Japan, Taiwan and South Korea certainly
bears out this conclusion.
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Last, the broad model or type of agrarian reform which best reflects Western
values and which also has proven to be the most successful in developing countries in
the post-colonial period, devolves ownership and production into a system of private,
owner-operated farms units.

in the case of food crops, usually small, family-operated

The alternative of collectivization, in numerous cases the handmaiden of

totalitarian government, certainly has been less efficient and less competitive with
other more open systems.

U.S. 5u_£port of Land Reform
The

conversion

of

landless

peasants

into

small

owner-operators

is

unquestionably a powerful incentive and a dynamic force in the evolution of
subsistence farmers into modern food producers. In Central American countries where
the development of the rural sector is lagging and most of the people are landless,
poverty-ridden, largely subsistence producers, land redistribution options should be in
the forefront of development choices.

External donors such as the U.S. should not

relegate land distribution options to the background as they are apt to do in favor of
technical approaches to what are essentially non-technical problems.
We would add that the United States has tended to embrace agrarian reform
programs only very late in a typically unstable and violent process of social change,
almost as a last resort in the face of threats inimical to U.S. interests, e.g., South
Vietnam and El Salvador. AIFLD would hope that this time perspective will change.
The United States needs to encourage and support democratic and fair redistributive
agrarian reform programs before the threshold of large scale social violence and
disruption. There is of course a prior requirement of political will by host governments
before external support and collaboration become meaningful. But the availability of
external financial and technical assistance can lessen the risks in what is usually a
difficult political

undertaking~

especially in its early stages.
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SURVEY OF VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR LEADERS
IN CENTRAL AMERICA

From August 23 to August 30, 1983, an AIFLD senior staff member surveyed the
views and perceptions of a representative sample of top-level democratic trade •1nion and
campesino organization officials in Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala and El
Salvador on major questions pertinent to the scope of inquiry of the Kissinger Commission
on Central America.

The information noted below represents a composite summary by

country of the views expressed by these labor leaders.

Question One: How does the electoral process and labor's role in that process function in
your country?
Panama

It functions reasonably well and we intend to participate in the next
elections; we think we will be able to play a meaningful role.

We

want to make sure that next year's election does not return power to
the oligarchy.
Costa Rica

The system works.
expand it.

Labor has begun to play a role and hopes to

However, this will depend on the preference of future

presidential candidates.

The recent election of a labor deputy was

due solely to the intervention of Luis Alberto Monge.
Honduras

The electoral process does not function particularly well, though
there was improvement in the 1980 elections.
participation by popular organizations.

There is little

The traditional parties are

too closed.
El Salvador

The election system does not work as it should. There is very little
organized popular participation, though the democratic trade union
movement plans to try to play a more significant role in the national
elections next year.

Guatemala

The electoral process has never functioned well or fairly -

e.g., past

electoral frauds; worker participation is limited, and campesinos have
lost faith in the process.

Absenteeism is a sign of this loss of faith.

Perhaps if the electoral system is reformed, democratic labor
organizations would decide to actively participate.
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Question Two:

Does the jll..tdicial system fairly protect civil, human and trade union

rights?
Panama

The system reasonably protects rights, but it is inefficient and needs
modernization. The system should also be more independent.

Costa Rica

The system functions equitably, but it is slow and inP.fficient.

Honduras

No -- The judicial system helps only those in power.

Courts have

blocked land reform.
El Salvador

No .... If it functions at all, it protects those in power. The new draft
constitutional reforms are no help. If they are approved, they would
make the situation worse.

As long as assassins are free, there is no

justice.
Guatemala

No - The judicial system is slow, bad, and protects the privileged; no
one has confidence in the system.

It will only change when the

government is democratic and has the will to effect reforms.
Question Three

In the view of organized labor, does the military play a proper role

within your society?
Panama

Yes -

Populist forces in the military have protected the popular

sector in recent history (Torrijos).

However, the military has too

much power now, and should be restrained in the present political
d emocra tiza tion process.
Costa Rica

The military is not a major factor.

Honduras

The military protects itself as an institution as well as protecting the
powerful. However, it has played a role in effecting some positive
changes in our society. Some of its members have taken advantage
of their position to enrich themselves and to accumulate large tracts
of land.

We are not optimistic about improvements, but organized

violent repression is seldom used.
El Salvador

The military has been a repressive instrument of the power elite,
though there are some progressive younger officers. Military officers
are in charge of civilian programs which they are not capable of
managing.
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Guatemala

The armed forces do not play a proper role.

The army has been

historically trained to protect the interests of the wealthy and to
combat the democratic trade union movement. The military is now
attempting to militarize the society by putting more military officers
in the government.

Gross human rights violations have been

perpetrated in the rural areas, and conditions will get worse with the
creation of civil defense patrols. The campesinos do not depend on
the military for protection.

Question Four: Does official corruption exist, and, if so, does it hamper the development
of a democratic and equitable economic process?
Panama

Corruption is sporadic but not generalized throughout society.

Costa Rica

There is some official corruption, but the problem is more a matter
of poor management.

Honduras

Yes -

It exists at all levels of government and the military, and it

has hurt the process of economic and political development in our
country.
El Salvador

Official corruption is general.

Examples are manipulation of prices,

bribes, military graft, and abuses of power for money and to serve
the power elite.
Guatemala

Yes -

Generalized corruption and abuse of power, both civil and

military, has a long history in Guatemala. "It will never change". It
would not necessarily hinder the democratization process, at least
not as much as elections with the traditional parties offering
traditional non-popular programs.

Question Five What are the most important economic factors that affect the workers
and campesinos for. the better or worse?
Panama

The need for economic development through investment, higher
agricultural production, and the development of external markets.
Unemployment must be eased and community enterprises stimulated.
Unemployment is at 13%, and 20% of the population lives in abject
poverty.
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Costa Rica

Economic development, better government policy, lower interest
rates and more production.

Honduras

Unemployment, the need for investment in agricultural production,
and the development of large tracts of land that are not producing.
The high cost of living is more important than the problem with
Nicaragua.
economic

The distribution of what the country produces and the
assistance

it

receives

both

favor

the

government

bureaucracy and business and commercial interests.
El Salvador

Congealed salaries, lack of purchasing power, lack of agricultural
credit, inflation, war, recession, war damages (600,000,000 colones),
and capital flight ($200 million).

Guatemala

70% of Guatemalans live on a subsistence basis outside the economy.

There is high unemployment.

There is need to reactivate the

economy, obtain more international aid, provide more infrastructure
in rural areas to facilitate marketing, and carry out basic changes in
economic policies to provide better access to international markets.

Question Six: How do you view foreign investments and transnationals as they affect the
workers and campesinos?
Panama

We need and want investment for modern production; however,
foreign investment should be under national controls and directed
toward

improving

our

country.

Free

zones

hamper

union

organization.
Costa Rica

Yes, we need investment but it should be controlled.

Workers of

transnationals are hard to organize because of reactionary local
managers. There should be a transnational code.
Honduras

Past abuses make the labor movement cautious about transnationals.
A code of conduct is needed to control their activities.

El Salvador

Transnational companies are hard to organize because they pay
salaries above local rates, and contract people only one year at a
time.

Transnationals control price of agricultural machinery and,

therefore, make exorbitant profits. They bleed the working class.
Guatemala

They are needed but should be controlled.

Labor laws should be

respected. Past history of bribes and corruption must be avoided.
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Question Seven:

Is there a class system which hampers upward mobility, educational

opportunities or health facilities? Is the situation improving ..
Panama

Workers have the opportunity to move up.
educational services.

They have health and

The quality is poor, but they are available.

Workers and workers' children are in the Universities.
works, but must be modernized.

The syster.

We need more vocational training.

For example, one-half of the welders on pipelines are foreigners
because of the lack of domestic skilled labor.
Costa Rica

The society is open, and workers have "pretty good" opportunities.
There is no class polarization, but support systems should be
improved

Honduras

Opportunities are limited.

The geographic dispersion of the rural

population limits the education and health services which are
provided by the Government. There has been little improvement, and
Honduras is still largely a closed society controlled by traditional
elites. For example, of each 200 students who finish primary school,
only 10 go on to secondary school, and only one goes to the
university.
El Salvador

"Yes.

Only the social mobility is downward."

Higher education is

only available for the poor at the state university, which is closed.
The power e1lte actively represses upward movement by discouraging
cooperatives, unions and small business competition.

Some rural

workers may have more opportunity now with the agrarian reform
programs than the urban workers.
Guatemala

Yes, there is a class system.
benefits or opportunities.

The majority have little access to

The social structure is stagnant.

Rural

services are poor. "For a campesino to try to better himself, he has
to go the city."
Question Eight: What is yow:- vie"W" of past international economic assistance programs?
Panama

Generally well thought out. Should be more diversification ... more
direct aid to social groups.

Costa Rica

Well done.

Generally worked

well.

Roads, schools, health,

particularly infrastructure in rural areas, have made contributions.
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Only criticism is in social sectors where workers and campesinos have
not participated, for example, in housing.
Honduras

Should give first priority to rural dwellers who represent 78% of the
population; therP should be worker representation in planning and
implementation of proj e::ts. Results of aid programs have been both
good and bad.

El Salvador

Good intentions, but badly administered.

"Trickle down" doesn't

work. As long as the aid programs go through the government, and do
not arrive directly to the poorer classes, they will never work
decently.
Guatemala

Aid programs only aid the "power class". They are always channeled
through the government.

Average worker knows little about them.

More should go directly to social and popular organizations. Military
and economic assistance should be conditioned on the "opening up" and
the development of our society.
Question Nine: What are the patterns of ownership of productive land? What are the
inequities built into them?

Panama

Agrarian reform is not an acute problem. There are landless peasants
but there are still public lands to be distributed.

The present

agrarian reform program is adequate, though it needs to be further
developed and its efficiency improved. Credit and extension services
are getting better.
Costa Rica

Land is too concentrated in large holdings. Major part of the land is
in private hands but its unjust distribution results in land invasions.

Honduras

Land is too concentrated in large holdings.

There are 600 large

estates, some as big as 20,000 hectares, which are not producing.
The large banana plantations of Standard and United are about 75%
productive. Present law erroneously classifies land as "producing" if
it is growing forage.

El Salvador

Land is still too concentrated in too few hands. The Phase II program
is needed (the redistribution of lands between 500 and 100 hectares).
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Guatemala

Land is tied up in too few hands.

At least 25% of the lands on the

large estates are idle.
Question Ten: Are the campesinos guaranteed the right to organize?
Panama

The right is guaranteed by law.

Costa Rica

The right is guaranteed by law.

Honduras

Yes, but the right is less than effective.

El Salvador

Yes, but in fact there are dangers of physical and economic
repression.

Guatemala

On paper the right exists, but in reality it is difficult and dangerous.
We must use the word "league" because we can't use the word
"union".

There is no campesino representation in agrarian agencies.

The campesinos are politically marginated.
Question Eleven: How can the labor movements of our two countries use the availability
of larger sums of U.S. aid as a lever to effect basic changes in social structure or to
guarantee human and trade union rights?
Panama

Form a Workers Bank, stimulate cooperatives enterprises, find
foreign

(U.S.)

markets,

modernize production,

restructure

~he

educational system, more vocational training; tripartite agreement
(business-labor-government) on aid planning and projects.

"Lack of

development more due to lack of resources than an unjust system".
Costa Rica

Not structural changes, but reforms of legislation and administration.
Projects

should

be

aimed

at

participation in planning is needed.
organizations.

improving

production.

Union

Channel aid through popular

Mixed planning commissions should be established.

Create worker-owned industries or cooperatives.

Form popular

foundations to administer programs. Less expensive mortgage money
should be made available.

Rotating funds for social projects should

be established.
Honduras

Basic. changes should be sought in the land tenancy, military, judicial
and political systems through conditioned aid programs and constant
consultation with the popular sectors. More training of agronomists,
extension agents and rural education is badly needed.

Participation
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of the popular sector is required not only to insure that the aid
programs benefit everyone, but also to avoid corruption.
El Salvador

Basic changes are required. Systems don't function for benefit of the
majority.

A.I.D. programs have to

participation.

be conditioned on

worker

Tripartite, yes, no; government and business are

natural allies and would overpower worker participation.

Workers

must be represented "like Kirkland on the Kissinger Commission."
Guatemala

A.I.D. programs should go directly to popular groups.

Strengthen

labor unions to combat abuses. Put in provisions that guarantee union
freedoms.
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OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
ISSUES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

EDWARD MARASCIULO

Historical Perspective
The level of Central American social development today, with partial
exceptions in Costa Rica and Panama, is poor.

The low quality of life

among major population groups across the isthmus has been a significant
factor contributing to the environment of political instability over the
past 30 years despite more than $12 billion in bilateral, multilateral and
private external support.
To truly comprehend the problems of social development in Central
America one must have a sense of history of the seven small colonies - the
size of ID1ode Island and Massachusetts - that received their independence
from Spain in 1821 as a Union of Central American States, very much the
same way as our thirteen colonies fought and received their independence
from England in 1776.

On the east, the Union was almost totally flanked

along the Caribbean by the British until their departure in 1903 from all
but British Honduras (now Belize).
The Union of Central American States fell apart in 1839, one part
seceding to Colombia (now Panama), another joining Mexico, and the rest
splitting into five feudal states made up largely of Indians with
relatively few European overlords.

There were many inter-state conflicts,

some civil wars, but no Emancipation Proclamation, even though some
observers consider that a form of slavery still exists in Central America.
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Conflicts following the breakup were severe - greatest in Nicaragua.
In 1851 a God-fearing American Free Boater named William Walker brought
mercenaries from the United States to quell the conflicts ensuing from
Nicaraguan independence.

He was Chief of State for almost five years, shot

before succeeding in efforts to annex other Central American countries.
Walker looms large in Nicaraguan history as the symbol of US imperialism
even though his actions had no US government sanction.

Ironically, he is

buried not more than a half mile from the camp where US military are today
training soldiers from El Salvador on Honduras' north coast.

Insurrection,

revolution, border conflicts and general public upheavel have existed in
Central America over the 160 years of independence.
Following efforts by a US Commission for Latin America in the 1950s,
promoted by Dag Hammerskjold, there has been a real attempt and some
success in steps to reunify the Central American countries.

Uneven

progress is continuing in the integration process and the Central American
governments give lip service to integration even though understandably
reluctant to turn power over to a regional authority.

Central American

watchers who can get themselves in a positive mood will in philosophical
moments declare economic, social and political integration of the countries
to be the only real hope for Central America's democratic future.
In 1950, amid widespread poverty in Central America, a small middle
class was developing in an essentially feudal-mercantilist economy
dependent on agricultural exports to the United States and Europe for
foreign exchange to purchase manufactured goods.

Since then, the economic

base of the area has broadened; rural-to-urban migration has accelerated;
capital formation, manufacturing and service industries have been launched;
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and physical and institutional infrastructure to sustain
initiated.

developm~nt

Most of this development occurred during the 1960s during the

early golden and progressive years of the Central American Common Market
when the Alliance for Progress was in full bloom.
However, deep and difficult problems remain.
are there now easy solutions.

There have not been, nor

Enormous difficulties face those involved in

trying to improve the situation - an enormous challenge to the Commission.
Population as the Major Issue
The dominating social factor of Central America today is the population explosion which has overwhelmed the capacity of public and private
entities to improve material living standards for the 60% or more who have
suddenly been thrust into a modern age.

Central America including Panama

had 8 million people in 1950, has 23 million today (admittedly very
unevenly distributed), and will reach 39 million by the year 2000.

It will

double again by 2025.
Wars have been blamed on population pressures.

For example, the 1969

border war between Honduras and El Salvador has been described as the first
of the population wars.

It highlighted the problem of 4.7 million El

Salvadoreans (580 per square mile) trying to expand into Honduras which had
only 3.8 million people (88 per square mile).
In human terms, the results of the population situation were analyzed
in a 1982 report by the Economic Commission for Latin America, "The Degree
of Satisfaction of Basic Human Needs in Central America".

The report

classified 63% of the 23 million inhabitants of the area as "poor", or 14
million people barely surviving, measured not merely in per capita income
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but also by access to health care, sound nutrition, schooling and-other
essential community services.

In contrast, over 7 million (almost the size

of the entire population of the area in 1950) had achieved higher standards
of living.

The ECLA study identified 40% of the population (9 million) as

critically poor living on the barest level of survival, and 23% (5 million)
unable to satisfy even basic human needs.

We must conclude that the

monumental development efforts of 30 years had in fact been largely negated
by the cumulative effect of population increases.
Education programs are hindered by the fact that 52% standards of the
children in the region (primarily El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras) are
classified by reliable nutritionists as malnourished.

This means that the

learning abilities of at least 50% are seriously impaired by inadequate
nourishment during their developing years.

While the Central American

Nutrition Institute (INCAP), founded by the UN and the OAS in the 1950s and
now administered by Central American experts, has an important role to play
in improving the nutrition situation, significant additional assistance
could perhaps turn this devastating situation around in 5 years or so.

We

will hear more about nutrition and INCAP later this afternoon.
Overloaded public services are not all due to population pressures,
intractable socio-economic problems, or current political turmoil.

Several

countries have been victims of natural disasters which aggravated already
difficult housing and public service problems.

Belize, Honduras, Guatemala

and Nicaragua all had hurricanes or major earthquakes during the 1970s
damaging urban infrastructure and many dwellings.

The danger of recurring

disasters in the future has both a pyschological and a real financial cost.
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The long range implications of a society much of whose

pop~lation

has

little economic opportunity, is undernourished and subject to debilitating
diseas, and cannot read and write is likely to be high susceptibility to
emotional appeals

rather than reason.

This does not bode well for

earlyachievement of a stable Central American social infrastructure.
Prospects for Social Development
Implications of the difficult social situation and prospects for the
next two decades as the population continues to double every 20 to 25 years
are deeply disquieting to demographers, development planners and political
observers.

Resources available to the Central American countries for

reducing the 63% poverty level are limited -- and experience has
demonstrated that only sustained programs over substantial periods of time,
with special attention to income and employment generation, will have any
significant impact on reducing the level of poverty.
Major Problems to be Addressed
Even with good expectations for the CBI and support by other donors,
scarcity of resources raises concern as to whether poverty and unemployment
can in fact be addressed simultaneously.

Because the scale of problems is

of manageable size (at least compared to those of some larger nations of
the Hemisphere and other continents), some improvement could likely be
achieved within the next five years on the basis of coordinated and
consistent efforts, requiring, however, new and unique approaches even to
maintain even a primitive level of services.

The recently funded Caribbean

Basin Initiative (CBI) will certainly have some impact on job creation in
the next few years.

However, at this time it does not appear that all

Central American countries can be certain to benefit from the CBI if they
fail to meet political and other qualificatons imposed by the Congress.
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A second major concern is whether the governments have the.will,
abroptive, or administrative capacities to take on the tremendous task
involved?

Indeed, this Commission must wrestle ways of establishing

priorities to respond to so many conflicting interests.
A third important concern, perhaps the most disquieting, is the need
to relate the call for major investments in social infrastructure, health,
education, nutrition, and the generation of labor intensive industries,
together with promotion of democratic processes like development of labor
unions and peasant cooperatives, to the environment of heavy military
expenditure, serious political unrest, and major capital flight accelerated
by a wary private sector.
Fourthly, concern also arises from the common perception of Central
America as a homogeneous region, whereas it is not.

Geographic variations

among the countries are very great, and some self-appointed pontificates
erroneously ascribe to the region characteristics observable only in one or
two countries.

For example, Costa Rica and Panama have far better social

indicators than do El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize.

Nicaragua

is set apart from all others.
Guatemala and El Salvador stand out as the most difficult in terms of
both political conflict and inadequate social development.
"why?"

We must ask

Costa Rica and Panama are set apart also, but with lesser problems

of social and political conflict.

Again, "Why?" Even more importantly, why

are Honduras and Belize set apart from the other two groups of countries
despite their statistical association with the poorest of the poor?
Sharp Differences Among Central American Countries
Analysis of these social and political disparities perhaps provide our
best key to political solutions and social development policies in the
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region:
Today only in El Salvador and Guatemala are there gross disparities
between the landed gentry and the landless poor.

Attempts in the last 30

years at labor union organization, agrarian reform, and rural leadership
have met with violent opposition.
Honduras and Belize on the other hand have no great disparities
between the wealthy and the poor.

Perhaps this is because they have more

land area per capita, fewer elite, and a greater tradition of democracy.
Their governments have a strong degree of will for social change and
perhaps less to lose.
debated.

Efforts to tackle agrarian reform have been openly

The labor union structure of Honduras' northern coast is by far

the most significant force of democracy in Central America.

An enlightened

and progressive private sector also contributes to north coast society.
The poorest countries in the region therefore, Honduras and Belize, appear
to be the most fertile environments for genuine social development.
Significant development investments in both countries promise quick results
which can be good examples for their neighbors to emulate.
The Nicaraguan Case
Something must be said about Nicaragua's recent steps towards social
reform and humanitarian development.

Like Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia,

Nicaragua is turning society around in a revolutionary fashion but with
only a few of the requisites of social change.

While agrarian reform is at

the core of its revolution, labor unions prohibited under Somoza have not
developed as entities free of government control under the Sandinistas.
Sandanista successes, aided by the Cubans, in literacy, education and
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health delivery systems are controversial.

Not yet tested over fime, these

social service activities are perceived as contributing to development and
the quality of life, and as evidence that the government cares.
You will hear from other witnesses about the Nicaraguan private sector
which is still functioning and also provides important social services -giving some real hope for pluralism in Nicaragua.
Important in the Nicaraguan case, whether true or not, is that there
is an upwelling of anti-Somozismo at the same time as left wing factions of
the Sandanistas are convincing many Nicaraguans that to be poor is to be
patri.otic, and that the government exists to help them.

Anti-government

criticism, even hostility, serves as a force to unite the people and create
a nationalistic fervor which does not exist elsewhere in the region.

This

is a lesson that the governments in El Salvador and Guatemala have not
learned from the Sandinistas is how to communicate with their people who do
not have the same feeling that the government is there to be helpful.
Addressing Basic Needs in Other Central American Countries
In this context, it may be worthwhile investigating whether the Cuban
and Nicaraguan literacy and health programs are worth replicating in El
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize where these problems are acute.
The greatest advantage might be the same creation of patriotism reflecting
the perception that the government cares about well-being of the citizens.
To nurture such patriotism, US and the developed world certainly can
produce a better model than the Cuban model being used by Nicaragua.
Hispanic Peace Corp Volunteers, for example, providing paramedic and
literacy training, could have an impact at least as great as the Cubans
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and in countries to which Cuba is unlikely to be invited even more.
However, a decision as to whether to assign Peace Corps Volunteers on an
adequate scale may prove difficult.
that US

Unfortunately, it sometimes appears

development planners have difficulty in thinking in sweeping

political terms, and perhaps our political people have difficulties in
recognizing development assistance priority as part of the total picture.
Many development practitioners who know Central America will agree
that programs directed to merely sustain current levels of employment and
incomes, literacy, health care, housing and other social services will
require large amounts of external support from a variety of sources over an
extended number of years.

Indeed, they blame the on-again off-again nature

of external support including US policies over the past 15 years,
reflecting fluctuations from high to low profile from one US administration
to another, for contributing to the current social malaise in the region.
Whatever is to be done must be part of a commitment over a longer period -at least five years with options beyond that.
The Diaspora
It is perhaps no great revelation that there are dramatic movements of
population, both within Central America and from Central America to the
United States and Mexico.

Even though accurate and reliable figures about

the Central American diaspora are hard to come by, newspapers report that
over 200,000 Central Americans (mainly Nicaraguans) now live in Costa Rica,
significant numbers of Guatemalans in southern Mexico, 20,000 Salvadorians
in Belize, and a half million Salvadorians in the United States.

Even more

dramatic, newly independent, English-speaking Belize, two years old this
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month, with a land area larger than El Salvador and only 145,008
inhabitants compared to El Salvador's 4.5 million, has, in just 4 years,
acquired a new refugee population of 10-15% of its current population.
These new Spanish-speaking Belizeans are made up mainly of El Salvadorians
and Guatemalans.
Resettlement and related legal and social problems in Central America
are so serious to the nations involved that the Secretary General of the
Organization of American States has ordered a demographic study of each
country affected to determine the number of foreigners visiting each.
Is Existing Assistance Adequate?
During the long 40 years of US bilateral assistance to Central
America, a great deal of sophisticated expertise has been gathered.
However, changing donor perceptions and capacities have meant that uneven,
interrupted, and even contradictory development has been undertaken.
One unfulfilled strategy has been a proper consultative arrangement
among donor insitutions.

That impasse may be finally broken by the

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which will host a special meeting to
be held in Brussels next week on the Program for Economic Development of
the Central American isthmus, to which are invited all donors and the
Central American governments.
Another critical issue long left undiscussed within the development
community is avoidance by the larger financial institutions of the more
controversial social development issues.

Their unwillingness and inability

leaves the more thorny problems mainly to the US bilateral program which
some consider today as becoming more like a banking institution and less
field sensitive or people-to-people oriented than it had been in the early
days of the Alliance for Progress.
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In a review of IDB materials presented for its consultative meeting,
it is interesting to note that the IDB, like Central American governments,
appears to relegate social issues to a lower order of priority.

Indeed, a

closer look at the Bank's lending strategies indicates that it has directed
its investment portfolio mostly to economic development and only a
relatively small amount of funds and staff focus to long range social
issues.

This is even true for the IDB's Small Projects operation which

approved 81 projects since its beginning seven years ago.

In 1982, of 22

small-scale projects financed for all of Latin American totaling almost $10
million, only 7 went to Central America.

Furthermore, their value

represents only about half the Bank's administrative costs to manage them.
These small social projects are a good beginning but a bad performance for
an institution that has a multi-billion dollar portfolio if it wishes to
make a significant and durable contribution to resolution of social
problems in the region.

IDB's program priorities and assistance delivery

are areas that the Commission might consider.
US bilateral aid also needs scrutiny by this Commission.

US political

assessment that the conflictive situation in Central America would improve
by 1984 led to a decrease in all categories of bilateral aid for 1984 and
1985 to Central America in the AID program budget submitted to Congress
last year.

The "squeaky wheel" philosophy evidently had not been applied

in assessing the situation.
Central America's private sector has also played an ambivalent role.
Its financing of industry has not truly reflected philanthropic concepts.
No doubt this attitude

has been fostered by the "easy out" available to
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businessmen to move to Miami or New Orleans instead of committipg
themselves to long range investments at home.
Recommendations of this body implying a higher price tag should be
made in knowledge of this.

Hopefully your reaction will be to recommend a

longer range commitment to helping solve these basic social problems which
have plagued Central America continually in its 160 years of independence.
Social Reform Is The Real War
Design and management of social development and humanitarian programs
is risky business.

Wars and major conflicts continue to be fought over

social reform issues among liberals and the conservatives in the Isthmus.
Costa Rica and Nicaragua never really settled their philosophic differences
while Somoza was in power.

Agrarian reform arguments put forth by the

communist government of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s must not be
forgotten, nor the furor created by the award winning Pulitzer Prize book,
"The Shark and the Sardines", in which Guatemala's Juan Jose Arevelo argued
for reform for Central America as a whole.

Agrarian reform will be

discussed in greater detail by Bill Doherty of the American Institute for
Free Labor Development, three of whose advisors were recently murdered in
El Salvador.
Much of the concern about human rights abuse in Central America arises
from violent responses to social reform efforts.

We have also a long list

of Americans, Central Americans and Europeans who were threatened and
murdered in the last 15 years (mainly in El Salvador and Guatemala) because
of their association with social change.

In 1968-9 the US Ambassador John

Gordon Mien and his colleague the Ambassador from West Germany were both
murdered in cold blood in Guatemala -- followed soon by the Guatemala's

151.

Foreign Minister Fuentes Mohr who was the leading expert on the

~ommon

Market and, along with Guatemalan socialist philosopher Colom Argeta, one
of the most outspoken proponents for social change.

US and other foreign

clergy, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, who were actively involved in
social change, were fingered as Communists, murdered, ailed, or if lucky
they got out.

We heard of the recent dastardly murder of El Salvador's

Archbishop Romero and a group of US nuns.
iceberg.

These are only the tip of the

We must not be blind to the high likelihood of continued violent

reaction to social development programs by entrenched interests.

You will

hear about the fate of an education reformer later today from Dr. Davis.
The story of Father Toomey, Jesuit from Loyola University, perhaps
best describes the true risk of agents of social change.

Twenty years ago,

AID funded his training of Central American rural leaders.

Students were

first trained at Tulane Center in New Orleans, later at an AID-sponsored
center at the Jesuit Landivar University in Guatemala.

His goal was to

stimulate change by providing "T-group" training sessions" to equip mostly
illiterate Indians, Ladinos and compesinos to become agents of change.
They became so successful in trying to improve conditions of the rural poor
in Guatemala that most have since been denounced as communists, and many
were murdered or are refugees in Mexico or in the United States.
Are the Governments Up To Social Change?
Speakers this afternoon will maintain that social and humanitarian
development in Central America is not only a matter of dollars and cents
but also a matter of will by governments and local leaders -- both good
will and bad.
AID.

If governments do not want it to happen, it won't, AID or no

Without a cadre of local leaders and grass root organizations, social

152.

development is like the parable of the mustard seed falling on faJlow
ground.
We cannot take for granted Central American political support for
human development.

The poor frequently are politically weak.

They are

often too sick and uneducated to be politically active.
Influential elites, particularly large landowners, may oppose human
development if they feel it might undermine their power and status.

The

elite in Central America cutomarily maintains deplorable serf-like
employment conditions on haciendas and plantations.

A maid in her early

teens with 1-2 illegitimate children sometimes is kept in the household
working from sunrise to late evening.
Without public and private sector support for real change (as distinct
from a facade), results will be minor and not worth either the effort or
taxpayers' money.

This is the most critical issue which must be addressed.

We Must Question Our Assistance Delivery System
It has been recommended to me by development practitioners who served
or are serving in Latin America that it is urgent reintroduce to Central
America a system created by Nelson Rockefeller in the mid-1940s and in
effect until the 1950s.

AID's predecessor agency "The Institute of

Inter-American Affairs", replaced by the Alliance for Progress in the early
1960s, introduced a "Servicio System" as an apolitical organization through
which external donors together with country nationals managed development
organizations in health, education and housing (and in some cases access
roads).

Contributions made to a Servicio central fund were managed jointly

by donor and host country nationals -- a system which reduced opportunities
for corruption and also contributed significantly to training a cadre of

153.

local development administrators.

Exmination of the backgrounds

~f

Latin

Americans in technical and management ranks of the Inter-American Bank and
the World Bank reveals that most began their careers in this early Servicio
System.

A brief background paper on the Servicio System is attached for

your review.
For today's conditions, the Servicio structure might well be adapted
resemble the more collaborative model of the OECD in Europe.

It should

continue to be run by both those who contribute and those who carry out the
activities (as distinct from governments).
to the Central American Common Market.

It should assure an orientation

However structured, delivery

systems for social and humanitarian assistance to the region should be
designed so that most will be used for its intended purpose.
Optimal social development assistance delivery requires clear analysis
of the current system of government-to-government assistance currently
carried out by the major aid-giving insitutions, and of whether there is an
alternative.

Some options are regional in scope; some must out of

necessity be carried out on a country-by-country basis.

It is perhaps best

that recommendations be deferred until all of the invited experts have
shared their views with you.
Before any new programs are recommended, the Commission should assure
itself that we can bring assistance programs directly down to the people.
Cold analytical loan programs often provide lip-service that they are
destined for the end-user, but the reality is that many pass through heavy
filters of governments where long delays and leakages occur.
There are bound to be other ideas and they should be welcomed.
message here is that the current system is not working well.

The
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*

*

*

Other Witnesses
Let me briefly introduce our speakers this afternoon.
good deal of briefing material from government sources.

You have had a

We find that

comments from private sector experts on social and humanitarian development
give another perspective.

I should add that all of these experts are

serving on a voluntary basis at no cost to the Commission or the US
government.
Dr. Loy Bilderdack, a demographer well-known for his work on Central
America, is Professor at the School of Social Science at California State
University at Fresno.

He will provide us with some insights into Central

America's major issues.
Dr. Nevin Skrimshaw is a respected international expert in nutrition
and currently on the MIT faculty.

He will draw on a wealth of Central

American experience, having spent many years in the creation, research and
management of the Central American Nutrition Institute (INCAP).
Dr. Russell Davis has also come down from Boston today where he is a
professor of education and development, a research scholar, and a Senior
Faculty Representative to the Harvard University Institute in International
Development.

Dr. Davis is an internationally known and respected author,

lecturer and advisor in education with a great deal of Central American
experience.

He knows most if not all of the actors involved.

He also

played a role i.n the creation of the Central American Council of Unversity
Rectors in the early days of Economic Integration in the Central America.
Shifting to the role that the private sector has played and can play
in social and economic development, presentations will be made by two
witnesses:

155.

We will hear from Mr. L. Ronald Scheman, Assistant Secretary for
Management of the Organization of American States, who twenty years ago had
the vision to create the National Development Foundations concept and
launch a program for their creation across Latin America.

He will have

interesting things to say on these foundations' work in mobilizing private
sector support for development and in helping

small producers in the

private sectors of Central America, also drawing on his recent trip to
Nicaragua, Honduras and Belize.
Mr. Leveo Sanchez, Chairman of Development Associates, Inc., has had
long personal, professional, and Peace Corps association with Central
America.

His consulting firm is currently very active in the region, also

elsewhere in the US and the world.

His perspective too is somewhat unique.

Tomorrow, two sessions will deal with agrarian reform and labor union
development, both presented by Bill Doherty, Director of the Latin American
Institute for Free Labor Development.

Mr. Doherty is perhaps one of the

most astute observers of the international labor scene in Latin America,
bringing some rather unique social insights.
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THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS ANB PROPOSALS
ALAN STOGA

I.

Introduction

Extremely weak economic conditions prevail throughout central America today,
reflecting the difficult international economic environment of the past
several years, the effects of political instability ana the consequences at
poor domestic economic management.
Economic and political stability are
intertwinea: without a reduction in the levels of violence, economic recovery
is almost impossible; without economic growth, the social and political
pressures underlying the tensions in the region will inevitably increase.
The United States has an essential interest in helping the central Pmericans
solve this dilemma.
Current conditions are unstable:
they must either
improve or deteriorate. Further deterioration would inevitably spread the
political ana economic turmoil which engulfs Nicaragua ana El Sal vaaor to the
rest of the region, including Panama.
This paper seeks to describe current economic conditions, highlighting the key
causes of the economic crisis. The conclusion is that, without a large-scale
program of foreign financial assistance in support of a sustained effort by
the cental Pmerican countries to restructure their economies, the vicious
circle of economic and political crisis will continue.
Breaking out of the circle will require a multilateral, multiyear program to
reconstruct the economies of Central America. The program assumes that such
an effort would have to address social and political problems simultaneously
to have any real prospects for success. As a result, the program of expanaea
financial assistance for the region proposed in this paper, to be funded by
the United States in conjunction with other creaitor countries ana
international financial institutions, is designed to achieve broad goals of
economic stabilization, economic reform and political, social and economic
development.
The price tag will be high. The region as a whole woula require some $24
billion in new money to finance an economic reconstruction program aesignea to
recreate the conditions for sustainable growth. Such a program would aim at
achieving the same level of per capita real income in 1990 as existed at the
beginning of the decade. The United States would have to provioe up to halt'
of this, a significant increase in the already high level of assistance whicn
is now being made available.
However, in the long run, the cost of the alternative woulo be even higher.
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II.

Economic Conditions*

Central America has been badly affected by the international economic and
financial crisis of the past several years. Adverse external conditions,
compounded by poor management and structural economic weaknesses, have
produced high inflation, economic stagnation, and debt service problems
throughout the region. Although individual country experiences have differed,
the same general pattern has prevailed: since 1979 the economies of the
Central America have tended to stagnate or contract (Table 1).
Table 1.

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

Changes in Real GOP
(Percent)
1979

1980

1981

1982

4.9
-1.7
4.7
6.2
-26.4
4.5

0.8
-9.0
3.7
2.9
10.0
6.0

-4.6
-9.5
0.9
0.2
8.5
4.3

-8.8
-5.4
-3.5
-1.2
-1.4
4.1

Changes in economic growth per capita have been even weaker in recent years
(Table 2). However, during the years between 1960 and 1975, per capita growth
was quite strong, reflecting the dynamism of the world economy and the
positive effects of sharply increased regional trade under the auspices of the
Central American Common Market (CACM). (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua formed a trade and payments union in 1960.) The most
dymanic sector was generally manufacturing, propelled by the expanded market
and industrial development policies created as part of the economic
integration process.
Economic activity declined sharply in Nicaragua
(reflecting the effects of the massive earthquake and the struggle to
overthrow President Somoza) and El Salvador after 1975. During 1980-82,
economic activity in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras declined
in per capita terms. Only Panama was able to maintain its economic growth
momentum, at least through 1982; however, in 1983 real economic activity is
reportedly declining in Panama as well. The result of the decline in activity
has been dramatic: in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras the absolute levels
of real per capita income in 1982 barely equalled that of 1976. In El
Salvador and Nicaragua real per capita income had fallen to the levels of the
early 1960s.
* Data in this paper are drawn from International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank,
U.S.
Government,
the Bank for
International Settlements, Economic Commission for Latin America, and
national sources. These data often conflict and are partially estimated;
the data which have been used are judged to be the most accurate
information available.
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Table 2.

Changes in Per Capita Real GOP
(Annual average percent)

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

1960-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

2.7
2.1
2.2
1.5
3.7
4.8

3.4
2.3
2.1
-0.1
2.1
1.6

2.6
-2.8
2.5
2.5
-7.7
1.5

1980-1982
-9.2
-10.6
-4.2
-4.0
0.2
1.6

The population of the Central American isthmus nearly doubled from 1960 to
1981, from 12 to 23 million (Table 3). Close to one-third of the region's
population lives in Guatemala and none of the other countries has more than 5
million people. Between the 1960s and 1970s, population growth rates slowed
significantly only in Costa Rica and Panama. Overall, the regional growth
rate remained around 3%, among the highest in the world, reflecting dramatic
acceleration in population growth in Nicaragua and Honduras. The primary
factor in the rapid population growth has been a sharp drop in mortality (life
expectancy in the region rose from 50 years to 62 years between 1960 and
1981), while birth rates have declined only modestly.
Table 3.

Population

Population
at Mid-year
(millions)
l96oa
1981

Population Growth Rates
(percent)
1960-1970 1970-1981 1980-20000

Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

1.2
2.6
4.0
1.9
1.4
1.1

2.3
4.7
7.5
3.8
2.8
1.9

3.4
2.9
3.0
3.1.
2.6
2.9

2.8
2.9
3.1
3.4
3.9
2.3

2.1
2.8
2.6
3.1
2.9
2.1

Total or Average

12.3

22.8

3.0

3.0

2.7

a Extrapolations based on the growth rate trends reported in this table.
b Projected.
The region's population will continue to increase dramatically for years
because of the large numbers of young mothers already born, even if fertility
rates begin to come down rapidly. Current projections are for a regional
population of 30 million in the year 2000, with population growth averaging
2.7% per year. At that rate, the population would double in 26 years.
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The rapidly growing populations have resulted in age structures heavily
weighted toward dependent age groups (particularly persons under 15 years at
age), placing considerable pressure on governments to increase spenaing for
education, health, and other social services. Where population density is
high, there are also pressures on the land which result in environmental
deterioration, rural landlessness and near lanalessness, and rural-to-urban
migration. Population density is especially hign in El Salvaaor: 224 persons
per square kilometer (580 per square mile), more than three times the figure
for any other country in the region.
In part, this renects consiaerable
migration of Salvadorans across the 1-bnduran boraer which was a major factor
in the Honduran-Salvadoran war of 1960. Population aensity is also nigh in
the Guatemalan highlands, though this is masked by a national figure which
includes large stretches of sparsely populated (ana not very fertile) lana.
Another tendency shared by all of these countries has been the steady growth
of the external sector in both absolute ana relative terms. Exports increased
more than eleven times between 1960 and 1980 when total export value peaked,
while the share of exports in the region's total output rose from 19 percent
in 1960 to 31 percent in 1980. At the same time, intra-Central American trade
grew rapidly, eventually accounting for about 25 percent of total trade.
Despite the increase in manufacturing output in all of the countries, they
have remained predominantly exporters of primary agricultural products
especially to countries outside the region. About all of the value of El
Salvador's extra-regional exports in 1980 were primary products; among the
five member countries of the CAQv1, the share is lowest for Guatemala, at 75
percent.
Excluaing re-exports, Panama's exports are roughly 70 percent
primary products.
Thus, the pattern of export-lea growth which cnaracteriz.ea economic
development in the 1960s ana 1970s resulted in economies that are oath
interdependent--an economic shock in one country affects all--ana nighly
sensitive to developments in the world economy. Moreover, tnis pattern of
economic aevelopment, which reliea heavily on proauct1on ana export of primary
commodities, has tended to reinforce traditional political and social
organizational structures, although a miaale class began to develop in several
countries.
The differences among the Central American econom1es are almost as important
as the similarities. Per capita GNP ranges between $600 in Honduras to $1900
in Panama. Population growth varies from arouna 2. 3% in Panama to 3. 9% in
Nicaragua; El Salvador, whose population of almost five million is increasing
2. 9% annually, faces the most serious population pressures on its land and
resource base.
Income within these countries is typically unequally
distributed, although the patterns of distribution differ signit'icantly among
countries. The Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) has estimated
that at the end of the 1970s the 20 percent of indiviauals with tne highest
incomes captured between 49 percent (Costa Rica) and 66 percent (E1 Salvador)
of total income, while the bottom 50 percent of individuals received between
21 percent (Costa Rica) and 12 percent (El Salvador). Moreover, the available
evidence indicates that the gaps between the richest and poorest nave tended
to widen over time. In Guatemala and Costa Rica, the real per capita income
of the poorest 20% of the population actually fell between 1970 ana 1980. At
the same time, the share of income going to the emerging miadle class has
tended to increase in most of the countries of the region.
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ECLA has estimated that of the more than 20 million people living in Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1980, some 13.2
million were impoverished in the sense that their incomes did not cover basic
human needs. More than 8. 5 million lacked sufficient income to purchase a
nutritionally adequate diet. This extreme poverty is worse in rural areas
than urban areas and differs between countries. For example, in costa Rica
one-quarter of the population was estimated to be impoverished, compared to
almost three-quarters in Guatemala. In general, poverty is more widespread in
rural than urban areas: urban areas, accounting for 40}6 of the population,
contained 28% of the poor.
Table 4.

Central America: Estimated Incidence of Poverty*
(millions)

Impoverished
Extreme poverty
Basic Needs not satisfied
Not impoverished
Total

Total

Urban

Rural

13.2
8.7
4.5

3.7
2.1
1.6

9.4
6.5
2.9

7.5

4.6

2.9

20.7

8.3

12.4

*Data compiled in late 1970s by ECLA, Central American Basic Neeas Project.
This urban/rural split reflects the economic structure of the region:
agriculture remains the largest single sector in each country except Panama.
Agriculture accounts for between 20% (Nicaragua) and 32% (Honduras) of
national output in the CACM countries, but only 10% in Panama which has a much
larger service sector. Moreover, agriculture accounts for an even larger
share of the labor force: the share is unaer 50% only in Costa Rica (29%) ana
Panama (27%). Labor productivity in agriculture is low and many farmers are
engaged in subsistence production except during the harvesting of cash crops.
The result is low farm incomes and high levels of poverty.
Rural underemployment is pervasive, reaching 50% in some countries. One cause
is the skewed distribution of land holdings; between 40% and 80% of farms in
the various Central American countries have less than 12.5 acres of productive
land and many have less. Such small farms produce much less than full-time
employment. In addition, limited access to agricultural land is another cause
of rural poverty. In the region as a whole, an estimated 3(]}6 of the rural
labor force depend entirely on employment, typically on a seasonal oasis.
Finally, agricultural production has grown slowly over the past decade,
limiting the development of new employment opportunities.
The inevitable consequences of widespread poverty are poor health, nutrition,
and social conditions. Mortality rates for infants ana chilaren are higher in
Central America than in the rest of the remisphere, although significant
improvements have been realizea over the past two decaaes. Communicable
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diseases are the major cause of death and disability in the region, reflecting
the relative lack of access to adequate health care.
At the same time,
malnutrition continues to be a serious problem. In Guatemala, Honauras, and
El Salvador, between 30l6 and 65% of all households consume fewer tnan the
minimum daily caloric requirements; in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama
nutritional deprivaton is less serious.
The quality and availability of
education also differ significantly across the region. Panama, Costa Rica ana
Nicaragua have high relatively levels of adult literacy. Literacy averages
under 60Yo for the other three countries with sharp differences between urban
and rural literacy rates.
Economic contraction over the past several years has almost certainly leo to
higher levels of unemployment and under-employment, ana increased poverty.
Accurate measures of unemployment are unavailable. However, unemployment must
have increased by at least the annual growth in the labor force over the past
three years; the regional labor force grows by at least 3. 4% amually, some
240,000 workers. In addition, the decline in economic activity has led to the
loss of existing jobs. As a result, as much as one-quarter of the labor
force, or around 1. 75 million people, might be unemployed today.
underemployment is undoubtedly even higher.
Increased inflation has also been a common regional characteristic in recent
years. The impact of higher world oil prices, accelerating inflation in the
United States, and overly expansionary domestic economic policies proauced
higher inflation in all countries in the 1970s. In 1980-82, inflation sharply
accelerated in Costa Rica and remained high in the other countries.
Table 5. Inflation: GOP Deflator
(average annual percent)
1960-1970

1970-1980

1980-1982

Costa Rica

1.9

El Salvador

0.5
0.3
2.9

13.9
9.8
9.1
8.0
14.2
7.4

65.5
9.3
7.5
8.7
12.2
5.4

Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama

1.8
1.6

In short, although the Central American countries experienced rapid economic
growth between 1960 and the ena of the 1970s, the pattern of export-lea
development, the unequal distribution of income, rapid population growth, low
productivity and slow growth of production in agriculture, increasing
inflation and high unemployment and underemployment lea to a worsening of
living conditions for many Central Americans. By 1982, most people in the
region were probably worse off in economic terms than they were ten or fifteen
years earlier.
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III.

causes of the Current Crisis

The economic crisis thoughout the region can be tracea to several factors:
1. High oil prices, prolonged world recession, and weak demand/prices far
commodity exports.
All of the countries in the region were badly affectea by the sharp rise in
oil prices during the 1970s. Oil imports in 1981, after the second rouna
of price rises and before the collapse of Central America's exports, were
equal to more than one-fifth of export revenues.
Moreover, slack world demand for Central America's key export products
(coffee, bananas, cotton, sugar, and meat) coupled with inflation-driven
increases in prices of their imports led to a drastic deterioration of the
region's terms of trade (the relationship between their export and import
prices). Between 1977 and 1982 the terms of trade fell 41%. This means
that the countries would have to sell 41% more in volume terms in order to
maintain the level of export earnings. However, at the same time oemana
for central America's exports was also falling. As a result, exports fell
dramatically during 1980-1982; for the region as a whole, exports aropped
2(m.

Table 6. Trade Performance, 1960-1982
(Average annual percent)
1980-1982

1960-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

Casta Rica
Exports
Imports

10.3
11.2

16.4
16.9

15.2
17.0

-6.5
-25.0

El Salvador
Exports
Imports

8.7
4.7

17.7
23.1

12.7
10.5

-19.3
-4.2

Guatemala
Exports
Imports

9.9
7.9

16.6
20.3

18.9
17.0

-11.1
-6.8

Honduras
Exports
Imports

10.9
12.2

11.7
12.9

21.9
20.7

-10.8
-15.7

~·

Nicaragua
Exports
Imports

10.8
12.3

15.9
21.9

3.7
10.7

-4.0
-5.3

Panama
Exports
Imports

12.8
11.7

20.5
20.0

2.5
10.3

-7.6
5.3
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Since each of these countries has a relatively open economy in which
exports of goods and nonfactor services account for 25 to 40 percent of
GOP, the shortfall in export earnings reduced the ability to import raw
materials, spare parts, and other capital and consumer goods, contributing
to the economic slowdown (Table 6). ECLA has estimated that, if the
region's 1977 export purchasing power hao been maintained, economic
activity would have been approximately 2% higher in 1982.
2. Intra-regional tensions and political unrest.
The conflict between El Salvador and 1-bnouras in 1969 adversely affecteo
cooperation among the CACM countries ana began a process which gradually
undermined the dynamics of the common market. Nevertheless, intra-regional
trade, largely in manufactured goods, continuea to grow until 1980. Since
1980 political unrest in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala and the
financial problems of all the CACM countries leo to a sharp oecline in
intra-regional traoe: the value of such trade fell by almost one-thiro
between 1980 and 1982. This collapse of intra-CACM trade--in part because
of the accumulation of serious trade imbalances between Costa Rica and
Guatemala with surplusses on tne one hana, and Nicaragua, El Salvaoor, and
Honduras with deficits on the other--contributed to the region-wide
economic contraction.
Another economic consequence of political conflict, besioes the oestruction
of economic infrastructure, has been commercial bank and investor
retrenchment.
Private sector confioence, both in and outside Central
America, has been shaken; domestic and foreign investment has declined and
capital flight has been substantial. Although accurate measurements of
capital flight are unavailable, balance of payments data imply that some
$2.5 to $3.0 billion in private capital flowea out of the six countries
between 1979 and 1982. Investment has fallen in all of the countries.
This reduction, refecting a sharp drop in savings because of both political
and economic turmoil, has seriously undermined the prospects for future
growth.
3. Weak economic management.
The Central American countries hao traaitionally been characterized by
relatively sound economic management.
However, these countries shifteo
policies after the second oil shock, the sharp increase in interest rates
and the onset of recession in the United States. Eacn of the countries
increased public sector spenoing in an attempt to sustain domestic economic
activity, and failed to raise taxes. Fiscal revenues as a share of gross
domestic product amounted to 9.3% in 1960, 9.7% in 1970 and 11.4% in 1980
for the regional as a whole. These levels are low compared to other
countries of similar economic and social structure; in combination witn the
unequal distribution of income, they suggest that the small groups in each
country which controlled large concentrations of income and wealth were
able to prevent their governments from imposing higher taxes.
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By contrast, public sector spending began r1s1ng rapidly in the late
1970s.
The percentage of central government expenditures in national
product rose from 11.2% in 1960 to 11.6% in 1970 ana to 19.3% in 1980. The
results were larger public sector deficits which lea to higher innation
(especially in Costa Rica where consumer prices rose on average 90% per
year in 1980-82) and increaseo foreign aebt (especially in Costa Rica ana
Panama). In 1980-82 consumer price inflation in the region averaged 23%,
despite the contraction in economic activity, and between 1975 ana 1982,
the external debt of the region increased 2401o.
4. Commercial bank retrenchment.
With the beginning of the international financial crisis in 1982, the
Central American countries lost their limited access to the international
commercial banking market. Trade finance lines were cut and public and
private sector borrowers were unable to raise new funds. To some extent,
this reinforced the drop in imports and the decline in economic activity,
even though increased official assistance more than offset the decline in
commercial bank credits.
The legacy of these developments has been economic stagnation--with attendant
widespread unemployment and declining real incomes--ana a significant
accumulation of external debt.
The size of the aebt ana the buraen of
servicing this debt, relative to foreign exchange earnings, are highest in
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, ana Panama (Table 7).
Total disbursed debt of the five CACM countries was estimated at $11.0 billion
at the end of last year; including Panama, the aebt total for the region was
$14 billion.
(These figures probably underestimate short term and private
sector indebtedness as well as interest arrears.) About 40% of this aebt has
been borrowed from commercial banks.
Table 7.

External Debt

Total Debt
(end 1982)
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Panama
Latin America

$3. 6 billion
1.2
2.0
1.7
2.5
3.1**
300.0

Debt/GJP
(%)

Debt
Service Ratio*

142
33
22
59
96
74

57
8
9

27

54

21

37
31

* Scheduled interest and amortization as % of merchandise exports ana
non-factor service earnings.
** Public debt only.
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Although debt service burdens are less than those of other countries in the
Western Hemisphere, all of the countries in Central America are having
difficulty maintaining timely debt service payments. Costa Rica, and Panama
are currently restructuring their external debt. Nicaragua is presently in
arrears on debt which was restructured in 1980 and 1981. Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador are also having difficulty meeting debt payments.
Faced with these conditions, all of the Central American countries--except
Nicaragua--have adopted IMF sanctioned stabilization programs. The programs
aim at reducing public sector deficits and slowing rapid money supply growth
in order to reduce inflation, while at the same time stabilizing the balance
of payments. There have already been some successes: inflation nas fallen
sharply in all of the countries; in Costa Rica, where inflation was 9070 last
year, prices rose at an annual rate of 2G'o in the first half of· 1983.
IV.

The Economic Outlook

In the near term, the outlook is for
through 1984.
Until the international
improves, the regional economies cannot
conditions in the region are stabilizea,
decline.

continuea economic decline at least
economic and financial environment
recover; similarly, unless political
there will be no halt to the economic

Despite the industrialization of the past two decades, which was largely aimed
at the regional market, the health of the Central American economy basically
depends on international commodity prices ana demand.
Around 7070 of the
extra-regional exports of the six Central American countries are accounted for
by six commodities: coffee, bananas, cotton, meat, shrimp, and sugar. Prices
of these commodities have not performed well; in particular, coffee and sugar
seem to be in structural oversupply.
Thus, the terms of trade and,
ultimately, the earnings of the region have not yet benefitted from economic
recovery in the United States. As a result, imports and economic activity are
constrained by the limited availability of foreign finance and the need to
devote foreign exchange to debt service.
More generally, the region's external performance--and, hence, domestic
economic activity--will be largely aeterminea by the aevelopments in three key
variables: dollar interest rates, oil prices and commodity prices.
The
sensitivity of the balance of payments to these variables can be easily
summarized. Because of the large share of generally fixed interest rate ana
lower cost official finance in the region's total foreign aebt, a one
percentage point rise in average interest rates costs Central American
countries about $60 million per year. A 1070 rise in oil prices costs some
$100 million. However, a lO'k rise in the prices of the region's commoaity
exports would produce aoaed annual revenues of at least $350 to $400 million
for the six countries as a group.
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The importance of these key variables should not be underestimated; in both
the short ana medium run, their performance wlll largely aetermine the
external financial needs of the countries.
A heal thy world economy
characterized by moderately increasing prices for the region's main commodity
exports, stable or lower interest rates, and stagnant or aeclining oil prices
would considerably ease the balance of payments problem ana exert a positive
influence on economic activity.
Nevertheless, over the next several years economic activity will remain
depressed unless there is a sharp increase in foreign financial inflows.
These countries need capital inflows to finance new investments, to rebuild
their productive capacity, to replace damaged infrastructure and to maintain
debt service, which is essential to restoring international financial
credibility. In the short and medium run, the bulk of new financing will come
from official sources, since private investors ana foreign banks are generally
unwilling to increase their investments or loans. For example, last year new
loans from commercial banks covereo only about 13% of the region's net
financing requirement (the sum of the current account deficit, reserve usage
and estimated capital flight), comparea to about 31% in 1980. In aaaition,
banks and other creditors proviaed involuntary financing to the extent that
borrowers in Central America aia not pay schedulea interest (incluaea in the
chart as "arrears").
Table 8:

Central American Net Financing Requirement, 1982
($ billion)
Direct Investment ($0.2)
Arrears ($0.6)
Commercial Banks ($0.4)

IMF ($0.1)
Other ($0.2)
U.S. Government ($0.4)

Other Official Sources ($0.9)

Net Requirement

= $2.8 Billion

More than half of the borrowing requirement was met by lenaing or grants from
official sources, including the IMF, the u.s. government, ana otner official
institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development BanK.
Although aata are not strictly comparable, U.S. non-military financial
assistance (including development assistance, Economic Support Funas, PL480
ana CCC guarantees) of some $370 million accounted for about l3:to of the
region's financial needs last year.
Combined Venezuelan ana Mexican
assistance, through a program of concessional loans ana grants to finance oil
imports (included in the chart as part of "other official sources") totallea
around $200 million.
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If official capital flows remain at current levels in real terms through the
rest of the decade, if private capital flows remain aepressed for several
years before increasing modestly, if the international economic environment
gradually improves, if prudent economic policies are consistently implemented,
and if political stability returns, the economies of Central Pmerica will
gradually recover. Economic activity might begin to increase after 1984.
However, the decline has been so dramatic over the past several years and the
underlying social problems are so great that, unoer the assumptions outlined
above, economic activity (measured in terms of real GOP per capita) would
probably reach only three-quarters of the 1980 level by 1990. This would be
insufficient to prevent a further increase in unemployment or to reouce
poverty unless the patterns of income distribution are radically changea.

Reactivation of the regional economy under the conditions which exist tooay
will have to be export-leo. Government spenoing is being reaucea ana private
investment, both domestic and foreign, is likely to remain weak for political,
financial, ana economic reasons. Thus, exports will lead; in the near-term
that principally means increased traditional agricultural exports--which
largely depend on improved commodity prices and oemano--ana development of
non-traditional exports based on agricultural processirg. At the same time,
improved intra-regional traae coula proviae some qu1ck growth benefits as long
as all countries are able to sustain their regional commitments.
Over the medium term, even to reach the moaest level of economic activity
described above, Central American countries will have to aevote scarce
resources to developing new export-oriented industries aimed at the
extra-regional market.
The incentives available under Caribbean Basin
Initiative should encourage increased domestic and foreign investment, but
unless there is a sharp increase in the availability of net foreign resources,
higher levels of investment will require higher levels of domestic savings.
In an environment where consumption has already been under severe pressure,
and where efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of income are
necessary for social stability, increased savings will be difficult to
generate.
V.

A Financial Assistance Program

The United States has profound interests in stimulating economic recovery,
social progress, and political reform in Central Pmerica. The countries of
the region lack the resources to halt the rapid aeter1oration which threatens
to engulf all the countries of the region.
Without a concentratea,
large-scale effort to stabilize economic conaitions, the mutually reinforcing
circle of economic and political crisis will accelerate. At the same time,
political and social change are necessary pre-conaitions for a successful
economic program--and are integral to long-run u.S. interests. Moreover, a
successful program must be multilateral, flexible, ana ambitious enough to
engage the public and private sector in a sustained effort, which is essential
to helping the Central Pmericans solve their problems.
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Principles
An expanded program of economic assistance should be designed to achieve
broad goals of economic stabilization, economic reform, and political,
social, and economic development.
The program should be available to all countries on the Central American
isthmus. However, credible economic and political development goals and
policies should be an essential requirement for access to financial
assistance.
The program should distinguish between the short and medium run. In the
very short run, the goal should be to prevent economic collapse of the
region; in the medium run, renewed economic growth is possible. Most
importantly, the program should lay the groundwork for a return to rates
of per capita growth which are sufficient to raise people's standards of
living; this means that a key element will be to improve the distribution
of income throughout the region.
The program should be multilateral, involving other creditor countries as
much as possible.
The program should be supportive of Central American originated
initiatives and, at least in the short run, should aim at reinvigorating
the Central American Common Market.
The program should encourage foreign private sector participation, but
not be dependent upon it.
The program should facilitate structural adjustment efforts in
conjunction with the programs of the international financial institutions.
The program should recognize that the region 1 s needs for extraordinary
assistance will continue for many years, even though the principal
economic objective will be to help the Central Americans achieve a
sustainable growth dynamic by the end of the decade.
Structure
Extraordinary financial assistance linked to the achievement of economic,
social and political goals should be channeled through a new multilateral
structure to be established jointly with the Central Americans. The Central
American Development Organization (CADO) would initially include the six
countries of the Central American isthmus, the United States and any other
country in the Hemisphere capable of making a significant political or
economic contribution (e.g., Mexico, Venezuela, Canada and Colombia).
Nicaragua would be encouraged to participate as part of an effort to engage
that country in a broad based policy dialogue; Nicaragua 1 s--or any other
countries'--access to funds would be conditioned on mutually agreed and
monitored political, social and economic progress.
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Economic growth which is not accompanied by greater social equity ana enhancea
political participation will not produce peaceful change in Central America.
Goals for progress in health care, education, housing, and the fulfillment of
basic human needs would be essential elements of the program for all the
countries.
Each of the participating countries would also make a firm
commitment to political pluralism, freedom of expression, respect for human
rights, and the right of their people to choose their destiny free from
repression or coercion. Progress towards these goals would be an essential
condition for future economic assistance through CADO.
Such an organization would promote continuing high level attention to the
problems of the region and encourage cooperative (and, hopefully, well funded)
efforts to address them. The essential functions of CADO would be to mobilize
external financial assistance; to assist the Central American countries in
defining and attaining social, political and economic development goals; to
regularize (and, to an extent, routinize) contacts among key U.S. ano regional
leaders; and, ultimately, to provide a framework within which regional
political and development problems can be aadressea cooperatively.
The
organization would not preclude or downgrade bilateral contacts, but would ada
a multilateral dimension to U.S.-Central American relations.
The key policy making boay would be a Political council that meets
semi-annually with representation at the Foreign ana Finance i'<linister levels
of each member country.
The COuncil's chairmanship--ana perhaps its
venue--would rotate among member countries. Its principal auties would be:
0

0

0
0
0

To provide a regular forum for discussion of regional political,
economic, traae and social issues;
To determine the parameters of action for the Economic
Consultative Group (ECG) and the Development Council (DC or Wise
Men's Group);
To review issues referred by these groups or member states;
To oversee the CADO budget; and
To appoint an Executive Secretary who would be responsible for
day-to-day management of the organization.

The Executive Secretary would be a Central American of considerable stature,
with broad experierce in regional organizations as well 1n his own
government. f-le would be a principal focal point of the activities of CADO,
especially in the initial years, and would be an ex-officio member of both the
Wise Men's Group and the Economic Consultative Group. However, by aesign, his
Secretariat would be very small with almost no professional staff; its purpose
would be to organize meetings, communicate policy decisions, and attend to
administrative issues.
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The two other main substantive boaies would be the Economic Consultative Group
and the Development Council or Wise Men's Group. The ECG would be modeled on
existing World Bank led consultative group mechanisms. Chaired by the World
Bank, with participation by the IMF, IBD, the six Central American countries
and all potential donors, the ECG woulo be the basic vehicle for assessing
national economic (and investment) programs. Working papers would be prepared
by the international agencies--there woula be no group of in-house economists
--who would be responsible for preparing an annual analysis of each country's
economic performance and policies, as well as its overall foreign exchange
needs. National development plans for the short and medium term would be
prepared by the countries themselves, in consultation with the donor countries
and international agencies. A key role of the ECG would be to develop a
regional development program ana to assure consistency of national development
plans; in this capacity the ECG would work closely with the Central American
Bank for Economic Integration ana other CACM institutions.
The ECG would annually review each country's development program.
These
plans, and their evaluation oy the economists of the IBRD, IMF ana IBD, woula
form the basis for aid pleaging sessions, attenaed by appropriate donor
countries. A regional meeting woula also be hela annually, at the completion
of the bilateral pledging cycle. (For convenience, all of these meetings
could be held at the same time as recently occurrea in Brussels for Central
America and regularly occurs for the Caribbean countries.)
The work of the ECG would have to be carefully coordinated with that of the
Wise Men's Group. The Wise Men would be responsible for defining political
and social development goals for each Central American country and for
reviewing progress toward specified goals. The quality of its membership
would be crucial to the success of the whole CADO initiative; without highly
respected members of considerable integrity and stature, CADO would fail.
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Each of the six central Pmerican countries ana the U.S. would be eligible to
nominate one member of the Development Council; two aaai tional memoers woula
be appointed by other member countries on a rotating basis. There woula be no
requirement that countries nominate their own nationals, although tnat woula
undoubtedly be the tendency.
Like the ECG, this group woula review each country's performance annually and
judge its progress vis-a-vis defined political and social targets. f-bwever,
since there is no international agency capable or willing to evaluate social
and political conditions, the Wise Men would receive evaluations from ad hoc
working groups of experts nominated by the member countries themselves. Each
of these working groups would be made up of representatives from the u.s.,
three of the six Central American countries, and one of the other member
countries. These five man teams, consisting of representatives of the public
or private sectors, would prepare their reports after brief country visits, if
necessary, and with reference to any testimony prepared by member states or
other interested parties.
The Wise Men would not be obligated to accept the finaings of the experts,
since they are ultimately responsible for the aetermination of country's
political ana social progress. If, on balance, they concluaea that a country
was fundamentally out of compliance with its political ana social program,
donor countries woula be expectea to moaify tneir aid programs accoraingly.
In the case of U.S. financial assistance, Congressional and popular reaction
to the decisions of the Wise Men woula /probably assure tneir potency.
However, since the deliberations of neither the Wise Men nor the ECG would be
binding, creditors would retain a substantial aegree of freeoom to aetermine
the pace of their own aid disbursements.
More generally, although economic assistance woula oe channelea tnrougn U1e
ECG, creditors would retain ultimate control over the size, composition ana
distribution of their assistance programs. Nevertheless, there woula be an
expectation that bilateral creditors, especially the u.s., would work in
concert with the multilateral group. In aaoition, bilateral creditors woula
be asked to define the amount of assistance they expect to make available over
a five year period.
If the U.S. were unable to make such a multi-year
budgetary commitment, the Congress could pass a joint resolution, at the
initiative of the President, indicating the magnitude of expected aia
disbursements over five years. (Ideally, this commitment would be regularly
renewed to add additional years.)
A crucial element of the CADO structure should be an active advisory role for
the private sector. This is especially important on the economic side since
the ECG would be an entirely official booy.
(Wise Men coulo--and probably
would--be drawn from the private as well as the public sectors.) Thus, an
Aavisory Council including Central American and foreign business ana labor
representation should be established parallel to the Consultative Group. Its
basic purpose woula be to aavise regional ana national author1ties on country
development programs and to engage the private sector in the effort to
reactivate the regional economy. The Executive Secretary woula be responsiole
for appointing two or three co-chairmen (perhaps one labor representative, one
foreign businessman ana one local businessman) who woula serve staggerea
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terms. They would define the membership and, to a great extent, the goals of
the Advisory Council. Two important additional functions would be to promote
dialogue among business and labor leaders from member countries and to
encourage the development of a continuous interchange on economic policy
issues between the public and private sectors.
In addition, each Central American country could be encouraged to establish
parallel councils.
The Investment Council of Panama, which advises the
government on its investment program but has no authority over the
disbursement of funds, might be an appropriate model.
This proposal explicitly excludes security issues, although the Political
Council could be expanded to incluae Defense Ministers ana its manaate
enlarged to incorporate the development of a regional security pact. However,
this could undermine the effectiveness of the organization in aaaressing
longer term economic, social and political issues in part by making membership
more difficult for countries outside the region.
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Although the establishment of a new institutional structure along these lines
would require considerable effort, such an initiative is probably essential to
generate adequate political ana economic resources. A piece-meal, bilateral
approach would inevitably fail to sustain support for what must be a long-term
program; moreover, excessive reliance on bilateral mechanisms would complicate
u.s. political relationships throughout the region and the 1-emisphere. An
institution like the Central American Development Organization could provide
the framework to help Central Americans begin to solve their deep rooted
problems over the next decade.
cost
The overall cost of an emergency assistance program for Central America
depends on a number of factors, including the international economic and
financial environment, the political climate in the region, the posture of
economic policy throughout the region, and the ability of national and
regional institutions to use increasea assistance proauctively. The estlmatea
cost of the program also depends on the goal: the higher the real growth
target, the greater the cost. However, the relationship is not symmetrical:
more money may not produce increased economic activity, but increased economic
activity almost certainly requires more money.
The ultimate goal of an expanded financial assistance program should be to
help the Central American countries recreate the conoitions for sustainable
economic growth. In practical terms, the program should focus on helping
these countries to re-achieve 1980 levels of per capita income by the end of
the decade.
Because of the depth and duration of the economic decline
throughout Central America--for the five CACM countries per capita GOP has
declined 15% since 1977 and 10% since 1980--getting back to 1980 will be
difficult and attainable with only an enormous, sustained effort.
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Macroeconomic projections have been prepared for the five CACM countries ana
for Panama through 1990. These projections are built on assumptions about the
international and regional economic environment ana about the policy responses
on the part of the Central American countries. They assume that the countries
of the region consistently pursue economic policies which encourage investment
(especially in labor intensive, export oriented indust.ries), promote price
stability, increase labor productivity, and enhance economic efficiency. In
other words, the projections necessarily assume that efforts to restructure
the economies of the region, which are now being implemented in most of the
countries, are sustained and effective.
In aggregate, the goal of re-achieving 1980 income levels by the end of the
decade for the six countries would produce a cumulative net financing
requirement of around $24 billion. Excluding Nicaragua--which at least today
would almost certainly not qualify for financial assistance on the sort of
economic or pali tical conditions envisioned as aid criteria--the total woula
be $21 billion.
External Financint Requirements, 1984-1990*
( billion)
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Subtotal

$5.1
5.5
4.5
2.3
17.4

Nicaragua
SUbtotal

3.4
20.8

Panama
Total

3.2
$24.0

* Projected aggregate net financing requirements associated with
achieving 1980 per capita GDP levels in 1990. For Panama the
goal is to maintain 1982 per capita GNP, since through last year
the economy continued to expana.
These projections probably underestimate the region's financing needs by
assuming that capital flight is eliminated after 1983, commercial ana
financial arrears are fully capitalized, maturing public ana private dents are
refinanced, and, most importantly, the bulk of new financial resources go to
investment rather than consumption. None of these assumptions are likely to
be fully realized; the overall net borrowing requirement would inevitably be
greater. In adaition, the gross financing requirement would be larger by the
amount of scheduled amortization, $3.2 billion for the five members of CACM
and another $1.7 billion for Panama.
These aeots wlll have to be
restructured, which is a burden on the creditors, but aoes not represent a new
transfer of financial resources.
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This enormous financing requirement reflects the extremely aaverse economic
development of the past years, the structural weakness of the Central American
economies, the need to rebuild infrastructure in El Salvador and Nicaragua,
and the likelihood that even steady progress to develop export capacity
through appropriate incentives ana accelerated investment will only gradually
have a significant impact on export revenues. At the same time, these funds
would not stimulate the projected economic recovery unless there is a sharp
reduction in the level of violence in the region and unless the Central
American countries themselves make a determined et'fort to restructure their
economies.
Most of the projected financing neea would have to be met by official
creditors. Over the next several years commercial banks are likely to be
reluctant to increase their exposure in Central America. However, some $4
billion in interest payments to banks are due auring 1984 to 1990. Based on
the refinancing proposals which are being discussed or are in place, it seems
reasonable to assume that at least half of these amounts will be reloaneo.
This fraction coula rise as economic performance improves.
In aaaition,
several of the countries are likely to attract some private investment flows,
especially in the context of an improving political ana economic environment.
Thus, official sources would probably have to provide around $18 billion.
For the U.S. this would mean at least $10 to $12 billion over the seven years,
assuming that World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico and
Venezuela continue their assistance programs at roughly current levels.
A
successful effort to increase assistance from these organizations or to
encourage European and Japanese participation would reduce the u.s. share.
Although a significant increase in assistance is needed in the near term to
prevent economic collapse, the bulk of the projected aid funds could be
disbursed in later years of the program.
One adverse consequence of such an ambitious recovery program woulo be a sharp
increase in debt levels in all the Central American countries. Unless the
terms on which this assistance is extendeo are highly concessional, the
increased debt burden would permanently mortgage Central America's future,
almost regardless of efforts to enhance export (ano, hence, debt service)
capacity.
Mechanisms
Specit'ic mechanisms to fund stabilization ana development programs should be
designed to aadress the region's particular problems; especially in the
initial stages, incremental assistance shoula be in program rather than
project form and should be quick disbursing.
-- Short-term stabilization . The immediate neeo is for increased balance of
payments assistance. AID has already programmed a significant increase
in such assistance; however, with the unwillingness of commercial banks
to make available short-term traae finance or to provide other credits,
additional monies will be needed if economic activity is to be
reinvigorated. More balance of payments assistance will allow countries
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to begin the recovery process, but such funas should be disbursed in
conjunction with IMF and World Bank economic stabilization efforts. For
example, increased aid coula be used as counterpart funding for existing
project loans where local budgetary retrenchment has undercut ongoing
projects.
-- Commodity earnings stabilization. Economic assistance aesignea to reauce
the volatility of export earnings waula oe useful to ease the impact of
cyclical downturns on the regional economy. In aaaitian, such a facility
would be politically attractive because, like the IMF's Compensatory
Finance Facility, it would have almost no policy conditionality. Such a
fund could be self-liquidating aver the cycle; credits could be repaid
during periods of rising prices to increase the availability of' monies
for periods of price weakness.
-- Export recovery. In the short-run, revenues from extra-regional traae
will improve only with the recovery of commodity prices and export
volumes, although specific u.s. ana European Community restrictions,
especially on the impartation of sugar and textiles could be easea with
Intra-regional traae coula be improved if the
immediate benefit.
existing debts of the countries within CACM were funded out and if
liquidity were provided to the regional financial institutions an an
ongoing basis (ana if improved economic policies--or administrative
restrictions--prevented the imbalances from recurring). In aaaition, a
trade finance facility could be established either with government funas
or guarantees. Alternatively, a mechanism coula oe set up which woula
purchase existing loans from commercial banks in return for the
establishment of new traoe lines. (Banks would in effect trade ala paper
for new paper, improving the quality of their assets, but not reducing
their exposure. The countries waula gain much neeaea liquiaity.)
Over the medium tenn, export expansion requires the development of
manufactured goods exports to countries outsiae Central America.
The
Caribbean Basin Initiative incentives will help in this regara, but
important reciprocal action is necessary on the part of the Central
Americans. A major liberalization of tariff policies as well as a
focused effort to reduce the impeaiments to foreign (ana for that matter,
domestic) investment shoula be undertaken.
In addition, appropriate
economic incentives have to be maintainea ana the full ranye of export
promotion programs and policies developed to support increased exports.
--Regional integration. The u.s. should support efforts to revitalize the
CACM institutions as part of its short-run assistance program. However,
over the long-term the kind of import substitution strategy which CACM
pursued with considerable success between 1960 ana 1975 seems unlikely to
hold much further promise; in particular, tariff liberalization will be
essential
to
developing
extra-regional
non-traditional
exports.
Nevertheless, there are considerable benefits in promoting regional
financial, energy, agriculture and other sectoral initiatives; to be
effective, these require strong regional institutions.
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--Debt relief.
Among the five CACM countries, only Costa Rica and
Nicaragua have debt problems in the sense that debt service imposes a
significant constraint on economic activity; Panama has a similar
problem. The easiest way to adaress the debt issue in all the countries
would be to provide concessional terms for public sector reschedulings,
to convert official loans to grants, or to establish an interest subsidy
fund.
However,
all of these--especially the last--woula have
implications for non-Central American countries that would probably
outweigh their benefits.
-- Public/private tradeoff.
A massive inflow of ot'ficial financial
assistance will inevitably strengthen the public sector in the recipient
countries relative to the private sector.
To minimize this eft'ect,
targetted efforts should be undertaken to encourage local businessmen,
including:
0
Establishment of a reconstruction fund for local businesses and banks
which would provioe working capital as well as longer term finance on
concessional terms.
These funds woula also be available for the
establishnent of new companies, especially in potential export sectors.
0
Development of a small loan facility within the Export-Import BanK
aimed specifically at providing small denominated loans or guarantees
to finance imports from the U.S.
0 Enlargement
of existing OPIC risk guarantee programs, incluaing the
development of a facility with u.s. participation for non-u.s.
investment insurance.
Investment. Investment has fallen in all of the countries ana, over the
medium term, neeas to be restored if sustainable economic growth is to be
realized. A key function of the Economic Consultative Group woula be to
help develop investment programs tailored to each country . In general,
the priorities of these programs should be:
0 High return, export-oriented development projects;
0
Energy projects;
0 Human development projects,
including investments in education, health
care, water, and housing.
These investments will have to be funaed both with increased foreign
assistance and with higher levels of domestic savings. Increased savings
will require approriate financial policies and incentives, which are
crucial to sustained recovery.
VI.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Central American countries will have to aefine their own
solutions to the economic, political, and social problems which threaten to
destroy them. The role of the Unitea States and other creaitors can only be
to provide some of the political and economic resources which these countries
need to grow. Without outsiae assistance, the people of the region t·ace a
grim future; with adequate support the Central Americans may gradually create
conditions under which future generations will have better opportunities to
benefit from balanced and sustained development.
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SECURITY ISSUES IG U.S.

POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

GREGORY F.

TREVERTON

This memorandum seeks to pose the critical questions, with some of
the arguments about each. It is broken into three clusters: interests,
threats, and issues about the role of military force or the threat of
force.
I.

What are critical United States security interests in Central America?

The answer is hardly obvious; different views, more often implicit than
explicit and seldom examined, lie at the root of much of the debate. The
tendencies ( impute grand u.s. security interests in the region, on the one
hand, o:c to conjure "worst case" scenarios on the other, bedevils assessment
of positive u.s. objectives and realistic dangers. Here are examples of the
arguments:

• u.s. security interests in Central America are broad and deep. The
political coloration of particular regimes in the region matters to our security.
The region is, figuratively at least, the United States backyard.
Hence even if specific u.s. interests are not strong, the global image of
the United States requires it to have a considerable measure of control over
the region.
-- Especially in our "neighborhood," it is important to promote democracy
and human rights. In a region whose past is distinguished by neither (Costa
Rica excepted), a high degree of u.s. influence is required.
-- The Panama Canal and associated sea lines of communication are crucial
to the United States. In the years before the ratification of the Panama Canal
treaties, some 70 per cent of cargoes passing through the Canal were en route
to or from the United States. On the other hand, that represented only onesixth of total u.s. ocean trade. More important, no active-duty American
aircraft carriers can now traverse the canal, and even with expanded naval
comm~tments in Southwest Asia and elsewhere, movement of fleets among oceans
is rare.
-- Central America itself is relatively unimportant to u.s. security, but
developments there eventually could pose a threat to interests that are
strategic -- especially Mexico. This, frequently asserted in one form or
another, is the central argument in support of an expanded conception of u.s.
security interests in Central America. It is hard to evaluate.
Pro: Mexico obviously is important enough to the United States to count
as a ~urity interest, and venezuela is also important even if not in the same
category as Mexico. With renewed economic growth here, Mexico could be supplying a third of u.s. oil requirements by the end of the decade. Though
current divisions among the Central American nations are sharp, ideas and
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people traditionally have moved among them. Moreover, given the precarious
domestic situations and slender armed forces of most of the nations, they
are extremely vulnerable to actions from outside their borders.
Con: The counter argument rests on two observations. (1) Most telling,
the "dominoes" we care most about do not perceive such a "domino effect"
threatening them, quite the contrary. }1exico remains sharply critical of
current u.s. policy, even discounting much of Mexican rhetoric as designed
for internal audiences. Mexicans regard their revolution as real, whatever
its current inequities, and they welcome, probably genuinely, the prospect
of real social and economic change in Central America. In any case, they
believe they can cope with the consequences of change in the region, even if
it is revolutionary and even if it brings to power regimes that label themselves Marxist.
(2) Paradoxically, the effort to exert u.s. control in Central America
is counterproductive, making it harder to achieve that control. That may be
especially true in Central America, given the history of u.s. intervention
and given that nationalism, long delayed, is breaking to the strrface. The
attempt to exert u.s. control only makes the United States the obvious target
of nationalism, and it discredits those governments the control is intended
to assist.
(3) A subsidiary point is that some of the specific scenarios for Mexico that are painted seem relatively independent of what occurs in neighbors.
Mexican oilfields, for example, are vulnerable to terrorist attack in any
case. What is happening in neighboring countries makes, in most cases, only
a marginal difference.

• u.s. security interests are weak in Central America, more important
in the Caribbean.
Most obviously, there is the role of Cuba and its relation to the
Soviet Union. Cuba has become an enormous Soviet military and intelligence
base; in the event of a war in Europe, for the first time the United States
would have to divert military resources to deal with a military threat in
the Caribbean. In peacetime a substantial portion of the world's seaborne
commerce passes through the Caribbean.
-- Because of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, the United States is
itself a Caribbean country. u.s. facilities in the region for tracking and
anti-submarine warfare are important though not vital. More important over
the long term is the flow of people. Between 1970 and 1978, 17.5 per cent
of legal immigrants to the United States came from the caribbean, as did a
substantial portion of the illegal immigrants. By contrast, immigration from
Central America (that is, excluding Mexico) has been small, though it can be
expected to grow with the fighting there.
-- Economically, the Caribbean is more important to the United States
than Central America, though neither is very important. About half of u.s.
oil imports from the Middle East and Africa are refined in the Caribbean,
and about half of u.s. requirements for bauxite and alumina come from the
region.
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• u.s. security interests in Central America and the Caribbean are
crucial but narrow. This view, my own, draws a distinction between objective and subjective interests -- between what u.s. security requires and
what we as a people prefer.
What is vital is to contain Cuban and Soviet military forces, bases
and facilities with clear military purposes. Those pose a threat to our -and the region's -- security. By contrast, whether particular regimes in
the region move to the "left" or "right" is a concern but a less immediately
pressing one.
-- A corollary to the imperative of containing Cuban and soviet military
power is the need to do so in ways consistent with norms of behavior we share
with the region (like non-intervention) and which distinguish us from our adversaries. Otherwise we risk needlessly embittering relations with our allies
throughout the region, thus damaging important long-term interests.
-- The Panama Canal is of significant but declining security interest.
It is more important to the Latin American states themselves than to us.
Moreover, the Canal treaties underscore that the Canal is more secure when
responsibility for it is shared by the Latin Americans.
_...;. "Domino effects" are unlikely. Indeed, states of the region
especially Mexico -- fear just the opposite: that hard, military responses
to revolution in particular countries of the region will destabilize, rather
than stabilize, their neishbors.
-- Growing Soviet, Cuban and East European cultural and economic cont,:<ct"'
with tlH.> regj on Eire worrisome, but in the rrodern V.'C.'rld t.he United States can
hardly prevent them. And whatever we think, the Latin Americans generally
regard such contacts as a sensible diversification of their external intercourse. The need is to distinguish those forms of Soviet and Cuban presence
that do pose a threat in security terms. Without doubt, there are hard cases:
witness the Grenada airport.
2.

What is the threat to u.s. security interests?

Here, the debate too often is stylized: either the problem is all the
Soviets and Cubans or only internal forces in particular countries. Views
of the threat derive from conceptions of u.s. interests.
• For those who take an expanded view of u.s. interests, almost everything
is a threat.
-- Even apparently benign forms of Cuban or Soviet economic presence
are threatening because they may have an intelligence function or, more important, may be the basis for a still more threatening future presence.
-- Leftist regimes are threatening even if they have no close Cuban connection: (a) because of the possible "domino" effect on the stability of
neighbors; or (b) because they might be receptive in the future to threatening forms of Cuban or Soviet presence; or (c) because even if neither were
the case, still the fact of left-wing or Marxist regimes will be regarded as
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a "loss" for the United States in global prestige and competition with the
Soviet Union, especially in the "backyard."
$ By contrast, a narrower conception of
to distinctions among threats.

u.s.

security interests leads

-- The primary security threat is Soviet and Cuban military forces,
bases and facilities. To be sure, Marxist regimes, especially ones that
are serious violators of human rights, are not to be desired, but they are
of less immediate concern provided primary security interests are safeguarded.
This distinction reflects three recognitions. (a) Central America
has not in the past been distinguished by its democratic and freedom-loving
regimes (Costa Rica again excepted); it is foolhardy to think that condition
will change easily or quickly. (b) The United States ability to determine
the course of internal change is limited, even in Central America. u.s.
citizens will, as the saying has it, do anything about the region except
pay sustained attention to it. (c) Most u.s. attempts to exert a high
degree of control would in any case be counterproductive. They would run
the risk of discrediting the United States and those it sought to aid. That
is especially true given the legacy of the past u.s. association with tawdry
regimes in the region.
In this context the Soviet-American understandings over Cuba of
1962, 1970 and 1979 are valuable and have merit as suggestions for the
future. In effect, the United States agreed not to try to overturn the
Castro regime in exchange for Soviet pledges not to introduce, first,
nuclear weapons and, later, certain forms of conventional forces in Cuba.
Those understandings might be extended to the entire region and to
cover Cuban military activities as well as Soviet. In return for Cuban and
Soviet pledges not to install particular types of military facilities or
forces in the region, the United States might agree, formally or tacitly,
not to intervene, directly or indirectly, against existing regimes in the
region. Those understandings might also be extended to mutual restraint in
providing weaponry. States and revolutionary movements in the region might
associate themselves with the understandings, agreeing not to accept particular kinds of outside forces, facilities or weaponry. In all cases, the
pledges would be conditional: they could be revoked if the other parties
violated their commitments.
$
In all of this, there are hard questions about the nature of the Cuban
and Soviet threat in the region.

-- Most observers agree that in the late 1970s the Cuban and Soviet attitudes toward revolutionary movements converged, with Moscow moving toward
the Cuban view that: such movements should be supported, not disdained.
-- At the same time there is little evidence that the Soviet Union is
prepared to pay much, or run much risk in support of revolutionary movements.
That is plain to Nicaragua.
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3. What is the role of u.s. force, or threats of force? These issues do
not outrank economic or political questions in thinking about u.s. security
interests in the region. But whatever other measures are considered, issues
of force will be important, emotional and divisive.
• What is the purpose of u.s. military assistance to particular governments, notably El Salvador{ Notice that no u.s. arms were sent to El Salvador between 1977 and 1981. Thus, the government defeated the guerrilla.
offensive of January 1981 without significant u.s. assistance. (By the
same token, State Department documents make clear that the guerrilla received little weaponry from external so1rrces before September 1980 and
only some before November 1980. Thus, the civil war raged well before
the guerrillas received much help from the Cubans and Soviets.)
• What does the limited assistance now provided El Salvador accomplish?
Is it the right kind of military assistance? Notice that because u.s. assistance goes to purchase (expensive) u.s. weaponry, it buys El Salvador much
less than if the money were deposited in a. Swiss bank account to purchase
used weapons from the bazaar in Tangiers. More important, there are questions
about whether the kind of weaponry, training and advice El Salvador receives
is the right kind.
• What would be the form and purpose of stepped-up u.s. involvement,
were it deemed appropriate and possible? Whatever the image in the public
mind, Central America. is no Vietnam. Twenty thousand American combat
troops could be decisive in purely military terms. The questions are:
decisive for what, and at what cost?
(Notice, however, than any analogy with the apparently successful
u.s. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is fatally flawed:
Pentagon analyses make clear that armed rebels in the Dominican Republic
numbered in the tens, not thousands, so the 23,000 American troops mostly
patrolled the streets of Santo Domingo. Moreover, there were two obvious
candidates for president, and the elections between them left no significant group feeling unrepresented.)
• What is the purpose of demonstrative displays of force, such as the
maneuvers of this summer and fall?
-- Surprisingly perhaps, the maneuvers seem to have had some effect.
Rather than denouncing them as "gunboat diplomacy," Cuba., Nicaragua and
the Salvadorean guerrillas made some vague conciliatory gestures. Paradoxically, since u.s. military forces have intervened in the region so often
in the past, displays of force may be more threatening to parties in the
region that we would anticipate. Some paranoia on their part is understandable.
However, the history of the u.s.-soviet understandings over Cuba
suggests the value of a. combination of carrots and sticks -- of displays
of force combined with a. readiness to talk about security arrangements
that may be acceptable both to the United States and to other parties.
e Should the United States abrogate the Soviet-American understandings
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over Cuba? Reagan Administration officials often have hinted that they
regard the understandings as of little value. But what would be the
purpose of the threat implied in abrogating them? What would the implied
threat be? How credible? Notice that recent events have tightened the
Cuban-soviet military link. Arms deliveries from the Soviet Union to Cuba
in the first eighteen months of the Reagan Administration sharply increased,
perhaps nearly doubled, Cuban military capabilities.
e What is the purpose of assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, covert
or open?
-- Does the threat implied by that aid frighten Nicaragua into cutting
off aid to the Salvadorean guerrillas? Or does it drive Managua closer to
Cuba and the Soviet Union? Or does it have little effect?
-- Notice the practical impossibility, given the chaos in the region,
of helping opposition groups like the Contras for our purposes but not
theirs. If our support is designed to achieve our purpose -- interdicting
aid to El Salvador, for example -- we still buy~nd are seen in the region
to buy, their purposes as well.
e What is the balance of short-term gains and long-term costs entailed
in particular u.s. military activities in the region?
-- Displays of force, for example, may achieve their purpose in the
short run. Yet they also entail costs, long-term and hard to measure, by
enhancing the image of the United States as interventionist. At least that
suggests the need to be clear that their short-run purpose is important.
-- In political systems as weak as those in Central America, assisting
local militaries to defeat subversion almost inevitably runs the risk of
making them more central political forces as well. There may be little
choice in the short run, and again the costs are hard to assess. But the
costs surely are present no matter how hard we try to minimize them.
e Finally, in military terms, what level of commitment in Central
America makes sense in light of crucial u.s. security interests elsewhere?
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PROMOTING U.S SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
DR. MARGARET DALY HAYES
[The ideas presented in this paper are the author•s own and are not
intended to represent the positions or opinions of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate]
It is the United States national interest that there exist in
Central America and the Caribbean stable, friendly, prosperous nationstates that permit the free movement of goods and services in and
through the region.

This interest is being challenged today by

political instability stemming from the region's own development
trauma; by economic insecurity resulting from the region's
backwardness and exacerbated by international economic trends; and by
insurgency generated internally and encouraged and supported
opportunistically by international Communism.
The critical questions to be answered in reviewing

u.s.

security

interests in Central America are not whether the U. S. has security
interests in that region -- or more broadly in the Caribbean Basin of
which it is a part -- but rather, how to promote those interests most
effectively.
This disucssion paper will review first, the dimensions of

u.s.

national interests in Central America, then discuss the challenges to
those interest and finally suggest options for

u.s.

policy for coping

with the challenges and enhancing the security of the region.

u.s.

security in the Western Hemisphere, and particularly in the

contiguous zone of the Caribbean Basin and Central America is defined
by different considerations than is security taken in the context of

u.s.

relations with the Soviet Union or with our principal allies in

Western Europe and Asia.

In the context of our major political-

military alliances, United States security is defined in
terms of a global balance of political, military and economic
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power.

u.s. allies contribute significantly to the balance of

power in favor of the United States, and because the relationship
is mutually beneficial it enjoys a certain stability and predictability over time that has contributed importantly to development
of relations over the long-term.

Central American nations do not

contribute significantly to the balance of power in favor of the
United States.

Nevertheless, they are important constituents in

the u.s. sphere of influence, and their possible defection from
that sphere weighs heavily against the u.s. balance.

The principal

u.s. goal in preserving security interests in the Central American
region is to minimize challenges to u.s. access and influence in
the region.
In considering the relative balance between the United States
and its principal rival, the Soviet Union, emphasis is given almost
exclusively to the military balance between the two powers.

The

Soviet military threat is seen as the principal threat to u.s.
national security.

Soviet intentions to limit u.s. access to

resources or to weaken international support for the United States
is given relatively less attention.

In particular, long-term

policies designed to limit Soviet opportunities have received
inadequate attention and application.

However outside the arena of

strategic force balance, U.S.-Soviet competition for the Third
World is likely to be far more important in determining the global
political balance and structure of emerging alliances than is the
military balance.
In the traditional focus of u.s. security concerns -- that of
u.s.-soviet military balance and the NATO-Warsaw political-military
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balance -- the Western Hemisphere countries (excluding Canada, a
NATO member), have traditionally had little or no role.

However,

in spite of the relatively low profile Latin America has enjoyed in

u.s.

national security planning, the United States' most constant

allies in the Third World have been the Latin American countries,
and the United States has a profound interest in maintaining, at
relatively low cost, a strong and supportive inter-American system.
As the United States' immediate sphere of influence, that system
has been a cornerstone of

u.s.

projection of the world scene.

With

the support of Latin American allies the United States for a long
time was able to muster votes within the United Nations and was
able to project a positive image for itself among the developing
world.

Moreover, the Latin Americans' announced (if not practiced)

commitment to democratic values has supported this country's firm
belief that democracies can provide the best opportunities for
political, social and economic development in Third World countries.
Relations within the Inter-American system have been changing
dramatically over the past 10 to 20 years as Latin American countries
have acquired greater economic and political power and have begun
to assert their independent voices in world affairs.

The Inter-

American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) survives as a
remnant of post World War II policy with which the United States
sought to make the Western Hemisphere "safe" from communism so that
it could concentrate on other higher priority areas.
circumstances have changed dramatically since 1947.

Hemisphere
The Latin

American countries have grown economically and politically.

Latin
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American nationalism is strong.

In the aftermath of the Falklands-

Malvinas crisis of 1982, it is unlikely that the Rio Treaty ever
can serve again as the focus on which to mobilize hemisphere-wide
political and military cooperation.
The challenge to the United States in responding to changes
in the hemisphere political balance is to assure that independent
Latin American voices are consistent with U.S. policies in areas
that are vitally important to us.

To do so will require from the

United States adroit diplomacy, accommodation to some Latin American
interests, and active engagement in long-term policies that contribute to the emergence of stable, prosperous, friendly states that
support the United States and do not threaten to throw their political weight behind

u.s.

principal antagonist in the global balance.

In pursuing policies that enhance

u.s.

security position in

the Caribbean and Central American region it is necessary to:
(1)

recognize the degree and dimensions of U.S. security
interest in the region;

(2)

recognize the nature of the present challenges to those
interests;

(3)

agree on goals for the region;

(4)

establish a consensus on how to deal with the challenges
to those interests; and,

(5)

establish a realistic level of investment of political,
economic and military resources in the pursuit of u.s.
goals in the region.

Degrees and dimensions of

u.s.

security interests in Central America

In spite of its relative underdevelopment, the Caribbean Basin
represents an area of important economic activity to the United

187.

States.

It is the principal source of

from the Western Hemisphere.

u.s.

raw material imports

Mexico is the United States' second

most important supplier of critical raw materials after Canada, and
the principal supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury,
bismuth, selenium, barium, rhenium and lead.

Mexico could supply

up to 30 percent of U.S. petroleum import requirements or up to two
billion cubic feet of natural gas per day.
provided a quarter of

u.s.

In 1980, Venezuela

iron ore imports, 23 percent of its

petroleum products and eighty percent of its crude petroleum.
majority of

u.s.

A

petroleum imports transit the Caribbean Basin from

producers in the Middle East, Africa, South America and, more
recently, from U.S. Alaskan fields.

Lightering operations at

Caribbean refineries will be critical to

u.s.

crude petroleum

supplies until Gulf ports are able to handle super-tankers.

Refin-

eries in the Antilles supply over 50 percent of U.S. petroleum
products derived from Middle Eastern and African crude.
Jamaica has been an important supplier of bauxite and alumina
to the United States.
activity.

Suriname and Guyana have joined it in that

A continuing high volume of inter-oceanic and hemispheric

trade moves through the Caribbean on north-south trade routes and to
and from the Panama Canal.

The entire region is today the focus of

development efforts sponsored by regional development banks, the
World Bank and bilateral aid programs.

Over time this export-oriented

development planning will increase the volume of trade that transits
the Caribbean Basis to and from the United States.
The Caribbean is also militarily important to the United
States, providing critical links in the network of

u.s.

listening
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posts monitoring ship and submarine activities in the Atlantic
Ocean and approaches to the Caribbean Sea itself.

A variety of

military training activities takes place in Panama, Puerto Rico and
Cuba (Guantanamo) that would be costly to move, and in some cases
would be irreplaceable.

Communications, tracking and navigation

facilities are located throughout the region and particularly in
the Eastern Islands.

The Navy's Atlantic Underseas Test and Evalua-

tion Center in the Bahamas has been critical in the development of
anti-submarine warfare capabilities.

The Panama Canal continues to

be a key facility on major east-west trade routes.
The Caribbean region's importance to the United States on
these dimensions should not be exaggerated.

The United States has

important military installations at Panama, The Bahamas, Puerto
Rico, Guantanamo and elsewhere.

Only recently, however, has the

United States had any military facilities in Central America.
The United States enjoys convenient access to certain raw
materials from the Caribbean Basin countries, including petroleum,
petroleum by-products, bauxite, alumina, and other materials that
constitute the list of critical imported raw materials.

However,

no critical raw materials come from Central America, which exports
sugar, cotton and some coffee to the United States.

Only about 3.7

percent of the U.S. world trade takes place with the Caribbean
Basin countries.

The same countries account for 11 percent of

trade with Latin America.

u.s.

In contrast, the United States supplies

the majority of imports to Caribbean Basin countries and is the
principal market for Caribbean Basin country exports.

The United
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States is economically important in the Caribbean Basin.

The

Caribbean Basin is not particularly important economically to
the United States.
About 18 percent of

u.s.

committed to Latin America.

overseas direct private investment is
Of this, above half is invested in the

Caribbean Basin, most of this (up to one-third) in offshore banking
facilities in The Bahamas, Bermuda and in Panama.

U.S. firms have

never been heavily invested in the island economies (the Dominican
Republic is an exception) mainly because of the islands' ties to
former European colonial powers.

In contrast to the widely held

belief that U.S. corporations "run" the economies of Central America,
major firms divested their interests in the "banama republics" in
the 1960s and 1970s.

Other firms left the region in the 1970s

because of the endemic political instability.

One of the most

questioned aspects of the Caribbean Basin Initiative has been the
assumption that

u.s.

firms would invest capital in the region.

Many if not most economists believe that the lack of economic
infrastructure, the low level of skills, foreign investment policies
designed to protect domestic producers from competition, would
discourage even the most altruistic corporation.
The Panama Canal continues to be important to

u.s.

East-West

trade though its importance has waned since the 1950s and 1960s
when European and Japanese economic recovery and growth fostered
unprecedented expansion in East-West maritime shipping.

By 1969-

70, Canal growth had stabilized such that even the most optimistic
growth forecasts could not justify expansion or investment in a new
canal.

Only the temporary (and recently ended) use of the Canal
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for transshipment of Alaskan petroleum to U.S. East Coast refineries
has sustained Canal use at its highest level over the past decade.
In spite of its diminished economic importance, the Panama
Canal does continue to be a valuable commercial and military asset
access to which must be defended.

It is nevertheless a vulnerable

asset whose utility would be limited in major global conflict.

u.s.

The

stake in the Canal today is as much a question of principle as

of vital interest.
If the United States has relatively low vested interests in
the economic potential or even in the military installations in
Central America, the region is the

u.s.

political stability and harmony enhances
the history of

u.s.

sphere of influence and

u.s.

security.

Throughout

relations with the Caribbean Basin countries,

political compatibility with U.S. determined values has been the
key factor directing U.S. attention to the region and determining

u.s.

relations with emerging governments in the area.

During the

19th century, U.S. efforts were concentrated on progressively
excluding other powers from the region in an effort to reduce
potential threats to

u.s.

u.s.

security.

In the early 20th century,

interventions in the affairs of countries of the region were

frequent and largly intended to promote the interests of expanding

u.s.

corporations.

In the aftermath of World War II,

u.s.

interests

in Latin America in general, and in Central America in particular,
declined.

Friendly dictators occupied most governments and were

supportive, on demand, of U.S. interests and policies.
ations were active in the region.

u.s.

corpor-
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u.s.

policy attention turned to Central America only when

trouble emerged -- in Guatemala in 1954, in Cuba in 1959, in the
Dominican Republic in 1964 and more recently in Jamaica in the
1970s and in Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979.

u.s.

In each of these cases

attention focussed on a political crisis that threatened to

bring to power a government thought to be potentially hostile to
the United States.

In most cases such governments were known to be

or suspected of being Marxist.

The same concerns have drawn atten-

tion to the present on-going crisis in Central America.

Insufficient

thought has been given to underlying causes of domestic instability
and policy response required to deal with that phenomena.
Present Challenges to

u.s.

Interests in Central America

The United States has enjoyed security in the Caribbean Basin
and Central American at relatively low cost for a prolonged period
of time.

The region has been largely free of external influences.

In the period after World War II, no other world powers had the
desire or capability to maintain a major military presence in the
region.

Over time the European colonial powers withdrew from the

Eastern Caribbean, confident that the United States would defend
their remaining interests.

Until the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union

did not have the ability to maintain a sizeable force in the region,
nor did it provide Cuba with such a force.
Under these circumstances, the United States became overconfident
of the security of its interests in the Central American region.
relied heavily on predictable dictators and failed to note the
changes taking place in the regional societies and economies that

We
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would eventually give rise to domestic unrest.

As aid and military

assistance budgets diminished, we had fewer and fewer people in the
region to report back through channels on local developments.
Given the low priority the region enjoyed during the late 1960s and
throughout the 1970s, even the best reporting might not have aroused
sufficient attention to the emerging political crisis in the region.
The present challenge to

u.s.

security interests in Central

America stems first and foremost from political instability that has
resulted from the deep-rooted social, economic and political backwardness of the region.

Backwardness and inequalities have encouraged

the emergence of radical and nationalist political forces within
the region.

The Soviet Union, Cuba and other pro-Soviet elements

have began to take advantage of the targets of opportunity that
such political instability presents.
Few scholars or members of the intelligence community believe
that the Soviets have a master plan for undermining
in the Latin American region.

u.s.

interests

However, the Soviets have become

much more aggressive in pursuing opportunities for building their
own influence and for undermining the United States influence in
the Third World.
The Soviet Union has long recognized the special importance of
Latin American solidarity with the United States and is increasingly
willing to take advantage of opportunities to exploit cracks in the
inter-American system.

At the same time, the Soviets understand

that their ability to operate in the United States' immediate
sphere of influence is limited.

As a result, they generally have
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taken a conservative attitude toward revolution in the Western
Hemisphere.

In the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, the Soviet

Union gave Fidel Castro rein to explore revolutionary potential in
the region.

After the death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967

however, it is generally agreed that the Russians instructed Cuba
to cease its revolutionary activities in the hemisphere.

Through

most of the 1970s, Cuban support to Marxist movements in the region
consisted of providing refuge to Marxist exiles and training Marxist
political leaders in Cuba itself.

Cuba did not become directly

involved in Central American's turmoil until the Sandinista victory
in Nicaragua was nearly assured.

Then, believing that conditions

might be "ripe for revolution" elsewhere in the region, Cuba became
active in organizing disparate revolutionary factions, in training
guerrilla cadres, and in developing mechanisms for logistic support
to revolutionary movements.

The Cubans did not have to initiate

revolutionary or terrorist activities in the Central American
countries.

Such eevolutionary movements had long been active in El

Salvador and in Guatemala.
Because of its proximity to the United States and because of a
long history of
well as because

u.s. domination
of u.s. efforts

of Cuban politics and economy, as
to overthrow the Castro regime, the

present Cuban government feel it has considerable motive to to
sponsor anti-American sentiment in the hemisphere.
Cuba seems to recognize limits to its challenge to
The Cubans do not want to provoke direct

u.s.

However, even

u.s.

interests.

military involvement

in the region, perhaps because they would themselves be required to
become involved on behalf of their clients.

There is strong reason
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to believe that the Soviet Union has made it clear to the Cuban
leadership that no Soviet support would be forthcoming if a direct
confrontation should occur.
In the current policy debate on

u.s.

interests in Central

America, there has been too little recognition that both the Soviet
Union and Cuba have goals of exploiting weaknesses in the political,
economic and social fabric of Central America for purposes of
embarrassing the United States and displaying weaknesses of
support within the Third World.

u.s.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the

Cubans are willing to take great risks to bring revolutionary
leaders to power or to maintain them once there, but they are
clearly motivated to pursue the lesser task of promoting instability
in the region and by doing so, undermining

u.s.

security.

Neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba has incentive to cease its
activities in the hemisphere.

Indeed expressions of heightened

U.S. concern for the Marxist threat in the region have the double
impact of signaling caution and raising interest in the ultimate
success of the challenge to

u.s.

interests.

Cautionary signals

from the United States may bring about temporary retreats from the
policy of challenge, but there is little to suggest that such
retreats will be permanent.

Only a long-term policy that is designed

to deny the Cubans or Soviets of their appeal within the region is
likely to assure

u.s.

security interests.

A second and different aspect of the problem confronting the
United States in its sphere of influence stems from internal political
and economic developments in the countries in the region.

The
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Central American polities are undergoing dramatic political change.
Economic, social and political forces have converged to bring about
the collapse of the traditional, narrow, elite-dominated political
order that has prevailed in the region for decades.

Yet, to date

the processes of change have failed to produce a substitute order,
and there is little consensus as to the nature of successor regimes.
Moreover, the near total lack of tradition of compromise and accommodation in the political patterns of the region make compromise
exceedingly difficult.

Democratic traditions are weak despite

historical claims of support for democratic principles.

Political

and judicial institutions have been weak and corrupted, servicing
the interests of a narrow elite.

In contrast to recent patterns in

a more politically developed South America, there is little tradition of benevolent authoritarianism in Central America, either.
Recent military authoritarian governments have worked to exploit
the system for the benefit of a small group, have engaged in repressive tactics against a broad spectrum of political opposition,
alienating large elements of the center of the political spectrum,
and in general have failed to engage in meaningful efforts to
respond to the economic needs of the population.

On the scale of

political development, the Central American countries are far behind
their South American neighbors or their American and European
democratic models.

The .foremost task confronting them in the

present crisis is to generate political institutions capable of
coping with change.
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The Central American countries are experiencing a crisis of
political leadership.

The military remains the single most coherent

political institution in the region and military leaders have provided the foundation of

u.s.

support there for many decades.

The

unique role of the Central American military institution presents a
serious problem to the United States in developing a policy for
coping with regional political instability.

Central American

militaries have been conservative guardians of the old order.

In

many countries -- El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala -- they were
(and are) corrupt.

Institutional commitment to pluralist, competi-

tive democratic political processes is severely limited.

Defensive

institutional considerations have been the prime motivators of
political involvement during the recent period of political instability.

At the same time, the military institutions were the first

political actors to recognize that the fall of Somoza signalled the
need for dramatic changes within the region.

In each of the Central

American countries military leaders -- often junior officers
reacted in a unique way to the Sandinista victory.

In Guatemala,

the military government intensified efforts to eliminate domestic
political opposition.

In Honduras, the beginning of an ultimately

successful effort to transfer authority from the military to a
civilian government were initiated.

In El Salvador, young officers

overthrew the military government of General Romero and sought to
establish a reforming civil-military coalition.

Similarly each

military institution has reacted in its unique way to continuing
domestic insurgency.
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The key political role of the Central American militaries has
complicated the emergence of independent civilian political institutions.

Political leaders are confronted with the task not only

of building consensus amoung self-interested political actors, but
also of countering the political wishes of the only institution
that has traditionally exercised veto power over the entire domestic
political process.

Democratic political institutions are unlikely

to be successful in Central America until the future role of the
military in Central American societies is decided.
Complicating the domestic uncertanties in Central America, the
region is increasingly permeated by competing international political
actors, including both revolutionary and non-revolutionary Marxists,
also Social Democrats and Christian Democrats from Europe and Latin
America, religious groups of all persuasions, union organizers and
others.

All of these groups seek to influence emerging political

leaderships for institutional purposes often irrelevant to the
political needs and realities of Central American politics.
activities challenge

u.s.

Their

abilities to channel national political

energies in directions that complement

u.s.

interests in the region.

In summary, instability and insurgency in Central America present a direct challenge to

u.s.

interest and security.

The Central

American and Caribbean countries constitute the United States
immediate sphere of influence.

They are more dependent on the

United States and over time have been more influenced by this
country than have other nations in the hemisphere.

Any change in

this traditional line-up of Central American countries with the
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United States represents a failure on the part of this country to
maintain support within its own sphere of influence.

While the

comparison is uncomfortable, the loss of a supportive government in
Nicaragua can be compared to a loss of the Polish or Czechoslovak
regime from the Soviet sphere of influence.
The United States has an understandably limited tolerance for
Marxist governments in its immediate sphere of interest.

In spite

of periodic tests of will, such as the missile crisis of the Cienfuego
submarine base incident, the United States has learned to live,
reluctantly, with the Marxist government in Cuba.

Additional

pro-Soviet, aggressively anti-American governments like Cuba's in
the United States' primary sphere of influence cannot be entertained
for a number of reasons.
First, the long and revered tradition of U.S.-Latin American
relations is one of general regional harmony.

An aggressively

hostile anti-American foreign policy on the part of one or more
members of the inter-American foreign community represents a breakdown of the community that has long been a cornerstone of
political power projection onto the world scene.

u.s.

It is important

in the global balance of political power that the United States be
able to demonstrate its alliance with the countries of the Western
Hemisphere.
Second, as the Cuba experience has demonstrated, Marxist
revolutionary governments are committed to promoting their ideology
abroad.

Given the politically weak regimes of Central American and
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the Caribbean countries, it is difficult if not impossible to limit
the activities of committed and coordinated revolutionaries.
Many domestic revolutionaries are nationalists first, then
Marxists.

International and

u.s.

sympathetic to the nationalists.

domestic opinions are generally
However if the leadership cadres

of revolutionary movements remain committed Marxist-Leninists, it
is unlikely that the less politically organized and prepared nationalists can prevail in determining the political direction of their
movements.

The recent Nicaraguan experience has demonstrated this

difficulty.

Moreover, in the geographically-linked region of

Central America, it is impossible to isolate one revolutionary
movement from another, or one subversive effort from another.
Borders cannot be controlled and longstanding personal contacts
cannot be eliminated.

Real risks to regional stability are presented

when revolutionary movements associated with and supported by
international communism come to powers.
Finally

u.s.

opinion leaders and more importantly, the

u.s.

public, are profoundly divided on the question of the potential
benign nature of Communist regimes and of

u.s.

ability to deal with

such regimes and moderate their revolutionary and anti-American
tendencies.

The weight of opinion falls heavily against conceding

ground to such movements, however.

The domestic political risks of

"being soft on Communism" severely constrain policy changes.

As a

consequence there is little room for the unpredictable alignment
such as might result from independent socialist or non-aligned
governments.

There is little tolerance in the present

u.s.
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political system for the uncertainties that a Marxist, but not
Soviet-oriented regime, might present to U.S. interests in the
region.

While many argue for greater accommodation with revolu-

tionary leaders, few political leaders are willing to assume the
greater political costs that such "absence of political guarantees"
might entail.

This has been a major stumbling block to achieving

consensus on current Central American policy.
Foreign Policy Objectives in Support of National Security

u.s.

vital interests in the Caribbean Basin can be maintained

by military force but only at very high cost.

Moreover, to rely on

superior military might to defend U.S. security in that region, and
especially in Central America, has negative consequences for

u.s.

relations with friendly nations in the region, and almost certainly
escalates the stakes in the Soviet or Cuban game of challenging the
United States.

The more military might that is committed to the

region, the greater the need to demonstrate resolve to use that
might and the greater the excuse offered to hostile governments
like Nicaragua, Cuba or Grenada for failing to respond to political
initiatives.
Moreover the more

u.s.

military might committed or committable

to Central American or the Caribbean Basin to defend against intermittent low level challenges to

u.s.

security, the less likely the

policy will enjoy full support of domestic public opinion.

In

spite of negative attitudes about co-existing Communist states,
there is no consensus to support the ouster of an installed, agressively anti-American, communist government like Cuba's.

There is
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less support for using military might to forestall the coming to
power of additional such governments.

u.s.

A better approach to promoting

security interests in the region is required.
The first questions that must be asked in establishing policy

for the Caribbean and Central American regions are:
outcomes do we want in the region?"

"What political

and "What are we willing to

expend to achieve these outcomes?"
At the beginning of this paper I asserted the answer to the
first question.

The United States wants to see stable, friendly,

properous states and freedom of movement of goods and services
within and through the region.

The United States wants no hostile

powers in its sphere of influence, thus expanded Cuban or Soviet
presence in the region, or additional Soviet client states are not
to be tolerated.

Realistically, the United States is not likely to

invest large amounts of political or economic capital in the region
other areas present more immediate demands on limited resources.
In short,

u.s.

objectives in the Central American region are to

achieve the stable, predictable, supportive and low cost environment
that characterized

u.s.

relations with the region, but which, in

the present and future will accomodate the rather dramatic changes
that Central America is experiencing in its current political
development crisis.

Such conditions might best promote key

u.s.

security interests in the region -- continued unchallenged access
for

u.s.

economic and military activities, support for

u.s.

foreign

policy objectives and denial of political support to the United States
principal world rivals.

In addressing such desired outcomes, it is
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important to recognize that in the 1980s the United States cannot
impose or will the preferred states of affairs in the region.
Rather it must contribute actively to their evolution.
Policies for Dealing with Political Instability and Insurgency
Three broad political areas of consensus need to be established in
order to elaborate a low cost security supporting policy for the
Central American region.

First,

u.s.

political leadership needs to

develop a greater consensus and more visible expression of U.S.
goals for the Central American region.
visible commitment of

u.s.

Second, there must be a

resources to the promoting of political

and economic development within the region.

Finally the United

States must develop a consensus on how to deal politically and
militarily with Marxist insurgencies within the region.

In each

case, policies should be elaborated with a sober view toward the
resources available for implementing them.

The tradition of

u.s.

relations with Latin America has been to promise much and deliver
little.

There is little patience left in the region for cynical

approaches to present instability.
Within broad
stating

u.s.

u.s.

public opinion there is little objection to

policy goals for the Central American region as the

promotion of stable and prosperous nations, as long as prosperity
is shared and stability is understood to entail managing and coping
with change and not just insistence on a convenient status quo.
However, there is great debate within the

u.s.

body politic on

the necessity of having supportive governments within the region.
This has been the crux of the debate over

u.s.

relations with
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Nicaragua or over the merits of negotiation with the Salvadoran
revolutionary Front.

Before a coherent

u.s.

policy toward Central

America can be adopted, this debate must be resolved and a consensus
must be forged on the costs and benefits of a non-aligned U.S.
Southern flank.
It is clearly more desirable from a national security perspective that regional governments be friendly and supportive rather
than aloof or hostile.

It is in the United States interest that

its neighbors not be torn politically between support for Western
or Soviet bloc interests in global political debates.

To date,

non-alignment has not become sufficiently neutral to provide an
appealing alternative to more formal commitment to one or another.

u.s.

diplomatic efforts must strive to make adherence to the

Western bloc more appealing than membership in a Soviet camp.
The weak link in the political equations of nearly all Central
American countries are the political instititions and political
practices.

The United States policy must seek to promote the

development of strong political institutions in the region.

To

date this country has tended to be too easily satisfied with
appearance and has overlooked practice in its assessement of political performance in Central America.

The human rights controversy

provides an exemplary strong case in point.
one of

u.s.

u.s.

The public image is

government laxness in asserting human rights priorities.

efforts in El Salvador to evoke elicit responsibile political

behavior from an entrenched corrupt system underscore the need for
more concerted efforts at promoting political institutional development in the region.

The best minds must be called to the task of
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devising policy for accomplishing the goal.

The

u.s.

past recorn

of transferring democratic values and practices to new regions and
cultures has not been good.
The United States must make a strong commitment to the economic
development of the region in order to stimulate hope of future
prosperity.

The present zero-sum economic environment in Central

America must end.

Economic constraints severely limit even the

best political leaders' abilities to generate support for their
policies.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative is a step in the right

direction, but the development effort must be more visible.

The

carrot of economic benefits to be derived from association with the
United States is one of the strongest incentives for regional
leaders to associate themselves with

u.s.

interests and policies.

At the same time, economic development programs must be elaborated
with a clear and sober view of the human and material resources
available in the region and of the absorptive capabilities of
individual countries.
Finally, the United States must engage in a consensus-building
debate that will generate a coherent understanding of the challenge
posed by Soviet-backed Marxist activities in the Western Hemisphere.
At least until the internal political questions are resolved in
Central America, Marxist insurgencies of greater and lesser political
strength will continue to pose a threat to regional political
stability and to

u.s.

security interests in the region.

At the

same time, until insurgent threats to emerging political coalitions
end, political solutions will be difficlut to impose.

Neither
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political nor economic development can take place in a climate of
war.

All sides must agree on this point.
A number of themes should be considered in the

debate.

u.s.

policy

They include the following items.

(1)

The United States must devote a much more serious
intelligence gathering effort to the Central American
region.
Terrorist, insurgent and radical opposition
movements (of left and right) must be better understood.
Throughout much of the current crisis in Central America
the United States has been operating in the dark.

(2)

The United States must deal directly with military
setablishments in Central America.
They must be prepared
to carry the burden of counter-insurgency alone.
Central
American militaries need training and equipment, but they
should not be spoiled by providing equipment, training or
political attention that far exceeds their requirements
in a more stable environment or under a democratic government.

(3)

Given the central position that militaries have occupied
in regional politics, caution should be exercised so as
not to further military veto authority over politically
weaker civilian leaders.

(4)

Contingent policies for dealing with Marxist or Marxistleaning governments must be elaborated.
Such governments
must be rejected by countries of the region, and not just
by the United States. Therefore, a regional consensus on
the acceptable foreign policy behaviors must be generated.
Criteria for judging such behaviors might include:
(a)

the extent to which such regimes would follow foreign
policy lines truly independent of the Soviet Union;
and,

(b)

the extent to which they contribute to regional
political stability and order.

The criteria should apply to Cuba as well as to newer
leftist governments.
On both of these counts, the present
Nicaraguan leadership would fail.
However, the radical
revolutionary leadership of El Salvador claims that its
program of government would satisfy u.s. concerns on both
of the dimensions.
That assertion needs to be tested.
(5)

A greater burden of regional problem solving must be born
by Latin American countries.
Like Central American
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political leaders, our Latin American allies have tended
to rely on the United States to take controversial
initiatives in the region. They have relished the
opportunity to criticize the United States for its actions
while enjoying the results of that policy.
Latin American
countries cannot afford large scale economic assistance
to Central America at present.
They must begin to share
greater political responsibility for their region nevertheless.
Any

u.s.

policy for Central America is likely to have mixed

success and mixed support.

Solutions being posed today to Central

American problems are not new.

In the past however, there has been

insufficient follow-through with policies to realize success.

The

Central American problem is deeply rooted in the political, social
and economic fabric of the region.

The region is experiencing

turmoil because its institutions are not adequate to deal with the
demands that confront them.

Soviet or Cuban supported insurgent

activities exacerbate difficulties, but did not cause them.
Resolving Central America's political problems will require a long
time.
relief.

Military responses can provide superficial and short-term
More difficult political responses are required for long-

term relief.

Moreover, the effort to find political solutions will

have to come from within each individual country.
can help but not accomplish the task itself.

The United States
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UNITED STATES POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
TOWARD A NEW RELATIONSHIP
HOWARD J. WIARDA
[The views expressed are the author 1 s and not necessarily of the
agencies with which he is affiliated.]

The United States has in the past accorded little attention to
Central America.

Not only do we not understand that area very well,

but we have seldom tried to understand it.

04r notions about

Central America are shrouded in myths and stereotypes.

Attitudes in

the United States toward the region tend to be patronizing,
condescending, and lacking in empathy.

We refer to the nations of

the area as "banana republics" and we doubt if they are worthy of
serious attention, culturally, historically, politically,
sociologically.

We turn our attention to the area only in times of

crisis, and then our inclination is look for an easy formula, pat
solutions.

As James Reston of the New York 'l'imes wrote twenty years

ago as we became absorbed by the area in reaction to an earlier
Cuban revolution: "The United States will do anything for Latin
America except read about it."

1

This statement attempts to provide some of the understanding
often lacking in our discussions of Central America, to assess the
difficulties of development there, to provide an overview of the new
realities of the area and of the constraints on U.S. policy as it
attempts to grapple with the area, and to assess policy options and
po s s 1'b 1'1'1 t.1 e s • 2=
Four points need to be addressed initially:

(1} Though our

assignment is to focus on the mid- (3-5 years) to longer- (10-2p
years) term, it needs to be recognized that in practice these time
frames cannot be easily separated.

O~r

instructions are to deal
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not with current events but to present models and frames of
reference for longer-term policy -- but one recognizes the
artificiality of these divisions.

For one thing Central

America today remains strongly a prisoner of its historic
past; for another, it is impossible to conceive that Central
America three, five, ten, or twenty years hence will not be
affected by what is occurring there presently; for a third, and
looking back over past history, one doubts that in the nearor even longer-term Central America will be altered fundamentally
by whatever we choose here to do.

The heavy hand of history is

too powerfully present there for these time frames to serve more
than analytical purposes, or for much to be altered quickly
despite all our efforts.

We can marginally affect change in that

area but we cannot reverse the course of history.

However, as

former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chief of Staff Pat Holt
has remarked, "even a change of direction of 3-4 percent would
have been enough to save the Titanic." 3
(2) A second point has to do with the presumption on which
the work of this Commission is based.

It is widely believed that

since past policies have "failed," there is now need for a new
approach.

That, after all, is why this Commission was created.

But I think we would be remiss in branding all past U. S. policies
in Central America a "failure" and therefore opting for some
wholesale -- and hence probably unrealistic -- revamping of
policy.

In this paper I suggest a new formula and some new

approaches but these build upon earlier efforts, reflecting the
"new realities" of the area, rather than any wholesale abandonment
of past strategies.

Such abrupt departures as may seem tempting
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may well not work, and I am not

entirely convinced past policies

were the unmitigated disaster they are often pictured.
(3) Related

is the possibility that the Corronission may be

overly tempted by some pat and easy

formula.

Among the candidates

are the "Project Democracy" and new "Marshall Plan" ideas.

These

are useful ideas deserving of support, but there is reason to be
skeptical of formulas that promise all-encompassing solutions to
Central America's problems and thus raise exaggerated expectations. 4
(4) Allow me also to enter a plea for a careful, serious,
bipartisan strategy, as distinct from an unbalanced and intensely
partisan one.

There are many axes -- partisan, personal, academic,

political, institutional -- that are being ground over the Central
America issue, most of which generate heat but little light.
Particularly in the midst of an election campaign the temptations
to partisanship, or to the private and personal ambitions that
Harvard's Edward Bansfield called "private-regardingness" (as
distinct from "public regardingness"), are powerful.

5

In this

charged context, it is especially important to suggest recommendations that are balanced and prudent, that have realistic possibilities of generating support and of achieving success, rather than
extreme, partisan, unrealistic and impractical ones.

The

presentation of such a reasonable, balanced, non-partisan, and
prudent policy is what I have attempted here.
Political Institutions and Institutionalization
in Central America
The literature on political institutions and institutionalization in developing countries is rich and diverse, but little
of it has been applied to Central America.

The seminal book on
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the subject is Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing
. t '1es. 6
S oc1e

This book is rich in general and conceptual ideas but

has almost nothing to say about Central America.

Indeed one would

be hard pressed to think of any general volume in that body of
literature called "Political Development" that contains anything
more than passing reference to the area.
The problem for Central America -- and for United States
policy there -- is an almost complete lack of institutions of any
sort.

Central America was characterized by colonial neglect

during Spain's 300 year long rule which means that, in contrast
to Mexico for example, the Central American nations never developed
strong centralized political authority, a strong and centralized
military, an efficient and rationalized bureaucracy, a strong
Church, even a strong oligarchy that might have held these countries
together after independence.

7

Nor did the instituions of a liberal

polity -- political parties, electoral machinery, republican and
representative institutions -- develop in nineteenth century Central
.

Amer1ca.

8

The result was -- and is -- a set of countries in Central
America, Costa Rica being the foremost exception, with the
institutional infrastructures neither of a traditional nor of a
liberal-democratic polity.

Central America was undefined

institutionally, unformed -- and it remains so.

Indeed at the

heart of the problem in Central America -- and at the root of its
instability, violence, and lack of viability -- is an almost
complete lack of institutionalization of any kind.

The absence

of institutions, particularly of a democratic sort, makes it
terribly difficult for the United States to assist these countries,
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to grasp on to the levers and to turn them to positive developmental goals.

For the levers prove slippery and difficult to

grasp, or else they simply break off in our hands.
To make up for these institutional deficiencies -- what

"'
the Central Americans often refer to as a "falta de civilizacion"
a variety of other agencies have been created over time.

These

seldom conform to United States or "Western" notions of good and
proper governance, but historically they have not functioned
entirely badly in the Central American context.

These include

extended family networks, clan and patronage networks, mixed
civil-military regimes that defy the rigid classificatory schemes
we often employ to define a government as either the one or the
other, personalistic and populist regimes such as that of former
President Torrijos in

~anama.

Such regimes are seldorn fully

democratic by our lights but they are seldom fully totalitarian
either.

Given the small, personalistic, city-state nature of

the Central American polities, one could argue such "mixed"
regimes are not entirely inappropriate in the Central American
context.

And given the absence of any other institutional

arrangements in these countries, one must warn against those U. S.
assistance programs that, sometimes purposely and sometimes
inadvertently, helped undermine or discredit existing institutions
in Central America before any new ones had been created.

While

often launched with the best of democratic and developmentalist
intentions, some of these programs had the practical effect of
destabilizing Central America still further and of leaving ·the
area with a vacuum of institutions of any kind.
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Left largely to its own devices, approaches, and sometimes
crazy-quilt pattern of institional arrangements, Central America
developed rapidly in the 1950s, 1960s, even on into the 1970s.
Economic growth was in the range of 5-7 percent per year, social
programs were greatly expanded with U. S. assistance, one could
even argue that representative institutions were growing -- though
not necessarily in conformity with U. s.-preferred democratic
precepts.

9

Then two main forces, one political and the other

economic, came together to undermine this not altogether unattractive picture and to precipitate the crisis in which we now find
ourselves.
The political trends involved cloture, sclerosis, and a
failure to adjust to new realities.

In Nicaragua the authoritarian

but not entirely unpopular or unenlightened reign of the father
Anastasio Somoza and then his son Luis gave way in the 1970s to
the greedy, increasingly corrupt and repressive regime of Anastasio
Jr.

(Tachito), which finally succeeded in antagonizing all groups

in society including the business community and the American
embassy.

In El Salvador the nationalistic and quasi-progressive

combined civil-military system that dominated from 1958 to 1972
was replaced by a brutal and reactionary civil-military faction
that sought to turn the clock back with predictably disastrous
consequences.

In Guatemala, similarly, the more-or-less centrist

regimes that had dominated in the 1960s and early 1970s were
replaced by a brutally repressive and corrupt regime that laid
the basis for renewed guerrilla resurgence later on.

The patterns

in these three countries are remarkably similar; they are also the
three countries with the largest current difficulties and with
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which

u.

S. policy recently has been mainly concerned.

It bears

10

repeating that none of these regimes replaced

by more brutal, corrupt, and repressive factions were models of
liberalism and democracy by our lights.

But they were tolerably

efficient, not entirely based on blood and guns, more-or-less
nationalistic and progressive.

Moreover -- and because of this

they kept the guerrilla challenges perpetually present in Central
America since the early 1960s from getting entirely out of hand.
Although it is getting ahead of the story, it may be submitted
that is about as much as we can reasonably expect or hope for
in Central America.
The second major precipitating factor was economic:

the

downturn of the Central American economies in the 1970s.

The

downturn was precipitated by, among other factors, the two oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979, declining or wildly fluctuating markets
for Central American products, and the world-wide economic
depression of 1979 and thereafter.

The subject has been extensively

treated by others and its details cannot detain us here.

11

What requires emphasis, however, is what the economic crisis
did to the whole model of Central American change and development.
That model and process, albeit not exclusively democratic, had
generally in the 1950s and 1960s been peaceful and accommodative.
New groups -- the business community, the middle class, some labor
groups -- had been gradually absorbed into "the system'' of Central
America in an evolutionary process that was not entirely undemocratic
and

with little bloodshed.

Accommodative politics is of course

relatively easy in a context of an expanding economic pie, since
there are always more pieces to hand out to the newer groups
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without the older and established ones having to be deprived.
But in the context of a stagnant or even contracting economic
pie as prevailed in Central America by the late 1970s, there
are no new pieces to hand out and competition for the existing
shares tended to become more intense and violent.

The responses

from existing governments was often greater repression.
These indigeneous political and economic causes of the
Central American crisis were then exacerbated and made worse by
the intervention of outside forces -- principally the Cubans, the
Soviets, eventually the Nicaraguans -- into the regional cauldron
and by their efforts to take advantage of the instability present.
Thus seen, the Soviets and Cubans are not the prime causes of the
rebellion in Central America, but it is their presence there that
. o b v1ous
.
1 y o f most concern to
1s

un1te
. d s tates

f ore1gn
.
po 1'1cy. 12

It bears reemphasis that the problems in Central America
are systemic problems.

13

They are long-term, deep-rooted, and

therefore not .amenable to quick or easy solutions.

They have to

do with fundamental political, sociologic, and economic trends
stretching back over twenty years and more.
or rapidly resolvable.
explanation for them.

They are not ephemeral

No one single cause provides an adequate
Because they are basic, systemic, complex,

and long-term, they will require long-term, sustained policies and
solutions on the part of the United States.

I believe it is

important for the Commission to stress this to the American people.
At the same time I am not certain the forces at work and the
realistic possibilities open are well understood by the American
public or, oft times, by policy-makers.

The struggle in Central

America is not some dichotomous, either-or struggle between
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dictatorship and democracy but rather lies in that murkier
series of halfway houses that exist in between these two poles. 14
How to reach not some ideal and therefore unrealistic solution
but one that shows promise of working and a measure of viability,
however we might disagree over precise emphases, would seem to me
to be a proper concern for the Commission.

Similarly, we need to

sort out the indigenous from the external causes of the crisis,
emphasizing the indigenous causes but showing how and why it is
the Cuban and Soviet presences that cause most concern for U.
policy.

s.

Hence I think the Commission needs, among other things,

to perform an educational function, educating the public and
policy makers both to the realities of Central American domestic
politics and sociology and more precisely concerning what is
important and not so important to the United States in that part
of the world.
Past United States Policies
Prior to 1959 Latin America was viewed as an area that was
''safe" for United States interests.

True, there had been the

Guatemalan affair of 1954 but that was looked on by policy makers
as a temporary aberration that had successfully been reversed.
The notion of Stalinist legions expanding into Latin America was,
at the time, viewed as preposterous.

Hence, with the exception

of some limited Point Four and other programs, Latin America could

.
d . 15
sa f e 1y b e lgnore
Benign neglect is not an entirely inappropriate policy in
easy and peaceful times.

However in Latin America that stance

was maintained too long, serving to obscure the smouldering
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problems of the region and therefore to catch us unawares and
ill-prepared when they eventually exploded.

The Cuban revolution,

among other things, meant Latin America could no longer be
ignored.
In response to the Cuban revolution, and reflecting also
the new idealism and dedication to democratic development of the
Kennedy Administration, the United States launched the Peace Corps
and the Alliance for Progress.
A review and evaluation of both these programs would require more
space than is possible here.

The Alliance requires some attention

because its assumptions are still alive and well in the United
States government; those same assumptions are current in the
debate presently over U. S. policy and the proposal for a Central
American Marshall Plan.

Hence the assumptions of the Alliance and

its accomplishments require attention.
The Alliance was posited on the major assumption that economic
growth would also produce social and political development that
would lead to happy, liberal, pluralist, democratic, middle class
16
. t'1es JUS
. t l'k
soc1e
1 e our own.

Th e goa 1 s were no t

. t
JUS
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and developmentalist in an updated Wilsonian sense, however, but
also had a major strategic component.

That is, they assumed that

in such a happy and economically modernized society, middle class
stability would be assured, extreme ideologies would lose their
appeal, the trade unions would become oriented to collective
bargaining rather than radical political action, the military would
put aside praetorianism in favor of professionalism and an apolitical stance, business elites would develop a greater sense
of noblesse oblige, etc., etc.
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No one should deny the significant economic accomplishments
of the Alliance.

Those 5-7 percent growth rates mentioned earlier

were in considerable measure due to Alliance pump-priming.
social modernization was also major.

The

Anyone going to Latin America

over the last twenty years cannot but be struck by the improvements
in housing, health care, roads, education, sanitation, water
supplies, communications, and a number of other areas -- all undertaken with Alliance support.
But it is important to emphasize, particularly as we consider
proposed new campaigns for democratic development, that the
political presumptions of the Alliance have not worked out.

Nowhere

in Latin America do we see the growth of happily middle class
societies like those of North America or Western Europe -- and
with them the moderation and stability in politics on which the
Alliance economic assistance was based.

Those countries that are

most middle class -- Argentina, Chile, Uruguay -- could hardly be
described as happily, moderately, democratic.

Nowhere -- certainly

not in Central America -- have extremist ideologies lost their
appeal.

Nowhere have the trade unions come to accept their "proper"

place in society, as docile and apolitical.

Nowhere han military

professionalization led to an apolitical military; indeed, as
Alfred Stepan's work has shown,

17

professionalization of the

military may lead to greater armed forces intervention in politics,
not less.
The list of assumptions that have not worked out goes on.
Social modernization has led not to greater stability but less,
as old institutions are destroyed before viable new ones are
created.

18

The country-- the Dominican Republic-- that received
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the most per capita aid in ·the early 1960s and was viewed as a
model of the Alliance exploded in left-wing revolution in 1965
calling forth a massive U. S. military intervention that
presaged the Vietnam imbroglio.

The country

-~

Chile -- that

received the greatest per capita aid in ·the late 1960s nevertheless
elected a Marxist president in 1970 and then produced one of the
most repressive regimes ever seen in Latin America when he was
overthrown in 1973.
These comments and examples are not meant to deny the
importance of U. S. social and economic assistance to Latin America.
Indeed such assistance is put forward later in this statement as
part of the recommended policy package for Central illnerica.

But

it is to caution against excess enthusiasm for such aid as a cureall, and against the widespread assumption that all such good
things as economic development, social modernization, and democracy
go happily together.

Not only is that not necessarily the case but

the evidence is strong in the more recent development literature
that economic and social modernization may actually be disruptive
of political development.

19

By the late 1960s, corresponding with the height of Viet Nam
War protests, the early development literature -- that of Rostow
and others, whose writings had undergirded the Alliance for
Progress -- was strongly under attack.

The Alliance continued to

limp along for a time, but with neither the funds nor the enthusiasm
of its early heady days.

Samuel P. Huntington and others had weighed

in with influential critiques of the development literature.

But

Huntington's own prescriptions -- an emphasis not on social
modernization but on such agencies as political parties, bureaucracy,
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and the armed forces as the only institutions capable of holding
divisive, fragmented Third World countries together -- did not
seem to work well in Viet Nam and came under a considerable cloud.
New approaches -- for example, meeting basic human needs -- were
being discussed in the aid agencies, but there was as yet no
consensus on them.

Indeed it was precisely this lack of consensus,

coupled with growing critiques of the familiar and exisiting aid
and development approaches, the fact that fewer funds were available,
preoccupation with Vietnam and other concerns, that led to a
lessened attention in policy circles to the spiraling problems of
Central America.
This new period of not-so-benign neglect produced consequences
similar to those that the same strategy had produced in the 1950s.
The problems began to build up; yet because of Watergate and other
preoccupations little attention was devoted to them.

This was

precisely the time, however, when the more repressive elements
were seizing power and consolidating their hold in El Salvador
and Guatemala, and when Tachito's greed was getting the best of
him in Nicaragua.

Most scholars and policy analysts look on this

period as an opportunity lost in Central America.

Had we been

more strenuous then in supporting moderate elements, we would not
likely face the same degree of magnitude of problems in the area
that we face now.
Benign neglect was replaced in 1976 by Jimmy Carter's
emphasis on human rights.

That strategy, which had earlier

echoes in the Kennedy administration and in Woodrow Wilson's
naive if well-intentioned efforts to make the world safe for
democracy, produced some notable successes.

There is no doubt
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that as a result of the human rights emphasis numerous political
prisoners were released from jail, torture was diminished, other
abuses were prevented, and the United States received considerable
moral credit.

But critics charged the human rights strategy was

not even-handed, that it favored some groups and regimes on
partisan grounds while ostracizing others, that it was inconsistently applied, that it was inefficiently and heavy-handedly run,
that it ignored cultural and societal differences, that it was
elevated to such a place that other U.

s.

interests -- economic,

strategic -- were ignored, and that, in the end, it was not very
effective.

20

While Jimmy Carter emphasized human rights, he no more
entirely abandoned American security doctrine than Ronald Reagan
abandoned human rights.

In fact most analysts, while seeing new

emphases, have stressed the degree of continuity between the Carter
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President Carter and his administra-

tion began on the left side of the political spectrum and gravitated
toward the center; President Reagan began on the right side and also
gravitated toward the center.

President Reagan has more strongly

emphasized the East-West struggle in formulating his Central American
policy and has considerably increased the U. S. military presence
and pressure.

Critics charge that a military solution is not likely

to solve anything and may produce the opposite consequences of those
intended.

And, they argue, his approach to Central America has done

little to resolve the basic, underlying problems that cause
revolutionary sentiment to flourish.
The idea is widespread in the land that none of the approaches
tried by the United States in Latin America in over thirty years have
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worked.

Certainly the litany of policies outlined here must

give pause to those who believe in ever-onward and upward.
These range from coexistence with all forms of regimes to
blatant military interventionism, from strong activisim to
benign neglect.

It is widely argued in the development field

that none of the doctrines of the past really fit Central
22
.
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been similarly deficient.

Hence the idea for a commission to

come up with new approaches.
Many scholars are not convinced the experiences of the
past have been such a dismal failure, however.

They are not

ready to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

That is, they

recognize the flaws in some aspects of policy but feel the overall
thrust and record have been not entirely unsound.

Mistakes and

judgemental errors have been made in some countries but they feel
in general and region-wide notable successes have also been
registered.

They see the need, hence, not for some wholesale

revamping of policy but for adjustment and updating.

They would

argue that the basic tenets of policy are not so much flawed in
their essentials but that these have been implemented haphazardly
and inconsistently by successive administrations.

Hence these

analysts argue not for some grand but untried new departures
but for a pragmatic eclecticism, choosing and balancing among
the tried and true policies of the past but accommodating to
nuance and new realities and, above all, without the wild
fluctuations from administration to administration that they
see as the heart of the problem.

Let us see what these "new

realities" are to which policy must be adjusted.
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New Realities in Latin America
and in U. s.-Latin American Relations
Policy of course is not formulated in a vacuum.

The

facts are that Latin America is quite different than it was
two decades back, and the context of U. S.-Latin American
relations has changed correspondingly.

These "new realities"

need to be factored into any assessment and recommendations for
policy.

They are here presented in summary form, recognizing that

more detailed analysis and qualification are necessary.
1.

The United States is presently in a generally weaker posi-

tion vis-~-vis Latin America than was the case 15-20 years
ago.
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Then, United States hegemony -- military, political,

economic, cultural -- was overwhelming; today that is no longer
the case.

Our foreign assistance is down and hence our leverage

is diminished; our aid, military, and other missions have been
greatly reduced; the American business community is no longer
dominant throughout the area; our presence overall is considerably less than it once was; and hence our capacity -- or
even willingness -- to influence events is considerably lessened.
We now have fewer levers to manipulate, fewer resources to
manipulate them with, and our stomach is not really with it.
The United States is of course

the dominant power in the

region and our recent buildup in Central America has
partially reversed the earlier trends; but this involvement
is widely viewed as an abberation, unlikely to be sustained
over the long haul, a temporary "blip" in a downward-tending
graph line.

Our heavy involvement currently in Central America

is viewed as temporary, there is impatience to withraw,
and the assurnptibh is widespread that the trends toward
16
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a decreased presence in the area will be resumed shortly
once the problem-of-the-moment is resolved.
2.

The U. S. as a political and economic model has been

considerably tarnished in recent years.

Our economy has

not worked so well, our political system shows warts and
flaws, sociologically we are seen to have become somewhat
unraveled, and our leadership position and stature in the
world have been questioned and challenged.

Abroad, there

is widespread skepticism of the American notion that "we
know best .. for other peoples, in Central America or
elsewhere.

Latin America in general no longer wishes

necessarily or so eagerly to emulate the United States or
to adopt its political institutions; nor does it wish
necessarily to follow our foreign policy lead.

These

changes also imply a more circumspect role for the United
States throughout the area.
3.

There is unlikely to be any major new foreign aid

program for Central America.

Neither the Congress nor

the American people are willing to support bold new
.
. t ance 1n1
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It is unlikely that

there could be another Alliance for Progress even if that
were desirable; Americans do not want it and we cannot
afford it.

Indeed the trends seem to point in the opposite

direction:

protectionist walls are being thrown up,

isolationism is rising, and the one major foreign assistance
program we have, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, has been
so heavily gutted in its crucial trade provisions that one
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cannot be optimistic about some new, proposed "Marshall
Plan" for the area.
4.

There is considerable apprehension, even given the

best efforts of this Commission, whether in the present
circumstances the United States can carry out a coherent,
sustained, bi-partisan, long-term foreign policy.

The

intense and divisive debate over Central America policy,
the uncertain fate of the CBI, the irresolution of and
schizophrenia in American public opinion lend credence
to this view.

Many seasoned Washington observers, looking

at the drumbeat in the popular media over El Salvador and
Nicaragua, the strength and independence of some U.S.
domestic interest groups who all but carry out their own
separate foreign policies, the murky bureaucratic politics
of policy in the foreign affairs area, the overriding
desire for reelection and hence dramatic headlines on the
part of all office holders, the "divided government••
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betv.reen president and Congress, and the bitter and partisan
nature of the debate, wonder aloud if we can conduct a
serious foreign policy.

We are so deeply divided that

we have reached a stage of near irnmobilisme, and the
notion that the main ingredients of a sound policy could
be sustained from administration to administration is
difficult to contemplate.

26

It is arguable whether these constraints on policy
are as severe as I have pictured them, and as to the
degree to which they may be or have been reversed.
Certainly in Latin America, even in the Caribbean and
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Central America, the notion of the Uni·ted States as a
floundering, indecisive, and declining superpower are
widespread.

These perceptions in the area may be at

least as important as any objective assessments to the
contrary that we may reach.
5.

While the United States would seem to be a diminished

or declining presence in Latin America, the Latin American
nations themselves have become increasingly assertive and
independent.

This includes even the smaller nations of

Central America, and is especially the case in Mexico.
Various efforts are being made by all countries of the
area to modify their ties of dependence to the United States,
or to redefine or renegotiate the terms of their dependence.
This effort at "breaking away'' from the United States is
characteristic of right wing and centrist regimes as it is
of leftist ones, united in this cause by their rising and
intense nationalism.

There has always been in this region

a "love-hate" relationship with the United States, and that
mixed sentiment is by no means confined to one side of the
political spectrum.

This effort to loosen the bonds with

the United States is of course related to Latin America's
perception of United States power; and to the degree the
Latin American nations perceive the United States to be a
declining power or a diminished presence, it is thought of
as prudent on their part to diversify their trade patterns,
27
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6.

At the same time, and to a degree that has not as yet

been publicly recognized, we have become more and more
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dependent on Latin America and our interests there have
become greater than ever.

As our own natural resources

have been depleted, we have become increasingly dependent
on Latin America for primary goods and raw materials.

We need

access to the area's markets and we are increasingly
importing both foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

It is

a little known fact that U. S. trade with the Third World
is now greater than that with Japan and Western Europe
combined, with Latin America overwhelmingly the most
important to us among Third World areas.

We are now

almost as much dependent on Latin America in various ways
as it is upon us.

Our complex interdependence with Latin

America is best illustrated by the case of Mexico, where
energy policy, immigration policy, trade policy, diplomatic
relations, drug traffic, migrant workers policy, and
political and strategic considerations are intertwined in
.
a var1ety
o f comp 1 ex ways. 28

7.

Other outside actors have meanwhile come to be

significant influences in Central America.

These include

West Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Spain, the Soviet Union,
the Scandinavian and Benelux countries, some Eastern European countries, Saudi Arabia, and various transnational
agencies (churches, unions, the Socialist International,
foundations) •

On numerous fronts these other nations and

agencies are competing successfully for trade, contracts,
business, and political influence.

At the same time a

number of new regional powers -- Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela,
Colombia, Argentina, Brazil -- have begun to play a

227.

stronger role, one that is generally more independent
of the United States.

The United States is no longer

the only hegemonic power in the hemisphere, and our
relations with the area have recently been made much
more complex and difficult by the presence of these other
actors.
8.
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Central America is itself changing rapidly.

The

old beliefs and structures are crumbling, new ones are
rising up, the winds of revolution are sweeping the
area.

All the nations are considerably more affluent,

developed, self-assured, and independent than they
were at the time John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance
for Progress.

Some have taken up l,eadership positions

in the Third World and have put themselves forward as
bridges or intermediaries between North and South.
Nationalism is powerful, new ideologies have come to
the fore not necessarily in accord with the older bases
of legitimacy, change and modernization are everywhere
in the air.

These features, too, affect how the Latin

American nations behave and their attitudes toward the
United States.
9.
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Central America is presently going through both a

crisis and a period of experimentation.

There is a

widespread sense that the United States economic and
political model may not be appropriate for them, yet
there is almost no admiration for the Soviet Union
either.

Many Central American thinkers and political
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leaders are searching for a new political formula, based
on indigenous or national traditions or perhaps combining
these with useful and workable imported institutions.

The

approach will be eclectic; no one set of institutions will
be adopted en toto.

While this experimentation goes on we

can expect considerable instability; Central Americans also
plead for some understanding on the part of the United
States as they search for that new formula.
10.
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New issues have come to the fore in inter-American

relations.

First, it is clear that economic issues are

more important than previously, particularly from a Latin
American perspective.

While we talk of political and

security concerns, their interests are in economic
development.

We speak of the East-West struggle while the

Latin Americans, with some prominent exceptions, are more
interested in commercial matters and access to U. S. markets,
investments, technology and capital.
they are interested more in trade.

We speak of aid but
This disjuncture in the

agenda of issues that we and Latin America think of as most
important is a major barrier to better relations.

Further,

even in terms of more traditional bi-lateral relations, the
issues now are often different.

These include such newer

but vitally important issues as migration, employment, the
drug traffic, human rights, undocumen·ted workers, oil, the
debt situation.

These issues are fundamentally distinct

from the large political and strategic designs of the
1960s

and they call for a different, more pragmatic

U. S. response.
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Policy Options
Several policy options have been set forth for Central
America, ranging from complete hands-off to a virtual American
takeover of the area.

While all

these options will be duly

considered here, it must also be said that they do not all
conform equally to the history and new realities of the area,
as outlined above.

In addition, a number of these options have

been tried, with varying degrees of success, in the past.

Let

us therefore review these options keeping in mind the implications
and realistic possibilities of each.
1.

Complete Hands-Off.

An influential body of academic

opinion suggests that since the United States has so much
capacity to do evil in the world and so little to do good,
we and the rest of the world would be best off if we did
nothing at all.

This position goes beyond non-interventionism

to suggest a complete hands-off policy, allowing Central
America to develop on its own without outside interference.
The troubles with this position are several.
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First,

Central America is as much affected by what we in the
United States don't do as by what we do; and cutting ourselves
off from trade or contact with Central America will be
devastating for that area.

Second, while there is an

argument for allowing Central America to develop autonomously
and on its own, it is unlikely the other outside powers now
operating in the region would permit Central America to do so
even if the United States were to withdraw.

Third, it is

inconceivable that the American public or the American
governinent would simply pull up all stakes in Central America

230.
and go home.

This option is not only undesirable from

both a United States and a Central American point of view
but it is also entirely unrealistic.
2.

Benign neglect, interspersed with occasional
involvement.
This policy has been attempted in the past, but it

is no longer a useful basis for policy.

It may have been

appropriate in the 1950s when there were no or few perceived
threats to U. S. interests in the area, but conditions have
changed drastically since then.

Benign neglect allows

problems to fester until they explode rather than providing
for treatment of them in their early stages.

It tends to

lead to dramatic interventionism (Guatemala in 1954, Cuba
in 1961, Chile in 1973) rather than the patient resolution
of problems over a longer term.

Benign neglect also ignores

the new reality of our complex interrelations with Latin
America on a host of issues, meaning we can no longer ignore
34
the area even if we choose to do so.
3.

Active Engagement and Democratic Developmentalism.
This is probably the most attractive option, especially

given the other alternatives.

Most scholars and experts

on the area, and the general public, would likely support
such an option.

But there are major problems here as well.

These will be discussed below in greater detail.

But here

let is be said that such active engagement as we practiced
in the region in the 1960s may no longer be feasible, the
limits on what we can accomplish are greater, the funds and
enthusiasm may not be available, the Central Americans may
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no longer want such heavy U.

s.

involvement.

Additionally,

our ability to promote democratic developmentalism, while
laudable in theory, runs the danger of being overblown,
oversold, exaggerated, unworkable, and therefore productive
only of unfulfilled expectations.

Some additional cautionary

notes follow.
4.

Proconsularism.

This approach would have the United

States, in effect, take over and run Central America.
If the Central Americans cannot resolve their problems,
the argument goes, then we should do it for them.
But this approach cannot be effective in the long
term.

Such a heavy-handed U. S. presence breeds

resentment from all sectors in the countries so treated.
Moreover if the long range goal is the development of
indigenous institutions in Central America capable of
functioning effectively on their own, then

pro~consularism

will not help create or develop such institutions.

It

serves in fact to undermine local institutions rather than
strengthen them.

Except in genuinely emergency situations,

pro-consularism would seem to leave more problems in its
wake than it resolves immediately.
5.

Gunboat Diplomacy.

Except in rare and very special

circumstances, the era of gunboat diplomacy in Latin
America may well be about over.

Such military interventionism

unites all Latin Americans against us.

Domestically, we seem

no longer to have the stomach for such action, and public
opinion is strongly against the commitment of American forces
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in on-the-ground fighting.

Americans tire quickly of

indecisive military standoffs, and a policy of military
commitment abroad cannot be sustained indefinitely.
Gunboat diplomacy tends to respond to the symptoms and
not the causes of upheaval and to leave more problems
unresolved than solved.

It may be an appropriate short-

term strategy under exceptional conditions but it is not
a basis for policy on a longer term.
Toward a Prudence Model of United States• Latin America Policy
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Most professional students of Latin America would likely
favor option #3 as a long-term basis for United States policy:
active engagement by the United States in Central America and a
policy of democratic developmentalism.

But such a policy needs

to be reconciled to the "new realities" listed above and to i:he
historical and institutional considerations also discussed.
There is widespread acceptance in the literature of the
fact that Central America is going through a profound systemic
crisis.

That crisis is also long-term and will not be solved

overnight or by easy panaceas.

It requires a major and sustained

commitment on our part, and to be effective that commitment must
necessarily be realistic, consistent, prudent, and bipartisan.
Second, such a policy must be based on the "nevr realities"
outlined earlier -- new realities in the United States, in Latin
America, and in

u.

s.-Latin American relations.

If the "new

realities" listed above have a sound basis in fact -- as most
students of the area have concluded -- then certain policy
prescriptions and guidelines tend to flow from them.

It is on the
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basis of these new realities, I believe, that the Commission's
recommendations ought to be grounded.

What follows therefore

represents an effort to reconcile the new hemispheric realities
with some broad guidelines for a sound, prudent, and realistic
United States foreign policy toward the area.
1.

The diminished United States presence overall throughout

the area, the seeming absence of realistic possibilities for
some grand new design such as the Alliance for Progress, and
the corresponding new assertiveness and independence of Latin
America all imply some greater prudence and restraint on the
part of United States policy toward the area.

We can no

longer work our will there easily, unilaterally, or automatically; the era of deep United States involvement in the
internal affairs of these countries has not produced the
desired results and may be about over.

We have neither the

inclination nor the means for such heavy commitments, they
seem unlikely to serve the purposes intended, and the
expanding presence of other outside actors also implies
greater restraint on our part.
The same restraints that now limit unilateral U. S.
military action in the Hemisphere also impose limits on
U.

s.

political and diplomatic initiatives.

A U. S.

ambassador, for example, can seldom serve efficaciously
any longer in a proconsular capacity as, de facto, the
third, second, or maybe most important person in the
country; nor is it useful to have U. S. mission chiefs
running roughshod over local sensibilities by effectively
controlling and manipulating those areas of the local
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national life that fall under their responsibilities.
Such blatant interventionism in the internal affairs of
other nations almost always produces unforeseen consequences,
leads to profound resentment on the part of all sectors in
the country affected, and is certain in the long-run to be
self-defeating.
There are qualifications to these prescriptions:
the formulation above does not take account adequately of
how and when the Congress, public opinion, or legislative
requirements such as the certification process may force
an American ambassador into a proconsular role; nor does
it take account of the degree to which those in the smaller,
weaker countries, as distinct from the larger ones, expect
us to play a powerful leadership role.
tions do not invalidate the main point:

But these qualificathe need over the

longer-term to forge a policy based on caution, restraint,
and balance and to reject heavy-handed interventionism
either military or political.
2.

United States policy must be based on a far greater

sense of empathy and understanding of these countries than
we have heretofore recognized or practiced.

The great

developmental models and panaceas of the 1960s, largely of
U.

s.

making, have been discredited or proved not to work

as intended.

The fact is, we do not "know best" for

Central America; and efforts to export our institutions to
a cul·ture area where the mores and traditions are different
have not been notably successful.

Central America must be
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allowed to fashion its own developmental formulas with
some timely and appropriate assistance from the United
States, not through the replacements of its own institutions
by those imposed from the outside.

It is prudent and wise

for us to desist from exporting our institutions and models
to societies where they do not fit, may not be wanted, or
may not be deemed appropriate in precisely our form.

Not

only have such efforts in the past been unsuccessful but
in the present context we no longer have the resources or
commitment to carry out such programs in any case.
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But a considerably greater degree of empathy and
understanding of Central America on its own terms and in
its own institutional framework does not necessarily imply
the acceptance of a Latin American-style Amin or Hitler.
We do have values and we can express them.

There are regimes

the Latin Americans find unacceptable as well as we.
would do well to follow their lead in these matters.

An

argument for a greater degree of empathy and cultural
relativism in understanding Latin America does not mean we
need carry the argument to ridiculous extremes.
3.

Similarly with the argument for restraint.

Such

restraint does not imply we do little or nothing.

The

key is to find a balanced involvement that falls between
benign neglect and heavy-handed interventionism.

We not

only have values at stake but also increasingly more
important interests to protect.

The Central American

nations, while no longer accepting U. S. hegemony and
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dominance, do expect us to lead, particularly in the
economic field, and to serve as a catalyst and locomotive
for their own economic recovery.
For example, we should stand for human rights but
in a less noisy, more restrained, and therefore more
effective and less often self-defeating manner than in
37
. .
.
t h e Car t er a d m1n1strat1on;
we can a 1 so b e more sens1' t '1ve
to the impact our statements regarding the priority of
human rights concerns have on Latin America, which was not
always the case in the early weeks of the Reagan administration.
The United States can no longer be the "caudillo of Latin
America" with all the strong-arm methods that implies, but
it can be a prudent bus driver.

That imagery implies that we

drive carefully and well with due concern for the needs of our
passengers, neither so slowly that they become impatient and
leave the bus nor so rapidly and far in front that we take the
bus in directions the passengers do not wish to go, forcing
them to bail out in confusion.

Above all what is called for

is consultations with the Central Americans themselves, to
ascertain their wants and needs, and to adjust U. S. policy
accordingly.
4.

The key would seem to be active involvement restrained

by greater understanding, empathy, prudence, maybe even an
unaccustomed deference to their wishes and aspirations than
in the past.

The United States cannot be a mere "moral

force" which sometimes seemed to be the popular perception
of President Carter.

That led to a vacuum of hemispheric

leadership and produced some unfortunate consequences.
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Our refusal to sell arms to some regimes deemed morally
repulsive, for instance, simply prompted them to buy
elsewhere, resulting in an even greater loss of control
on our part over their actions and helping precipitate
a dangerous arms race throughout the hemisphere whose
sour fruits we are now reaping in the form of spiraling
conflict within and between the various Latin American
states.
Nor can we elevate the notion of a "global" strategy
and "no special relationship" v1ith Latin America to the
level of revered truth which the previous administration
at times also seemed to be doing.

That flies in the face

of the "special relationship" that has always existed and
still exists in some areas between the United States and
Latin America, and the requirement of balancing a bilateral
and global strategy with a regional one.
But heavy-handed interventionism and Cold War rhetoric
are not an appropriate basis for long-term strategy either.
Instead the United States must be seen as a catalyst, a
fair arbiter, a presence (but not an interventionist one),
a leader (but a judi9ious and temperate one) .

live are

inclined and expected to play a leading role in Central
America, but that orientation must be tempered by the
changing realities outlined earlier.

We must acknowledge

and build upon the special relationship that both we and
the Latin Americans recognize we have in this hemisphere,
but we must also be cognizant of how this relationship is
now changing.
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5.

Finally, United States Latin American policy must be

based on realities, not wishful thinking, myths, and
romance.

Neither the United States nor Latin America

understand each other very well.

Our relations are too

often governed by moralistic, pietistic, and ideological
posturing often devoid of realism or mutual comprehension.
It is time for the relationship to grow up, to be put on
a firm and stable basis rather like that with Western
Europe, to eschew condescension and theatrics.
We must not only promote cultural exchanges that
flow in both directions but we must also begin to focus
on the real issues in hemispheric relations, not phantom
ones.

In the long run these are not likely (except in a

few especially troubled countries) to be the Cold War
issues that receive so much media attention nor the
grandiose political designs of twenty years ago, which now
won't wash and are, additionally, impractical.

Rather they

involve a whole set of new issues outlined above -- and
above all trade, markets, access to capital and technologies.
Our
---

agenda
often focuses on the older political and ideological
.

issues when in fact it is economic issues that form Latin
America's chief long-term area of concern and which, as shown,
lie behind and are the chief cause of the region's political
upheavals.

Unless we recognize and come to grips with these

factors soon, our initiatives and policies and those of
Latin America are likely to diverge even further.
Given these general parameters for policy, what more
specific recommendations can be suggested?

What can we do
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and what are the means to get there?

What should

u.

S.

policy be to enhance U. S. interests in the longer term?
The proposals that follow remain broad and require even
more detailed fleshing out, but they do reflect the new
realities in the area we are now facing and they are in
accord with the general guidelines suggested previously
that reflect an emerging consensus among scholarly experts.
They are also meant not to offer a single simple answer but
a broad matrix of answers that address the complexities of
Central America.
Political.

A strategy based on democratic develop-

mentalistm but more restrained and less heavy-handed
than in the past.

Avoidance of some of the overdrawn

expectations of Project Democracy and of a singleminded campaign to implement these in favor of the
more modest goals set forth in the actual legislation.
Bloated rhetoric and unrealistic promises should
be avoided.

We will not succeed in transplanting our

institutions into Central America or creating bastions
of democracy there, but we may appropriately provide
some modest nudges in the right directions and to assist
the Central Americas in their own institutional development.
Human Rights.
rights policy.

We should favor a strong, visible human
On the other hand that should be balanced

against a concern for other preeminent U. S. interests, a
sensitivity to foreign cultures whose givens are different
from our own, a sensitivity to interventionism
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in other nations' internal affairs, the requirement
of even-handedness, and a subtle and discriminating
approach rather than a heavy-handed one.
Military.

u.s.

military assistance should be continued,

may even be stepped up in some countries; but we should
have no illusions that we can create a modern professionalized (by our criteria) military there that
will eschew involvement in civilian politics.

That is

unrealistic and will not happen, but we should nevertheless continue our training programs and efforts to get
the El Salvadoran military, for example, to see the
"bigger picture."
Social.
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Vastly stepped up social programs are called

for in the areas of housing, health care, education,
etc.

Moreover we need to get our people "on the ground, ..

in the villages the way the Cubans do, so that our
assistance is both effective and visible.

We need to

use our human resources far more effectively, and to
plug into local institutions (neighborhood groups,
women's groups, family groups) for more than we do at
present.

We need to send teachers, doctors, agronomists

and others to operate at grass roots levels, with the
empathy and understanding previously called for.
Economic.

A major new economic assistance program is

required, which may be called a Marshall Plan for
Central America.

The program must recognize the

differences of aid to already developed countries
temporarily devastated like thos.e in Europe after
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World War II, and aid to non-institutionalized
countries like those in Central America.

Appropriate

modesty should accompany these proposals so as not to
raise exaggerated hopes, either from the point of view
of how much aid can be expected from a reluctant public
and Congress and how much that aid can accomplish.
However the main emphasis should be on trade.
That is most advantageous to us and to the Central
Americans.

The trade package should include provisions

for stable prices for Central America's export products
(essential for these single-crop economies), guaranteed
access to U.

s.

markets (enabling them to plan and to

be assured of a stable market over a longer term) ,
access to credits, capital and technology.

These

provisions can be carried out in ways that are not
prejudicial to U. S. industries.

Continuous

consultations with the nations affected are again
required.
Cultural.

The United States needs greatly to expand

its programs of scholarships, training, and travel to
the United States for emerging Central American leaders.
The Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations are
beginning to overwhelm our own efforts in this area.
We risk losing an entire generation of young Central
American leaders.

The provisions of Project Democracy

that provide for greater cultural interchange deserve
strong support.

Some more imaginative new programs
are also called for. 39
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Strategic:

U. S. security interests should be

defined in broad terms that include developmental as
well as military assistance.

The United States should

be prepared to accept a considerable degree of ideologial
pluralism in Central America, but it should make clear
that it will not accept (1) intervention by one state
in the affairs of another, and (2) an alliance with the
Soviet Union that leads to Soviet military bases in the
area.
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These suggestions are intended as broad guidelines and
directions for policy.

They provide a framework and matrix in

which more specific recommendations may be fitted.

These more

specific suggestions can be appended or they can be provided by
the particular government agencies involved.

We believed it was

important for the Commission to develop a broad framework first,
and that specific program recommendations could be formulated
subsequently.
Conclusion
The spiraling crisis in Central America demonstrates,
among other things, that the United States can no longer afford
to ignore the area -- or to pay attention to it only in crisis
times when our capacity to shape the outcome is already severely
limited.

Our difficulties of coping with the problems of that

area also illustrates the limited knowledge and understanding we
have about Central America, as well as our tendency to treat it
not on its own terms but through the mirror of our own
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domestic political beliefs and preferences or as an extension
of our own election campaigns.

Neither moral preconceptions,

wishful thinking, nor exaggerated rhetorical flourishes have
or will prove sufficient to achieve the kind of measured,
balanced policy that is required, or to enable us to understand
the dynamics of socio-political change in the area in terms of
its own practices and institutions rather than through our own
rose-colored lenses.
The reorientation of policy suggested here, toward greater
prudence, some modesty, greater empathy, and restraint in our
attitudes and actions toward the area, coupled with the more
specific policy prescriptions that followed, would seem to be
both practical and wise.

The United States both by its own

preferences and power and by the expectations of the Central
Americans themselves can be a leader -- and not just a moral
one -- in the area; but such power and leadership also imply
great restraint and forbearance in their use.

The United States

can serve as a bastion of freedom and human rights; but policies
in these areas need to be practical, kept in perspective, and
attuned to the distinct meanings and understandings such key
terms may convey in the two quite different civilizations in the
two parts of the Americas.
We can and must adjust to the new realities of Latin America
without presuming either ourselves to lead the change process or
to stand irrevocably and hostilely against Latin America's own,
quite natural processes of change.

We can similarly continue to

be a strong military as well as a strong political and economic
influence in the area, while also exercising great moderation in
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the use of such influence.

We may even be able to use some tough

rhetoric and action sometimes for a domestic political audience,
as long as it is made clear to the nations of the area that other
kinds of discussions and negotiations can go on behind the curtain.
There are, similarly, ways to balance domestic economic concerns
while also making provision for Latin American access to our
markets -- access that the Central American countries desperately
require, without which the political conflicts of the area are
bound to worsen, and hence which rests at the top of Latin America's
agenda if not yet our own.
Such a strategy of greater prudence, empathy, and restraint is
not only wise for us in the long term but it is also, most importantly,
strongly grounded in the new realities of Latin America and our
relations with it.

It responds to the somewhat diminished presence

and influence of the United States in that part of the world in a way
that enables us to continue to play a strong and positive role.
It allows and encourages us to play a catalytic and "locomotive"
role while also taking realistic cognizance of the circumscribed
limits on what the United States can and cannot effectively do in
that area.

It reflects the growth and influence of other outside

powers besides ourselves in the area and enables us to adjust
realistically to the complexities of policy that the presence of
these other actors necessitates.

It reflects also the growing

assertiveness and independence of the Latin American nations, their
desire to diversify their trade and international connections, and
the need for us realistically to accommodate to these newer currents.
Finally, such a strategy enables us to continue to play a leadership
role in the regional, in both the politico-strategic and the economic
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spheres, in ways that both we and the Central Americans desire;
but to do so with considerably greater wisdom, empathy, and
enlightenment than in the past.
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BACKGROUND PAPER
Regiona1 Diplomatic Options
Prepared by Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise
Institute and Lead Consultant

Executive Summary
This paper is designed for the hearings of September 30-0ctober
1, and explores the regional diplomatic options for a Central American

settlement.

It is divided as follows:

I. An Introduction that sets forth the basic presumptions of the
paper writer;
II. A review of existing instruments for diplomatic solution,
with particular attention to the mechanisms of the Inter-American System;
III. A survey of peaceplans presently on the table, followed
by a brief analysis of their content;
IV-V. An extended analysis of the most important of these, known
as the Contadora initiative, including
(a-b) An analysis of the players and their goals;
{c) An analysis of outsiders crucial to the success of the
initiative;
(d) A brief evaluation of the Contadora process thus far;
VI. Three models of diplomatic solutions based on Contadora
guidelines, with attention to
(1) Which countries could be expected to support each, oppose
each, and which might be persuaded to shift in one
direction or the other, and,
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(2) What the costs and benefits of each are bound to be;
(3) What likelihood each has of bringing events to a successful
conclusion, and, finally
VII. What are the alternatives if the Contadora process fails?
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I . INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no element in the national debate over Central America has
given rise to so much confusion as the false dichotomy between military
and diplomatic solutions.

The harsh truth is that no diplomatic

solution will last long enough for its ink to dry if it is not based
on certain hard realities on the ground--be they the disposition of
forces or the will of contending parties to continue the battle.
Further, it is impossible to understand both the possibilities
and obstacles to a negotiated s6lution without understanding the
motives and objectives of the players.

This paper thus spends

considerable space outlining how different elements in the Central
American drama conceptualize Success
11

11

•

The central presumption of this paper is that any diplomatic
solution must satisfy three criteria.
for more than a few weeks.

It must be workable, and

It must be acceptable to the countries

whose fates are therein decided.

And it must accord with our own

national values of pluralism, democracy, and self-determination.
II. WHAT ARE THE EXISTING REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION?
[1] The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. This
document, signed and subsequently ratified by all members of the Pan
American Union at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, establishes a mechanism for
considering and responding to cases of armed aggression, and, more
generally, threats to the peace of the Americas.
3, wherein

t~e

Its heart is Article

signatories promise to regard an attack against one

as an attack against all, and accept an obligation to take concrete
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measures to assist the aggrieved party Without delay
11

11

•

Of more interest in the present context is Article 6, which binds
the signatories to collective action in the case of less conventional
forms of aggression ( any other fact or situation that might endanger
11

the peace and security of America

11

·).

The current Cuban technique

of financing and training subversives cou·ld be so considered, and
in fact has been in the past.

For example, in 1964 the Organ of

Consultation voted a full range of sanctions against that country
in response to its activities in Venezuela.
The Rio Treaty has been invoked sixteen times since its ratification,
almost entirely in connection with events in Central America or the
Greater Caribbean, including Venezuela.

The Organ of Consultation

has been convened to discuss the situation of Cuba five times, relations
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua four times, relations between the
Dominican Republic and Haiti twice, and once, in 1969, conflicting
territorial claims between Honduras and El Salvador.

Actually the

issue of international Communism has been on the agenda only
11

11

twice--once in connection with Guatemala, once in connection with
Cuba.

Article 7,

provides a mechanism for resolving conventional

conflict (typically, border disputes) between two or more American
states, and in fact that is the use to which the document has been put
most often and most usefully.
To successfully invoke the Rio Treaty, a two-thirds vote of the
Organ of Consultation must be obtained.

On minor issues this has

not been a serious problem, but on what might be called the larger
political questions (indirect aggression and multilateral action to
meet it) the consensus has been steadily eroding.

In 1974 Colombia,
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Costa Rica, and Venezuela reversed their earlier position and launched an
unsuccessful attempt to challenge the sanctions levied against Cuba
ten years before. The following year the United States was compelled
to agree to a compromise resolution which in effect left each country
to define the kind of relations it wished to maintain with the Castro
regime.

Presumably the treaty could still be invoked in the future

under extremely compelling circumstances, but if the signatories cannot
agree on a coJTJllon policy toward Cuba, it is unlikely--to say the very
1east--that they wi 11 be willing to use the existing treaty machinery
to deal effectively with Castroite activity in the region.
[2] The Charter of the Organization of American States. This
document also provides for defensive measures whenever two-thirds of
the membership can agree that a threat to peace and security exists.
However, in contrast to the Rio Treaty, the deliberations of the OAS
Council are not binding upon signatories, and in any event the increasing
size and diversity of its membership* make it more difficult to obtain
a decisive vote on

security~related

issues. The most recent attempt

by the United States in 1979 (to obtain stationing of an Inter-American
Peace Force in Nicaragua at the end of its civil war) was an unmitigated
disaster.

In general, Latin American diplomatic opinion over the

last decade and a half has tended to move away from the Treaty and
in the direction of the Charter--even beyond it. A foretaste of
things to come might be found in a series of proposed amendments to
the Rio Treaty itself on the table since 1975. The impact of these-if ever actually incorporated into that document--would be to dismantle
much of its existing machinery. One article would divide decisions of
*At present all American states are members, including many who are
English-speaking. The exceptions are Canada and Guyana, who maintain
observers, and of course, Cuba (since 1962).
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the Organ of Consultation into binding and non-binding resolutions;
11

11

11

1
•

another, while retaining the provision for a two-thirds vote on obligatory
resolutions, would reduce to a simple majority the number needed to
rescind same.

A new protocol would strengthen the language of non-

intervention, and insist upon

11

the rights of all states to choose

freely their political, economic, and social organizations ...

Most

importantly, a new Article 6 would prohibit the Organ of Consultation
from providing assistance to a state wi-thout its consent.
The recent activities of Cuba and Nicaragua in Central America
and the Caribbean have caused something of a shift back toward a more
rigorous approach, perhaps eventually to· the extent of cooperating
with the United States in providing a multilateral umbrella for its
actions.

But the OAS Charter offers little guidance on how this

might come about.

Article 59 merely makes provision for a Meeting

of Consultation at the ministerial level, but unlike the Rio Treaty,
offers no indication of the measures such a meeting might take.
[3] The Central American Security Treaty (1963).

This instrument

can basically be regarded as a Central American miniature of the Rio
Treaty, inasmuch as it builds upon the principle of reciprocity, obligates
the signatories to respond in case of attack, and defines aggression
broadly to encompass any other fact or situation that might endanger
11

the peace of the Central American isthmus ... Signatories include
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, with Panama and Costa
Rica as observers.

(The United States also maintains an observer

at the Treaty secretariat in Guatemala City.)
The treaty also establishes a Central American Defense Council
(CONDECA) composed of ministers of defense or officials of appropriate
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rank who meet annually or at the request of any of the member states.

A

Permanent Defense Committee, comprised of officers drawn from the armed
forces of signatory states, aGts as a general staff and performs
administrative duties.

Since 1963, when the organization was created,

the member states have held joint maneuvers, some with the participation
of U. S. forces.
Changing political contexts and the inability to cope with regional
conflict have seriously undermined the credibility of the CONDECA.
In 1963 the Cuban threat was sufficient to unite all signatories; today
Panama pursues a two-track policy toward Havana, and, of course,
Nicaragua is virtually an ally of the Castro regime.

Moreover, in

the one case of conventional conflict (the war between El Salvador and
Honduras in 1969), the organization was powerless to act, although
given the small number of militarily active members, it was probably
inevitable that the issue be transferred to the Organization of
American States.
The real achievement of CONDECA has been to temper and moderate
the extreme nationalism and territorial rivalries which have poisoned
relations between Central American countries, particularly El Salvador
and Honduras.

There has been some talk about reviving and revivifying

the alliance as an effective security instrument, simply on the grounds
that four of the Central American five are already pursuing a cooperative
approach to regional diplomacy.

It could not include Nicaragua,

however, and begs the question of how that country would fit into
some hypothetical security arrangement.
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III. WHAT PEACE PROPOSALS ARE PRESENTLY ON THE TABLE?
(a) Identification and chronology.

Because the traditional instruments

of regional diplomacy have not proven of value in the present Central
American conflict, there has been a burgeoning of ad hoc multilateral
proposals.

At present, five viable peace plans are on the table.

In chronological order, they are:
(1) THE SIX-POINT HONDURAN PEACE PLAN, announced by Foreign
Minister Paz Barnica in a speech before the OAS on March
23, 1982;
(2) THE SAN JOSE DECLARATION of foreign ministers of countries
interested in the promotion of democracy in Central America
and the Caribbean (Belize, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras,
Jamaica, and Costa Rica), proposed October 4, 1982;
(3) THE TEN-POINT CANCUN DECLARATION announced July 17, 1983
by the Presidents of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and
Panama (the so-called "Contadora countries").
(4) THE SIX-POINT NICARAGUAN PROPOSAL, announced July 19,
1983 by Directorate Coordinator Daniel Ortega, and later
submitted to the United Nations;
(5) THE FOUR-POINT U. S. PROPOSAL contained in President Reagan's
letter to the four Contadora presidents, July 27, 1983.
(b) Analysis of the plans.

All of the plans address certain common

themes--the need for an end to intervention, either on the part of the
Central American countries in each others• affairs, or by outside powers;
an end to the acquisition of offensive armaments, or at least a freeze
at existing levels; a shift away from political conflict and towards the
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more

construc~ive

path of economic and social development; and some

procedures for verification of whatever agreements are finally reached.
More important are the elements which are not common, for they
define and explain the impasse at which we presently find ourselves.
Thus, alone of the five plans the Nicaraguan is utterly silent on
the subject of democracy and pluralism.

The United States, Honduras,

and the countries of the San Jose declaration all favor reduction
or ultimate withdrawal of all foreign military advisers.

Neither

Nicaragua nor the Contadora countries have anything to say on the
subject; conversely, the Nicaraguans and Contadora would prohibit
the existence or installation of foreign military bases, and
11

11

11

11

in the case of Nicaragua, the holding of military exercises by foreign
armies anywhere in C.entral America.

On the subject of verification,

the U. S. prefers an OAS mechanism, while the Nicaraguans would recur
to the United Nations Security Council.

Contadora, the Hondurans,

and the San Jose countries have left open how international supervision
would be organized.
Thus the two major sticking points are democracy and the role of
foreign military advisers or forces, although the difficulties of
setting up an adequate system of verification should not be underestimated.
That the US prefers the OAS, while the Nicaraguans would go to the
United Nations is not merely a matter of taste, nor is it surprising
that the other parties have not yet defined how they expect any
agreement to be enforced.

For how all of these questions are ultimately

decided will in effect shape the outcome in Central America.
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IV. WHAT IS THE CONTADORA INITIATIVE?
It is a diplomatic process calling for a comprehensive regional
settlement in Central America, launched by the foreign ministers of

r~exico,

Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama at a meeting on Contadora Island off
the coast of Panama in January, 1983.

It has been unanimously endorsed

by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community, as
well as the governments of Spain and the United States.

Under its

auspices a series of meetings have been held at the ministerial and
vice-ministerial level, as well as one conclave of Contadora chiefs
of state in Cancun, Mexico in July.

The most recent Contadora meeting

in Panama City September 7-9, produced a 21-point 0ocument of Objectives .. ,
11

essentially a compilation of points found in all of the peace plans
(Section III, above).

This approach--seeking, as it were, the lowest

common denominator--does not resolve existing differences but at
least keeps Contadora alive, which at present all parties to the
process appear to favor.
V.

WHO ARE THE CONTADORA PLAYERS AND WHAT ARE THEIR OBJECTIVES?
(a) The Contadora Four.
MEXICO.

Mexico's basic view is that the Central American crisis

is the product of centuries of socio-economic backwardness and political
oppression.

While acknowledging the role of outside forces (e.g., Cuba

and others), it minimizes their importance, and insists that the entire
thrust of regional diplomacy should address itself to presumed root
causes rather than ephemeral politico-military fixes
11

11

•

The Mexicans also believe that it is possible to co-opt important
sectors of the revolutionary left, and in so doing presumably moderate
their political views and wean them away from the Cubans and the Soviets.
They profess to believe that U. S. policy has precisely the opposite
effect, although in fact the Mexicans are not particularly bothered
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by what for Washington would be the Worst case scenario--the Cubanization
11

of much of Central America.

11

For them this would be preferable either

to overt U. S. military intervention, or even, extended assistance
to the Salvadoran government or the counter-revolutionaries in and
around Nicaragua.

Until quite recently (actually, the September 7-9

meeting of Contadora in Panama City), the Mexicans have abstained
from advancing democracy and pluralism as one of the conditions
for settlement, and they have generally been the sturdiest pro-Nicaraguan
element of the Contadora coalition.

Whether this represents a

permanent shift in Mexican policy remains to be seen; if it does,
the implications are highly significant.
Although

this

position has elicited much resonance in the

American liberal community, it should be noted that there are concrete
limits to Mexican pragmatism.

What is perfectly acceptable for El

Salvador, Nicaragua, or even Honduras is somewhat less so for Guatemala,
a state With which Mexico maintains a long and inadequately policed
boundary and from whence there is a constant flow of i 11 ega 1 migrants.
The activities of guerrillas on both sides of the border has led to
a significant increase in Mexico's military presence in the states of
Chiapas and Campeche, and what is more, quiet but effective cooperation
with the:.armed forces and government of Guatemala.
Mexico's objectives are two-fold: (1) to stake out a position which
will provide an alternative to the dominant U. S. presence in the area,
and (2) to defuse criticism of domestic policies by its own left.

The

latter is particularly important at a time when the imperatives of
economic austerity threaten to undermine the country's political
stability.

Mexico•s revolutionary posturing in world affairs has also

purchased a long period of peace with the Cubans, who have foreborne from
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supporting there the kind of destabilizing activities they have been caught
sponsoring in Colombia and Venezuela.

Within this framework, the

Contadora process has the additional virtue of keeping the United
States at the conference table, from which it presumably would be
unable to act unilaterally, guarantees the survival of a Sandinista
government in Nicaragua, and holds out at least the possibility of a
negotiated U. S. withdrawal, which for Mexico would probably be its
11

best case .. scenario.
VENEZUELA.

As the major democracy in the region, Venezuela has

long been interested in the nurturing of free political systems about
its immediate periphery.

It shares Mexico's oft-stated repugnance

for oppressive, unrepresentative regimes, but regards democratic
pluralism as the proper remedy.

Venezuela also hopes to avoid either

regional war or unilateral U. S. intervention, but regards the victory
of the revolutionary left as an equally undesirable outcome.

It

also views the Cuban role in far less benevolent terms, but is fearful
of taking too strong a stand against Castro for fear of becoming
involved in quarrels with the Eastern bloc, with whom it maintains a full
and productive commercial relationship.

Also,

~n

order to maintain

its credibility at home, the Venezuelan government must avoid identifying
too closely with the United States, although on Central American policy
there are in fact many important areas of convergence.
With Sandinista Nicaragua Venezuela can be said to have walked
the extra mile: it was frankly supportive of the revolution against
Somoza, offered aid with no political strings attached to the infant
Government of National Reconstruction (GRN), and has continued (along
with Mexico) to provide it with oil on the same preferential basis as
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it does other Central American countries.

It was hoped that these actions

would obtain for Caracas an important lever of influence with the new
regime in Managua; this has not proven to be the case.

Consequently,

Caracas has quietly begun to assist democratic elements in the
labor movement, church, universities, and business community, while
publicly insisting that it has not given up on the GRN.

In El

Salvador, Venezuela strongly supported the provisional government of
Jose Napoleon Duarte, largely because of common ties to Christian
Democracy, but since Duarte•s replacement after the March, 1982
elections, Venezuelan enthusiasm for the regime in San Salvador has
no tab 1y receded.
Venezuelan objectives in the area are (1) to preserve democracy
in Costa Rica and Honduras, and to encourage openings in Guatemala
and greater movement in El Salvador; (2) the 11 domestication 11 of the
Nicaraguan revolution and its gradual turn towards pluralism, (3)
reduction of outside influence in the area, particularly military
influence, from whatever source; (4) isolation of Central America•s
problems from the East-West conflict, and (5) the forging of a regional
In this connection Venezuela prefers to preserve unity

consensus.

among the Contadora Four even at the risk of foregoing concrete
achievement.
COLOMBIA.

In the Contadora process, Colombia has assumed an

unaccustomed role in the region, one it previously claimed it did
not want.

The Betancur administration seems less interested in resolving

concrete issues, however, than in bringing about a harmonious (but
unspecified) outcome.

Colombian objectives are thus simple, undramatic,

and also rather unilluminating: (1) to assure that the Central American

nations are able to work out their own differences among themselves,
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independent of East-West tensions, and (2) to bring an end to outside
involvement.

Colombia is only lukewarm to the U. S. notion of linking

reduction of tensions to the democratization of Nicaragua.
Colombia's position, vague though it may be, rests upon a very
broad .domestic consensus.

For both the Center-Right and Center-Left,

peace in Central America on almost. any terms is preferable to continued
conflict, with its attendant risks.

For the Center-Left, it implies

the preservation and consolidation of the Sandinista regime, and
--if accompanied by a U. S. withdrawal and the suspension of military
aid--the collapse of the Salvadoran government.

(Guatemala and Honduras

are regarded as ripening fruits that will fall eventually of their
own accord.)

For the Center-Right, peace means the preservation

--for now, at least--of the governments of El Salvador, Honduras,
Guatemala, and Costa Rica.

It also eliminates the embarrassing

necessity of having to comment on any unilateral U. S. action or to
choose up sides between the United States on one hand, and Cuba,
Nicaragua, and the Soviets on the other.
PANAMA.

Of all of the Contadora nations, Panama is most fascinated

by the process, since it is anxious to promote itself as a venue for
international diplomacy.

On the substantive issues it is vague and

erratic, largely a reflection of its fragmented domestic politics,
in which

pro-Cuban~lements

are--within the government itself, if not

among the general public--at least as strong as those in the Center or
on the Right.

Although in recent months the Panamanians privately

have been far more supportive and understanding of U. S. policy
than their public postures would suggest, a slight shift within the
ruling coalition could easily change that.

I
I

.I

I
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(b) The Central American Core Four.
GUATEMALA.

Initially this country was not receptive to the

Contadora process because it felt it had little to gain from the intromission of other Latin American countries into strictly Central American
matters; in particular, it resents Mexico, not merely for its public
embrace of the Sandinistas and the retlels in El Salvador, but from
longer-term suspicions of a more powerful foreign neighbor.

It has

always rejected the notion of bilateral relations with Nicaragua,
against whom it favors a unified approach by the Core Four.
HONDURAS.

A strong proponent of Core Four unity against Nicaragua

as well, Honduras nonetheless fears that El Salvador and Costa Rica
might be unreliable partners, and attempt to make a separate deal
with Managua.

It also harbors apprehensions that Guatemala might

act in some precipitous fashion which would sunder the alliance.
In general it views the OAS as an alternative should Contadora break
down, and has used that forum effectively to make a well-documented
case against Nicaraguan aggression.
COSTA RICA.

This country is the strongest advocate of pluralism

and democracy in the isthmus, and therefore somewhat embarrassed to be
linked with Guatemala in even a provisional diplomatic alliance.
At the same time, it profoundly regrets the outcome of the Nicaraguan
revolution, which it strongly supported.

Towards the latter country it

pursues a two-track policy--repeatedly expressing interest in a negotiating
solution, while winking at anti-Sandinista activities on its own soil.
In general, Costa Rica has strong feelings of insecurity that the
Contadora initiative does not alleviate.

It cannot withdraw from the

process without appearing to be the spoiler, but it fears that any
agreement to which the Nicaraguans are a party will be worthless,
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eventually leaving them to face alone the full force of Sandinista wrath.
EL SALVADOR.

In principle this tiny, embattled republic has favored
a regional approach, but regards Contadora mainly as a 11 tensionrelieving11 mechanism.

The Salvadorans share the Guatemalan view that

a final peace agreement should come from the Central American countries
themselves, with the Contadora Four merely acting in a ratifying role.
The common objective of the Core Four is to end Nicaraguan support
for Salvadoran guerrillas and to promote movement towards democracy
in Nicaragua itself.

Only if the Contadora process can produce this

result will it be regarded by them as a success.
(c) Other parties to the Contadora
NICARAGUA.

process~

Before the launching of the Contadora initiative,

Managua persisted in the view that its outstanding foreign policy problems
should be resolved bilaterally--with Honduras on one hand and the
United States on the other.

(Although it has repeatedly denied

misconduct with respect to its Central American neighbors, it has
always insisted that such issues are the proper subject of

state~to-

state negotiations.)
However, because the Contadora initiative has won the endorsement
of so many governments, the Nicaraguans have been forced to at least
nominally support it.

Under the pressure of the U. S. military presence

in Honduras, Managua now offers to agree to a multilateral reduction
of arms shipments to El Salvador.

Unfortunately, nothing in that

proposal alleviates Core Four concerns over implementation or
verification of any agreements the Nicaraguans might sign.
For the Nicaraguans, a successful conclusion to the Contadora
process would be an end to counter-revolutionary activities based in
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Honduras and Costa Rica, tacit U. S. recognition of the sanctity of its
own revolutionary process, and a free hand in the region, not subject
to external sanctions, or, at any rate, not amenable to enforcement under
any document or agreement.
CUBA.

The Cubans are in much the same position on Contadora as

the Nicaraguans.

While they have no parti·cular interest in the peaceful

resolution of regional conflict, they find it convenient to endorse
the initiative, since it obligates them to nothing particular, and
to desist would render them vulnerable to serious criticism in
Latin America and Western Europe.

Havana's objectives are virtually

identical with those of Managua, with the additional wrinkle that
any peace conference to which Castro were invited, there to sit alongside other hemispheric chiefs of statei would be valued as one more
step out of the isolation in which he has languished since the
imposition of OAS sanctions twenty years ago.

Apart from this, the

Cubans appreciate Contadora for much the same reason as the Mexicans-presumably it restrains the United States from taking precipitous
action against Nicaragua, or even against Cuba itself.
THE UNITED STATES.

The United States has been favorably disposed

to the Contadora approach from its inception, because it has engendered
a spirit of unity among the Central American Core Four, and because
it has preempted other efforts to resolve the crisis, particularly
by the Nicaraguans, Soviets, and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to move
discussions to the United Nations.

Further, by devising their own

initiative, the Contadora Four have been forced to take an active
responsibili·cy for dialogue, facing the reality that a perfect solution
cannot be precooked.

It also relieves the United States of considerable

domestic and international pressure to produce a result of its own>
which in any case--just because of its unilateral character--would be
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difficult to sell to the Contadora powers.
U. S. difficulty with the Contadora Four is not difficult to explain.
(1) Above all the U. S. is interested in bringing the process to a
definite conclusion, and as such is willing to risk failure in order
to pin down specifics.

(2) One of the four U. S. objectives--the spread

of democratic pluralism--arouses no great interest in Mexico, or even
in Colombia and Panama.

The other three U. S. objectives (non-intervention,

removal of the conflict from the East-West confrontation, and the
promotion of long-term economic development in Central America) sound
unobjectionable.

But the U. S. interprets non-intervention to

include a ban on support for subversive elements seeking to destabilize
other countries, to which Nicaragua, Cuba, and to some extent Mexico
could be expected to take umbrage, at least if applied across the board.
Washington also understands that the most efficient way to isolate
the conflict from larger strategic struggles is to accomplish the
ve·rifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers,
and a certifiable freeze on the acquisition of offensive armaments.
Both of these presuppose rather complicated enforcement mechanisms
that so far no Contadora country has been willing to contemplate.
President Reagan's insistence that the four U. S. objectives are
11

inextricably interrelated .. in his letter to the Contadora presidents

on July 25, 1983 adds an additional,

discomfiting measure of

specificity to the U. S. position.
(d) Analysis of the Contadora process.

Since the Contadora

initiative was launched in January, the distinguishing characteristic
of more than half a dozen meetings has been an inability to reach
a working consensus.

The principal difficulties have been

(1) the initial refusal of Nicaragua to deal with the
Core Four except on an individual basis;

(2) Costa Rica's attempt--unsuccessful because of Mexican
opposition--to obtain a permanent border/observer
force to assure its neutrality and protect it from
Nicaraguan incursions;
(3) the inability to agree on an agenda for ministerial
and vice-ministerial meetings;
(4) the excessively general framework of Contadora
declarations (e.g., the Cancun declaration);
(5) the constant unwillingness of the parties to grapple
with mechanisms of verification and control.
VI. WHAT WOULD A CONTADORA-BASED SOLUTION LOOK LIKE?
There are three possible variations.
A Mexican-Nicaraguan version, with the benevolent approval of Cuba.
The key provision would be the withdrawal of foreign military advisers
and forces, and the right of each country to its own form of government
(

11

ideological pluralism").

Conceivably such a plan could win the support

of Colombia and Panama, although it would have to be sold to the U. S.
and Venezuelan governments, and virtually imposed upon the Central
American Core Four. It would probably also disarm that segment of
the U. S. Congress, press, and public critical of the present direction
of American policy.
If our sole objective in Central America is to find a graceful
and immediate method of disengagement, then this is a perfectly conceivable
option.

However, if we retain even a residual concern for the stability

and democratic evolution of the countries concerned (leaving aside
the issue of their international orientation) it can only work if
(a) the Nicaraguans live up to whatever agreements they sign, and (b)
that no enforcement mechanisms are necessary, or that all parties
can agree to them if they are.
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The dangers of this option are not merely that it may fai 1 in its
primary objective (to bring peace to the area), but even in its
presumptive secondary goals (remove Central America from the EastWest conflict, enhance U. S. credibility, promote democratic institutions
and human rights).

It also runs the serious risk of provoking a

backlash in U. S. opinion, since the most articulate voices so far
have been those of a minority not particularly representative of
our people as a whole.

Since the plan would have to be imposed

upon an unwilling Central American Core Four, in all likelihood
it would destabilize the governments concerned and provoke the
further flight of resources and persons from the area.
A U. $.-Venezuelan version, the centerpiece of which would
be the gradual opening of political processes throughout the region
towards pluralism and democracy where presently nonexistent.

This

would require negotiation past some very formidable diplomatic
obstacles, including Mexican, Nicaraguan and Cuban resistance,
Colombian reticence, and Panamanian ambivalence.

Presumably, it

would have the strong support of the Central American Core Four,
particularly if accompanied by a significant economic aid package.
It would be easily defensible before U. S. public opinion.
This option can only succeed, however, if several of the major
players--particularly Mexico--can be persuaded to alter their position.
It also assumes that the Nicaraguans are so fearful of a U. S.
invasion that they would be willing to hold elections even at the
calculated risk of losing them.

It will also require a rather

extensive supervisory mechanism, which, to be fully effective, would
have to contravene long-held notions of sovereignty and non-intervention.
Presumably a third version would be negotiations on a step-by-step
basis, engaging all of the parties in a process from which none could
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escape, and which would develop a momentum which would carry them (and
the process itself) to a successful conclusion.

We say presumably
11

11

because, unfortunately, even this could not be done without making
critical choices which would be bound to imperil the process itself.
The advantage of this approach is that it puts off the difficult
questions until later to work on the more tractable problems now,
without foreclosing any possibilities. The disadvantage is that
practically all of the relevant issues are difficult and fraught
with implications for the future.

It would prolong the negotiating

process and therefore postpone the search for alternatives.

But

during that time, the situation could deteriorate on the ground in
such a way as to make the entire process nothing but an academic
exercise.
VII.

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES IF CONTADORA FAILS?
They are not many.

(1) We could attempt to form a new, ad hoc

negotiating framework, but it could not conceivably exclude Mexico
or Nicaragua. (2) We could respond to Nicaraguan calls for bilateral
negotiations, but this would isolate us from our Central American
allies without necessarily producing a desired result. (3) We could
simply withdraw from the Central American theater altogether, urging
all of the parties to work out whatever solution they could devise.
Unfortunately, this would lead neither to peace nor pluralism, and
it would not remove the area from the East-West conflict. (4) We
could recur to the OAS as the proper venue for discussions.

This is

precisely what the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives
has already mandated in the Wright Amendment to the Boland-Zablocki
Bill (HR 2760), which calls upon the President to seek a prompt
recovening of the Organ of Consultation to discuss Nicaragua•s failure
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to meet its commitments to the OAS and for violating hemispheric norms
relative to respect for the territorial sovereignty of its neighbors.
It also urges the President to use the OAS to Seek resolution of
11

the conflicts in Central America based on the provisions of the Final
Act of the San Jose Conference of October, 1982, especially principles ...
relating to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries,
denying support for terrorist and subversive elements in other
states, and the nternational supervision of fully verifiable arrangements."
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Long-Range Diplomatic and Political Options
Factors External to Central America

Robert E. Hunter

Introduction
This discussion paper will look at long-range U.S. diplomatic
and political options for Central America primarily from the perspective
of external factors -- in particular, the roles of the Soviet Union,
Cuba, and Western Europe.

It is designed to help the Commission in

examining witnesses on this subject by posing some central issues,
raising questions, and exploring some particular options.
This paper is based on four premises:
First, that a direct military solution to current U.S. problems
in Central America is indeed possible.

However, that would impose

certain costs: a) going in, in terms of U.S. public attitudes,

u.s.

casualties, and reaction within the Hemisphere and among allies abroad;
and b) coming out, perhaps including long-term U.S. occupation of
particular countries and alienation of a number of Latin American
countries.

If we are not prepared to pay those costs, then alternative

approaches need to be considered.
Second, that any successful strategy will need to include a
combination of military, political, and economic approaches and
instruments.

With broad bipartisan backing, this combination could

be an effective assertion of American power in all its aspects.
Third, that any strategy will probably be messy, and will
challenge the American ability to manage any approach with subtlety
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over many years.

u.s.

Fourth, that any

political and diplomatic strategy developed

for the region should meet several tests.
promote

u.s.

It should:

interests;

be easily understood by the

u.s.

public and by others;

be able to gain broad bipartisan support in the United States;
have a reasonable chance of being sustained over many years
e.g., in view of developments within the region and of changes in
U.S. administrations;
-- gain sufficient support within the region and alsewhere in
Latin America (e.g., in Mexico) to make it practicable; and
--preserve other

u.s.

interests in the world -- e.g., in

the Western alliance and East-West relations.
However, a viable, long-range diplomatic and political strategy
for Central America cannot be developed in the abstract.

It will

depend, in the first instance, on answers to at least two sets of
prior questions:
First, what are our basic goals for the region?

The following

choices, roughly in descending order of importance to the United
States, are most evident:
-- to prevent military intrusion by the Soviet Union and/or
Cuba in Central America-- i.e., defining the region as "off limits"
in this respect;
-- to prevent any other use of the region as a base for Soviet/
Cuban expansion at the expense of U.S. interests;
-- to contain the spread of violent revolution, or of other
destabilization within the region

that poses risks to

u.s.

interests;
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to shape evolution and change within the region in ways
that are supportive of

u.s.

interests; and

to ensure the development of free, democratic, and
pluralistic nations throughout the region.
Clearly, the kinds of diplomatic and political options that
should be considered by the United States will depend on how much
we want to achieve -- in effect, the "bottom line" in terms of our
interests, preferences, and capabilities.
Second, do we have any real choice in the degree to which we
will be involved in the region, and how much control we will need
and want to exercise in diplomacy and other activities related to it?
This question reflects a basic debate in the United States, in three
parts:
Are we able and willing to create a framework that will permit
us in time to "step back" from deep involvement in the region?

Or

will we both want and have to continue playing a central role in the
region whatever specific arrangements are made for it?
-- Are we prepared to help establish a diplomatic and political
framework and share major responsibility both for its structure and
its conduct-- e.g., with Contadora or European countries?

Or will

we want to assume primary responsibility for any ongoing diplomatic
and political efforts, largely tailored to our designs?
-- Assuming that we were able to create conditions in which
the region is not used by the Soviet Union, Cuba, or states like
Nicaragua against regional countries or other

u.s.

interests, are

we prepared as a nation to accept whatever developments take place
within individual societies, whether or not we like them?

Or will we
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inevitably want to play a significant role in the internal politics
of regional countries -- e.g., to prevent a Marxist-Leninist or other
objectionable regime from taking hold?
At the moment, this debate is most important in terms of the
extent to which the United States is prepared to tolerate regimes
such as that in Nicaragua, without employing sufficient military means
to bring about their decisive internal change.

For purposes of this

discussion of political and diplomatic options, the premise of this
paper is that we could accept such regimes.

Of course, this premise

may not be valid: for example, we may not be prepared to see any
objectionable regimes in the Hemisphere other than that in Cuba; and
the concept of "revolution without frontiers" may mean that this premise
conflicts with other

u.s.

objectives in the region, such as preventing

Nicaragua from acting against its neighbors.

But assuming the opposite

implies that our focus, at least to gain short-term results, would
need to be less on politics and diplomacy and more on other instruments,
especially military force and other punitive measures -- subjects of
other Commission hearings.
The importance of these prior questions will be reflected in
the issues, questions, and options that follow.
Issue I:

Soviet Involvement

There is little dispute in the United States about the need
to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a direct military
presence in the Western Hemisphere, beyond its long-standing involvement
in Cuba which, while not preferred by the United States, has been
tolerated for more than two decades.

There is also widespread support

in the United States for limiting Soviet capacity to meddle within
the region in ways that would be invidious to our interests -- e.g.,
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in fomenting revolutions that would produce regimes hostile to us and
to regional states or in promoting cross-border destabilization.
Debate in the United States polarizes around the extent to which the
Soviet factor is central to regional problems, around the level of
Soviet involvement that is "tolerable," and around the costs of
reducing or eliminating Soviet involvement.
For the past several years, the Soviet Union has seen its
involvement in the region as a low-cost, relatively low-risk, and
potentially high-payoff policy.

In terms of Central America itself,

very little has been required in economic resources, as opposed to
the high costs of direct aid to Cuba.

In part through the use of

proxies, Moscow has been confident that it could manage its exposure
to prevent any basic crisis in relations with the United States or
the Western allies in areas of the world intrinsically more important
to it.

Through the use of proxies and through the gradualism of

its tactics, it has also been able to escape any real opprobrium within
the Hemisphere, and thus has had considerable flexibility.

Thus the

opportunity to exploit problems for the United States in our own
backyard

a) to distract our attention and resources; b) to cause

tensions within the Western alliance; and c) to try revitalizing the
Soviet image as being in the revolutionary vanguard -- has been too
valuable to pass up.
So far, the Soviet Union has been reluctant itself to challenge
the United States directly in areas beyond the Soviet periphery,
despite the rise in Soviet conventional military capabilities and
global reach.

In Central America, the Soviet Union is also handicapped

by a poor capacity to project military power.

Yet there is debate in
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the United States about whether that caution will continue to prevail
for the foreseeable future.

Similarly, at the moment the Soviets have

made no commitments to countries in Central America that could not
be abandoned without serious loss of face.

This is in marked contrast

to Cuba, where Soviet commitment is evident despite the lack of a Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation.

Yet there is debate about whether the

Soviet Union will increasingly commit resources and run risks to ensure
that friendly regimes, once established, cannot be overthrown.

At the

extreme, will the Brezhnev Doctrine be extended to the Western
Hemisphere?
These points thus pose a central issue: is it important for
the United States, now, to establish clear limits on Soviet
involvement in Central America in order to reduce the chances of larger
problems later on?
and

u.s.

Is there, indeed, a basic issue of Soviet challenge

credibility in the Hemisphere that will have implications for

other parts of the world?

Alternatively, is Soviet interest in the

region a) so ephemeral that a strong demonstration of

u.s.

will would

reduce or end Moscow's role, or b) so responsive to our actions and
consistency of purpose that a sustained policy would do the job?
Judgments on these questions are critical to the future of

u.s.

diplomacy.
In addition to assessments about Soviet motives and the depths
of Soviet involvement, key questions include the following:

,I

Can the Soviet Union simply be warned off by the United

States from challenging our primacy in the region ("sphere of
influence")?
'

Can diplomatic and political efforts to reduce or eliminate
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Soviet meddling be expected to work unless things first change "on
the ground"?

That is, must there first be efforts either to dry up

Soviet opportunities through political, economic, and social progress
in particular regional states, to thwart Soviet objectives through
military success, or to pursue some combination of the two?
~~

Can we make distinctions between imposing limits on Soviet/

Cuban military (or military supply) involvement in Central America and
accepting continued political support for revolutions like that in
Nicaragua?
~~

Can we reach broader understandings with the Soviet Union,

involving other aspects of East-West relations, that could lead to
a significant reduction or end to Soviet activity in Central America?
'

Do we have the capacity to orchestrate approaches towards

the Soviet Union-- e.g., in raising risks-- without producing
unacceptable responses in

u.s.

public opinion, from the Congress,

among our allies, or in the Hemisphere?
Selected Options
Bearing these questions in mind, options for the United States
in trying to shape Soviet behavior within the region include the
following.

We could:

1. Simply assert that Central America is "off limits" to the
Soviets.

This could include asserting our primacy in the region,

opposing Soviet introduction of weapons and advisors, and countering
any application of the Brezhnev Doctrine to Central America.
For: This would put the Soviets on notice of our concerns -- and
indeed, we have been following this option.

If backed by a sustainable,

overall policy for the region that gains broad bipartisan backing,
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the Soviets could get the message.

Talking itself need not imply

giving the Soviets legitimacy in the region.
Against: Absent such a sustainable policy and results "on the
ground," it would be hard to make this approach credible, except
perhaps with regard to heavy weapons that heighten Soviet visibility.
The Soviets would also make similar demands with regard to other
regions.
2.

Try to isolate the Soviet Union within the Hemisphere

through a sustained campaign of presenting the facts of Soviet
involvement and ambitions.
For: This could alert leaders and attentive publics in the
Hemisphere to the Soviet role and, if successful, could reduce our
own relative isolation on this question.

As with President Reagan's

handling of the Korean Air Lines incident, it could multilateralize
opposition to Soviet actions.

The Soviets' flexibility would thereby

be reduced, and they could not as easily hide behind proxies.
Against: It would not be easy to establish

u.s.

credibility.

In addition, we would also need to demonstrate that we were paying
adequate

a~tention

to regional and internal realities-- i.e., not

just trying to shift the burden of the problem onto Soviet shoulders.
3.

Attempt to strike a global "deal" with the Soviet Union

that would reduce or eliminate its involvement in Central America.
For:

Moscow would likely accept this approach, since it is in

line with its concept of spheres of influence.

It would also revive

the concept of "rules of the road" in the behavior of the two
superpowers.

It would be more likely to be effective at a time of

greatly reduced East-West tensions overall, in which the Soviets might
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see attractions in the positive aspects of u.s.-soviet relations, in
general.
Against:

Efforts to strike a global deal with the Soviet Union

would beg the question of trade-offs on our part.

Moscow would

demand u.s. restraint in areas in contention where it has much to
gain and we have much to lose-- e.g., in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe,
or involvement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy.

The Soviets would gain

significant advantages, while only giving up a secondary objective of
its overall strategy.

Our acknowledging the validity of spheres of

influence would represent a substantial Soviet gain.
4.

Abrogate the u.s.-soviet understandings on Cuba as a means

of applying political pressure.

These understandings, developed tnrough

a variety of channels over several years, can be summarized as our
not invading Cuba and the Soviets' not basing offensive weapons in
Cuba.

However, we could assert privately that Soviet/Cuban activities

elsewhere in the region have implicitly violated these understandings
and that henceforth they are null and void.

This option does not

depend on whether the Soviets have indeed violated the understandings;
that pdint could simply be asserted.
For:

This option might force the Soviets to decide whether

retaining their position in Cuba is worth more than continuing their
activities elsewhere in the region.
Against:

The Soviets could respond by increasing their military

presence in Cuba or elsewhere in the region, although this- could raise
the stakes beyond Soviet interests in the region as a whole.

More

important, the Soviets would recognize that we will not accept the
political or human costs of using military action against Cuba.

The
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declaration could also be turned against us for propaganda advantage
within the hemisphere, within the Western alliance, and in U.S.
politics.

The Soviets could also respond in some other region of

their choosing -- e.g., in the Middle East or diplomatically over
Berlin.
A variant of this approach would be to tailor our overall
strategy towards trying to pose a choice for the Soviet Union
between increasing its involvement in the region and suffering a
visible defeat, without calling into question the understandings on
Cuba, itself.

This would depend heavily on results "on the ground" in

individual Central American countries.
5.

Extend the u.s.-soviet understandings on Cuba to the rest

of the region, with "non-interference" the rule on both sides.
For:

This could embed the Soviet Union in specific undertakings

not to provide military weapons, advisors, and training, or to establish
military bases, in exchange for establishing the legitimacy of the
Nicaraguan regime and the outcome of any other changes in Central
America and the Caribbean.
Against:

The Soviet Union would gain legitimacy as a power in

the region, and there could be interminable squabbles over Soviet/proxy
violations, especially in cross-border subversion, covert action, and
traffic in small arms.

Similar arguments about Soviet legitimacy

would apply to our permitting Moscow to subscribe to a regional economic
and political framework.
A variant of this option would be to seek agreement on limitation
of heavy weapons and modern aircraft, if Soviet abstention cannot be
achieved by simple assertion of our primacy in the region.

This would
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not, however, deal with the small arms and efforts at subversion that
are also important.
6. "Link" Soviet behavior in the region to other aspects of
East-West relations, especially where we have advantages.

We could,

for example, step up support for insurgents in Afghanistan and be
more assertive in opposing Soviet ventures elsewhere in the Third
World.
For:

Such a strategy would require the Soviets to assess their

priorities and could turn the question of diverted
its head.

u.s.

attention on

In addition, the Soviets have so far shown most concern

for protecting core positions rather than the periphery

i.e., with

most emphasis on Cuba, Vietnam, and to an extent Syria.
Against:

Linkage implies that we have advantages in other

areas, which may not always be the case; indeed, the Soviets could
respond in areas of their choosing.

As in the past, a declared

strategy of linkage would also raise concerns in Western Europe and
in

u.s.

public opinion.

This would be particularly true if limiting

the pursuit of arms control agreements were included in any linkage.
A more direct and more credible option would be to try denying
the Soviet Union successes within Central America, itself.
can also not be sure that

u.s.

The Soviets

shows of force-- e.g., naval maneuvers

are only that.
A further variant of linkage, however, is the issue of political
facts of life-- e.g., if a Soviet role in Central America were
perceived in

u.s.

politics as making agreement on arms control

impossible, as with SALT II and Afghanistan.
7.

Counter the Soviet role through a strategy focussed on
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the problems of the region and based on a regional framework for
security plus social and economic progress.
For:

Putting the primary U.S. focus not on Soviet invqlvement,

but rather on a regional political and economic framework, would, if
successful, radically decrease Soviet opportunities.

If broadly

supported within the United States, such a regional framework
could also signal to the Soviets that the

u.s.

has a consistent and

sustainable approach to the region-- i.e., that we know our interests
and are prepared to back them up over many years.

Moscow would be

less likely to be confused by, to make miscalculations about, or to
exploit, changes in
Against:

u.s.

administrations.

A regional security, political, and economic approach

may not work sufficiently well by itself, especially with continuing
Soviet and Cuban efforts to obstruct and undermine it.
Issue II:

Cuban Involvement

It is generally accepted that Cuba has so far had more of a
stake in promoting revolutionary change in Central America than has
the Soviet Union and that, indeed, Cuba took the lead in Nicaragua
and in asserting the validity of violent revolution.

For the Soviets,

meddling in the region may have appeared to be a low-cost, low-risk,
and potentially high-payoff tactic in a global struggle with the United
States in a region peripheral to central Soviet concerns.

For Castro

the export of revolution has been a basic reason for being, although
there are contending "pragmatic" strains in Cuban leadership, as well.
There is, however, considerable debate about "which is the dog
and which is the tail" in the Soviet-Cuban relationship, in terms of
specific tactics within the region, the direction of Communist bloc
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efforts, overall risks to be run, and the possible curtailing of
subversive efforts.

Debate turns on several key questions, including

the following:
~~

Even though Cuba was in the vanguard, will the Soviet Union

now be consistent in its support of violent revolution in the region?
Indeed, has it already flashed a caution light, whether for tactical
or policy reasons, because of recent u.s. actions?
'

Would the Soviet Union try to constrain Cuban activities

even if it were to constrain its own because of a shift in its basic
calculations about costs, risks, and advantages?
,!

Could the Soviet Union constrain Castro-- e.g., through

limiting the transshipment of military supplies -- or would Castro
try to export revolution even in defiance of the Kremlin?

Would, in

fact, the Soviets be able and willing to bring Castro to heel, at
risk of potentially jeopardizing today's terms of their involvement
in Cuba?
' Are there potential differences between the Soviet Union and
Cuba elsewhere in the world that could be exploited with benefits
in the region

e.g., on the long-term value of violent revolution

and the risks to be run on its behalf?
There is a second major strand of u.s. debate concerning what
would be possible in u.s.-Cuban relations.

This debate has a long and

checkered history, beginning with the Cuban Revolution and repeated
at regular intervals ever since.

Several administration have made

efforts to change the terms of the u.s.-Cuban relationship.

The debate

has clustered around the following questions, among others:
,! Does keeping Castro uncertain about whether we would use
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military force against Cuba constrain his actions elsewhere?

Or is

he able to use such uncertainties to ga1n deeper support within Cuba
and sympathy elsewhere in the region-- i.e., in defying the United
States?
'

Could we wean Cuba away from the Soviet Union by lifting the

embargo and providing the Cuban economy with an alternative source
of direct economic support?

That is, can Cuba be "Finlandized?"

Or

does the ideological character of the Castro regime make the Soviet
Union and Cuba political bedfellows in any event?

,I Would lifting the embargo against Cuba or taking other positive
steps help us elsewhere in the Hemisphere?

Or would it simply signal

inconsistency in our overall approach?
'

Is there any basis for a u.s.-Cuban "deal" in which the

latter would be accorded economic benefits and greater legitimacy
within the Hemisphere in exchange for curtailing its revolutionary
activities elsewhere?
United States does?

Or is Castro committed to his line whatever the
In effect, does Cuban policy have to be confounded

"on the ground" in Central America and the Caribbean?
Selected Options
Bearing these questions in mind, options for the United States
in dealing with the Cuban role in Central America include the
following (this list does not include invading Cuba or imposing a
blockade, on the assumption that these would impose costs that would
not be politically sustainable at home or abroad):
1.

Try to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

This could entail a) efforts to raise the risks and/or lower the
benefits to the Soviet Union of challenging the United States in the
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region-- e.g., through one or another form of linkage, countering
Soviet efforts "on the ground," or creating an effective regional
framework~

b) dealing over Cuba's head with the Soviets (as in the

Cuban Missile Crisis): c) trying to wean Cuba from the Soviet embrace:
or d) trying to exploit any Soviet-Cuban differences beyond the
immediate region-- e.g., in Ethiopia or in Angola.
For:

Any successful effort to split basic Soviet and Cuban

policy towards the region could reduce the overall threat and sow
confusion in basic bloc policy.
Against: The mechanisms for achieving this goal are not clear.
Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union is critical at home and would be
a constraining force elsewhere -- even though, in any "client"
relationship, the client also has leverage.

And this may simply be

a case of the wish being father to the thought.
2.

Lift the trade embargo against Cuba, and potentially offer

some economic aid as part, for example, of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative.
For: This might have some limited, positive effect in the region
in reducing the impact of Cuban propaganda against

u.s.

"imperialism."

Simply lifting the embargo could create some domestic discontent in
Cuba in the likely event that trade with the United States would not
develop to any real degree.
Against: If past Cuban positions are a valid guide, Castro would
be unwilling to trade anything for this

u.s.

concession.

elsewhere in the region would not likely be substantial.
in

u.s.

Any gains
This shift

policy would be hard to justify at home, politically, unless

Cuba did indeed change its behavior not only in Central America but·
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also in Angola and elsewhere.

Without substantial

u.s.

aid -- the

Soviets now provide close to $5 billion annually -- this would
not jeopardize the Soviet-Cuban connection and up to a point could
be welcomed in Moscow.

Cuban trade with other Western countries is

already 30%, and has had no impact on Cuba's behavior.

And the West

would have to extend credits to make trade meaningful, with problems
somewhat analogous to credits provided to other bloc countries.
Variants of this approach would be a) to lift the embargo on
medical supplies, which would have propaganda advantages in the
Hemisphere; b) to work towards normalized immigration; or c) to open
up travel to Cuba and family contacts, thus focussing on the "successor
generation" in Cuba and working for long-term change.

Travel would,

however, provide foreign exchange to Cuba, and Castro may be able to
handle an influx of visitors better than before.
3.

Pursue a two-track policy of a) lifting the embargo -- in

whole or in part -- and/or travel restrictions, plus perhaps also
offering economic assistance or credits with political strings attached
concerning Cuba's external behavior; and b) opposing Cuban ventures
abroad -- both in the region and in places like Angola -- through
a combination of political, economic, and military instruments.

This

could also include setting up Radio Marti.
For: This would have the advantages of Option 2, and would also
polarize Cuba's choices more clearly.

In the event that Cuban export

of revolution were being beaten "on the ground," this would provide
some face-saving for Castro and might be the basis of a long-run deal,
including such things as air piracy and the Soviet intelligence base
in Cuba.

It could also provide a basis for working on the "successor
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generation" in Cuba.
Against: A two-track policy would pose many of the difficulties
in political explanation that attend the duality of u.s.-soviet
relations-- e.g., understanding Soviet brutality but also recognizing
the need for arms control.

If Cuban activities were being thwarted

within the region, there would be little need for the positive step.
And for Cuba to consider any long-term deal would probably also require
our keeping "hands off" Nicaragua, as well as places like Grenada.
4.

Invite Cuba to join any larger political and economic

framework for the region as a whole.
For: This would have propaganda advantages in the region, and
would show a good-faith attempt to embed Cuba in a regional system.
Against: Cuba would exploit this position to try undermining
any regional arrangements and to call into question U.S. compliance,
while continuing its own subversive activities.

Castro would gain

legitimacy without changing his nature.
5.

Counter the Cuban role through a strategy focussed on the

problems of the region and based on a regional framework for security
plus social and economic progress.
For: This approach could decrease Cuba's opportunities for
meddling in regional developments by putting it in the position of
opposing gains for all Central American states.

This would be

especially true if the approach were couched in terms of support for
democracy and non-interference.

With proper safeguards, it would also

push Cuba back onto indirect methods of subversion.
Against: Given its position in the region and its ideological
fervor, Cuba would be in a better position than the Soviet Union to
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confound regional arrangements, especially during a period of uncertain
social and political change within individual Central American states.
Issue III:

u.s.

West European Concerns and Involvement
involvement in Central America is only beginning to achieve

real saliency in Western Europe, where in general there is a greater
focus on more pressing problems and developments.

Knowledge of

Central America is also sparse, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal the
best informed.

In general, there is a spectrum of opinion from

north to south in Europe, with greatest emotional reactions against

u.s.

policy in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, and somewhat

greater appreciation of U.S. dilemmas among the Latin countries,
especially because of the direct experience of Socialist governments
in dealing with Communists.

Some governments, like that of Mitterrand

in France, can afford to be critical of the United States to appease
their left-wing, because of the low saliency of Central America.

There

is also some division al9ng generational lines (the "successor
generation"), analogous to nuclear debates.
European political groups (plus elements of the Church) -- most
notably the Socialist International -- have also been deeply involved
in Central America, most often carrying poor signals in both directions:
the value of the Central American radical left to Europe, and doubts
on

u.s.

policy to Nicaragua and elsewhere.

The SI has, however, become

somewhat disillusioned as it has gained more experience with the
Sandinistas.

There has also been some sense of "saving the Americans

from themselves," by offering an alternative to

u.s.

"irrationality"

that could lead Nicaragua to the Cuban model.
In general, European interest and concern can be expected to rise
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in step with increasing
troops were introduced.

u.s.

involvement, most particularly if

u.s.

If experience elsewhere in the world is a

reliable guide, most of the allies -- with some exceptions, depending
on the character of individual governments -- would become concerned
about three basic problems:
,, that

u.s.

diplomatic and military attention will be diverted

from West European problems to those of a region not seen as germane
to European security, at least in the terms we have so far posed them;
,, that the United States will take actions that will raise risks
of military conflict and of worsening North-South relations, in general
i.e., that we can't be trusted to act responsibly.

At the extreme

there would be concern in Europe that a new Vietnam psychosis could
develop among the American public, with implications for

u.s.

commitment

to European problems and security; and
,, that the United States will overemphasize the Soviet dimension
of Central American problems, at risk to the benefits of relatively
relaxed East-West tensions within Europe, itself, and perhaps also to
arms control.
At bottom, West European governments, in general, are likely to
object less to

--u.s.

u.s.

actions in Central America that meet several tests:

policy must comport with overall

u.s.

interests, as

comprehensible in Western Europe;
-- It must be seen as consistent, sustainable, and having broad
support within the United States;
-- It should focus more on economic and political developments
within the region, itself, and limit the use of military force to
a clearly secondary role; and
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-- It must not divert u.s. attention, especially over the longterm, from West European concerns; and it must not pose added dilemmas
in East-West relations.
Even then, it is not clear that any deep and active engagement
of the United States in Central America, where that would entail direct
u.s. involvement in military conflict, will prevent the rise of West
European anxieties.

If we had compelling reason to introduce u.s.

forces, the price of the European reaction could be worth paying.

If

not, the European factor could be a severe constraint.
There are several pertinent questions, including the following:
'

Can key West European governments and public opinion come

to understand the issues involved in Central America for the United
States and, by extension, for the West as a whole?

Can European states

come to accept u.s. definitions of appropriate responses, especially
ones that entail the projection of military power?

This has been

difficult enough with regard to Persian Gulf security; how much more
difficult will it be with regard to Central America, where so far the
allies in general see few if any direct interests for them?
'

Can the United States tailor its approach to Central America

to take account of West European anxieties and still get the job done
however we define it?

,I Will, indeed, U.s. involvement in Central America begin to
impose costs on the Atlantic alliance -- either in diverting u.s.
attention, in complicating East-West relations, in spilling over
onto security issues (especially nuclear issues like INF), or in
breeding u.s. hostility to European criticism?
'

By contrast, would any West European states be able and willing
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to play a role supportive of U.S. efforts in Central America?
would be the parameters of any such efforts?
forthcoming from Europe?

What

Would resources be

Can groups like the Socialist International

play a constructive role?
• Would there be any value in our sharing leadership with any
West European states-- e.g., Spain-- in creating and managing a
political and economic framework for Central America?

Would either

side be willing to do so?
Selected Options
Bearing these questions in mind,

u.s.

options in dealing with

West European allies over Central America include the following:
1.
get across

Mount a sustained diplomatic effort in Western Europe to

u.s.

concerns and responses towards Central America,

designed in the first instance to reduce opposition to

u.s.

policies.

Also continue to seek European diplomatic representation in Central
America and an end to exporting criticism of

u.s.

policies to the

region.
For:

Education of key European governments in Central American

issues is a first requirement.

Provided

u.s.

policies can be shown

to "add up" in terms of overall Western interests, this would help
to neutralize opposition at the level of governments, even if public
opinion remained skeptical.
Against:

As with other issues, consulting with allies is no

real substitute for policies that can gain West European support on
their merits.

Where the U.S. focus were being diverted from Europe,

the problem would be doubly difficult.
2. Seek out individual European countries to open a sustained
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dialogue with Cuba, on our behalf.
For: This would permit a level of contacts deeper than now
politically possible.

Spain would have advantages based on history

and culture.
Against: We can talk with the Cubans now.
control over the dialogue.

We could lose

And Castro might exploit it to our

disadvantage.
3. Seek European support for an economic assistance program in
Central America, including the Caribbean Basin Intitiative, preferences,
and direct aid.
For: An overall economic program would gain added legitimacy
and thus would provide regional states with a sense that they were
not totally dependent on the United States.
Against: Few European states would want to commit significant
resources, and they would likely want a serious measure of control
over other

u.s.

policies towards the region.

4. Seek European involvement in selling arms to Central American
countries and in training local forces, plus continuing ties with
the regime in Nicaragua.
For: Arms sales and training would offer an alternative to
dependence on either the United States or on the Soviet Union/Cuba.
Politically, this would enable Nicaragua to keep open the door to the
West.

The United States would be able to act at one remove, for both

sides' benefit.

To some extent, the Soviet and Cuban role could be

diminished.
Against: Encouraging any arms sales would create political
difficulties for the United States, especially if weapons were
diverted for cross-border or internal subversion.

In Nicaragua, it
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is questionable how much having an alternative to dependence on the
Soviet Union and Cuba would really affect the situation.

Arms sales

to Nicaragua without a "change of heart" in Managua would just complicate
matters.

European states would be reluctant to train local forces

without a major share in overall

u.s.

decisions.

One element of this option would be to encourage Britain to keep
forces in Belize.
5. Seek direct European involvement in developing and managing
an overall political and security framework for Central America.
For:

Any such framework would have less of a "made in America"

stamp and would gain broader legitimacy both within the Hemisphere
and elsewhere.

This would also permit us to step back somewhat from

total management of Central American problems for the West.

There

might be some European support, especially if couched in democratic
terms and if this were seen as an alternative to possible

u.s.

"irrationality."
Against:

There would be great reluctance in Europe to share

leadership or to get involved in any such arrangements so far from
home 1although Spain might be an exception).
European governments have been to support

u.s.

As loath as most
efforts, the region

does continue in their eyes to be America's backyard, with our having
primary responsibility.

Any European state that were involved would

also want to share in making decisions for which it would have to
take some responsibility.
Conclusions and Recommendations
(These will be provided on request in the course of the hearings).
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Appendix: A Model Framework
The preceding list of options has referred to a possible political
and security framework for Central America.
variants.
~I

There could be many

The following are principles of one such variant:

It could draw upon experience with the abortive Central American

Defense Council of 1965 (CONDECA), which included all the regional
states except Honduras (although CONDECA itself reflected circumstances
that are now obsolete and it is not a good precedent to cite).
~I

Its basic principle would be the sovereignty, independence, and

integrity of all six Central American states, plus commitment to
democracy.
~

Each state would undertake not to engage against its neighbors

in any military attack; transfer of military arms -- overt or covert;
training of the military personnel of a neighboring country; or
any form of subversion, direct or indirect.
~I

Each state would undertake not to accept arms from third parties

that exceeded certain sizes, types, and capabilities.
from outside would be from Western sources.

Any arms provided

The total permissable

size of military forces in each state would be stipulated in the
framework document.

No military forces, bases, or advisers of non-

Central American states would be permitted, other than those provided
for in the Panama Canal Treaties.
~

The United States would be a party to the agreement, and would

participate as a matter of course in arrangements applying to military
and security issues.
~

The framework would be administered overall by a permament

council of ministers of the six Central American states, with the
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United States as a permanent, non-voting member.

The chairmanship would

rotate, but any two Central American states could call the council into
plenary session.

,I The council would include procedures for conflict-resolution
among member states.
• The council would be assisted by a military advisory board,
drawn from all six Central American states, with the United States
as observer.

,I Verification provisions would be spelled out in the agreement,
as a permament feature.

Individual verification teams would be composed

of representatives of the host country and of two other Central American
countries, with

u.s.

technical advisers.

These teams would be permitted

full access to territory and facilities both on a routine basis and
on a challenge basis whenever requested by any two Central American
states.

Other states, as agreed by four of the six Central American

states, could be invited to replace the United States in providing
technical assistance for verification in any particular team.
' Other states, as agreed to by any four of the six Central
American states, could be associated with the agreement (with Belize
potentially a full partner).
'

The United States would undertake not to intervene in any

state that remained in compliance with the framework agreement.

u.s.

interpretations of this provision could be overturned by any four of
the six Central American states.
' The six Central American states could request that other states
in the Hemisphere undertake mutual pledges of non-interference.
'

The United States would undertake to provide specified levels
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of economic assistance to any contracting Central American state
deemed, on an annual basis, to be in compliance with the terms of
the agreement by vote of four of the six regional states.

The United

States would agree to undertake its best efforts to secure further
economic support from other Western states and institutions on the
same basis.
'

The agreement would be registered both with the United Nations

and the Organization of American States.
' This framework should be proposed by a state other than the
United States, either within Central America or Western Europe -perhaps Spain.
'

This framework should be developed in stages, including the

active particapation of the Contadora

states~

and it should be

integrated with any long-term economic program for the region.
Discussion
This framework assumes the following:
'

that a comprehensive framework is indeed possible;

'

that the United States would accept the current regime in

Nicaragua;
~~

that the Sandinistas would, for an economic and political price,

be prepared to give up the export of revolution;
11 that the verification provisions are indeed practicable-- e.g.,
that the region is not inherently too "porous;"

,I that the United States (and others) would be prepared to
commit the level of economic resources that is required; and
11 that the Soviets/Cubans would not develop ways of confounding
it

0
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Its advantages include the following:
~I

it provides a political basis and reference point for regional

security and political evolution.
~I

it provides for a system of mutual security guarantees, with

incentives for compliance, voting procedures, and verification;
~I

it would permit a majority of regional countries to determine

whether all of its members were in compliance;
~I

it would permit the United States to step back somewhat from

management of political and security problems;

,I it could provide a basis for bipartisan support in the United
States;

,I it could be attractive to West European countries, and might
elicit the support of some of them; and
11 if it worked, it would reduce opportunities for the Soviet
Union and Cuba.
Its defects include the following:

,I it begs the question of the process of internal change in
Central American states;

,I it begs the question of the willingness of the Sandinistas to
subscribe to democracy, even in principle;

,I it would require the emergence, simultaneously, of political
maturity and mutually-supporting calculations about risks and benefits
on the part of all Central American states;

,I it imposes limits on the United States-- e.g., on the
right to intervene -- that could set a precedent that would affect

u.s.

flexibility if the framework collapsed or if other objectionable

regimes emerged in the region; and
~

by itself, it would not solve the problems of the region.
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MODEL U.S. APPROACH IN CENTRAL

A~ERICA

ROBERT E. HUNTER

The following is the outline of a possible long-term approach
for the United States in Central America.
1.

Basic Principles
,,

Long-range U.S. goals should be based on those presented by

President Reagan to the Congress on April 27th:
democracy, reform, and human
economic

freedom~

development~

support for the security of the region 1 s threatened
dialogue and negotiations, both regional and
,,

nations~

and

internal~

We should oppose any expansion of the Soviet Union 1 s military

power in the region beyond its position in

Cuba~

~~

We should oppose Soviet/Cuban interference in Central America;

~~

We should place key emphasis on the principle of bipartisanship,

recognizing that it is central both to a sustainable, regional strategy
and to dealing with the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Western allies
in Central America;
~I

We should make a major,

long-term economic commitment to the

nations of Central America, subject to certain conditions concerning
the activities of individual countries (see Appendix);
~I

We should put primacy on regional negotiations and regional

solutions, and promote the active engagement on a sustained basis
vf appropriate outside countries-- e.g.,

the Contadora group and

selected West European countries (such as Spain).

This means emphasis
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Model Approach
on "multilateral hegemony;" and
~

We should be prepared to accept the principle of non-

intervention, provided other countries (within and without Central
America) also adhere to this principle.

This implies working for

long-term rather than short-term political change in Nicaragua.
2. Steps to Take
A. Soviet Union.

We should:

,I recognize that the Soviets are most likely to be impressed

by U.S. approaches that meet three tests: 1) they have bipartisan
support and can be sustained over changes in u.s. administrations; 2)
they gain support within Central America and other nations of the
Hemisphere; and 3) they gain support -- or at least neutrality -- on
the part of the Western allies;
,I adopt a low rhetorical profile on Soviet engagement within U.S.

debate, while presenting the facts of that engagement to Hemisphere
governments-- i.e., to multilateralize opposition to Soviet involvement;
,I keep Central America on the agenda of u.s.-soviet discussions,

highlighting our concerns and our opposition to Soviet involvement,
especially in arms and training.

To avoid misunderstanding and

miscalculation, the primary focus should be on the unacceptability
of any strategic use of Cuba or any Soviet military bases elsewhere
in the region;
~I

strike no "deals" with the Soviet Union, but also not call

into question understandings on Cuba; and

,I

rely primarily on "lowering the benefits" to the Soviet Union

::.·ather than trying to "raise the risks."

303.
~odel

Approach

B. Cuba.
~I

We should:
retain the embargo on trade with Cuba, so long as Cuba is

actively exporting revolution;
~

eliminate trade restrictions on pharmaceuticals and relax

travel restrictions;
~I

establish Radio Marti, appealing especially to the successor

generation;
•

continue to oppose Cuban involvement in Angola; and

~I

oppose Cuban activities in Central America, itself, through

a coherent and sustainable regional approach (outlined below).

Cuba

should not be invited to take part in regional arrangements.
C. Western allies.
~I

We should:

work to heighten understanding of Central American issues

among governments, to get increased diplomatic representation in
the region, and to reduce unhelpful involvement by the Socialist
International and other non-official groups;
~I

soft-pedal (and make more sophisticated) rhetoric on Soviet

involvement -- other than specific risks to allied interests such as
supply lines -- and increase rhetorical emphasis on regional problems;
~I

underscore the principles of democracy and non-intervention;

~I

seek European support for a long-range economic program in

Central America;
~

try to engage Spain (and others, if appropriate), in regional

diplomacy; and
~

within a comprehensive framework, seek European military

training in individual Central American countries, and permit limited
and controlled European arms sales -- under certain circumstances
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(see Appendix) to Nicaragua, as well.
D. Militarv.
~~

We should:

indicate to the American people the limits of possible

military involvement:

u.s.

limited to key interests, but not to changing

governments;
• keep the mandate of support for the Contras tied to Nicaraguan
export of revolution and regional negotiations, and not to the
character of the regime;
~I

be prepar.ed to halt support for the Contras provided Nicaragua

will negotiate, but make clear that this support will resume if it
does not respond

with support then provided overtly rather than

covertly;
,, limit direct

u.s.

military engagement in Honduras and other

regional states to small-force training,

tailored to appropriate

tactics and limiting the U.S. impact on the society;
• continue training and advice to the El Salvador government,
with appropriate tactics and clearly tied to the political process;
,, limit shows of force where we do not intend to apply force; and
• present terms and conditions on which the U.S. would not
intervene directly-- e.g., absence of Soviet/Cuban bases.
E. Political.
•

Continue the four assurances of President Reagan's April 27

speech, with minor modifications:
-- support any agreement among Central American countries
f0r the withdrawal -- under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions
-- 0f all foreign military and security advisers and troops.

305.
Model Approach
help opposition groups join the political process in all
countries and compete by ballots instead of bullets.

(In Nicaragua,

however, this should be seen as a long-term, not short-term, goal).
support any verifiable, reciprocal agreement among Central
American countries on the renunciation of support of insurgencies on
neighbors' territory; and
-- help Central America end its costly arms race and
support any verifiable, reciprocal agreements on the nonimportation of
offensive weapons.

(This should recognize the half-way house of some

Western arms supplies);
~

Build a regional political strategy on the work of the Contadora

group, while also trying to involve Spain; and
~

Work towards a security arrangement such as that contained

in the Appendix.
F. Economic
,,

Make a long-term commitment of resources and seek support from

other Western nations, along the lines of the Appendix, as well as
through international and regional institutions.
G.

Institutional.

We should:

~

Work to refurbish the OAS and the Rio Treaty,

~~

Draw on the best working-level expertise on Central America

u.s.

in the

in general;

government, and keep it in place for several years;

~I

Develop continuity in our military advisory teams; and

~

Develop a long-range, working partnership between Congress

and the executive branch,

including key Congressional staff members

possibly continuing the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.
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u.s.

Interests in Central America

Ambassador William H. Luers
(The ideas presented in this paper are the author's own and
are not intended to represent the positions or opinions of
the Department of State.•
I.

INTRODUCTION

Americans believe that their country has a special mission
in the world and that belief in the "American exceptionalism"
has in fact grown over the past 2~0 ye~rs. Since George
Washington first set limits on u.~. foreign relations,
presidents have seen u.s. national interests expand as we have
become increasingly entangled in the affairs of virtually all
of the peoples of the world. John Quincy Adams defined the
country's vision of itself as "a nation coextensive with the
North American continent destined by God and nature to be the
most populous and most powerful people ever combined under one
social compact."
In the 2_0th century the interests of the United States have
become involved in the affairs of nations everywhere. We have
become, since World War II, the world's largest trading nation,
the largest aid donor, the most enthusiastic supporter and
financial backer of virtually all of the new international
institutions dedicated to rule by law and to economic
development. We have been the advocate for the dozens of new
nations which were born, as we were 150 years earlier, from
colonialism. Many nations and peoples of the world came to see
their own interests entwined with those of the United States.
Interdependence became the glue of this new patchwork of over
150 sovereign states. The vast majority of these states came
to believe that their future was closely bound to how wisely
and generously the United States managed its role in this new
interdependence.
The nations of the Western Hemisphere were the first to
seek institutional expression for the management of
interdependence. The New World has for over a century shared a
common destiny.
In Thomas Jefferson's words, "America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe
and peculiarly her own." These sentiments were echoed by the
liberator Simon Bolivar and other leaders of the independent
nations of Hispanic America.
The United States wanted to ensure that the geographic
region to its south did not pose threats to its own security
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and political interests. The other American states wanted to
ensure that the North American power committed itself firmly to
policies consistent with being a "good neighbor." It has been
the North American self image of its own "exceptionalism" in
the New World that has often been offensive to other American
states. Yet all the states of the Western Hemisphere sought to
defend their different national interests through the pursuit
of common objectives and ideals -- liberty, cooperation,
economic development, the exclusion of extra-hemispheric powers
and peace. The Inter-American System, as it has come to be
known, has been remarkable in the past in providing the setting
for the achievement of these ambitious objectives. In most
cases the objectives of American states coincided closely with
their national security interests, since they realized early on
this interconnection. One of the more prominent writers on
national interest, Hans Morgenthau, has explained his view on
this aspect of interdependence: "The national interest of the
nation that is conscious of not only its own interests but also
that of other nations must be defined in terms compatible with
the latter. In a multinational world this is a requirement of
political morality. In an age of total war it is also a
condition for survival."
The test of our leadership and wisdom in managing our
international responsibilities comes when these multiple u.s.
interests seem to conflict with each other. The resolution of
conflicts between u.s. national interests has severely taxed
the American political system over the past two decades. We
have on occasion been bold in our choice. We have frequently
been wise. The decision of the Reagan Administration to send
u.s. troops to accompany forces of other Caribbean states into
Grenada was an instructive case of a president setting
priorities among many u.s. national interests. There were on
the one hand u.s. interests in ensuring the protection of the
lives and well-being of American citizens, to support the
appeal of the small democratic nations of the Caribbean, to
help protect their special political culture, and to
demonstrate the unacceptability of the arbitrary use of force
by a few to change the course of a nation, both militarized and
politicized by the Soviets and the Cubans in the Caribbean. In
apparent conflict with those interests was the u.s. interest in
upholding the principle of non-intervention, which has become
the keystone of the Inter-American System and a first
principle, although often violated, of the UN Charter. The
choice was not an easy one, but to delayed this decision would
have been to make another choice of potentially fateful
consequence.
Another serious and often more difficult task of presidents
is to resolve conflicts that arise when the national interest
of the u.s. conflicts with the interest of another state. The
u.s. holds firmly to the principle that conflicts among states
will be resolved by peaceful means. Yet in a world in which
other nations are arming and using military force to project
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power across frontiers, the United States cannot declare itself
unwilling to defend, by force if necessary, its own vital
interests and those of its allies, friends and neighbors. The
definition of what interest is considered vital is thus the
ultimate test of statesmanship.

u.s. interests as they pertain to Central American issues,
are a blend of history, geography, economics and current
events. Any effort to make sharp distinctions among them is
likely to appear artificial. Yet we believe it is necessary to
convey some sense of the complexity of the tangled U.~.
interests in the world today. Our interests are not
homogenous. We must constantly make choices about which
interests are paramount. We found it useful, therefore, to
divide our discussion of U.S. interests into four broad
categories: political and moral, economic and social, security,
and global.
Before discussing these four broad areas, a few
observations about the special nature of u.s. interests in
Central America are appropriate:
-- Our historic involvement in the region has been
primarily to pursue our security interests and political ideals
not, as is often popularly believed, to pursue economic gain.
In his important study on "Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in
the Caribbean 1900-1921," Dana G. Munro concludes: "If we look
back on the history it seems clear that the motives that
inspired (U.S.) policy were basically political rather than
economic. What the u.s. was trying to do throughout the period
with which this history has dealt was to put an end to
conditions that threatened the independence of some of the
Caribbean states and were consequently a potential danger to
the security of the U.S. Revolutions must be discouraged; the
bad financial practices that weakened the governments and
involved them in trouble with foreigners must be resolved; and
general economic and social conditions, which were a basic
cause of instability, must be improved." Because our
interventions in the region were primarily for a political
purpose, not colonial, our involvement has been episodic, has
depended on political attitudes in the U.S. and has been
responsive to events in Central America.
--The u.s., unlike other major nations in the 20th
century, has not had to be concerned with threats to its vital
security interests on its borders or periphery, with the
exception of the Cuban missile crisis and subsequent concerns
with the Soviet/Cuban connection. For most nations "defense of
vital national security interests" immediately evokes concerns
with the frontier areas. The Soviet Union has used its
military force directly since World War II to secure its
periphery, from which it has historically been threatened. For
Americans, however, it is a wrenchingly new experience to think
of threats near our border.
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-- Finally, the perception that other nations have of u.s.
interests in Central America is as critical to United States
policy as is our own understanding of those interests. The
United States is perceived by geography and history to have a
hegemonic or quasi-imperial relationship with the nations of
Central America. Indeed our past relationship of intervention
and involvement confirms an historic u.s. effort to dominate
events in that part of the world. Other nations, therefore,
will draw important conclusions about the u.s. ability to
manage military, economic and political power, international
law, collective security, and diplomacy from how we define and
defend our complex of interests in Central America.
II.

POLITICAL AND MORAL INTERESTS

The political and moral interests are our oldest historic
interests in Central America and the Caribbean. They are part
of the ideology, the rhetoric and the dreams of the New World.
The calls for democracy, liberty, respect for human rights and
hemispheric solidarity have echoed throughout the Western
Hemisphere even though the reality has often been different
from the dream. In the 20th century, since our security
interests have rarely been challenged from our borders,
Americans have concentrated their thinking about Latin America
in ideological and political terms. The Good Neighbor Policy
and the Alliance for Progress were for a political purpose.
And both were presented with an energy and commitment that were
moral. The political issues dominate u.s. public thinking
about Central America. The political issues also dominate the
reality of Central America. As we have said before, the
central issue is the legitimacy of government. This is not a
mindless conflict. It is an expression of a drive for power.
To the extent that we have been interventionist, hegemonic
or quasi-imperial in our relationship with Central America
since the early 19th century, we have been so primarily to
promote our political and regional security interests. We have
sought three goals: to promote stable and friendly
governments, to promote more just governments, and to exclude
the influence of extra-hemispheric powers. We have pursued our
own self-interests. We have also proclaimed a moral purpose.
In the pursuit of our objectives we have at times given less
emphasis to the promotion of just governments, in order to
ensure stability and to exclude extra-hemispheric powers. We
will here discuss three political interests: democracy, the
Monroe Doctrine, and the hemispheric system. Then we will turn
to the moral dimension.
The first political interest has to do precisely with our
historic desire to try to shape the type of political systems
that govern in Central America. we have established strong
alliances with some of the most despised despots of Central
America in the name of internal stability and anti-communism.
Yet, over the past 25 years, we have invested enormous economic
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and political resources in the promotion of economic
development, free political institutions, and democracy.
Should the United States have as one of its "interests" the
building of democracy in Central America? There are a variety
of responses that North Americans give to this central question.
One point of view argues that "democracy is not an export
commodity."
It is not the business of the United States to
concern itself with the shape of political institutions in the
nations of Central America, since that is a form of
interventionism. Moreover, "elections" are meaningless in a
country at civil war or in countries where social inequities
deprive most of the people of a chance to participate in the
political process. The nations of Central America must be left
to their own devices, which will probably result in social and
political revolutions that will not please but need not
threaten the U.S.
Another point of view argues that the nations of Central
America, with the remarkable exception of Costa Rica, lack the
educational base, economic development, leadership, and
political culture even to contemplate in the foreseeable future
the formation of "democratic systems" as we know them. While
the u.s. must take an interest in the political direction of
these countries, the nations of Central America should not
become Marxist-Leninist or allied with Cuba or the Soviet Union
nor should they become conspicuous violators of human rights.
The u.s. would most certainly fail if it sets as one of its
interests in Central America the evolution of democratic
systems. We will have to be realistic and seek to bring about
and work with anti-communist but relatively benign governments
that are supported by the military and traditional elites.
There is a third point of view which holds that as
difficult as the building of democratic institutions might be
in the countries of Central America, it is nonetheless one of
the few objectives that can galvanize U.S. political support
and mobilize the backing of the other democracies and
democratic political groups in the hemisphere (e.g., the
Socialist International and Christian Democrats). According to
this point of view, when the u.s. has placed the protection of
"liberty" and the promotion of economic development at the
center of its expressed political interests in the western
Hemisphere, we have pursued policies which found the greatest
resonance among Latin democratic and popular leaders. Those
who argue this view note that both major democratic parties of
Venezuela believe, and have stated publicly since 1958, that
the promotion of democracy and the support of democratic
governments in the hemisphere is the primary way in which the
democratic state of Venezuela seeks to protect its "national
security." This view goes on to argue that although elections
do not make democracy they are at least a point of departure
which, combined with other institutions, could provide the way
to pacify and eventually to eliminate insurgency and violent
opposition.
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This third point of view on democracy ought to be supported
based upon a determination that no u.s. Government can refuse
to adopt policies that support the evolution of democratic and
pluralistic systems. To deny that goal would be to deny
ourselves. The trends throughout South America over the past
decade, moreover, have moved those countries relentlessly
toward more open political systems. The Latin Americans
themselves have never lost faith in this endeavor. We can do
no less, even though the problems of building pluralistic
systems in Central America are formidable.
The second set of political interests deals with the issue
raised by the Monroe Doctrine and its variations over the past
150 years.
Should the United States today still hold that it
is in our political and security interest to consider any
attempt on the part of European powers "to extend their system
to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety"? That principle has long since been modified and
internationalized within the Rio Treaty and the various actions
and resolutions of the Hemispheric System. Yet in the
Caribbean Basin, despite the Cuban presence, should we not
still adhere to some policy of excluding extra-hemispheric
powers?
One point of view argues that such a position was overtaken
by events long ago because of the Soviet/Cuban alliance, and
that it is offensive to the other nations of the hemisphere.
According to this point of view, the United States should
finally bury the Monroe Doctrine and recognize that the nations
of the Western Hemisphere have entered the modern world as
full-fledged participants. The United States should indeed
encourage the full participation of our Western European allies
in the economic and political development and crisis management
of events in the Caribbean Basin.
There is a second point of view which argues that the basic
Monroe Doctrine principle should still apply in some form to
the Caribbean Basin. The United States should perhaps try to
multilateralize the Doctrine with other hemispheric powers but
our political interest in keeping the Soviet Union, its system
and its allies out of the Caribbean Basin should be clearly
stated. Those who hold this view might differ on whether to
extend the exclusion to Western Europeans. Some could argue
that the Western European attitudes toward Central American
developments, particularly their large scale assistance to
Nicaragua and Cuba, demonstrate cleary that they play a
spoilers role and conduct policies at odds with or
diametrically opposed to u.s. interests.
Moreover, in view of
the differences, European disruptive involvement in the
Caribbean Basin simply adds another element of tension in the
NATO alliance.
Yet others would argue that, despite the differences in the
past, the u.s. must make every effort to encourage the key
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European democracies such as Germany, Spain, England, Portugal,
France and The Netherlands, most of which already have
substantial political or economic interests in the region, to
play a more constructive role in the Caribbean Basin. Moreover
since developments in the Caribbean Basin may become
increasingly an area of new U.S. military attention, the NATO
Alliance interests might be affected.
Although no reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine is
particularly desirable or useful, a u.s. statement of the
region's emerging views of what it wants could be a more
important and more binding multilateral assurance. The
.. Organization of Eastern Caribbean States made a statement
regarding Grenada which helped define their own objective.
Likewise, the Contadora Group and the Central American
Democratic Community are moving carefully and wisely toward a
definition of what they would like to see established as norms
for the nations of the region.
A third political interest relates to the inter-American
system. For most of the post World War II period, the
tranquility of the Western Hemisphere has been guaranteed in
large part by the capacity of the Western Hemisphere nations to
resolve their own problems. Hemispheric tranquility has been a
major asset to the United States and the United States has a
major interest, as does the rest of the hemisphere, in
maintaining that tranquility. Unfortunately that tranquility
seems to be corning to an end. The problems in u.s. hemispheric
relations are interconnected and are now seriously beginning to
threaten u.s. interests, including our vital security
interests. The following is a short list of problems:
The $300 billion debt owned by Latin American
countries, if not managed well, could result in a collapse of
the international monetary system and the top u.s. banks.
The internal economic and social strains in the major
Latin American countries resulting from the two years of world
economic depression threaten the stability of political systems
in the major Latin American states, and the assumption of
rational governance in the region.
The growing nationalism of Latin nations combined
with the increased ideological strains among them are leading
to heightened tensions over old border disputes and greater
attention to military preparedness. The enormous build-up of
sophisticated weapons in Cuba and Nicaragua makes those nations
pacesetters in the regional arms race at a time when funds for
military expenditures are just not available. The commitment
of Cuba and Nicaragua to a "revolution without frontiers"
suggests a prolonged period of guerrilla warfare in the region.
The Falklands/Malvinas war broke the long tradition
of Latin reluctance (except in Cuba) to engage in modern
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warfare against foreign armies. Argentina showed itself
capable of using effectively sophisticated missile systems and
nearly defeated the British Navy. Other Latin American nations
have been forced to think of building up their military
forces. This event must focus even greater world attention on
the Argentine nuclear program, which could produce a nuclear
explosion in the next few years.
The Falklands/Malvinas War also revealed the profound
weakness in the OAS and the Rio Treaty -- the key mutual
security institutions that, despite their poor international
reputation, have helped to resolve or avoid dozens of conflicts
between the American states over the past 30 years. The member
states were deeply divided over the appropriate role of the OAS
and Rio Treaty in the conflict. Neither organization could
head off the military confrontation. The weakened u.s.
capacity to work with and through the inter-American system
limits u.s. diplomatic options significantly.
One view of how the u.s. should deal with this unraveling
and disintegration of the inter-American system is to
strengthen the existing institutions -- the OAS, the Rio Treaty
and other regional organizations. According to this view, if
the u.s. were to place more trust in and pay more attention to
the hemispheric relationship, we could revive it and find
regional solutions to border disputes, and other political
problems, as well as find ways to improve our peacekeeping
efforts in such trouble spots as Central America. Many of
those who hold this view also believe that the hemispheric
system would be more effective were Cuba to be reincorporated.
Another point of view would argue that the unraveling of
the inter-American systems is probaby irreversible. If it is
not irreversible, the United States should not expend much
political capital on trying to reverse it. The u.s., by its
actions on behalf of the "system," could only make matters
worse~
According to this point of view the strains,
ideological and national, are so great within the OAS and over
the Rio Treaty that the U.S. can resort to these traditional
ways of dispute resolution only under most unusual
circumstances. Should the inter-American system be revived it
would only be at the initiative of the leading Latin American
nations themselves -- a situation which now seems highly
unlikely. Therefore, according to this view, the u.s. should
seek political support primarily through ad hoc regional and
sub-regional agreement and special accords-to deal with the new
emerging issues. We would probably need to associate ourselves
with one, or perhaps a series of sub-regional political groups
in the Caribbean Basin and elsewhere over the next several
years to give shape to a genuine sub-regional political
approach. Those who know the hemispheric system best realize
that it has worked because of informal groupings and issue
oriented alliances, not because of formal votes or the
institutional strength of the system.
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This complex of political issues is burdened by a history
of unfulfilled dreams and fulsome rhetoric.
Passions have been
high and real accomplishments low in the wake of these decades
of frustrated aspirations. Despite these disappointments the
u.s. ought to be determined to reaffirm the oldest American
ideals of the New World. The Americas were to cherish liberty,
to be separate and different from Europe, and to work together
toward their common purpose. Despite the current Central
American crisis conditions and the imperfect state of liberty
and cooperation in the Americas, the Commission found hope in
the trends across the hemisphere in the 20th century. We are
able to say that events have pointed toward the original dreams
of Bolivar and Jefferson.
No u.s. government can refuse to adopt policies of working
with the nations of the hemisphere toward more open,
pluralistic systems based on consent. The democratic form of
government has been confirmed as the aspiration of the American
peoples whenever their consent has been sought. Therefore, as
difficult as the conditions are in Central America, those goals
of pluralism, government by consent, and respect for human
rights must be retained as u.s. policies and objectives.
Moreover, the nations of this hemisphere can prosper only
if they retain their distinctive character and independence
from external powers. Only the Cuban regime in the Western
Hemisphere has chosen to adopt a political system from, and
full dependency on, a European power.
It is precisely that
dependency that has alienated the Cuban government from the
other nations of the hemisphere and from its own people. The
various declarations of the Contadora group and the Central
American Democratic Community are beginning to define the
elements of a multilateral statement of purpose and direction
that is needed in lieu of mere affirmation of the Monroe
Doctrine. The United States should support these efforts. The
nations of the Caribbean Basin seek a community of states which
are democratic, free from external military and political
dominance and determined not to interfere in each other's
internal affairs.
The hemispheric system, in the final analysis, should
remain a part of United States' efforts to cooperate with the
other American states. As we approach together the matrix of
economic, social, political, and security problems this
hemisphere confronts today, the regional organizations and the
spirit behind them will play a role. The crisis of confidence
in the OAS and Rio Treaty cannot be changed by a u.s.
initiative.
If these institutions are to be revived, the other
American states will need to begin. We do believe that the
u.s. must convey to the states in the region our commitment to
work with them on initiatives proposed by them. The sustenance
and strengthening of the OAS, the Rio Treaty, and other
organizations such as the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, would be in the interest of the United States if other

315.

hemispheric nations determine it is in their interest. These
organizations could serve their purpose in the years ahead as
fora in which the will to cooperate can be generated. The
organizations themselves will not make the cooperation happen;
the American states will.
u.s. purposes in this hemisphere
must continue to be defined as a multilateral enterprise.
If
existing organs are refurbished or new ones created, the u.s.
should cooperate in the endeavor.
Finally, the moral interests that urge North Americans to
concern themselves with the rest of the hemisphere are strong.
The spirit of the past 150 years that has driven the United
States to seek more just governance in Latin America has
appeared at times as patronizing and interventionist. That the
United States has on occasion sought to justify our actions on
moral grounds has offended Latin dignity. Yet in our proudest,
most helpful periods of cooperation the people of the United
States have demonstrated generosity and caring for the Latin
people, who are increasingly becoming a major part of our own
nation.
This drive to concern ourselves with social justice,
hunger, sickness, unemployment, education, and the human
condition in Latin America is a part of the idealism, and
indeed part of the arrogance of the North American
exceptionalism.
That we believe we can and must help has been
both a bond with and an albatross for our neighbors.
Certainly
one of the greatest tasks for the u.s. Government is precisely
how to energize the North American people again to renew our
commitment to the people of this hemisphere without succumbing
to a new era of interventionism.
III.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTERESTS

The economic and social interests are the most concrete,
most easily defined U.S. interests in Central America.
Much of
the discussion related to the "defense of u.s. interests" in
this century has centered on the tangible "interests" of
foreign investment, resources, trade, and the property and
rights of u.s. citizens.
Despite the earlier assertion in this
chapter that historically our interests in Central America and
the Caribbean have been primarily political in nature, there
has been a long history of dispute between the u.s. and
governments in the region over such issues as expropriation of
u.s. investment without "prompt, adequate and effective
compensation," and other nationalistic moves against U.S.
investment and trade.
Moreover, as the u.s. moved from being a
regional to a world power in this century and from being a
self-contained economy to a major world trader after World Har
II, economic and trade issues have tended to dominate relations
in the Hestern Hemisphere, except when a political crisis
arose.
Americans are concerned with the movement of people,
products, money and ideas to Latin America, yet their concern
with the political issues of human rights and democracy often
overrides these more concrete interests.
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It is therefore important to stress that the tangible u.s.
economic interests in the five Central American countries are
small:
we are sovereign over no territory in Central America.
Direct u.s. investment in Central America amounts to
less than 0.5 percent of the total u.s. foreign investment
worldwide.
We import minimal strategic materials from Central
America.
The countries of Central America account for less
than 2.3 percent of the total exposure of u.s. banks in the
western Hemisphere.
In trade, Central America has a declining share of
the u.s. market.
It took 1.2 percent of u.s. exports in 1979
and supplied 1.0 percent of u.s. imports.
These data reflect the poverty in natural resources and in
productive capacity of the Central American nations, and the
low intrinsic value to the u.s. of our economic relations with
that small isthmus population (20 million people in the five
countries).
The important economic interests we have in Central America
are derivative, not direct. How will the far more important
u.s. economic interests in the Caribbean Basin region and in
Latin America as a whole be affected by developments in Central
America? It is useful to enumerate some of those important
u.s. economic and sovereign interests in the areas directly
adjacent to the five countries of Central America:
The u.s. is sovereign over Puerto Rico and the u.s.
Virgin Islands and has an important interest, shared with other
nations in the region, in the continuing functioning of the
Panama Canal.
Mexico is our largest southern neighbor and our third
largest trading partner in the world.
In 1982, the u.s.
imported $15 billion from Mexico and sold $11 billion to
Mexico.
Mexico is our largest foreign supplier of oil and
could supply up to 25 percent of our petroleum imports. The
interaction of people, products and money with Mexicio is on a
scale unmatached by any other nation. Economically,
politically and in human terms, what occurs in Mexicio is vital
to u.s. interests.
The Caribbean Basin is a major source of strategic
and other important raw materials. Venezuela and Mexico,
combined with the Caribbean based refineries, supply 25 percent
of our imported petroleum products. Mexico is a principal
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supplier of silver, zinc, gypsum, antimony, mercury, bismuth,
salenium, barium, rhenium and lead. Nearly 60 percent of
imports of bauxite and alumina come from Jamaica, Guyana and
Suriname.
The Caribbean Basin countries have $18.5 billion in
direct U.S. investment, over half of which is in Mexico,
Venezuela and Colombia. The Basin countries exported $25.7
billion to the U.S. in 1980 and imported $25.8 billion in the
same year. Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia were by far our
largest trading partners in the region.
The population of the Caribbean Basin, including
Mexico, is about 160 million.
It could reach 278 million by
the year 2000, a percentage of which will most certainly move
to the United States, legally or illegally.
Immigration
specialists predict that this region will provide the largest
flow of legal and illegal immigration in the next decade.
The Caribbean Basin countries own nearly half of the
total debt of $300 billion to commercial banks and
international lending institutions. The impact on these
countries of debt management efforts, requiring greatly reduced
investment and imports resulting in increased unemployment and
negative growth, is likely to have a significant near- to midterm affect on the political systems and economic future of
those countries.
The sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) through the
Caribbean are important to the commerce of the entire region,
and important to the activities of the u.s. Navy.
In contrast to the small economic interests in Central
America, the tangible economic interests in the Caribbean Basin
as a whole are significant. They are vital since they mesh
with political and security interests involved in our
relationship with Mexico. When we consider the broad U.S.
economic and social interests in the Western Hemisphere, the
Central American dimension can be seen as the weakest link in a
chain that extends to the southern cone. The conceptual
problem is to determine how to relate these larger economic
interests to developments in Central America. There are two
broad views on that linkage.
One point of view argues that the low level of u.s.
economic interest in Central America is a good indication of
the minimal intrinsic importance of that poor region.
Precisely because the regional powers are so much more
important to the U.S. and are most directly affected by events
in Central America, we should follow the lead of Mexico,
Venezuela, Colombia and Panama. Even if one were to follow a
worst case domino theory, the regional powers would deal with
revolutionary change and help bring about largely nationalistic
regimes. The economic realities for those small countries
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would demand that they accommodate to the u.s. and the region,
since the Soviets will not support those nations. Mexico,
Venezuela and Colombia, according to this argument, would not
be seriously threatened by revolutionary developments and it is
not our role, in any case, to be the protector of these
sovereign states. As to the Panama Canal, it would be unlikely
that any Panamanian government would risk the wrath of its
neighbors by restricting traffic.
In any case, according to
this view, the importance to the u.s. of the canal is not so
great as it used to be. The marginal increase in Soviet/Cuban
naval activity that might result from closer Soviet relations
with one or more Central American countries is not likely to
affect significantly either the commercial or security aspects
of Caribbean sea lanes. There is and should be no connection
between the debt management in Latin America and events in
Central America.
If the u.s. should try to make such a
connection, we would confuse matters even more.
There is another point of view which sees an important link
between our larger Caribbean Basin interest and Central
America.
Indeed, this view would link much of our entire
hemispheric relationship directly with events in Central
America. This view is based on the assumption that the region
is entering a period of great uncertainty resulting from the
economic and social turmoil of the past two years, the
breakdown of the hemispheric system, heightened role of the
Soviets and Cubans in the region and the growing likelihood of
ideological and military warfare. This is a highly unstable
period for a region which has been accustomed to relatively
peaceful and cooperative relations and quite consistent
economic growth for two decades. The challenge to the
democratic governments in the region of managing the near- to
mid-term economic crises is demoralizing and may well affect
the assumption of rational governance. The strain on these
systems is real.
Moreover, the uncertainty over u.s. policies
and soviet/Cuban activities forces government and military
institutions to think more and more about national
self-interest -- regional obligations and traditional alliances
are given even lower priority amid serious turmoil and crisis.
It is a region composed of governments entering a period of
major readjustment to frightening new realities and a
pessimistic future.
Because of the debt crises, for example,
what Latin American governments decide about their economies
will, for the first time in history, have a profound effect on
the u.s. and on the international financial system. Moreover,
regional governments are in no position today, becasue of the
economic and social problems at home, to take bold decisions or
a leadership role in resolving the problems of Central
America. They therefore must look to the u.s. for leadership.
There is a strong and persuasive argument that the broad
economic and social interests that the United States has in
Latin America are closely linked to the current crisis in
Central America. Even though our economic and social interests
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in quantifiable terms are not large in Central America, the
accumulated responsibility of over one hundred years of u.s.
involvement in the region plus the potential for large scale
migration from that region to the u.s., give us both a moral
and practical need to take very seriously the well-being and
economic growth of the five Central American countries.
Although it can be debated how closely linked the origin of
revolutionary activity is to the economic crisis, we must
recognize that resolution will come only through a combination
of effective diplomatic, political, economic and security
programs. No United States policy toward Central America can
be perceived as a purely security oriented policy. Yet
economic growth is not possible while guerrilla war rages.
Here, the Alliance for Progress is instructive. The u.s. must
demonstrate that the major resources we will direct toward the
region will be for the reconstruction of the economies and the
social fabric of those small countries.
The economic stagnation and debt burden of the entire Latin
American and Caribbean region provide a backdrop that gives the
Central American crisis a striking profile.
If the regional
powers, such as Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico and Panama, were
experiencing today the economic growth and optimism that they
showed in the 1970's and early 1980's, they would be more able
to devote resources and energy to support a constructive
resolution of the Central American problems. The current
economic uncertainties and insecurities of governance that flow
from the combined burden of debt and reduced trade and
investment, limit the capacity of the regional powers to find
both economic and political resources to confront these
momentous regional, political and security problems. We
believe these countries are facing a future that is frightening
for them because of this combination of new challenges for the
Western Hemisphere. Should the existing political structures
of one of the major countries find the explosive forces too
difficult to contain internally and resort to extreme solutions
either with regard to management of debt or internal political
structures, there would likely be an unraveling of the current
creative climate created by the Contadora group and other
regional efforts. The possibilities of a regional solution,
therefore, appear now to rest on a fragile economic and
political base. Yet despite these gloomy prospects that the
hemispheric nations face over the near term, we continue to be
encouraged and impressed by the will of governments to confront
simultaneously debt management, political evolution to
democracy, and a creative foreign policy. Despite the
unprecedented problems most countries like Argentina, Brazil
and Mexico have faced over the past year, they are still
managing responsibly to work through their difficulties in
differing ways.
Therefore, the U.S. must see these linkages between the
economic and social problems of the region and those we are
facing in Central America of a security and a political sort as
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part of the overall fabric of the inter-American system.
web of interests demands that programs and policies be
conceived as a strategic whole.

The

IV. SECURITY INTERESTS
Security interests are vital interests. The President is
obliged to resort to whatever means are necessary, including
military force, to defend the national security when it is
seriously threatened. Under security interests we have
examined two distinct categories: 1) The actual level of
threat posed by the Soviet/Cuban and their allied military
build-up in the Caribbean Basin and 2) the degree of threat to
the u.s. security posed by one or more new Soviet or Cuban
allied regimes in Central America.
Here too there are differing points of view. For some
Americans, U.S. security interests will not be seriously
threatened unless the Soviets establish identifiable air and
sea bases, deploy missiles, or enlarge their aircraft and other
forces in the region.
Hostile governments, ~ se, in Central
America could not threaten the u.s. To the extent that they
threaten the security of their neighbors, then their neighbors
will deal with them or ask us to help. Whatever the level of
military security interests involved in Central America today,
they are less important than our long term interests in
establishing constructive relationships within this
hemisphere. According to this view, none of the countries on
our periphery could conceivably become a serious threat to the
u.s. and, in view of the mobility and intercontinental capacity
of modern weaponry, the old geographic considerations relating
to security interests are irrelevant.
A second view argues that, over the past four years, the
expansion of Soviet and Cuban hostile forces in the Caribbean
Basin and the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Central
America pose potentially serious challenges to traditional U.S.
thinking about its national security. The current "threat"
from the region is not so alarming or sufficient to call for
the direct application of u.s. force. The trends are, however,
sufficiently portentous to require a re-evaluation of u.s.
force capacity, structure and deployment, and to require a
reassessment of the likelihood that u.s. military action in the
region may be required over the next five years.
There is yet a third, more alarming position which argues
that u.s. security interests are already seriously threatened
by an armed Cuba with strong Soviet backing allied with the
increasingly totalitarian Sandinista regime. According to this
point of view, it is essential for the United States to reverse
the trends in the Caribbean Basin. The u.s. must also adopt
policies now which would eliminate the threat posed by the
Sandinista regime and severely restrict future Cuban adventures
in the region.
According to this view, the p~esent Sandinista
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government will only increase the security threat to the
countries in Central America and consequently to Mexico, Panama
and the United States, and ultimately to Venezuela and
Colombia. The Sandinista regime will continue to promote
violent revolution and will increase its military and
inevitably its economic and political dependence on the Soviet
Union.
Reflecting on these views, one would be constrained to
conclude that although the present level of Soviet military
force and basing systems in the Caribbean Basin areas does not
signify change in the strategic relationship with the Soviet
Union, the long-term trends of current developments on our
border could constitute a major and even fundamental shift in
u.s. security concerns. A dynamic process is under way that
has already resulted in disturbing increases of Soviet and
Soviet-allied military presence in the Caribbean area since the
1960's. Should the soviets manage to achieve multiple sites to
locate aircraft, ships, personnel and intelligence gathering
capability, increasing amounts of u.s. forces would have to be
directed toward that area. The evolution of Soviet military
capability in the region, simply because of the Cuban facility,
demonstrates that in a certain sense Cuba, without the missiles
that were removed in 1962, has become an even more important
and secure strategic outpost than if missiles had actually been
deployed. The u.s. must set out now to stop an increase of
Soviet military presence and to reverse the already disturbing
trends.
The second set of security interests relates to the threat
posed to the United states by the emergence of one or more
revolutionary regimes in the region that resemble Cuba or
become allied to the Soviet Union. The discussion of this set
of interests is complicated by the belief of some people in the
u.s. that revolutionary regimes in Central America would not
necessarily be, or remain for long, genuinely Marxist-Leninist
totalitarian governments. Some Americans argue that because of
the nationalism inherent in Central America, the reality of the
economics of the region and the pressure of neighbors,
revolutionaries would eventually adapt to regional politics.
While possibly unfriendly to the u.s., these regimes would not
actually pose a security threat either to the u.s. or to the
other states in the region.
There is another point of view which argues that given our
experience with Castro and the sandinistas, given the knowledge
we have of the guerrillas in the rest of Central America and of
the politics of the region that virtually require revolutionary
nationalists to be violently anti-u.s., the emerging regimes
would most likely be Marxist-Leninist. The geopolitics of
Europe demand that communist states press for independence from
their giant neighbor, the soviet Union.
"Titoism" was a
victory for national communism, because Yugoslavia is in the
shadow of the USSR. The frustrated independence efforts of
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Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are testimony to this
persistent geopolitical reality that states seek independence
from neighboring superpowers. Yet the further the communist
state finds itself from the Soviet Union, the less likely it is
to need independence from it; indeed, the more likely the state
is to become more closely allied with Soviet foreign policy
objectives. Cuba, in the shadow of the u.s., and VietNam,
near China, are two compliant Soviet client states. A
Marxist-Leninist state in our neighborhood would have to be
both anti-u.s. and closely allied with Soviet power. The
question for the u.s. Government is, therefore: At what stage
would a Marxist-Leninist regime seriously threaten u.s.
national security?
The current threat to u.s. security from the communist
exploitation of revolutionary developments in Central America
seems to be a more immediate source of concern than the
incremental increase of Soviet and allied military presence in
the area. The potential for the consolidation of a Sandinista
Marxist-Leninist government, allied with the soviet Union and
Cuba and committed to the export of revolution across its land
borders, contributes significantly to the region's disorder.
Should one or more additional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
states emerge in the region over the next three to five years,
the entire Caribbean Basin would be threatened, including some
of the larger nations such as Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
The threat would come from the dramatic polarization and
probable militarization of the region. We do not foresee in
this event a simple domino theory of communist states. What we
would expect to see would be the shrinking of the political
center and the failing of confidence of the region's struggling
democrats. Nations would arm themselves more. Military
institutions would take forceful measures against real or
imagined terrorists. such polarization and fear could lead to
serious setbacks to the encouraging democratic trends in Latin
America.
Of course, in an abstract sense a Marxist-Leninist state
does not necessarily have to be antagonistic to the u.s. or to
its security interests. We can and have coexisted and even
cooperated with Marxist-Leninist states, from Yugoslavia to
China. We must find a way to live peacefully with the Soviet
Union and its allies. Yet in the Caribbean Basin, Cuba and
Nicaragua have already demonstrated the threat that a
militarized, revolutionary and Soviet-allied government brings
to a backward and depressed political and economic
environment. We must make decisions about u.s. security based
on our experience, not on our hopes. But it is precisely the
political and military affiliation of the revolutionary
insurgents in an economically and politically weakened Central
America that poses the greatest immediate threat to U.S. and
regional security.
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V.

GLOBAL INTERESTS

All Americans recognize that the United States has global
interests. Since the Vietnam War, however, Americans have
become ever more deeply divided over how to define them. The
debate over Central American policy engages directly those
competing perceptions of which u.s. global interests should
determine our approach. Two broadly different conceptual
approaches, and one important variant emerge.
One view holds that our global interests should be defined
by an overriding commitment to rule by law and to preserving
world peace by strengthening international instiututions. We
should pursue a principled approach which stresses respect for
human rights and greater attention to the major global problems
-- economic development, third world debt, world population
growth, non-proliferation, pollution and the impact of modern
technology. This view holds that maintaining a balanced power
relationship with the soviet Union is essential to u.s.
security. Yet the East-West issues are dwarfed by the larger
global challenges to mankind. Nationalism in the developing
world ultimately will work against the hegemonic ambitions of
both superpowers. The u.s., therefore, should not use force to
counter the adventurism of the Soviets and their surrogates.
The Soviet obsession with military security issues and
political influence should not distract us from our broader
purpose. u.s. leadership will prevail if we concentrate our
efforts on the economic, social and humane global interests.
In Central America, according to this view, our overriding
interests are to adhere to a policy of non-intervention, of
respect for national sovereignty and self-determination and of
strengthening our record in the promotion of respect for human
rights. Disruptive political revolution is an outgrowth of the
economic and social inequities of the region. The Soviet and
Cuban effort to take advantage of these developments should not
provoke the u.s. to go against its broader global interests,
unless there is a clear case of Soviet or Cuban military action
or attempted action. Over the long term, the small nations of
the Caribbean Basin can present no threat to u.s. national
security unless they serve as soviet bases, which is not likely
to occur and which alone would justify our intervention.
A second view holds that our primary global interests are
determined by strategic questions of military power and the
balance of politico-economic power in the world. U.S.
interests, in this view, are to ensure that our nation
continues to be the leader of the free nations of the world
through the maintenance of u.s. military and economic power and
world respect for that power. According to this view, the
erosion of u.s. power and the world perception of that decline
over the past decade have contributed significantly to
instability in the developing world, to the more aggressive
military adventures of the Soviet Union, and to the general
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lessening of the ability and the authority of the United States
to be a leader in the promotion of international peace and rule
by law. We cannot serve as an example to the world if we are
not seen as strong.
The current turmoil in Central America, in this view, is
perceived as the most recent and most serious result of a
deterioration in the u.s. power position over the past decade.
~ihile the Soviets and Cubans may not have created the
conditions that brought about the revolutionary conditions in
Central America, Soviet policies in support of Cuban efforts to
promote violent revolution in Central America, combined with
the progressively greater military and official presence of the
Soviets and Soviet allies in the region, are trends that must
be reversed. The costs of their not being reversed would be
high over the next five years:
The u.s. would have to dedicate increasingly greater
resources and military assets to that area thus limiting its
capacity to defend other vital u.s. interests in Europe and the
Middle East.
This more bold Soviet/Cuban thrust, if even
marginally successful, could encourage higher risk Soviet
behavior and imply that despite their own serious domestic and
foreign problems, the balance of power was actually shifting in
their favor.
Other nations where our vital interests are more
directly engaged, most particularly Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela, would be seriously affected by the deterioration of
u.s. influence in Central America and by the expansion of
revolutionary/guerrilla activity.
Other European allies and our partners around the
world, despite what they say now about our Central American
policies, would be stunned and profoundly disturbed by
significant new Soviet/Cuban inroads into our southern
periphery.
These two competing views of u.s. global interests have
deep roots in the making of American foreign policy. Every
modern President has sought a proper mix between the moral and
power imperatives in shaping u.s. policies. The American
people yearn to have a powerful and trusted nation. These
yearnings are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Yet in the
post-Vietnam period a sharper conflict has arisen between these
two broad American views of how we should act internationally
as a nation. There are those who believe that we should also
renounce, or at least forego, the use of force and that we
should have military power but not use it except under
circumstances of direct and immediate military threat to the
U.S. or to NATO.
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The post-Vietnam period has given birth to an important
variation on the traditional debate between power and principle
in the conduct of United States foreign relations. A large
body of Americans concluded after Vietnam and other u.s. and
Soviet misadventures in the Third World that the United States
simply cannot effectively project its power in the developing
world, except under very limited circumstances. This pragmatic
point of view holds that u.s. governments have proven
themselves so inept at counter-insurgency, at promoting
democracy, at controlling covert action and at deploying U.S.
power in areas we know little about that we should simply
desist. Moreover, congressionnal restrictions on presidential
power, combined with the low public tolerance for foreign
involvements that could cost u.s. lives and resources, severely
limit the capacity of presidents to sustain policies and
programs to victory.
Failure in pursuit of a power role in
Central America is likely to have a more damaging affect on the
u.s.-soviet balance, the region and our allies than not
engaging the issue at all.
There is a strong Eurocentric bias to the pragmatic view
that the U.S. should not project its power where it has proven
itself incapable. The containment policy was originally
designed to stop further soviet expansion of its borders.
Containment was conceived, along with the idea of NATO, in the
European context. That the u.s. fought two costly wars in Asia
in pursuit of containment severely diverted u.s. attention from
the fulcrum of our global interests in Europe. That we failed
in Southeast Asia demonstrated to those who have always viewed
Europe as the centerpiece of u.s. foreign relations that we
should not again permit ourselves to be distracted.
Preoccupation with Latin America can only divert us from our
historic and far more important Atlantic alliance structure.
Therefore, even if we were capable of engaging u.s. power
effectively to control the spread of Marxist-Leninist
revolutionary regimes in Central America, it would not be worth
the high cost.
Moreover, the Eurocentrist pragmatists argue
that Soviet interests in the Caribbean Basin are so minor and
their assets there so meager that it is hardly likely that
current trends there could have any significant effect on the
strategic balance, much less threaten our national security.
Nevertheless, the United States probably has no choice but
to conduct a foreign policy which is global in its vision, and
which is strategic to the degree that it comprehends the
effects of action in one part of the world on developments and
attitudes elsewhere. We concluded, moreover, that a global
strategy demands that we seek to make our policies coherent
across geographic frontiers.
It also demands that we seek an
even blend of the multiple ideals and power responsibilities
that determine our central role as the mightiest country of the
free world. What we seek in Central America must be consistent
with what we seek in the larger world. Yet the problems in
Central America pose special challenges to u.s. policy
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precisely because, as we have discussed in this chapter, the
mix of u.s. interests is so complex. We refused to accept the
false dichotomy between the maintenance of a principled policy
and the exercise of u.s. power to ensure that the principles
for which we stand are preserved. That the United States has
been clumsy, hesitant, inconsistent and unsuccessful on
occasions in its efforts to assert u.s. power can be admitted;
it must not be used as an alibi to disqualify us from a
leadership role among free nations. For in the end global
security and progress depend on that role.
our experiences
have prepared us to be more dependable, coherent, measured and
persistent in the defense of our interests and those of others.
Although it is not necessary to attempt to make a judgment
here on whether or not the Soviet Union is an expansionist
power or simply an opportunistic superpower, one must recognize
that the central issue in determining how seriously U.S. global
interests are threatened in Central America is the degree to
which the Soviet Union has itself become directly involved in
trying to shape the course of events to its advantage on the
North American continent.
On this central point one can conclude that a disturbing
shift in Soviet policies over the past few years makes the
Central American turmoil more than just another series of
national struggles over which groups or which concepts will
govern. In addition to this shift in Soviet policies, u.s.
interests have been challenged by the internationalization and
militarization of the internal struggles over who will govern
in the small nations of Central America. The challenges today
are more serious than they were in the early 1960's, when the
Kennedy Administration designed the Alliance for Progress as
part of the u.s. response. What distinguishes the 1980's from
the 1960's with regard to the Soviet threat in our hemisphere
is that today:
the Soviets have a global military capability
and vocation; there is an authentic revolutionary situation in
Central America; for the first time, the Soviets have supported
the Cuban strategy of promoting revolution in Central America;
Cuba is no longer not the only Latin country promoting
revolution, since Nicaragua, which borders three other Central
American countries, is directly engaged in what it has called a
revolution without frontiers; and the United States, because of
Vietnam and our prior involvement in Latin America, has a
lingering incapacity and unwillingness to use even limited
military measures to defend the region.
The soviet Union is now openly seeking to influence
directly and through its allies the course of the revolutionary
events in Central America.
It is not a given that there is an
immediate danger that the soviets will succeed in their
efforts. Yet the trends in soviet efforts to manipulate events
in our neighborhood, if not reversed, could lead over the next
several years to a significant shift in the global deployment
and focus of u.s. power, resources and attention.
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VI.

CONCLUSION ON U.S. INTERESTS

As u.s. interests are examined closely, one is drawn more
deeply into the American domestic differences over what we want
and what we believe we can achieve as a nation. The world
around us, particularly the nations of Central America,
demonstrates little malleability -- little susceptibility to
our entreaties. Those societies are remarkably resistant to
outside pressures, yet sadly prone to revolution and
unraveling. One must conclude that the United States is limited
in its capacity to change events over the short term.
Yet it can also be concluded that we have the time and
capacity to affect events positively as long as we do not set
for ourselves a goal of fixing the Central America problem
quickly in order to be able to forget about it for another
decade. We must set a horizon of five to ten years of
intensive resource expenditures and policy attention in order
to protect the broad u.s. interests in the region.
This paper has tried to demonstrate the complexity of the
interests that a sound bipartisan United States policy must be
designed to defend. There must be choices made between
regional and global, between moral and security, when those
interests are conflicting. There are no easy choices.

328.

SOVIET POWER IN CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE'" CARIBBEAN:
THE GROWING THREAT TO AMERICAN SECURITY
Carl Gershman

The significance to the United States of developments
in Central America and the Caribbean Basin cannot be
appreciated apart from a consideration of the Soviet Union's
role in the region and its implications for American
national security.

Over the last quarter of a century,

with the imposition in Cuba of a Communist regime allied with
Moscow, the Soviet Union has steadily, if at times imperceptibly,
expanded its power and presence in the region.

This steady

advance, which is reflected in Soviet doctrinal shifts registering
Moscow's heightened capabilities and ambitions in the region,
has been marked by an immense increase in Cuba's military
capability and greatly stepped up aid to regional insurgent
forces.

With the coming to power in 1979 of pro-Cuban groups

in Nicaragua and Grenada, the ability of the Soviet Union and
Cuba to promote armed struggle and to project military power
throughout the region was vastly enhanced.
These developments, especially if view.ed in the
context of the Soviet Union's growing global power and its
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unprecedented peacetime military build-up, pose a grave
and growing threat to what Hans J. Morgenthau once called
"the permanent national interest of the United States in the
Western Hemisphere."

They also threaten the well-being

of the region's peoples who have suffered from escalating
levels of violence, economic destruction, and social
dislocation.

Not least, the deteriorating regional

conditions threaten the NATO Alliance owing to the special
importance of the Caribbean Basin as a geopolitical zone
the "strategic rear," as the Soviets call it, of United
States global power.
The critical importance of the Caribbean Basin to
American security and the growing threat to U.S. interests
there is still not adequately appreciated in this country.
As Americans, we have been so accustomed throughout most of
our history to security in our own hemisphere that we have
come to think, as Walter Lippmann wrote four decades ago,
"that our privileged position was a natural right."

In fact,

it was the divisions in Europe and the supremacy of British
seapower that allowed us to uphold the Monroe Doctrine
with minimal effort during the last century.

The only significant

breach of the Doctrine came during the American Civil War
when Napoleon III, taking advantage of our debilitating
internal conflict, installed an Austrian archduke in Mexico
City and Spain briefly reannexed Santo Domingo.

The Monroe
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Doctrine remained essentially intact for a full century
thereafter, until the intrusion of Communism into Cuba.
That event, which prompted Khrushchev to declare that
the Monroe Doctrine had "outlived its times" and had
died "a natural death," might have been expected to challenge
the complacency with which Americans have tended to regard
their security in the Hemisphere.

But the 1962 understanding

with the Soviet Union, according to which the Soviets would
not introduce offensive weapons into Cuba and would curtail
Cuban aggression in the Hemisphere in exchange for our
assurances against invading Cuba, allowed the belief that "the
Cuban problem" had been effectively contained.
~istory

Subsequent

has shown, however, that this belief was both premature

and mistaken.
In the aftermath of the 1962 agreement, the Soviet
Union and Cuba followed different policies toward the
Hemisphere.

Cuba, hoping to replicate its own revolution

in other countries, followed the foco theory of Castro and
Che Guevara which was based upon the belief that protracted
guerrilla warfare in the countryside could create the political
as well as military conditions for the overthrow of established
governments.

The Soviets, showing a Leninist distrust of

"infantile leftism," preferred to prepare the ground slowly
and systematically for a future challenge to the U.S.
While not opposing Cuban support for armed struggle in Venezuela,
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Colombia, Guatemala and several other countries, the
Soviets concentrated on expanding their diplomatic, economic,
and cultural ties in the region and on strengthening the
influence of local Communist parties in broad electoral
fronts and the trade unions.
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, this strategy
appeared to be paying off.

While Cuban-supported guerrillas

suffered repeated setbacks, the Soviets were encouraged
by the victory of Allende in Chile, the success of the Broad
Front in Uruguay, and the return of Peron to Argentina, as
well as by ''progressive" military coups in Peru, Ecuador,
Bolivia, and Panama.

In 1971, Boris N. Ponomarev, the

chairman of the international department of the Central Committee
of the Soviet Communist Party, welcomed "the upsurge of the
revolutionary movement on the Latin American continent" which
had "tremendous importance to the world revolutionary
process."

Emphasizing the strategic significance of this

development, Ponomarev wrote,
Seemingly quite reliable rear lines of American
imperialism are becoming a tremendous hotbed of antiimperialist revolution.

A tremendously powerful

revolutionary movement is developing by the side of
the main citadel of imperialism, the U.S.

These

changes are having and, unquestionably will continue
to have, a strong impact on the further changes in
the correlation of world forces in favor of the
international working class and socialism.
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A number of developments came together in the 1970s
causing the Soviet Union to abandon the relatively cautious
approach it followed in the decade after 1962 arid to adopt
a policy of revolutionary armed struggle, thus setting the
stage for the current crisis in Central America.
The first of these developments was the overthrow
of Allende in Chile and the subsequent right-wing takeovers
in Uruguay, Argentina, and Bolivia.

The effect of these

events was to discredit the Soviet line concerning the "peaceful
path" to Communism in Latin America.

While the Soviets

continued officially to uphold this line -- they did not
abandon it completely until the Sandinista victory in 1979
they also embraced the armed struggle, as indicated by the
Havana Declaration of Latin American and Caribbean Communist
parties in 1979:
The utilization of all legal possibilities is
an indispensible obligation of the anti-imperialist
forces ...• Revolutionaries are not the first to
resort to violence.

But it is the right and duty of

all revolutionary forces to be ready to answer
counter-revolutionary violence with revolutionary
violence.
Second, with the triumph of Soviet-backed forces in
Indochina, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, the
Soviets adopted a much more aggressive policy toward the Third
World, reflecting their view that the "correlation of forces"
had shifted dramatically against the West.

In the Soviet view,
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changes in the balance of strategic and conventional
forces had created the conditions for further Soviet gains
in Third World struggles, which the Chief of the Soviet
General Staff Academy, I. Shavrov, called "epicenters" in
the global East-West struggle.

Under these favorable

conditions, wrote Soviet Central Committee member and Third
World specialist Karen Brutents, the decisive issue was no
longer the defense of the Soviet Union but "carrying on the
offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a
whole in order to do away with them."
Third, the Soviets dramatically strengthened their
military capability in the Caribbean, in line with their global
build-up.

This development was marked by the "Sovietization"

of Cuba, which fell into line behind Soviet policy after
1968, and by a dramatic increase in Cuban military forces.
Cuba's total armed forces, which numbered less than 50,000 in
1960, more than doubled by 1970 to 109,500.

With the beginning

of Cuba's Africa operations in the mid-1970s, these forces
expanded once again, from 117,000 in 1975 to 175,000 in 1976.
In addition to acquiring valuable combat experience in Africa,
these forces received upgraded training and sophisticated
weaponry, including an impressive array of tanks, armored
cars and personnel carriers, heavy artillery, surface-to-surface
missiles, anti-tank guided missiles, self-propelled antiaircraft weapons, and surface-to-air missiles.

This build-up
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included an expansion of the Cuban Navy, which acquired Osa
patrol boats equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles,
as well as the expansion and modernization of the Cuban Air
Force, which received advance models of the MiG-21MF in
1975 and MiG-23/27 fighter bombers in 1978.
The Soviet military presence in the Caribbean also
increased dramatically during this period.

A seven-ship

Soviet task force entered the Caribbean in July 1969, beginning
a series of regular visits that gave the Soviets a routine
naval presence in the region.

Though the Soviets were

forced to halt their construction of a nuclear submarine base
at Cienfuegos in the fall of 1970, Soviet nuclear submarines
and diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines made repeated
visits to Cuban ports thereafter, and new naval basing and
repair facilities were under construction at Cienfuegos
by the end of the decade.

In addition, Soviet TU-95

Bear reconnaissance aircraft began to be deployed in Cuba in
1975, and several new airfields were constructed capable
of accommodating the Backfire strategic bomber.

Increased

numbers of Soviet military advisers, technicians, and
instructors arrived to supervise and service the build-up
of Soviet and Cuban forces.
As an indication of the increasingly close
collaboration between these forces, significant numbers of
Soviet pilots were sent to Cuba in 1976 and 197B to replace
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the Cuban pilots who were sent to Africa to defend the
pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia.

The 3000-man

Soviet brigade in Cuba also indirectly aided Cuban military
activities:

as a guarantee of the Soviet commitment to

the survival of the Castro regime, it allowed Cuba to pursue
a more aggressive policy in the region without fear of a
retaliatory U.S. strike.
Fourth, just as the increase in Soviet global
power was accompanied by a major build-up in the region,
the retreat of U.S. global power during the same period was
matched by a corresponding regional decline.

Between 1968

and 1981, U.S. military personnel in the Basin decreased
from over 25,000 to under 16,000, and U.S. military installations
in Panama, Puerto Rico, and Guantanamo were downgraded or
closed down entirely.

At the same time, the rise of the

"Vietnam syndrome" in the United States created a climate of
indifference to

u.s.

security concerns in the Basin and

stimulated calls for ending what some disparagingly called
the American "hegemonic presumption."

The resulting power

vacuum altered the geopolitical dynamics of the region,
inviting new foreign intervention -- from the Socialist
International as well as the Soviet bloc -- and contributing
to increased Balkanization and political instability.

These

trends were accelerated by the enunciation of a new human
rights doctrine during the Carter Administration which
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signaled the withdrawal of support for Central American
governments previously backed by the United States.
Fifth, rapid social and economic changes in Central
America during the previous quarter of a century forced new
pressures to the surface in the mid-1970s that made the
region an inviting target for insurgency.

The sustained

economic growth of the 1960s produced a new middle class and
an urban working class whose political aspirations were
blocked by the traditional oligarchs, and whose rising
economic expectations were frustrated during the recession
that followed the first OPEC oil price rise of 1973-74.
The shattering impact of the second oil price rise of 1979-80
brought to a head seething social conflicts which, as they
turned more violent, worsened the economic collapse.
Sixth, by the mid-1970s and increasingly thereafter,
Cuba had developed a much greater institutional capacity to
promote guerrilla warfare than it possessed during the
previous decade, and its revolutionary strategy was much
more sophisticated than the failed foco strategy of Che Guevara.
The principal institutional instrument for promoting
insurgencies was the Americas Department, which was
established in 1974 to centralize Cuba's operational control
over covert revolutionary activities throughout the Hemisphere
and particularly in Central America.

The Americas Department

brought together the expertise of the Cuban military and
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the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) in a
coordinated operation that included covert operations in
the field, networks for the movement of intelligence and
other personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad,
and extensive cultural and propaganda activities tailored
to discredit targeted governments and to build support for
armed opposition groups.

The Department's activities also

included supervision of a network of guerrilla training
camps and indoctrination schools on the island where trainees
from throughout Latin America received 3 to 6 months of
instruction in guerrilla warfare tactics, weapons use, and
propaganda and agitation.
The revolutionary strategy pursued by Cuba in target
countries involved the creation of separate military and
political fronts, as well as the establishment by such fronts
of relations with a broad array of non-Communist allies,
both domestic and foreign.

This strategy, as it developed in

the course of the Nicaraguan revolution, required in the first
instance the unification of traditionally splintered insurgent
groups as a condition for increased Cuban military advice
and assistance.

Just as the creation of such unified military

fronts allowed Cuba to exercise control over the armed
struggle, so too did the creation of broad political fronts
with non-Communist oppositionists allow the guerrillas to
coopt such forces and neutralize them as rival alternatives
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to the existing government.

This objective was also

served by the armed struggle itself, which undermined the
political center by sharpening the increasingly violent
confrontation between left and right.
The popular-front tactic had the added advantage of
allowing the guerrillas to disarm critics by posing as
non-Communist democrats, a posture given further credibility
by the alliances formed with non-Communist Latin governments,
Euorpean Socialists, political forces in the United States, and
church and human rights groups.

These alliances strengthened

the international legitimacy of the guerrillas and helped
delegitimize the target government, and they neutralized U.S.
opposition even as they legitimized support from Cuba as
just one of many foreign backers of the insurgents.
This highly sophisticated and subtle strategy was
successfully applied in Nicaragua, with far-reaching
consequences for the future of Central America.

In March

1979, after more than a year of effort, Castro announced the
unification of the three guerrilla factions of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN).

During the next three

months, Cuba escalated -- but also cleverly masked

its

military involvement, transshipping through Panama to Costa
Rica 450 tons of weapons for use in the "final offensive."
It also provided the FSLN with some 200 military advisers,
who manned the heavy artillery and other sophisticated weapons,
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and with an "internationalist brigade" drawn from Central
and South American terrorist groups.

In addition, an

intelligence center was set up at the Cuban Embassy in San
Jose under the control of Julian Lopez, the DGI officer
sent to Costa Rica the previous year to coordinate Cuba's
assistance to the FSLN.
In the meantime, a Broad Opposition Front (FAO) had
been established in 1978 consisting of political representatives
of the FSLN (the so-called "Group of 12") and leaders of
political parties, trade unions, and business 1and professional
groups.

Though the FAO was disbanded after the militarization

of the conflict had given the FSLN preeminence in the
opposition, the Front had, in the words of an FSLN document,
"allowed the channeling of external help from many sources
and without restrictions, while limiting the maneuvering
of the most reactionary forces within the U.S."
Among the principal sources of such external help
were the governments of Venezuela, Panama, and Costa Rica,
which provided important material, logistic, and political
assistance.

Other sources included Westn European Socialist

Governments and the Socialist International, and human rights,
church, and political groups in the United States.

Instead

of moderating the revolution, as many of these external
actors had surely hoped to do, they supported the democrats
and the "extreme left" without distinction, thus conferring
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democratic legitimacy on the latter and limiting the options
available to the U.S.

Their involvement also helped Cuba

conceal its decisive role.
The success of the armed struggle in Nicaragua
brought about a basic revision of Soviet doctrine regarding
revolution in Central and Latin America.

The editor of

Latinskaya Amerika, Sergo Mikoyan, called the Nicaragua
revolution an event of "colossal international importance"
demanding a "reexamination of established conceptions" in
light of the fact that "only the armed road has led to victory
in Latin America."

Another contributor to the Soviet

publication stated that "The Nicaraguan experience demolished
the previous simplistic interpretation of guerrilla actions,
confirmed the justice of many of Che Guevara's strategic
principles and crystallized his idea of creating a powerful
popular guerrilla movement."

The President of the Soviet

Association of Friendship with Latin American Countries,
Viktor Volski, called the armed victory in Nicaragua a "model"
to be followed in other countries, while Boris Ponomarev
included for the first time the countries of Central America
among Third World states undergoing revolutionary changes of
"a socialist orientation."
The new line was unanimously endorsed by the leaders
of the Central American Communist parties.

For example, the

Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), which had previously
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described the country's insurgent groups as "adventurist"
and "bound to fail" -- and was accused, in turn, of
"decadence" and "revisionism" -- made a complete about face
and established itself as the revolutionary arm of its
front group, the National Democratic Union (UDN).

The

party secretary Shafik Jorge Handel wrote in Kommunist, the
theoretical organ of the Soviet Communist Party, that
the Salvadoran revolution "will be victorious by the armed
road .•. there is no other way."
The change of line was also embraced by Communist party
leaders from elsewhere in Latin America.

Luis Corvalan, the

leader of the Chilean Communist party who had earlier derided
the Castroites as "petty-bourgeois revolutionaries," now
called for armed struggle, as did Rodney Arismendi, the first
secretary of the Uruguayan Communist party.
The change in doctrine was accompanied by a new
build-up of Cuban and now also Nicaraguan military forces,
and by an effort to export the Nicaraguan revolution.

By

the early 1980s, Cuba had become by far the most formidable
military power south of the United States, "a kind of vast
floating military base," as Robert S. Leiken has aptly put
it, "united by a Soviet-built central strategic highway
and railway system ... "

Including army ready reserves, Cuban

armed forces in 1981 totalled 227,000.

This represented

over 2.3 percent of the population, fully 10 times the
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average proportion of military personnel to population
in ten other leading countries of the Basin (including
Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and the Central American states).
Moreover, this figure does not include a paramilitary
force of 780,000 consisting of a Youth Labor Army (100,000),
a Civil Defense Force (100,000), a Territorial Troop
Militia (over 500,000), Border Guard Troops (3,000), the
National Revolutionary Police (10,000 plus 52,000 auxiliaries),
and the Department of State Security (10,000-15,000).
Whereas the Soviet Union annually delivered an
average of 15,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba during
the 1970s build-up, 66,000 tons arrived in 1981 and about
the same amount the following year.

The new equipment

enhanced the mobility and firepower of Cuba's ground
forces, which have an overwhelming numerical superiority in
weapons over Cuba's Latin neighbors, as well as a qualitative
advantage.

The Cuban Air Force now possesses more

than 200 combat jet aircraft, including three squadrons of
MiG-23s whose combat radius, if they could refuel in
Nicaragua and Grenada, would emcompass all of Central America
and the eastern Caribbean, southern Mexico, and northern
South America.

The Air Force is also equipped with Mi-8

helicopter gunships and Mi-24 assault helicopters, as well
as AN-26 and other transport aircraft which give Cuba a
logistic capability much greater than it had at the time of
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the airlift to Luanda in 1975.

This capability could

be used to deploy quickly to crisis points within the
region the Special Troops Battalion, a 3-4,000 man allpurpose elite force under Castro's personal command.

The

expansion of the Cuban Navy that began in the mid-1970s
has continued with the acquisition of three Foxtrot- and
Whiskey-class submarines, a Koni-class frigate, 24 fast-attack
missile craft, 24 fast-attack torpedo craft, and 22 fastattack patrol craft, as well as coastal patrol craft,
minesweepers, and landing craft.
A corresponding military build-up has taken place
in Nicaragua.

According to Nicaraguan army commander

Joachin Cuadra, by the end of 1982 the Nicaraguan forces
had grown to be "four times as big and eight times as
strong" as Somoza•s Guardia Nacional.

With a population of

just 2.7 million, Nicaragua has 25,000 regulars and 80,000
reserves and militias, a force that already vastly overshadows
that of Honduras, with only a 15,000 man force, and Costa
Rica, which has no armed forces at all.

Moreover, the

Nicaraguan force is rapidly being built up through broadbased conscription and Soviet bloc logistic support.
Nicaragua has added nearly 40 new military bases,
as well as a powerful array of Soviet Bloc weaponry, including
some 50-60 T-54/55 tanks -- the heaviest by far in Central
America -- 1,000 East German trucks and armored personnel
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carriers, heavy artillery, assault helicopters, antiaircraft weapons, mobile multiple rocket launchers, patrol
boats, and amphibious ferries.

The first delivery of

sophisticated Soviet electronic gear of a type seen
previously in Cuba took place in December 1982, giving
Nicaragua the ability to intercept signals from throughout
Central America that would be especially useful in locating
Honduran military communication sites.
The acquisition of these and other weapons accelerated
during 1983, with 14 deliveries arriving from the Soviet
Union between January and August, compared to 11 such
deliveries in all of 1982.

Libya has also succeeded in

delivering military equipment to Nicaragua after its failed
attempt earlier this year to transship through Brazil arms
labelled as medical equipment.
The foreign military presence in Nicaragua
includes Soviet, East European, Libyan, and PLO advisers,
along with a 2,000 man Cuban force that is reportedly
headed now by the former commander of the Cuban forces in
Angola and Ethiopia.

East German advisers have reorganized

Nicaragua's internal security apparatus and intelligence
system and set up a military communications network linking
Managua with Havana and Moscow, while the Soviets are
supervising the reorganization and "Sovietization" of the
Nicaraguan economy.

The Cubans have constructed a major
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strategic road between Puerto Cabezas and the interior,
facilitating the movement of troops and supplies to suppress
and 1:emove indigenous Indian residents of the region.
They have also supervised the extension of the airfields
at Puerto Cabezas and Bluefields on the Atlantic Coast and
Montlimar on the Pacific Coast to accomodate advanced jet
aircraft.

About 70 Nicaraguan pilots who were trained in

Bulgaria are now in Cuba, where it is reported that about an
equal number of advanced MiG warplanes designated for
Nicaragua have recently arrived.
The Nicaraguan leaders have made no secret of their
intention to use this new military capability to promote
revolution through armed struggle in Central America.
The Economist (May 16) quoted Defense Minister Humberto
Ortega as follows:

"Of course we are not ashamed to be

helping El Salvador.

We would like to help all revolutions."

Similarly, Interior Minister Tomas Borge told columnists
Evans and Novak earlier this year that the Sandinista revolution
was the vanguard for similar revolutions throughout the
region and that "the energies released here will be universal
in all Central America."
The effort to export the Nicaraguan revolution to
El Salvador began almost as soon as the Sandinistas had seized
power in Managua.

As had earlier been the case in Nicaragua,

the first priority was to unite the various Salvadoran
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guerrilla factions.

A meeting in Havana in December 1979

resulted in an initial unity agreement, after which a
combined military command was formed called the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).

A joint command and control

apparatus was established in the Managua area, and logistic
and training support for the guerrillas was organized on
Nicaraguan soil with Cuban and other Soviet Bloc assistance.
The training of the Salvadoran guerrillas in military
tactics, sabotage, explosives, and special commando
operations has taken place in Cuba as well as in Nicaragua.
One Salvadoran guerrilla who defected to Honduras in
September 1981, for example, reported that he and 12 others
were sent for training from Nicaragua to Cuba, where over
900 other Salvadorans were also being trained.
Cuba is also intimately involved in the arms
supply to Salvadoran guerrillas, both by shipping arms
destined for El Salvador directly to Nicaragua and by
coordinating the acquisition and delivery of arms from Vietnam,
Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe.

In December 1981, after meetings

in Havana with Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, Castro directed
that external supplies of arms to FMLN units be stepped
up with a view toward mounting an offensive that would disrupt
the elections planned for March 1982.

In addition to

ammunition, these supply operations have included greater
quantities of sophisticated heavy weapons, including M-60
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machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 antitank
weapons.

Confirmation that Nicaragua remains the primary

source of these weapons was given by Alejandro Montenegro,
a high-level Salvadoran FMLN leader captured during a raid
on a guerrilla safehouse in Honduras in August 1982.
One of the guerrillas captured with Montenegro had already
made five trips to Managua that year to pick up arms
for the insurgents, using a truck modified by the Sandinistas
to carry concealed weapons.
Montenegro also provided evidence of the role
played by Cuba and Nicaragua in the Salvadoran armed struggle.
He said that he personally had attended two high-level
meetings with Cuban officials in 1981, one in Havana and
the other in Managua, to review the situation in El
Salvador and to receive strategic advice.

Another captured

Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Lopez Arriola, admitted to
attending a platoon leaders course in Cuba in July 1979.
He also confirmed that the Sandinistas control weapons
delivered to Nicaragua for the Salvadoran insurgents, and
that the guerrillas have to seek permission from the
Sandinista authorities to draw on the supplies.

He added

that the Sandinistas give the insurgents an extensive base
of operations in and around Managua, and even provide a school
for their children.
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After years of combat, the Salvadoran guerrilla
headquarters in Nicaragua has evolved into an extremely
sophisticated command and control center.

Guerrilla planning

and operations are guided from this headquarters, and Cuban
and Nicaraguan officers are involved in command and
control, coordinating logistical support for the insurgents
which includes food, medicines, clothing, and money as well
as weapons and ammunition.
The Salvadoran insurgents have not denied their
relationship with Cuba and Nicaragua.

In a broadcast last

year, the Salvadoran guerrilla Radio Venceremos declared,
"We are and will continue to be friends of the peoples and
Governments of Cuba and Nicaragua, and we are not ashamed of
this."

It added:

"We have conducted important logistics

operations clandestinely, which have served to provide our
forces with arms and ammunition for long periods of time.
We have conducted these operations using all the means
available, and, therefore, have used the entire Central
American region and other countries."

The purpose of these

operations, the broadcast pointed out, was the destruction
of the Salvadoran economy.
This past spring, for example, the guerrillas
announced a heightened campaign to disrupt the planting of
cotton and the processing of coffee, products that account
for 60 percent of El Salvador's export earnings.

In an
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effort to stop trade and communication between El
Salvador and Honduras, they increased the destruction of
bridges.

Following the destruction of the bridge at El

Amantillo in April, the guerrillas announced that they
would kill anyone who tried to repair it.

They have attacked

the rail system, hoping that the paralysis of traffic
between the capital and the East Coast would discourage
growers and investors.

They have also ordered continued

operations against energy and transportation facilities and
have destroyed hydro-electric plants.
As a result of these massive attacks, unemployment
has increased from 7 percent to 40 percent since 1979,
per capita income is down by over 30 percent, the eastern
part of the country has been blacked out for most of the
year, half of the country's buses have been destroyed, schools
have been closed, and hundreds of thousands have fled,
including many of the best educated and trained citizens.
El Salvador has not been the only target of the
armed struggle in Central America.

Guatemala exemplifies

Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to create a unified guerrilla
command as a first step in mounting a sustained insurgency.
In the fall of 1980 the four major Guatemalan guerrilla
groups met in Managua to negotiate a unity agreement.

It

was signed in November -- in Managua -- in the presence of
Manuel Pineiro Losada, the Chief of Cuba's Americas Department.
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Following the unity agreement, which set the goal of
establishing a Marxist-Leninist state, Cuba agreed to increase
military training and assistance for the Guatemalan
guerrillas, including instruction in the use of heavy
weapons.

Arms smuggled from Nicaragua overland through

Honduras have included 50mm mortars, submachine guns, rocket
launchers, and M-16 rifles that have been traced to

u.s.

forces in Vietnam.
Reflecting the Nicaraguan experience, the Guatemalan
guerrillas have adopted a comprehensive political-military
strategy which combines a commitment to prolonged armed
struggle with an awareness of the need to establish popular
front organizations and links with the media, churches of
all denominations, human rights organizations, trade unions,
political parties, and sympathetic governments.

A General

Revolutionary Command (CGR) has been established by
the leaders of the four insurgent groups to plan military
strategies and strengthen ties to front organizations and
international solidarity networks in Mexico, Central America,
the United States, and Europe.
Honduras has also become a target of Cuban and
Nicaraguan assisted armed struggle.

Until 1981, Havana and

Managua maintained links with Honduran terrorist groups
primarily for the purpose of transporting arms to insurgents
in El Salvador and Guatemala.

At the same time, the ground
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was laid for armed struggle with the formation of the
Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH) .

In

El Nuevo Diario, the pro-government Nicaraguan newspaper,
a founder of the FMLH described it as a political-military
organization formed as part of the
of the Central American conflict ...

11

increasing regionalization
Evidence of Nicaraguan

and Cuban involvement came when Honduran authorities
raided several guerrilla safehouses in late November 1981,
detaining a number of guerrillas, including several Nicaraguans.
Captured documents and statements by detained guerrillas
revealed that the group was formed in Nicaragua at the
instigation of high-level Sandinist leaders, that its chief
of operations resided in Nicaragua, and that members of the
group had received military training in Nicaragua and
Cuba.
The strategy pursued in Honduras until March 1983
involved a series of urban terrorist incidents, most of which
saw Salvadoran guerrilla groups working together with
Hondurans.

Captured Salvadoran and Honduran terrorists

have admitted that explosives used in bombing attacks in the
Honduran capital were obtained in Nicaragua.

Other information

indicates that the Cubans had a hand in planning the seizure
of 108 hostages in San Pedro Sula in September 1983.
In March 1983 the Communist effort to destabilize
Honduras took a new turn with the announcement that four
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extreme left groups had formed a Unified Revolutionary
Coordinating Board.

The April 21 issue of Barricada, the

Sandinista organ, published the new group's declaration
of "Popular Revolutionary War" which called on the Honduran
people to rise up against the government and armed forces
and against "U.S. imperialism."
Subsequently, on July 19, 96 Honduran guerrillas
launched an unsuccessful raid from Nicaragua into Olancho
Department.

The 24 guerrillas who deserted or were captured

told a fairly consistent story of their recruitment and
training.

In almost all cases they were recruited by deception,

having been told that they would receive some type of
training in mechanics or agriculture.
that they would be sent to Cuba.

They were not told

The training took up to two

years and included 4 to 6 months in Cuba at the guerrilla
training school in Pinar del Rio.

There they received

instructions in ideology, weapons, intelligence, and military
tactics.

At the same camp were guerrilla trainees from

other countries, including El Salvador and Guatemala.

For

some, the stay in Cuba included "volunteer labor" as farm
workers or servants at state guest houses.

Following their

stay in Cuba, they were sent to Nicaragua for additional
training before their entry into Honduras on July 19.

Statements

by Havana and Managua indicate that despite the failure of
this raid they will persist in efforts at rural insurgency
and destabilization in Honduras.
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Costa Rica remains the most politically stable
nation in Central America but it, too, has not been able to
isolate itself from the turmoil in the region.

For the

past two years, Cuba and Nicaragua have used terrorism and
diplomacy to intimidate Costa Rica into neutralism.

The

July 1982 bombing of the Honduran Airline office in San
Jose, for example, took place at Nicaragua's direction.

The

captured terrorist who placed the bomb said that Nicaraguan
diplomats in Costa Rica had recruited and trained him
for the operation.

Though Nicaragua denied complicity, the

accused diplomats were caught in flagrante, declared persona
non grata, and expelled from the country.

The captured

terrorist also stated that the bombing had been part of a
broader Nicaraguan plan which included sabotage, kidnapping,
bank robberies, and other acts designed to discredit Costa
Rica internationally.

Since the beginning of 1982, several

guerrilla arms caches and safehouses have been uncovered in
Costa Rica.
Terrorist attacks have continued to occur in San
Jose, along with a joint Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan campaign
attacking Costa Rican democracy.

There have also been

incidents involving Sandinista forces along the border,
including the recent Nicaraguan attack on the Costa Rican
border installation at Penas Blancas which Costa Rica denounced
at a specially called meeting of the OAS Permanent Council.
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The cumulative effect of the armed assault on
Central America and of the overall growth of Soviet and
Cuban military power in the Caribbean Basin has been to
pose a major threat to the "strategic rear" of the United
States.

The view that U.S. security is only threatened by

the establishment of Soviet military bases in the region
or by the deployment of SS-20 missiles there -- a step
repeatedly threatened by the Soviets, most recently by the
chief of the Warsaw Pact forces in connection with the
planned deployment of U.S. intermediate range missiles in
Europe -- overlooks the vital strategic importance to the
United States of a secure Basin.
Until now, the United States has been able to act
on the assumption that its "strategic rear" was secure and did
not require a large diversion of military resources for its
protection.

The Western Alliance has benefited from this

"economy of force" posture since, as Congressman Dante B.
Fascell has pointed out, "in a real sense it is the nonthreatening environment close to home that permits the United
States to concentrate so much manpower, equipment, and
attention on Europe."
This situation has already begun to change as the
United States has had to expend increased military resources
and growing attention on the crisis in Central America.

In

the event of a collapse there, the reversal of our posture

355.

would be swift and drastic, requiring the diversion of
significant resources to protect our southern border and the
Caribbean Basin.

Were the United States ever to be tied

down within this region in such a manner, our ability to
fulfill commitments in Europe and elsewhere in the world, not
to speak of our own security and well-being, would inevitably
suffer.
The Basin is also important strategically, since
as much as 70 percent of

u.s.

seaborne reinforcements to NATO

would transit the sealanes leading from the Gulf Coast
and the Panama Canal in the event of a Soviet armed attack
in Europe.

The goal of interdicting such reinforcements is

an important element in Soviet strategic thinking, as set
forth in 1979 by Soviet Navy Fleet Admiral Sergei Gorshkov
in his book, Naval Power in Soviet Policy:
To achieve superiority of forces over the enemy
in the main sector and pin him down in secondary
sectors ••• means to achieve sea control in a theater
or a sector of a theater

the enemy will be

paralyzed or constrained in his operations

and

thereby hampered from interfering with our
operations.
The Soviets have already achieved a far greater
interdiction capability than the Nazis had during World War
Two, when 50 percent of

u.s.

were shipped from Gulf ports.

supplies to Europe and Africa
At that time, German U-boats

were able to sink 260 merchant ships in just six months,
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despite the fact that the Allied forces enjoyed many
advantages, including a two-to-one edge in submarines and
the use of Cuba for resupply and basing operations.

The

Germans, meanwhile, had to operate from the Bay of Biscay,
4,000 miles across the Atlantic and without the benefit of
aircover.

Today these advantages have been reversed.

It

is the Soviet Union that now has the two-to-one edge in
submarines and can operate and receive aircover from Cuba,
a point from which all 13 Caribbean sealanes passing through
four choke-points are vulnerable to interdiction.
The Soviet ability to carry out a strategy of
"strategic denial" is further enhanced by the presence near
Havana of the largest Soviet-managed electronic monitoring
complex outside the Soviet Union, as well as by the deployment
of TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft.
The strategic position of the Soviet Union in the
Caribbean would be considerably strengthened if Grenada were
used for refueling and stationing tactical and transport
aircraft or as a site for naval refueling, both real
possibilities with the construction of a new airport at
Port Salines and the reports of Soviet plans to build naval
facilities on the island.

The establishment of new Soviet

military positions in Grenada would give Moscow a routine
military presence in the Eastern Caribbean, while the
acquisition of new positions in Nicaragua -- especially the
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construction of a naval base on the Pacific Coast, where
a fishing port is being built -- would extend the Soviet
reach to the Pacific Basin.

Either development would constitute

a major gain for Soviet strategy.
The sea routes of the Caribbean are also important
economically to the United States, since they now carry
nearly half of all the crude oil and other foreign cargo
shipped to this country.

Moreover, the Basin itself is a

growing source of critical raw materials.

Mexico supplies

33 percent of the crude oil currently imported by the U.S.
and has reserves estimated at 45 billion barrels, roughly equal
to the reserves of such major producers as Iraq and Abu
Dhabi.

Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago supply another 8

percent of

u.s.

crude oil imports, while 56 percent of the

refined petroleum products imported to the
Basin refineries.

u.s.

come from

In addition, Jamaica and several other Basin

countries supply 85 percent of the bauxite imported to the

u.s.

and nearly 40 percent of the alumina.
Beyond the issue of

u.s.

strategic interests in

the Basin, the overriding fact is that our credibility worldwide is inevitably engaged in an area so close to the United
States.

The triumph of hostile forces in our "strategic rear"

would be read as a sign of

u.s.

impotence -- the inability

successfully to define our objectives, manage our policy, and
defend our interests.
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A consensus on policy ,.muld need to be based upon a
common understanding of the nature of the problem facing the
United States in Central America.

The view heard frequently

that the problem is essentially internal, deriving from
poverty and repression, does not take adequate account of the
scope of the external threat facing the region and the extent
to which the Soviet Union and CUba are exploiting the serious
problems of very

~llnerable

Central American societies.

Since

their strategy of armed struggle wre«!ks havoc with any effort
to promote economic opportunity, a democratic political center
and free institutions, and a more professional military -- the
pillars of any meaningful policy of reform in Central America
it is hard to see how it is possible to deal effectively with
internal problems without resisting the external threat.

As

President Kennedy's Latin American task force declared in its
report that led to the creation of the Alliance for Progress,
"good wishes and economic plans do not stop bullets or hand
grenades or armed bands."
Today the threat is greater -- far greater -- than it was
in 1961 when the task force declared that it "resembles, but
is more dangerous than, the Nazi-Fascist threat of the Franklin
Roosevelt period and demands an even bolder and more imaginative
response."

Moreover, today 1-.re have fewer resources at our

disposal -- economically, militarily, strategically, politically.
We are still, ten years after the -.;vithdra·.ral from Vietnam,
divided over our foreign policy and national purpose, over our
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understanding of the threat we face and our sense of our
proper role in the world.
The deterioration in the region to our immediate south has
been such, however, that we cannot afford paralysis in defending
our national interests and in achieving our national purposes.
The fact that such paralysis could be attributed to the continuing absence of a national consensus on foreign policy in
the United States would not mitigate the consequences of failure.
As George Kennan once wrote, "History does not forgive us our
national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of our
domestic politics."
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AN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS IN LATIN AMERICA:

1939 -

1983

Richard W. Barrett

Introduction
Down through the years, a succession of American presidents have established for one reason or another programs aimed at assisting the political,
economic, social, and military development of our Latin-American neighbors.
In most cases, these programs have been carried out by agencies specifically
established for that purpose.

In other cases, Presidents have relied upon

the delegation of specific program authorities exercised by existing agencies
in the accomplishment of desired objectives.

In addition to these extraordi-

nary measures, Presidents have at times attempted to obtain their objectives
by strengthening the impact of existing programs throught the establishment
of special devices to improve coordination among responsible agencies.

In

almost all cases, these efforts have either been abandoned, fallen in disuse,
or superseded by later events.

The purpose of this paper is to review these

developments, particularly with respect to their organizational and managerial
implications with a view toward seeing what if anything might be gleaned from
this experience that would prove useful to the Commission in the course of
its present deliberations.

Toward this end, the paper will:

o review the history of the programs special arrangements referred
to above.
o present short profiles of those that appear to have some relevance
to current conditions.
o analyse the forces operating for and against establishment
of those selected for discussion and, to the extent possible,
evaluate their success.
o outline a number of options that appear worthy of the Commission's
conside~ation.
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o present the author's conclusions and recommendations.
It should be emphasized at the outset that because of a tight deadline
and rather strict financial arrangements the paper relies heavily upon the
memories and predilections of a relatively small number of persons who were
involved in the events described.

In this sense, the paper should be viewed

more as a product of oral history than the result of an extensive scholarly
review of the written record.

While every attempt has been made to present a

balanced point of view, the author is aware that certain biases are inevitable
and that in the final analysis they are his.

He also knows that he must

therefore take full responsibility for all matters of opinion expressed as
well as any errors of omission or commission that may be found in the final
product.
Several additional explanatory notes are in order.

One is that the paper

deals primarily with the administration of bilateral assistance.

Such refer-

ences as may be made to multilateral institutions are included only insofar
as they contribute to bilateral efforts.

Second, the paper is rather weak

with respect to roles of the military establishment and the intelligence
community.

Aside from the limitations on time and money mentioned above, the

reason for this lack of attention is due to the infeasibility of obtaining
the security clearances necessary to research and report upon events in these
areas of activity.

Third, the reader's attention is invited to the chart

attached as Appendix A which depicts the chronology of the major events
described in the body of the report.
In conclusion, the author would like to express his appreciation to
several friends and former colleages, particular Melbourne Spector and William
Parks for their help and encouragement.
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A Brief Review of U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs
For students of public administration, the end of World War II marked
the beginning of a new epoch in the management of the nation's foreign
affairs.

With their roots in a history of isolationism, U.S. relations with

other countries prior to the war were studiously correct and essentially
bilateral in nature.

Responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs within

the Government bureaucracy rested almost exclusively with the Department of
State which performed the traditional diplomatic functions--representation,
reporting, and negotiation--and administered the consular activities associated with the movement of U.S. citizens abroad and the acceptance of
foreigners into the United States.
All this changed with the War and its aftermath which saw the U.S. emerge
as the most powerful of the new superpowers and the acknowledged leader of
the free world.

Its relations with other countries now became infinitely

more complex involving many new activities including the furnishing of
economic, technical and military assistance.

In addition, it found itself

participating in a number of newly established international organizations
dealing with such diverse subjects as the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, the development of underdeveloped countries, the mutual security of
allies, the health and welfare of the underprivileged people of the world,
and the stability of worldwide financial and monetary systems.
These changes in the international scene brought with them tremendous
changes in the ways in which the government managed its foreign affairs.
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First, the State Department lost its monopoly.

Other agencies that hereto-

fore had been totally occupied with domestic matters suddenly found they had
legitimate and sometimes pressing interests overseas.

The Departments of

Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, among others, established their own
11

foreign offices 11 and began to demand representation not only in councils at

home but also at our posts overseas.

The military, once considered rela-

tively benign during peacetime, became a full-time and sometimes bellicose
partner in the formulation and implementation of postwar policies.
This explosion of international activity posed the Government's
organizational planners with the most challenging set of problems they had
encountered since the early days of the New Deal when they were confronted
with a similar eruption of new activities on the domestic front.

First, they

had to decide where and how to house the new initiatives in economic and
military assistance, and second they had to devise ways to coordinate the
increasing number of international activities being carried on by agencies
primarily engaged in domestic affairs.
The pattern that emerged for dealing with the first of these two problems
was remarkably similar to the one created by President Roosevelt when he set
up the alphabet-soup agencies of the New Deal.

Like their predecessors in the

Roosevelt administration, President Truman's organizational planners decided
it would be unwise to entrust such bold new enterprises as European recovery
to such old-line agencies as the Department of State and the Treasury.

Con-

sequently, when the Marshall Plan was proposed in 1947, they persuaded the
President to create a new agency to put the plan into effect.

It is signifi-

cant to note that the authorities under which that agency, the Economic
Cooperation Administration, operated were granted first to the President and
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then delegated from him to the head of the agency by an executive order.
This pattern was repeated four years later when President Truman
inaugurated his Point Four program of technical assistance to underdeveloped
countries.

Again the planners decided that the new program required a new

agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration was launched under a
delegation of Presidential authority.
Meanwhile in Europe, under pressures generated by the Cold War, the
emphasis had shifted away from economic recovery toward measures designed
to increase the security of the free world.

In response, the President

decided in 1951 to replace ECA with still another new agency, the Mutual
Security Agency.

Recognizing the

nee~

to involve other agencies, principally

the Department of Defense, and the need to coordinate their activities with
the technical assistance and economic development programs, his planners also
established the post of Director of Mutual Security to oversee the total
assistance effort.

To strengthen the Director's ability to perform this

role, the Presidential authorities were delegated to him for re-delegation
to the heads of the operating agencies.

This arrangement was continued as

a part of the Reorganization of 1953, which consolidated the functions of
MSA and TCA under a single agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, and
1955, which transferred the military assistance programs to the Department of
Defense and the economic and technical assistance programs to the Department
of State to be administered by the semi-autonomous International Cooperation
Administration.
The inauguration of John F. Kennedy in 1961 brought with it a new burst
of enthusiasm for foreign aid, particularly as it promoted the development
process advocated by Rostow and Miliken; several new initiatives, Food for
Peace, the Peace Corps, and the Alliance for Progress, and a host of new
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organizational dilemmas.

In the year immediately prior to Kennedy•s

inauguration, the Senate, apparently upset over inter-agency squabbles
involving loans and grants for economic development and the relationship
between trade and aid, called upon the President to conduct a study of the
Government•s foreign economic programs with a view toward improving coordination and strenthening their role in the attainment of U.S. foreign policy
objectives. The results of this 'tudy, which was carried out by an interagency task force under the direction of the then Bureau of the Budget, were
given to President Kennedy•s organizational planners toward the end of 1960
and eventually became the basis for the establishment of the Agency for
International Development in the fall of 1961.
taken in conjunction with that action were to

Among the important decisions
(1) appoint a Food for Peace

Director as a part of the White House establishment, (2) create an independent agency to administer the Peace Corps, (3) diminish, but not eliminate,
Treasury•s control over loans to foreign countries and contributions to
international banks, and (4) locate the administrative support for the U.S.
contribution to the Alliance for Progress in AID under the direction of a
single individual who served in the dual capacity of head of the AID bureau
for Latin America and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. After considerable debate, military assistance was left in the Department of Defense,
and AID was made an independent agency reporting to the Secretary of State
and the President.

With the exception of several minor embellishments that

will be touched upon later, this pattern has remained intact and the arrangement described governs the operation of foreign assistance programs today.
To complete the picutre of the Government•s foreign affairs establishment, one must, of course, include the military, the intelligence community,

366.

and the international activities of the so-called domestic agencies.

While a

full description of this system is well beyond the scope of this report, it is
perhaps worth reviewing the roles of some of the more active players.

First

there is the Department of State, the agency charged with primary responsibility for the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign
affairs.

Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a full

picture of the sometimes arcane workings of the senior executive department.
It might, however, be useful to point out that the organizational structure
of the Department combines four different types of offices:

one for geography,

one for functional specialties such as economic affairs and the gathering of
intelligence, one for certain specified operations such as passport and
consular services, and one for administrative support.

It might also be

useful to point out that through the years, depending upon the international
situation at the moment and the personalities of those involved, the exercise of
power between these sets of offices, particularly the two concerned with
geographical and functional matters, has shifted back and forth.
The largest single organizational issue to confront the Department since
the end of World War II has been to decide how to deal with the emergence of
the assistance programs and the intrusion of domestic agencies into the
international arena.

As we have seen, a succession of Presidential advisors

counseled against assigning the assistance authorities directly to the
Department.

While accepting this advice, Presidents have continued to

expect the State Department to exert

11

leadership 11 over foreign affairs and

have frequently grown impatient when the Department has failed to live up to
these expectations.

Faced with these ambivalences, the Department has tended

to retreat to its own turf--that of policy making and the conduct of formal
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diplomatic relations--leaving operational matters to others and thereby forcing
the President to resort to extra-departmental devices for the coordination of
inter-agency activities.

The relative influence of the Department within

this system has ebbed and flowed largely as a function of the principals
involved, the pressures of external events and their internal political ramifications.
From an organizational standpoint, the two constants in this kaleidoscope
have been the State Department desk in Washington and the U.S. ambassador
overseas. As the only two points in the chain of command that are concerned
with the totality of the U.S. activities in a given country, the Department•s
regional bureaus and foreign missions are natural coordinate points for the
exchange of information and, in those instances where foreign policy is
concerned, executive direction.

As Presidents• exasperations over their

inability to issue commands and assign responsibility for action increased,
more and more emphasis was placed on the role of the ambassador as the
President•s representative not only with respect to the country to which he
was assigned but also with respect to the heads of U.S. agencies operating in
that country.

This trend reached its apex in 1961 when President Kennedy

issued a letter that formally put the ambassador in charge of all U.S.
activities except those assigned to military commands. With the exception of
a relatively short-lived assignment given to Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann
by President Johnson in 1963, no such designation has been made in Washington.
The net effect, therefore, of the Kennedy letter has been to give the ambassador
a definite set of responsibilities in the field but no way of exercising his
authorities in Washington except through the State Department which does not
have a similar mandate with respect to other agenices engaged in the conduct
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of foreign affairs.

The SIG and IRG arrangements instituted in the middle

60s tried to overcome this deficiency but they have proved largely ineffectual
and this ambiguity in the chain of command between the President and the
ambassador remains unchanged today.
As matters now stand, then the U.S. foreign affairs establishment consists of:
o the Department of State and its sister foreign affairs
agencies, i.e., AID, USIA, and the Peace Corps.
o other agencies involved in foreign assistance including DOD and the
Department of Agriculture and, with respect to contributions to international financial institutions, the Department of the Treasury.
o the military command structure under the direction of the Secretary
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
o the intelligence community.
o elements of a number of executive departments and agencies
primarily concerned with domestic affairs but with important and
legitimate interests overseas.
From a Presidential standpoint the principal devices for coordinating
the work of these various elements are the National Security Council
apparatus in Washington and the ambassadors and the country teams in the
field.

The following section will take a closer look at the evolution of

foreign assistance programs in Latin America and the devices that have been
used through the years to improve their coordination and effectiveness.
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Latin American Assistance Programs and Their Coordination
The first officially sanctioned inter-governmental assistance program
was initiated in the spring of 1939 when Congress authorized the President
to detail "for temporary service of not exceeding one year at a time any
person in the employ of the United States to give advice and assistance
on request to the government of any American nation."

This action was taken

to regularize a previously ad hoc practice of sending U.S. government
employees to provide technical assistance to countries that requested such
services.

The original act was expanded somewhat a month later to authorize

departments and agencies to join with Latin American countries in reciprocal
undertakings authorized by resolutions and recommendations signed by the
21 American republics at international conferences held in 1936 and 1938.
To administer these early operations the President established an interagency committee, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural
Development, consisting of representatives in over 25 bureaus of some 18
executive departments and agencies, under the chairmanship of, interestingly
enough, the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

Except for a

small secretariat provided by the State Department, the Committee had no
staff nor was it authorized to operate or direct programs in its own right.
Its main functions were to consider estimates submitted by each member agency
of the applications it expected to receive from Latin-American governments
during the coming fiscal year, draw up a budget for the expenditures required
to support the applications the Committee approved of and, under the auspices
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of the Department of State, present its recommendations to the President and,
following his review, the Congress for its consideration and action.

Once

funds had been appropriated, the Committee met again to apportion them among
the agencies who were responsible for arranging and administering the detail
of the individuals or work groups to the requesting country.

Starting with a

budget of just over $300,000 in 1939, the work of the Committee gradually
expanded to the point where its annual budget averaged nearly $4 million
during 1948- 1950, the last three years of its existence.

In all, the

Committee brokered approximately $26 million from its inception in 1940 until
its activities were transferred to the Technical Cooperation Administration
in 1950.

These funds supported the temporary assignments to close to 2,000

U.S. government experts, and the training in the U.S. of some 3,000 foreign
nationals in the fields of agriculture, public health, resource development,
social welfare, and education.

Judged in today•s terms these are rather small

sums. The work of the Committee, however, did provide some useful insights
for future generations of organizational planners.

The first lesson was that

piecemeal responses to requests received from the Latin-American governments
did not, in most cases, result in building a sound basis for the economic
development of the host country.

With this realization came a recognition of

the need for some sort of overall plan or strategy against which individual
requests could be evaluated.

The second lesson came when the State Department

realized that it could not effectively perform its role as chairman of the
Committee without some expression of explicit authority and the provision
of additional stafff to carry it out.

Proposals to rectify both of these

deficiencies were being circulated at the time of the Committee's demise.
reviewing subsequent chapters of the history of foreign assistance in Latin

In
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America one wonders whether or not these early lessons

were ever fully under-

stood.
The outbreak of war in Europe in September of 1939 brought forth a
very different approach to providing assistance to our Latin-American neighbors.

In August 1940, as a result of a governmentwide review of a memorandum

prepared by Nelson Rockefeller urging the President to initiate a joint
economic program to safeguard and strengthen the economy of the Western Hemisphere as part of our defense effort, the Council of National Defense issued an
executive order establishing a subordinate unit to itself an Office for
Coordination of Commerical and Cultural Relations between the American
Republics.

The order also appointed Mr. Rockefeller as the head of the office

with the title of Coordinator and responsibility for establishing and maintaining

11

liaison between the Advisory Commission of the Council of National

Defense, the several departments and establishments of the Government and
such other agencies, public or private, as he might deem necessary or desirable, to insure proper coordination of . . . the activities of the Government
with respect to Hemisphere defense, with particular reference to the commercial and cultural aspects of the problem ...

In addition to his assignment

as Coordinator, Mr. Rockefeller was made a member and chairman of an InterDepartmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs which included the President
of the Export-Import Bank and representatives of the Departments of State,
Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce and which was to 11 Consider and correlate
proposals of the Government with respect [to] Hemisphere defense, commercial
and cultural relations and to make recommendations for action by appropriate
Government departments and agencies...

In July 1941, the title of the Office

was shortened to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
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(CIAA), the term by which it became commonly known.
True to form, Mr. Rockefeller wasted no time in tackling his new assignments and, with characteristic vigor, quickly established a full-blown agency
to carry out whatever mandate he had been given.

By the end of the year,

the Office of the Coordinator consisted of four operating sections--one for
cultural affairs, one for communications, one for commercial development, and
one for trade and financial matters--plus a full complement of staff and
support offices including four special consultants listed on its organization
chart as W. Benton, H. R. Luce, Anna M. Rosenberg, and B. Ruml. The organization of the office clearly reflected the dual purposes of its mission--propaganda and economic development--but only the latter realy interested the
Coordinator.

It is also the one that persisted well after the war was over,

and along with the work of the Interdepartmental Committee described above,
formed the basis of the postwar worldwide assistance programs.
The CIAA also spawned two organizational innovations that would have
additional lasting effects on subsequent development efforts in Latin
America.

Trained in the ways of private enterprise and impatient with

the bureaucratic trappings of government, Mr. Rockefeller in 1942 secured
a charter under the laws of Delaware for a government-owned corporation
called the ''Institute of Inter-American Affairs," whch was authorized to
conduct cooperative programs with the Latin-American Governments in the
promotion of public health and in agricultural development.

In 1944, a

similar corporation, called the "Inter-American Educational Foundation, Inc.,"
was organized with authority to provide similar cooperation in elementary
and vocational education.

In 1947, the two corporations were consolidated

and reincorporated by an act of Congress to be henceforth known simply as the
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Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The Institute continued to function as a
constituent unit of the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs
until that office was abolished by executive order of the President in 1946
at which time the Institute became part of the Department of State.

In the

fall of 1949, the Institute•s Congressional charter was extended until June
30, 1955.

On March 1, 1951, it became the regional office of the newly

established Technical Cooperation Administration for programs in Latin
America.
The operations of IIAA differed from the technical assistance provided
under the auspices of the Interdepartmental Committee in two significant
respects--one, its activities were joint operations between the United States
and individual Latin-American countries, and two, its activities were conducted
along program lines with a program consisting of a number of related projects
in each of its three fields of interest, agriculture, health, and education.
The device created for putting these concepts into operation was the servicio,
the second of the two great innovations that came out of the Office of the
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs.

Each of the Institute•s programs was

embodied in an international agreement between the government of the United
States and the government of the cooperating country.

In the typical case,

these documents, known as program agreements, stipulated that the work that
was agreed upon by both parties would be performed by a cooperative service
or servicio that was to be established within the appropriate Ministry of the
host country.

The servicio was intended to function as an integral part of

the Ministry but with a special semi-autonomous status not unlike that of the
IIAA itself.

The servico•s independence was further enhanced by the fact

that operations were supported by a joint account funded by contributions
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from both parties and staffed by employees of both countries.

In order to

preserve U.S. interests, with but one exception, the director of this staff
was the chief of IIAA's technical mission answerable both to the minister (as
the head of the servicio) and to the President of the IIAA (as the head of
the technical mission).
The special genius claimed for this device by its originators was
that it encouraged intimate daily cooperation between U.S. technicians and
administrators and host country technicians and administrators on common
problems involved in the achievement of their mutual objectives. A less
ingenious reason for its popularity with generations of technicians and field
administrators might be found in the aphorism that those who serve two
masters in fact serve none.

While this may be an overly cynical point of

view, it is true that the servicios managed to feed at several public troughs
for a number of years unemcumbered by most of the restraints placed upon
other governmental institutions.

Whether or not this freedom was benefical

or even necessary in order to achieve the objectives for which the IIAA
was established depends upon one's concepts of public responsibility and the
means ordinarily adopted for enforcing it.

What is important to note is that

those in charge of technical assistance in Latin America and the cadre of
technical experts they recruited have a long history of seeking to avoid what
they consider troublesome and unnecessary constraints imposed on government
agencies at home and abroad.

What is even more important to note is that this

attitude of being above and beyond what they considered short-term and selfcentered political realities led them to largely ignore local political institutions and the role such institutions must play in the development process.
These feelings have become deeply imbedded in the subculture of the assistance
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movement and, as we shall see, have had important effects not only upon the
content of their programs but also the organizational forms created to carry
them forward.
Aside from the administrative flexibility they provide, adherents of the
servicio point with pride to the success these organizations have had in
gaining local support for projects deemed desirable by U.S. experts.

In

financial terms the record shows that in their heyday, the years from 1942 to
1950, the servicios attracted contributions in money and kind at least equal
to and in many cases surpassing the U.S. input.

The actual figures for this

period are roughly $66 million in local contributions against $63 million in
U.S. investment.
Two further characteristics of IIAA operations are noteworthy for the
impact they have had on subsequent organzational development.

One is the fact

that at no time during the years of its individual existence did the agency
make any serious effort to integrate its three major programs into one.

Each

of these programs had its own operating division in Washington which established its own set of servicios in the field.

The failure to provide central

capabilities in Washington also adversely influenced the development of
government-wide planning facilities in the field thereby further strengthening
the technical bureaucracies at the expense of the central governments.

The

dominance of the technical specialties in IIAA carried over into the days
TCA, FOA, and ICA and became a major organizational issue during the establishment of AID in 1961.
The second characteristic worth notinq is the nature of IIAA•s relationships with other U.S. agencies.

Both in Washington and in the field, IIAA

carried out its operations more or less as though it were not a part of the
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U.S. government.

As we have seen, it was originally chartered as a quasi-·

governmental entity under the laws of the state of Delaware.

Its sponsors

and directors were members of a Presidential office operating under extraordinary wartime powers.

Either conciously or not, these originators took no

notice of an already existing mechanism for delivering technical assistance
to Latin America, the Interdepartmental Committee.

As a matter of fact, they

considered the government employees used as technical experts under that
system as inappropriate to the job at hand.

They also drew inspiration from

a President who had long felt that bold new initiatives could not be left
with stodgy old government agencies.

As a result of all these factors,

the Institute maintained a certain aloofness, some would even say arrogance,
toward other agencies of government.

While this posture was certainly

tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by the powers that be, the President
was forced to intervene on behalf of the State Department when the Institute
attempted to dispatch its emissaries overseas without the appropriate diplomatic clearances.

However, these early attitudes of aloofness persisted and

resulted in the evolution of an elite corps of professional assistance
technicians who to this day resist assimilation into the larger foreign
affairs community.
The IIAA lost much of its corporate individuality when it became a part
of the worldwide Point Four program in the early 1950s. While it continued to
operate as a regional bureau under TCA, it no longer possessed its own staff
and administrative support functions.

It did retain much of its culture and

many of its field operations, although beginning in 1951 the separate programs
in the field were placed under a single director for technical assistance
located in the U.S. embassy.

Also, at about the same time, previously rejected
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efforts to develop coordinated country programs were introduced at the
Washington level under the auspices of newly established program-planning
committees.
The effects of the reorganization of 1955 were much more far-reaching.
In the first place, it for the first time put all of the foreign assistance
programs under one roof, the Foreign Operations Administration.

Second, it

brought in vital new leadership under the direction of Harold Stassen that
was determined to create a vigorous, hard-hitting institution out of the
jerry-built collection of agencies it inherited.
tion were the words of the day.
and profound.

Centralization and unifica-

The effects on Latin America were immediate

Under direct orders from President Eisenhower, IIAA was

reduced to a paper shell despite the fact that its charter had two more years
to go. Its personnel were forced into a new central personnel system which
many refused to join, choosing instead to return to the home bases in other
government agencies and academia.
ened.

Program planning procedures were strength-

New forms of assistance, including economic aid and military assistance,

were added to the already existing technical assistance operations.

In the

field, strong, fully staffed USOM's replaced the weak and relatively ineffectual directors of technical cooperation and brought their operations closer
to the embassy than had been the case previously.
remained clung to their old ways.

Still, many of those that

Of all the regional bureaus in FOA, the

Latin-American bureau gave the highest priority to technical assistance and,
despite the efforts to achieve more integrated programming, the old interests
in agriculture, health and education predominated.

Even the addition of

military assistance to the agency's portfolio had less impact on the LatinAmerican operations than those of other regions since the MAAG continued to
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report through a command channel, CINC South, thereby preserving to" a great
extent the bureau's isolation from military programs and their influence in
the area.

In the field, even the servicios survived attempts to subordinate

their activities under the newly established USOM's.

In short, as so often

happens in the case of seemingly cataclysmic organizational change, once the
dust has cleared it's pretty much business as usual.
The reorganization of 1955 signaled a return to the pluralistic approach
to the delivery of foreign assistance.

Largely in response to the often

feverish machinations of foreign aid activists to devise new ways to bamboozle
what they perceived to be a hostile Congress, the decision was made to break up
the FOA on the grounds that it was a sitting duck for the enemies on the Hill
and that the cause could better be served by hiding whatever eggs there were
in a larger number of baskets.

Thus, military assistance was returned to the

Pentagon, new loan programs which did not meet the standards of existing
central banking institutions were placed in a newly created Development Fund,
and administration of the extremely powerful P.L. 480 program of exchanging
agricultural surpluses for local currencies that could be used for development purposes remained with the Department of Agriculture.

The leftovers

were placed in the International Cooperation Administration, established as a
semi-autonomous agency within the Department of State which for the first
time was forced to take on some direct responsibility for foreign assistance
programs.
The 1955 reogranizations had a twofold effect on Latin-American assistance.

On the one hand, the divestiture of responsibility for military assis-

tance and the strictly financial aspects of economic aid opened the door for
a resurgence of the old technical assistance advocates and along with it a
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transfer of power from central programmers with their country-wide focus to
technical experts who were as always more interested in promoting their
individual functional specialties than in developinng integrated country programs.

On the other hand, the establishment of ICA as an agency of the State

Department brought the technical assistance types once again face to face
with their diplomatic counterparts.

Relations between the two had never been

good, but largely due to the separation of powers that had existed since the
establishment of IIAA as an independent agency, they had usually been if not
cordial at least civil.

The transfer of its employees to State Department

rolls even as members of a "semi-autonomous" agency immediately raised a
host of nasty administrative questions.
would the newcomers have?

What sort of a personnel status

Certainly not Foreign Service appointments!

Would they be entitled to the cherished diplomatic passport and afforded
diplomatic status abroad?

Where would they be housed?

How far down did the

lines of supervision extend?

Who submitted the foreign assistance budget and

who defended it on the Hill?

Who had final authority for program content?

These and other questions greatly exacerbated the already strained relationships between the two agenices and in the ensuing years led to a spate of
studies dealing with such things as the conflicts between "short-term
political considerations" and ''long-term economic benefits," the need for
common personnel systems, and even a serious proposal for the establishment
of a Department of Foreign Affairs that would encompass not only State and
Aid but also the information functions that had remained relatively unnoticed
in a separate agency since the days of the Office of the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs.
The fact that these tensions were controlled at all was due more to a
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set of fortuitous circumstances than by any grand design of the organization
planners.

The reorganization of 1953 that transferred the functions of MSA

to DOA retained the position of Director of Mutual Security as the arm of the
President responsible for dispensing the Presidential authorities contained
in the annual Mutual Security Acts.

This arrangement continued through the

FOA period when the function was largely perfunctory since practically all the
authorities granted the President were immediately transferred to the head of
FOA.

However, when these authorities were more widely dispersed as a result

of the 1955 reorganization, the position of the Director of Mutual Security
assumed a renewed importance.

Through a quirk of fate, a single individual,

Douglas Dillon, was given the dual assignment of Director of Mutual Security
and Under Secretary of State for Econmic Affairs, the third-ranking position
in the Department. The happy circumstance of Dillon's tolerance for ambiguity
and extraordinary managerial abilities combined with the fact that his dual
role gave him what amounted to line authority over all aspects of foreign aid
including ICA and the State Department regional bureaus produced what many
observers believe to be a high-water mark in the administration of foreign
assistance.
Despite the enormous scope of Dillon's authority, there were significant
facets of the assistance effort that he did not control.
particularly bothersome.

Several proved

One involved foreign lending operations that were

largely controlled by the Treasury Department; another was the use of local
currencies generated under P.L. 480 which was totally controled by the
Department of Agriculture, and the third included questions involving the
relationships between trade and aid which were dealt with rather unsuccessfully by a succession of White House-chaired interdepartmental committees.
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It was Congressional doubts over the adequacy of coordination of these activities that caused the Senate to request a study of foreign economic activities
in the spring of 1960.

As indicated earlier, the report of this study provided

a basis for the later creation of AID which from an organizational point of
view attempted to reunify the major assistance activities in a more independent
agency organized along geographic rather than functional lines with a strong
emphasis on an integrated long-term economic development programs.

More will

be said about its success in achieving these objectives in later sections of
this paper.
For Latin-American hands, the early 60s will be remembered primarily as
the years of the Alliance for Progress.

The Alliance, or the Alianza as it

was known to its Latin admirers, meant many things to many people.
it was a slogan.

To others it was a multi-national program.

To some

And to still

others it was a catchword for U.S. economic assistance efforts in Latin
America.

For those who worked for AID, the Alliance became a synonym for

AID's Latin-American program and the regional bureau responsible for its
implementation.
these things.

In point of fact, the Alliance was a little of all of
The term first appeared in a speech made by John F. Kennedy

in Tampa, Fla., in October 1960.

In this speech, Kennedy declared his belief

in a Western Hemisphere where all were joined together in an alliance consisting of "a great common effort to develop the resources of the entire hemisphere, strengthen the forces of democracy and widen the vocational and
educational opportunities to every person in all the Americas."

Kennedy's

interest and sense of urgency prompted him to set up a task force on Latin
America under the chairmanship of Adolph Serle with the charge of putting
some flesh on the ideas expressed in his Tampa speech.

Among the recommenda-
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tions submitted by the task force in its final report was one dealing with
organizational matters which though not accepted at the time would reappear
toward the end of Kennedy•s administration and which has remained a live
issue off and on ever since. This was Berle•s assertion that the nature of
the effort envisioned and its relative importance required that within the
State Department the principal officer for Latin-American Affairs be given
the rank of Under Secretary.

It is not clear exactly how or when this

proposal was turned down, but it is known that Mr. Berle rejected President
Kennedy•s request to become the principal officer in the Department for
Latin-America Affairs because that position was not elevated to the rank of
Under Secretary.
In the meantime, the organizational issues surrounding the management of
U.S. participation in the Alliance were caught up in the more general reorganization of foreign assistance activities.

After several false starts in the

winter of 1961, this matter had been assigned to another task force chaired
by Henry Labouisse, the newly installed head of ICA.

Along with the question

of how to deal with the lending and the trade and aid issues mentioned
earlier, this group now had to decide how to handle all of the new Kennedy
initiatives including Food-for-Peace, the Peace Corps, and of course the
Alliance for Progress. The expressed desire to create a unified aid approach
suggested putting all of these functions in a single agency.

Proponents of

each, including a number of new appointees, naturally wanted to retain or, in
the cases of the new programs, achieve independent status.

The process of

deciding who was in and who was out was heated and at times even bloody.
the end there were more winners than losers.

In

The principal soft loan agency,

the Development Loan Fund, was absorbed but Treasury retained a strong voice
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in developing the policies and standards under which loans could be made and
outright control of U.S. representation on, and contributions to, the international banks.

The Director of Food-for-Peace ended up in the White House but

without direct program authority which remained in Agriculture.
Corps became an independent agency.

The Peace

Only the Alliance was a clear loser.

Despite several sporadic attempts to obtain an independent home, the function
of supporting U.S. participation in the Alianza became a part of AID's
Latin-American program administered by the Assistant Administrator for Latin
America who for public consumption was also dubbed Coordinator of the Alliance
for Progress.
Considering the ambiguities surrounding the creation of AID, not the
least of which is the provision in its enabling legislation stating that its
Administrator reports to the Secretary of State and the President, it is not
surprising to find that the President soon found himself enmeshed in interagency squabbles and frustrated by his inability to assign responsibility to
any one person for carrying out his wishes.

With his strong interest and

heavy commitments in Latin America, President Kennedy grew especially impatient with the lack of responsiveness resulting from what he perceived as
inadequate leadership in that area of the world.

Accordingly, shortly before

his fateful trip to Dallas, he requested Secretary Rusk to undertake the
steps necessary to establish an Under Secretary of State for Latin America
who would be responsible for all U.S. programs operating in that hemisphere.
While that specific request died with President Kennedy's assassination,
the idea of a single official responsible for all Latin-American Affairs did
not.

As one of his first actions upon taking office, President Johnson sent

a letter to former Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, then our ambassador to
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Mexico, asking him to return to Washington to serve as his special representative to oversee all U.S. programs in Latin America and, in addition, to accept
the positions of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and
the Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress.
Immediately upon his arrival in Washington to assume his new duties,
Ambassador Mann assembled a small working group to iron out the details of
his multiple assignment.

After some deliberation, this group concluded that

if he were to fully live up to the President•s expectations, Ambassador Mann
would need, in addition to his official designations as Special Assistant to
the President, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and
Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, some visible symbols of his status
plus explicit delegations from the heads of those agencies that exercised
authority over the major foreign assistance programs.

Operating on this con-

viction, members of the group started to work at establishing the Ambassador•s
position.

Space for his use in the West Wing of the White House was secured,

letterheads designed, and arrangements made for a limosine and chauffeur, all
obvious signs of importance and a constant reminder of his special relationship
to the President.

Other members of the group researched the lines of authority

and prepared drafts of the necessary delegations as well as an executive order
to formalize the substance of the President•s letter.

In the meantime Ambas-

sador Mann had been testing the waters himself, particularly through talks
with Secretaries Rusk, Dillon and Freeman, and AID Administrator Bell.

As a

result of these conversations, the Ambassador decided that he needed nothing
more than the expression of Presidential intent he already possessed and
turned down the White House emoluments which he feared would affront his
old colleague Dean Rusk and the various delegations which he felt were
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unnecessary in view of the relationships he had established with the aforementioned principals.

Thus, another attempt to elevate the position of the

senior official in charge of hemispheric affairs above the level of assistant
secretary failed and, with Ambassador Mann's departure, Presidental hopes
for a single point of responsibility vanished once again.
It is interesting to note that in its next reincarnation as the first
recommendation of the Rockefeller Commission's report of 1969, the status of
the single-voice notion rose to the level of a Secretary in charge of his own
department of Western Hemisphere Affairs.

It is also interesting to note

that this Commission also recommended that an Institute of Western Hemisphere
Affairs be set up as an operating corporation under an Economic and Social
Development Agency to be created in the Executive Office of the President to
supersede AID.

Never let it be said that Mr. Rockefeller lacked persistence.

Another organizational innovation launched by President Johnson early
in his administration met a similar fate for quite different reasons.
Prompted by his boyhood experiences in Texas, LBJ always had a special fondness for U.S.-Mexican relations.

His predilections in this area led him to

meet with the President of Mexico in the spring of 1966 to discuss ways to
improve relationships between their two countries.

Out of these talks came a

joint declaration "to improve the relations between the frontier cities on
the borders of both countries and to elevate the life of those who live in
the Border region." This declaration was followed by an exchange of notes
stating that both countries would establish a joint commission to study
existing border conditions and the steps needed to improve them.

Early

in 1967, almost one year after the President signed the initial declaration,
an executive order, whose contents for some unknown reason were classified,
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was issued creating the U.S. Section of the United States-Mexico Commission
for Border Development and Friendship.

The U.S. section of the Commission

consisted of the relevant assistant secretaries of the Departments of State,
Interior, Health, Education and Welfare, Labor, Commerce, Transportation,
and the Deputy Administrator of the Office of Equal Opportunity under the
direction of a full-time Chairman appointed by the President.

Lacking

legislative authorization, the U.S. section, aka CODAF, was forced to
rely on contributions from other agencies, most notably the Department of
State and the Office of Equal Opportunity (Sargeant Schriver was a great
believer in the program) for staff support and operating expenses.

At the

height of its activity, the U.S. section of CODAF had a full-time complement
of 25 persons most of whom were on detail from participating agencies and an
operating budget of over $500,000.

In 1968, partially because of its general

dislike of the practice of supporting Presidential commissions by transfers
of funds appropriated for other purposes and partially because this particular
commission was one of LBJ's pet projects, Congress severely restricted the
amount of contributions that could be made to suport CODAF.

The administra-

tion thereupon proceeded to seek legislation ratifying its existence and
authorizing direct appropriations to support its work.

In the delibertations

over the form of the authorization, the Chairman unwisely insisted upon a
continuation of his status as a part of the Executive Office of the President.
His stubbornness on this point earned the enmity of the Department of State
and contributed to the failure to obtain the necessary authorizations.

The

Chairman resigned in the spring of 1969 and was replaced by the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

CODAF itself went out of

business at the end of the year due to a lack of funds.
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The story of CODAF has been dealt with at some length because it illustrates perfectly what happens when a well-intentioned Presidential initiative
is left to the tender mercies of the bureaucratic establishment and the
Congress.

As the account shows, these sorts of projects require sustained

Presidential attention and support if they are to survive in the bureaucratic
jungle.

If, in this case, the Chairman had used his time to create a base of

support within the bureaucracy rather than insisting upon his independent
status and if the President's attention had not been diverted by the pressure of other more important matters, CODAF's fate might have been different.
Faced as it was, however, with Presidential indifference, bureaucratic hostility, and Congressional jealousy, its demise was inevitable.
Except for several innovative attempts to improve the coordination of
its disparate elements, which will be discussed in the next section of this
paper, the organization of foreign assistance has remained relatively stable
since the establishment of AID in 1961.

There have, of course, been a number

of structural and procedural changes within AID itself, but these also have
been relatively minor, reflecting changes in the geographical configuration
of its clients, the general international situation and the usual shifts
in emphasis between geographic and functional orientations.

The only serious

attempt at changing the basic structure occurred in 1980 when, largely in
response to pressure from Senator Humphrey and Congressman Zablocki of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, an attempt was made to establish an umbrella
agency, the Internatonal Development Cooperation Agency, to oversee the
activities of AID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the programs
of the State Department involving U.S. particpation, and the newly established
Trade Development Program.

The Agency was also supposed to exert a greater
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influence on the actions of U.S. Representatives on the multilateral development banks and the Food or Peace programs.

Finally it was contemplated that

a new unit, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, would
be established as an additional operating unit to facilitate the transfer of
U.S. technology and scientific knowledge to other nations in the free world.
Needless to say, this rather amb'itious undertaking lived barely long enough
to see the light of day and at present consists only of a small staff dealing
with the trade and development program and a paper organization under the
titular chairmanship of the Administrator of AID.
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Efforts to Improve Coordination
of Latin-American Assistance Programs
As indicated earlier, because of their very nature and the importance
occasionally bestowed upon them, the Latin-American assistance programs have
been the subject of a number of special arrangements designed to produce a
more coordinated U.S. effort.

Several of the more important of these came

into being during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and are discussed
in this section.

Experience gained from these arrangements together with

that provided by the organizational entities discussed in the previous
section will form the basis for the evaluations and recommendations that
follow.
When President Kennedy took office in 1961 he had already expressed an
active interest in Latin American affairs and in fact proposed a specific
approach to improve the quality of life in the countries to the south of our
border.

Even before his inauguration, he had a task force under the chair-

manship of Adolph Berle busy working on the details of that proposal as well
as the general tack he should take in grappling with the problems he foresaw
taking place in this hemisphere.

From an organizational standpoint the task

force got hung up on Berle's view that nothing could be accomplished until
the senior officer in charge of Latin-American affairs in the State Department was elevated to the level of an Under Secretary.

The vacuum created

when this proposal proved unacceptable was eventually filled by an alliance
between a Presidential staff assistant, Ralph Dungan, and the incoming Assis-
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tant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin.

Dungan•s

involvement came about first as a result of his duties with respect to
filling Presidential appointments in AID and other foreign affairs agencies,
and was broadened some time later when he was assigned responsibility for
following developments in Santo Domingo after the assassination of Trujillo.
Martin, who had a background in economic affairs, came to the Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs in the spring of 1962 succeeding Robert Woodward.

The two

men quickly developed a bond of mutual respect that grew into a day-to-day
working relationship that transcended the formal channel of command between
the White House and the Department of State and eventually enabled Martin to
assert many of the pregrogatives Berle had sought for his proposed Under
Secretary.
Early in his tenure, Martin, with Dungan•s blessing, established an
inter-agency committee known as the Latin-American Policy Committee which he
chaired and which consisted of representatives of all of the foreign assistance agencies including the Defense Department.

Originally convened to

assist Martin in the preparation of country policy papers, the group soon
became what was in effect a steering committee for the day-to-day operations
of the member agencies in Latin America.

Under Martin•s tactful but firm

leadership the Committee held regular weekly meetings, kept minutes of its
proceeding, which were distributed within the member agencies, and monitored
the implementation of decisions reached as a result of its deliberations.
Most observers would agree with Martin•s assertion that the LAPC was a most
effective coordinating device.

Its weakness was the fact that its success

rested on Martin•s determination to assert his leadership and the fact that
his relationship with Dungan enabled him to do so.

After the departure of
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the two men, the Committee lost much of its effectiveness and eventually
became part of the SIG-IRG system.
As indicated earlier, the coordination of desperately placed functions
was at times accomplished with varying degrees of success by the simple act
of appointing a single individual to two or more positions of responsibility.
As we have seen, the use of this practice in Latin-American affairs began
with the appointment of Nelson Rockefeller who was already the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs when he was appointed to the position of Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

In the earlier 60s Teodoro

Moscoso held the title of Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress along with
his position as Assistant Administrator of AID for Latin America.

We have

also discussed the successful reign of Douglas Dillon as Director of Mutual
Security and Under Secretary of State and the less successful tenure of Thomas
Mann in the triple posts of Special Assistant to the President for LatinAmerican Affairs, Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, and Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Often these arrangements

reflect last-ditch efforts to paper over deficiencies in organizational
planning.

Moscoso's dual appointments, for example, represented a compromise

between those who wished to establish the Alliance as an independent agency
and those who believed it should be part of AID.

In this instance the

separatists lost, for in practice the title of Coordinator proved to be
virtually meaningless.

Sometimes, as was the case with the Dillon assignment,

the dual assignments did in fact give the incumbent two sets of authorities.
In these instances the practice did provide a mechanism for resolving and
coordinating complimentary but disproportionately placed activities.

However,

as we have seen in the case of the Mann appointments, even in these instances
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effective coordination depended upon the willingness of the incumbent to
wield the power his assignments afforded him.

It would appear from these

experiences that the old maxim that power belongs to those who takes it holds
true and that, by and large, titles mean little unless they are accompanied
by real authority and/or a determination to govern.
Double-hatting of a different sort was used at lower levels in an
attempt to harmonize the economic and political aspects of the Alliance.
These efforts took the form of combining the staffs of the State and AID
country desks under the direction of a single officer who reported to
Ambassador Mann during his tenure and following the dissolution of his
triple assignments to both the Assistant Secretary of State and AID Assistant Administrator.

This latter arrangement proved to be almost unworkable

because of difficulties inherent in having to report to two masters and the
fact that for career purposes members of the combined staffs still belonged
to different systems.
On the procedural front, a major attempt to improve coordination was
undertaken by reviving the country programming process pioneered by IIAA 10
years earlier.

This effort, known as the Comprehensive Country Programming

System, or CCPS for short, took as its points of departure the authority
vested in the Ambassador by the Kennedy letter and the invigorated country
planning process instigated under the auspices of W. W. Rostow, a Presidential
assistant who later became head of the policy planning staff in the Department
of State.

In its simplest terms, the CCPS was an attempt (1) to link the

policy directives produced by the Rostow enterprise to the actions of U.S.
agencies under the command of the U.S. ambassador, and (2) to strengthen
the ambassador•s ability to manage these resources by providing him with
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what were in effect country budgets.

The designers of the system, who came

from the administrative arm of the Department, immediately encountered
two obstacles that plagued the effort from its inception in December of
1962 to its demise in the summer of 1967.

The first of these was that in the

judgment of the program designers the existing agency data bases did not
provide information about agency activities in a form that would enable the
ambassador to conduct an adequate review of agency programs. This led the
group working on the project to embark on a series of independent datacollecting exercises that included a requirement for allocating time spent in
the performance of a long list of activities.

These exercises, which were

eventually conducted in some 35 countries, created a furor within the establishment where they were viewed as attempts to substitute administrative
controls for professional judgments.

The second difficulty resulted from the

designers' contentions the lines of action contained in the policy papers
being turned out of the Rostow enterprise were not expressed in the quantitative terms needed in order to relate to the resources required to carry
them out.

This led the program designers to suggest changes in the contents

of policy papers which was viewed as further intrusion of administrative
types into substantive matters.

Opposition in these two areas, aided and

abetted by the intransigence of the system's designers, contributed heavily
to the decision to abandon the effort in 1967. Unfortunately, the heat
created by these details tended to divert attention from the solution of the
basic problem, namely the coordination of foreign operations in the face of
intense institutional rivalries.
The most recent to establish a U.S. integrated program in Latin America
is the Caribbean Basin Initiative which was conceived in the spring of 1982
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and has been growing ever since.

Essentially the effort consists of a series

of actions agreed to by the governments of Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the
United States to improve the economic status of the countries in the Caribbean
Basin.

The U.S. portion of the program consists of a number of mutually

reinforcing measures in the fields of trade, taxes, and financial assistance
designed to improve the economy of the region.

These measures are being put

into effect under the terms of an Act of Congress entitled the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act which authorizes the President to confer under
certain specified conditions duty-free status for articles imported from
Caribbean Basin countries.

The Act also authorizes other Federal officials

to take additional actions in connection with excise taxes and related
trade matters calculated to assist in the improvement of economic conditions.
At present there is no single point of responsibility for carrying forward
these or other measures being taken as a part of the President's initiative.
Most observers believe that unless and until such a point is established, the
program will have only a marginal impact on conditions in the area.
In the final analysis, all of the experiments described in this section
tend to point up the fact that there is no substitute for well-conceived
organizational strategy based upon sound theory and established principles.
Viewed in this light the actions described above are in effect measures taken
to compensate for the failure to resolve a number of fundamental issues
arising in connection with the inception of the foreign assistance programs
20 years ago.

We will examine the reasons for this failure as well as the

pressures leading to the search for its remedy in the next section.
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Factors Operating For and Against
A Coordinated Approach
Throughout the long history of the foreign assistance effort there have been
factors operating for and against the integration of the various types of
assistance, and at the same time there have been forces operating for and against
the better coordination of the foreign assistance effort with other facets of
foreign affairs particularly those associated with the formulation of foreign
policy.

This section attempts to identify these plus and minus forces and

assess their impact on the development of the overall effort.
Probably the most powerful force operating in favor of a coordinated
approach is the prevailing notion that somehow coordination is good and
uncoordination is somehow bad.

Whether or not this has something to do with

the basic human needs that seem to favor unity over disunity is much too
exotic to be answered here.

What can be asserted, however, is that the

propensity for coordination exists and that it sometimes manifests itself as
a subliminal conviction not susceptible to rational analysis or debate.
Having encountered and occasionally been trapped by this mysterious force,
the author has learned to approach blind assertions of pressing needs for
coordination with a degree of caution bordering on skepticism.

Experience

has shown that it always behooves the organizational planner when faced with
such assertions to ask the essential question:

11

Coordination for what? 11

In

the absence of a cogent answer to this usually unasked question, the planner
is ordinarily better off spending his time on other matters.

This is not
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said in jest but to underline the fact that attempts to inject coordination
into situations where there is not a real community of interest usually end
up being nothing more than a futile exercise.
The history of organizational planning in the field of foreign affairs
suggests that too little attention has been given to identifying those areas
of common interest that require and are susceptible to some degree of coordination and separating such cases from those situations where coordination is
in fact merely a question of organizational and managerial aesthetics.

Put

another way, to be successul an organizational plan for coordinating diverse
activities must meet the test of felt needs.

The situation with respect to

U.S. efforts in Central America seems to satisfy this requirement.
A second factor favoring coordination is the desire of persons in authority to affix responsibility.

The major cause of Presidential dissatisfaction

with the management of foreign affairs comes from the President's inability
to (a) find someone with enough authority to carry out his orders, and (b)
find someone to blame when things go wrong.

These kinds of frustrations are

typical in organizations where there are no clear lines of authority and
where responsibility for actions is widely shared.

The natural tendency in

these situations is to plead for more coordination even when a more sensible
solution might be a realignment of responsibilities.

This is not to suggest

that it is possible in all instances to design organizations in which there
are clearly defined lines of authority and fixed points of responsibility.
Indeed, the complexity of modern life has led to a complete re-evaluation of
orthodox theories with respect to these matters.

More and more planners have

come to look upon organizations as holding ponds of relevant skills and energies
that can be arranged in an infinite variety of groupings to accomplish tasks
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necessary to achieve the organization's objective.

The mechanism for managing

activity in these organizations is the program, a document stipulating the
combination of resources needed to accomplish the tasks that over time will
achieve the desired objectives.

More will be said about this approach to

management in the final section of this paper.
A third factor in favor of coordination is a desire on the part of each
of the participants in a potentially related activity to know what each other
is doing.

This desire seems to spring from a natural tendency on the part of

an individual to understand the relationship of his part of the action to the
whole.

A somewhat related psychological force is the sense of well-being that

comes from participation in any form of group activity.
is called team spirit.

In sports this force

These two items--the desire for information and the

sense of participation derived from group activity-- ranked first and second
on a list of forces leading to collaborative behavior in study of the operations of the Brazil "country team" in Washington done during the middle 60s.
This study also showed isolation and the withholding of information among
participants to be powerful deterrents to the collaborative process.
A fourth factor favoring the establishment of coordinating devices is
a clear sense of urgency.

Some of the examples previously noted have come

about as a result of a real or perceived crisis.

Others stem from a sense of

urgency engendered by the President or some other highly influential individual.

Experience shows, however, that while the creation of a sense of

urgency may facilitate the initial establishment of coordinating mechanisms,
sustained efforts are required to keep them in operation.

Many times such

efforts are not desirable since the need for coordination may disappear as
the crisis subsides.
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Turning to the factors operating against coordination one would certainly
start with the related forces associated with institutional rivalry and the
protection of one's turf.

In foreign affairs these two factors have been a

constant and powerful source of dissension and disunity since the emergence
of the foreign assistance programs in the middle 40s.

As we have seen, the

seeds for this discord were probably sowed when the decision was made to
locate responsibility for the Marshall Plan in the Executive Office of the
President.

To some extent this action was foreshadowed by the establishment

of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs when it promptly
staked out its own turf in Latin America and thereby laid the groundwork for
subsequent battle between the apolitical technical experts of the IIAA and
the ever-cautious diplomats of the State Department.

However, Mr. Rocke-

feller's backyard enterprise did not have anything near the impact of the
Marshall Plan which placed a highly visible intruder on the hallowed grounds
of Europe and which started the clash between long-term economic development
and short-run political considerations.
There were plenty of reasons for not assigning the economic recovery
program to the State Department.

For one thing, as originally conceived, the

effort was regarded as temporary in nature.

Second, once the basic decisions

had been made, it was relatively free of political overtones.

Third, it

required an expertise not then available within State and which would have
been difficult to recruit under the Department's personnel system.

Given

these circumstances the establishment of a new agency equipped with a new set
of administration procedures tailored to getting its mission accomplished
quickly seemed to make a lot of sense.

One wonders, however, what the future

would have been had the job been turned over to the State Department.

Would

399.

the distinctions between the objectives of economic development and the
political considerations necessarily involved in their achievement been as
sharp?

Would the technical assistance programs, had they also been assigned

to the State Department, been as successful in avoiding the problems involved
in developing viable political institutions?

Would the diplomatic community

become more proficient in the use of various new tools of diplomacy? We can
only speculate on the answers to these and many other questions.

We can,

however, feel fairly secure in assuming that many of the impediments to
harmonious relations among the agencies engaged in the conduct of foreign
affairs would have been avoided and the need for special coordination devices
would never have arisen.
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Alternatives and Recommendations
In presenting a paper such as this, it is usual to conclude by presenting
a number of alternative courses of action, ordinarily three, two of which are
strawmen and one of which represents the author's preference.

This paper

departs from this practice only to the extent that the author will make his
preference known and will attempt to explain the reasons for his choice.
The foregoing material suggests three models worthy of the Commission's
consideration.

They are:

o An independent agency with full operating authority to
undertake such programs as the Commission or its successor
sees fit to recommend to the President and the Congress sees
fit to approve.
Following the example of the Mutual Security agency, this agency would
have cognizance over all operations normally associated with conduct of
foreign affairs with the exception of command military forces and the formal
conduct of diplomatic relations.

The agency would be authorized to engage

in these operations itself or to enter into agreements with other public and/
or private institutions for their performance.

In addition, the agency

would have the administrative authority to hire, fire, contract, purchase,
or transfer persons, goods and services as required to carry out its mission.
o The appointment of a special assistant to the President to
oversee a multi-agency initiative.
Under this model, operating authority would remain with the agency
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responsible for performing the activities to be included in the President's
initiative.

Requests for such additional funding as may be required to carry

out these activities would be developed and packaged by the special assistant
for inclusion in that agencies' appropriations for expenditure under the
agency's existing legislative authority.
o A special office reporting to the President to manage
a Presidential program authorized by an Act of Congress
and funded by appropriations made to the President.
Following the example of the Director of Mutual Security, the head of
this office would supervise the allocation and use of special authorities
granted to the President and redelegated to the several agencies engaged in
the conduct of foreign affairs.

The President would seek standby authority

to establish such additional institutions as deemed necessary on the understanding that such authority would only be used if it was determined that a
task could not be performed by an existing organization.
Obviously, the final choice of an instrument to carry out the Commission's
recommendations depends in large part upon the nature of those recommendations.
All other things being equal, the author's preference is for the third alternative.

It embodies the best features of what most observers believe to be the

most effective arrangement devised thus far for the management of foreign
affairs programs. It makes full use of the President's prestige at home and
abroad, and by so doing enhances the chances of securing necessary authorizations from the Congress.

It provides a single point of responsibility

with sufficent power to make things happen.

It is extremely flexible, permit-

ting rapid changes in the configuration of agency participation.

And, best

of all, it is relatively easy to install and, once the program is developed,
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comparatively simple to operate.
Certain obvious candidates have been omitted from the list of alternatives
presented above.

The most notable of these is the establishment of a quasi-

governmental corporation such as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs and
contemporary versions of the servicios created to carry out the Institute•s
operations in the field.

The reasons for this omission is not a reflection

on the contributions these institutions made during the period of their
existence, but rather a considered judgment on the part of the author concerning their appropriateness at this time.

In the case of the Institute itself,

the authorizations necessary to create a similar organization today would not
be forthcoming from this or any other Congress. Furthermore, even if the
Congress were to charter a government corporation for the purposes contemplated, its operations under current law would be considerably more circumspect
than was the situation during the days of the IIAA.
With respect to the servicios the author admits to a strong bias against
devices designed to remove public businesses from the political process.

More-

over, given the current situation in parts of Central America, it would appear
to be extremely risky to set in motion a program of semi-autonomous locally
run entities to deal with existing economic problems in that part of the world.
In short, if there was a time for the Institute and the servicios that time
is passed.
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OUTLINE OF A MEDIUM TERM U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY
FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
by
M. Haris Jafri
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to sketch an outline
of a medium-term u.s. economic policy toward Central America,
in the form of answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 15 and 17, of
this questionnaire entitled "Questions on Central America".
The recommendations cover the "problem" countries - Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.
2.
Since the economic problems of these four countries are
quite similar, the recommendations are expressed in regional
terms at this stage.
However, differences do exist among these
countries and specific country-by-country recommendations would
be presented shortly.
3.

Questions 1, 2 and 3.

a) U.S. Interests in Central America: Apart from national
security considerations, the u.s. has an important economic
stake in Central America in terms of its exports to, and
investments in, the region. Most of the exports of Central
America find their market in the u.s. and the region obtains
the bulk of its imports from the u.s.
The u.s. is the source
of most of the investment and trade financing received by the
region.
Thus, Central America is economically dependent on the
u.s. - a factor of great political importance.
b) Recent Economic Performance in Central America:
The
preservation of the close economic (and hence political) ties
between the u.s. and Central America calls for sustained
economic development of the region.
In fact, the region has
retrogressed economically since 1979, largely as a result of
higher oil prices, worldwide recession, high interest rates and
political instability in the region. With the decline in world
demand, the region's export earnings fell because of lower
export prices while it had to pay a steeply increased oil
import bill. Higher interest rates increased the burden of
external debt service.
Instead of net capital inflow on which
the region had been so dependent traditionally, there was a net
outflow of capital, particularly bank and private sector
capital, during this period. All these factors aggravated the
weakness in the balance of payments of the region, which
consequently reduced the rate of economic growth.
The u.s. can
play a crucial role in stimulating the economic growth of these
countries in the short run through a well-conceived program of
increased balance of payments assistance.
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c) Constraints on growth in Central America: Apart from
intensified balance of payments pressures which have
constricted the economic development of Central America in
recent years, there are numerous institutional, structural,
administrative and financial shortcomings that continue to
inhibit sustained growth. The more important of these
inhibitions are:
i) Political instability, civil war, a pervading
sense of insecurity.
ii) Outmoded and inefficient systems of land tenure.
Firm and gradual implementation of well-conceived land reform
measures (particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala), designed
to improve land utilization while reducing the concentration of
land ownership, is a political and economic imperative.
iii) Perhaps the most serious deficiency, given the
important role of the public sector (the government and the
state enterprises) in development, is in the field of public
administration. The administrative weaknesses are pervasive
and are related to laws, organization, procedures and
personnel. As a result, day-to-day administration involves
waste and delays; project preparation and formulation is
inadequate;
the utilization of available foreign aid funds is
slow; there are large deficits in the government budget and in
the financial performance of state enterprises. These
deficits, besides having an adverse impact on the monetary
situation and the balance of payments, make it impossible for
these countries to provide the domestic counterpart funds
necessary for the utilization of foreign aid.
iv) All these countries have large budget deficits
which accentuate inflationary pressures and balance of payments
problems. In all these countries, changes in tax laws and
improvements in tax administration are needed to increase the
flow of tax revenues, while determined efforts have to be made
to control the growth of current expenditures.
v)
Similarly, the deficits of t~e state enterprises
(which ultimately impinge on the budget) require more realistic
pricing policies (to increase revenue) and measures to control
current expenditures.
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vi)
Inflation is a serious problem in all of these
countries and its control must have a high priority. At
present, given the large budget deficits, the burden of
fighting inflation falls unduly on monetary policy.
vii)
There is room for improvement in monetary policy
through a more efficient use of monetary instruments.
In
particular, realistic interest rate and exchange rate policies
have to be pursued consistently, in order to achieve and
maintain domestic and external monetary equilibrium.
viii) To achieve greater flexibility in the pursuit of
monetary policy objectives and to promote a more efficient
mobilization of domestic savings, it is necessary in these
countries to bring about changes in banking structures and
banking practices.
n1is can largely be achieved by actions of
the monetary authorities (central banks) but, in some cases,
changes in banking laws would be needed.
ix)
As for (nonbank) development finance
institutions, the countries of the region are well-endowed with
such institutions, both public and private.
Instead of the
creation of more institutions of this kind, some amalgamation
and consolidation is in order, so as to have fewer but more
efficient institutions. This will also lead to better
utilization of the relatively scarce technical personnel.
x)
The economic planning agencies in all these
countries need thorough reorganization and reorientation.
Emphasis has to be shifted from ambitious long-range plans to
realistic short and medium-term plans - plans that are better
tailored to resource endowments and financial constraints. An
appropriate balance has to be struck between investments in
infrastructure and quick-yielding projects. Given the level of
economic development of the region and its geography, an
outward-looking export-oriented strategy would serve better
than one oriented towards import substitution. While the
involvement of the public sector would continue to be
significant, every effort must be made to promote private
sector production and investment. To this end, planning and
development policies have to be attuned to the working of the
price mechanism and not to run counter to it. Hence the need
for economic pricing for agriculture and for the products and
services of state enterprises, market-related interest rates,
and realistic exchange rates to provide a stimulus for the
sustained growth of exports of the region.
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d) u.s. Policies towards Central America:
The basic
ingredients of a medium-term u.s. economic policy towards
Central America are:
i)
Sustained economic recovery in the u.s. and lower
interest rates.
This would, in itself, stimulate Central
American exports, reduce the debt service burden and promote
U.S. private investment in the region.
ii) The overall strategy should be to assist the
governments of the region to place greater reliance on private
initiative and the working of market forces in the development
process (see 3.c.x. above), particularly in view of the sad
state of public finances in all these countries (see 3.c.iv.
above).
iii) The measures included in the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) are a welcome first step towards the promotion
of u.s. trade with, and investment in, the region.
iv) Given the political and security stakes involved,
an expanded program of u.s. economic aid to the region, mostly
on concessional terms (grants and "soft" loans) must form part
of the medium-term policy.
It is important that the increased
aid be. "tied" (in a politically acceptable way) to self-help
measures to be implemented by these countries in the areas
mentioned in 3(c) above.
(This does not preclude the
possibility of some of this aid being given on purely political
grounds or under emergency conditions.)
The "tying" of aid to
performance would apply to both components of aid - balance of
payments support and project aid - with different types of
conditionality. Hence, there is a close link between economic
aid (financial assistance) and technical assistance (see 3.d.v.
below).
v)
The most important ingredient of medium-term
policy is a vastly expanded program of tedhnical assistance.
Technical assistance is needed not only for the effective
utilization of available foreign aid but across-the-board in
all the areas mentioned in (c) above.
In the light of my
experience in Central America, technical assistance has to go
beyond training, advice and reports, and must involve close
supervision and follow-up ("leading by the hand") from the
beginning of a task to its conclusion, given the present state
of organization and administration in the region.
For such an
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undertaking, the human resources of the u.s. Government alone
would not be enough; the vast array of talent at the disposal
of the u.s. private sector would have to be mobilized. By way
of example, I may mention the work of Presidential Agricultural
Mission in Honduras in 1982 or that of the International
Executive Service Corps (IESC).
I was able to help IESC
establish an office and begin large-scale operations in
Honduras in 1982.
vi) A major objective of u.s. policy is to work
towards a reduction of the glaring inequalities in income
distribution in Central America (which breed discontent).
However, apart from the political and economic imperative of
land reform (see 3.c.ii above), any drastic measures of income
redistribution would, at this stage, be counter-productive
because they would discourage private saving and investment in
the short run and thus reduce economic growth.
If economic
growth can be sustained through the policies outlined in this
memorandum, income inequalities would gradually be reduced
partly through the application of tax measures but largely
through the creation of new jobs and improvements in nutrition,
health, education and housing.
4.

Questions 4, 15. and 17

a) The adverse impact of the international economic and
financial crisis on the economic growth of Central America
since 1979, has been mentioned in 3(b). With the deep
involvement of international (IMF, World Bank, IDB), and
regional (BCIE) financial institutions in Central America, no
new institutional arrangements or emergency IMF or World Bank
programs are needed. However, improvements are possible in two
areas. First, with respect to the IMF standards of
conditionality, it may be recalled that the standards have been
more rigorously applied (in practice) since 1981 at the strong
urging of the Reagan Administration. The u.s. Executive
Director in the IMF Executive Board can now urge some
relaxation (in practice) of the IMF standards of conditionality
for Central Amrica. Second, the IDB is currently heading the
inter-agency Consultative Group for Central America. The work
of this Group needs to be expedited, made more concrete and
focused more on the short run.
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b) The EEC countries and Japan (particularly Japan) have
increased their aid programs for Central America in recent
years. The u.s. may try to persuade these countries to step up
their aid further.
5.

Further Work

Concrete recommendations will be submitted shortly in the
areas indicated in 3(b) and 3(c), with specific ones for each
of the four countries - Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and
Honduras.
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HONDURAS - Policy Measures in Selected Areas

1.

Land Reform (3.C.ii of my October 18 memorandum)

Concentration of land ownership is not a matter of serious
concern at this time, thanks to the implementation of a land
reform program initiated in the mid-seventies.
The main thrust
of this program is sound -- to offer some degree of security of
tenure to the tillers of the soil and to provide land to the
landless by bringing new land under cultivation. However, the
implementation of the program has encountered difficulties
because of serious shortcomings in the administrative capacity
of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INA), the agency
mainly responsible for the implementation of the land reform
program (see "2.
Public Administration" below).
For the
development of the agricultural sector, there are problems
related to production, marketing and pricing policies which
need more urgent attention at this time than land reform (as
analyzed in the best study on this subject:
the report of the
1982 u.s. Presidential Agricultural Mission for Honduras).
2.

Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum)

a.
In the case of most central government agencies and
those of the rest of the public sector, the administrative
shortcomings have been clearly identified, and solutions
specified, in reports prepared by foreign experts. However,
action on the recommendations has been slow or non-existent,
even though some of these reports are several years old. The
shortcomings stem from weak or incompetent leadership at the
top and are compounded by a scarcity of capable personnel at
the middle levels.
It is a very common experience that
decision making, even on simple matters, is delayed for no
apparent reason except just plain inertia.
b.
The efficient functioning of these agencies is, in many
cases, also hampered by antiquated or poorly drafted laws,
defects in organizational structure, and faulty procedures.
Examples of deficient laws are the Mining Code, the Income Tax
law, the Customs law, and the Public Credit law. Among the
examples of poor organization are the National Planning Council
(CONSUPLANE), the National Industrial Development Corporation
(CONADI), the Water and Sewer Agency (SANAA) and the Forestry
Development Corporation (COHDEFOR).
Examples of faulty
procedures are those for Customs appraisal, for determining
income tax and sales tax liability, and for approval of
purchase orders relative to projects financed with foreign
credits.
·
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c.
Administrative weaknesses plague routine government
work as well as the formulation and implementation of projects,
leading to increased expenditures; the same weaknesses also
reduce the flow of revenues. Hence, the deficits in the
government budget and in the financial performance of the state
enterprises are larger than they otherwise would be.
d.
Equally harmful consequences can be observed in various
phases of the life-cycle of many projects, particularly in
terms of the wasteful utilization of foreign credits. The
construction of a new cement plant at Bijao (Cementos de
Honduras) is a prime example of economic waste. More than $100
million in foreign credits have been invested in the plant
which is still incomplete.
If the plant is completed (at the
cost of another $40 million), there would be substantial excess
capacity and the surplus can be exported only at a significant
loss, given the costs of production. The new sawmill in
Olancha (partially completed), financed with large foreign
credits, is a similar example. Given the constraints on the
availability of lumber and the level of expected final demand,
the sawmill would have to operate below capacity and at a loss
for an indefinite period.
The near fiasco of the new port,
Puerto Castilla (also financed with foreign credits), is due to
poor supervision during construction, which has led to a still
unresolved dispute between the Honduran Government and the
contractors, with OPIC in the middle. Apart from these
examples of clear economic waste, administrative weaknesses
lead to delays in various stages of project execution -purchase orders, work orders under contracts already signed,
assignment of domestic and foreign technical personnel
(including unexplained transfers and dismissals), and
implementation of recommendations of technical experts.
Another serious problem is default on scheduled external debt
service (including some u.s Government loans), often involving
small amounts, because of administrative neglect (aside from
the question of scarcity of foreign exchange).
e. The following is a list of ministries, government
agencies and state enterprises with major administrative
weaknesses: Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Economy; Ministry
of Natural Resources; National Planning council (CONSUPLANE);
National Agricultural Development Bank (BANADESA); National
Housing Finance Company (FINAVI); National Housing Institute
(INVA); National Port Authority (ENP); Forestry Development
Corporation (COHDEFOR); Water and sewer Agency (SANAA);
Agricultural Marketing Institute (IHMA); Social Security
Institute (IHSS); Banana Corporation (COHBANA); Coffee
Institute (IHCAFE); National Food Purchasing Institute
(BANASUPRO); and National Agrarian Reform Institute (INA).
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3.

Technical Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum)

a. Assistance related to projects. At present, most
project financing in Honduras by u.s. and other governments and
by international agencies is linked to some kind of technical
assistance. The main problem is that, while the solutions are
evident in many cases and have been clearly identified in the
reports of technical experts, these recommendations are not
acted upon for various reasons, mostly through inertia. Apart
from persistent "suasion" or "pressure" by lenders (including
slowing down or stopping future disbursements on existing
loans), it would be very useful if the lenders assign one
high-level "expert" (or several depending on the size of the
project) for each project with executive responsibilities.
This "expert" would work with the national authorities in
assigning priorities among the recommendations of the technical
experts and closely following up action ("leading by the hand")
on the recommendations (from the beginning of a task to its
conclusion, if necessary).
It is my experience that a good,
on-the-spot "expert" can prove to be very effective.
Fortunately, the Ministry of Public Works, which is responsible
for the execution of many public sector projects, has good
leadership and is the strongest ministry in administrative
terms.
·
b.
Assistance for general administrative improvement: The
correction of the pervasive administrative weaknesses is a
time-consuming process, needing determined efforts over time.
However, significant improvement in the short run can be
expected from the following actions:
i.
Short (4-6 weeks) training programs in the u.s.
or in Honduras for groups of middle-level officials in the
weakest agencies.
These programs must be tailored to the
specific problems of the agency concerned.
ii.
As in the case of project assistance, the
assignment of one (or several, if need be) high-level "expert"
with executive responsibilities would be very productive.
Again as in the case of projects, reports of technical experts
are available on most of the pressing administrative problems.
The problem is implementation. This "expert" would work with
the national authorities in assigning priorities among the
recommendations and closely following up action on the
recommendations (from the beginning of a task to its
conclusion, if necessary).
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c.

Implementation of the above.

i.
The above recommendations involve a large
expansion of the existing technical assistance programs and the
human resources at the disposal of the u.s. Government alone
would not be enough.
Every effort has to be made to mobilize
the vast array of talent available in the u.s. private sector
-- universities, foundations, other non-profit institutions and
corporations -- in this undertaking.
ii. Coordination with the technical assistance
programs of other governments and of international agencies,
whose activity is substantial in this field, is essential to
avoid overlapping.
Instances of such duplication have not been
rare in Honduras.
iii. The local USAID Mission would have the primary
responsibility for identifying the needs for short training
programs and for high-level "experts," as well as for
coordination with the technical assistance programs of other
governments and international agencies.
4.

Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum)

The large deficits in the government budget and in the
financial performance of the state enterprises (which, in turn,
affect the government budget), accentuate inflationary
pressures and balance of payments problems and make it
impossible for Honduras to provide the domestic counterpart
funds necessary for the utilization of foreign aid.
Changes in
tax laws, improvements in tax administration, and more
realistic pricing policies, are needed to increase the flow of
avenues, while determined efforts have to be made to control
the growth of current expenditures.
a. Tax laws: There is a voluminous amount of material
available in Honduras consisting of tax reform recommendations
made by international experts - the problem as usual is that of
implementation.
In early 1982, an IMF tax expert made some
recommendations for changes in income tax and sales tax laws focused on some urgent problems and for immediate
implementation.
Some of the recommendations (which were made
prior conditions for the IMF standby) have been implemented but
others are pending.
In late 1982, an IMF Customs expert made
recommendations for changes in the Customs law; l~gislation was
presented to the National Congress towards the end of 1982 (a
prior condition under the IMF standby), but nothing has
happened since. The following changes in tax laws are
necessary in the medium term in order to increase the
elasticity, and buoyancy of the tax structure:
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i.
Income tax.
Exemption of lower income brackets;
elimination of a large number of economically meaningless tax
exemptions (102 different laws give tax exemptions); changing
the present flat income tax rate for individuals and
corporations to a progressive tax for different brackets of
individual income and a different flat rate for corporations; a
new law consolidating tax exemptions and giving economically
meaningful tax incentives.
ii.
Sales, excise and consumption taxes.
Increasing
the coverage to include many products and services not at
present covered; increasing the sales tax rate to the general
Central American level; increasing the excise tax on alcoholic
and other beverages, on gasoline and on automobiles.
A new consumption tax on luxury goods was introduced in
1982, but it was a drastically watered down version of the tax
recommended.
The law should be amended to enact the original
recommendations.
iii. Customs tariff. The present customs tariff is
20 years old and is a mixture of specific and ad valorem
rates. The law submitted to the National Congress in 1982
combined the specific and ad valorem rates into new ad valorem
rates, adjusted for the inflation of the past 20 year~ for
different categories of imports.
Enactment of this law is of
high priority.
b.
Tax administration.
In recent years, the tax
collection efforts became very lax and tax evasion (or plain
non-payment of taxes) greatly increase.
Some tax
administration measures were enacted in 1982, including a very
important one -- a steep increase in the penalties for late
payment of all taxes.
However, the collection of these
penalties has been very lethargic so far.
Also, the
adjudication of disputed tax payments takes a long time and, in
the meantime, the taxpayer gets away with non-payment.
In
1982, tax experts from the IMF as well as the IRS recommended
measures to improve tax administration.
The following is the
agenda for action in the near future:
Collecting the legal penalties for late payment of taxes;
streamlining the system for adjudication of tax payments;
compiling a register of taxpayers; strengthening the Customs
appraisal office; issuing a tax payment certificate and making
it a requirement before a taxpayer can receive any kind of
government services (passport, licenses), bank credit and
foreign exchange.
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c.
Pricing policies for state enterprises.
In 1982, there
were rate increases for electricity, port services and water
(prior conditions for the IMF Standby), but they were well
below the recommended levels. This process should continue, in
line with the principle of economic pricing for the services of
state enterprises.
d.
Expenditure control.
In 1982, serious efforts were
initiated by the Budget Bureau (DGP) to control current
expenditures, thanks largely to the personality and competence
of the present incumbent (who enjoys high-level political
support so far).
These efforts have to be continued,
including: further improvement of information systems;
institutionalizing the control of DGP (which is, at present,
largely personal) through the enactment of a law which has been
drafted but whose presentation to the National Congress has
been repeatedly delayed; clear demarcation of checkpoints for
control of current expenditures; strengthening, through
technical assistance, of the newly-established section in the
DGP for asserting effective DGP control over the expenditures
of the state enterprises; enactment of the Public Credit Law
(drafted but presentation to the National Congress repeatedly
postponed) designed to prevent indiscriminate contracting of
foreign credits by state enterprises.
5.

Domestic financial system (3.c.vii and viii of my
October 18 memorandum)

a) With respect to the banking system, the main areas of
action are:
i. Greater flexibility in interest rates.
The
Central Bank maintains fixed interest rates which are not low
at present but are discretionary.
It would be better to have
greater movement in interest rates in line with specified
domestic and international indicators.
Also, some interest
rates, such as on loans to the agricultural sector, are fixed
at low levels, which effectively discourage the flow of bank
credit to those areas.
11.
The enforcement of legal reserve requirements by
the central Bank is not immune from charges of favoritism.
Also, the penalty for legal reserve deficiencies is rather mild
and needs to be increased greatly.
However, this would need an
amendment of the Central Bank law.
111.
The domestic banking system is branching out
into trust instruments, money market instruments and ownership
of "financieras" and holding companies.
The banking law is old
and has not kept pace with these developments. As a result,

.
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these new activities are unregulated and abuses have come to
light. A new draft of the banking law has been prepared but,
for political reasons, there are little prospects of its being
presented to the National Congress.
iv. The bank supervision function of the Central
Bank needs considerable improvement. At present, the Central
Bank has an IMF adviser in this field but, after his departure,
further technical assistance from the FED or FDIC would be
needed.
b. The main problem area is that of non-bank financial
intermediaries, particularly official development finance
institutions.
In some countries of the Third World, there have
been instances of the failure of one such initiative but the
·
successor institution has done well.
In Honduras the process
seems unending.
First, there was the National Development Bank
(BANAFOM) which failed.
Its successor institution, BANFINAN,
went bankrupt.
Now the successor institutions of BANFINAN,
viz., CONADI and BANADESA are on the verge of failure.
All
these failures have been for the same reasons, all the mistakes
in the book, viz., corruption, political influence, technically
bad loans and utilization of short-term, high-interest foreign
credits to finance domestic long-term loans (on which the
borrowers do not meet debt service payments). Several
international agencies, including the World Bank, are currently
trying to save CONADI, but the Honduran government has been
very slow in taking promised actions.
CONADI is virtually
bankrupt and BANADESA and FINAVI are in a weak financial
position.
Concrete recommendations by international experts on
all these institutions are in the hands of the government -all that is needed is implementation.
IMF conditionality (4a of my memorandum of 10/18/83)
Wh1le the analytical framework underlying IMF
recommendations has remained the same in recent years, the IMF
standards of conditionality have, in practice, been more
rigorously applied since 1981 at the strong urging of the
Reagan Administration.
It is, however, true that the same
analytical framework permits some flexibility in the setting of
the key targets.
Much depends on the assumptions made and
nobody can deny that the assumptions made by IMF missions have
sometimes proved erroneous.
Hence, the u.s. Executive Director
in the IMF Executive Board can now urge some de facto
relaxation of the IMF standards of conditionality as applied to
Central America.
However, with this relaxation, the IMF must
make it clear that it would be very strict in its appraisal of
the "performance criteria," in order to avoid the "patching up"
that is a common feature of successive standby programs.
6.
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7.

u.s. Trade policies toward Central America (3d.iii of my
October 18 memorandum)

The measures included in the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(C.B.I.) represent useful first steps to help the region.
Further measures that may be considered are: (a) a closer
association, short of a common market, giving preferential
access in the u.s. market to Central American exports. A
pattern could be the relation between France and its former
African colonies, such as the Lome Convention; (b) the u.s.
could study the feasibility of providing additional
compensatory financing for central America, which may be linked
with or independent of the IMF Compensatory Financing
Facility.
However, in view of the difficulties encountered by
the modest C.I.B. measures in the u.s. Congress, it is doubtful
if a study of additional measures would be worthwhile.
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COSTA RICA - MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS
l.

Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum)

Given its democratic traditions, the system of land tenure
in Costa Rica has evolved as the most equitable one in Central
America.
Costa Rican agriculture is dominated by large-scale
commercial farming for domestic consumption and exports.
Medium and small-scale farming needs a strengthening of the
existing programs of the provision of extension services and
the channeling of bank credit.
In the medium term, a system of
rural cooperatives should be established to improve the
economic functioning of very small farms.
2.

Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum)

a.
Public administration in Costa Rica is the most
efficient of the four Central American countries covered in
this study.
However, administrative shortcomings of the kind
mentioned in the case of Honduras do exist in Costa Rica,
although to a lesser extent.
b. The ministries, government agencies and state
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are: Ministry
of Planning; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Commerce and
Industry; Social Security Institute (CCSS); Petroleum Refinery
(RECOPE); Electricity Institute (ICE); Development Corporation
(CODESA); and National Production Council (CNP).
3.

Technial Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum)

a. Assistance related to projects: Same recommendations
as in the case of Honduras, except that the need for high-level
"experts" with executive responsibilites is much less.
Technical assistance related to externally financed projects
has made a vital contribution and should be continued and
amplified. The Ministry of Public Works, responsible for the
execution of most public sector projects, has performed quite
effectively.
b. Assistance for general adminitrative improvement:
Same
recommendations as in the case of Honduras, except that the
need for high-level "experts" with executive responsibilities
is much less. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the
Development Corporation (CODESA) and the National Production
Council (CNP) need the assignment of such high-level experts.
Short (4-6 weeks) training programs for middle-level officials
would be of great benefit to all the agencies menioned above.
4.

Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum)

Large deficits in the government budget and in the
financial performance of the state enterprises (which, in turn,
affect the government budget) were the prime factors underlying
the high rates of inflation and severe balance of payments
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problems experienced by Costa Rica during the period 1978-82.
Determined fiscal adjustment measures were taken in 1982,
including increased taxes, improvements in tax administration,
higher prices for the services of state enterprises and tighter
expenditure control. Further efforts are needed.
a. Tax laws: The main emphasis in the short run should be
on maintaining the higher tax rates introduced in 1982, in the
face of pressures for tax reduction. A medium-term program
should have the following ingredients:
income tax reduction by
decreasing the present steep progressivity of individual income
taxes and replacing the present steeply progressive corporate
tax rates by a flat rate; elimination of many existing income
tax exemptions and consolidation of the remaining exemptions,
in order to compensate for the revenue loss from the proposed
reductions in income tax rates; replacing the present
single-stage sales tax by a value-added tax; simplification and
consolidation of the large number of existing consumption and
excise taxes; changing the customs classification from the
NAUCA to the Brussels classification and replacing the present
specific and ad valorem rates by ad valorem rates; reduction of
export taxes.
b. Tax administration: The efforts, seriously initiated
in 1982, to improve tax administration should be vigorously
pursued over the medium term, particulalry in the areas of
income tax and customs duties. The proposed USAID technical
assistance in these two fields should be quite valuable and
should be implemented forthwith.
c.
Pricing policies for state enterprises: As in the case
of tax laws, the main emphasis in the short run should be on
maintaining the higher prices introduced in 1982 for the
services provided by state enterprises, in the face of
resistance to the increased tariffs.
In fact, in mid-1983,
electricity rates and the prices of petroleum derivatives
(other than gasoline) were reduced. Over the medium term, firm
adherence to the principle of economic pricing (adjust prices
in line with costs, for example, raising the prices of
petroleum derivatives in the case of an increase in the price
of imported crude) would be essential.
d.
Expenditure control: Measures of expenditure
restraint, initiated in 1982, should continue to be implemented
steadily over the medium term. The areas needing special
attention are: further improvement of information systems;
clear demarcation of checkpoints for control of current
expenditures; and the creation of a corps of trained Budgetary
Authority representatives to monitor the budget execution of
the agencies and enterprises. To this end, it is necessary to
provide technical assistance to the newly-established Budgetary
Authority and the Presidential Commission for the Reduction of
Public Expenditures, so that they may effectivey exercise their
functions.
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5.

Domestic Financial system (3.c.vii and viii of my October 18
memorandum)

a.
The domestic financial system of Costa Rica is
relatively developed and is adequately equipped to perform the
function of mobilization of financial resources. The factors
that inhibited financial savings during the period 1977-82 were
broader in scope -- such as "the Central American situation"
and the worsening of Costa Rica's credit-worthiness abroad as a
result of high inflation (82 percent increase in consumer
prices in 1982) and large balance of payments deficit (a loss
of $279 million of net international reserves in the two years
1980 and 1981). As a result of monetary, fiscal and exchange
policy measures implemented in 1982 and 1983, substantial
progress has been made in reducing inflation, the payments
deficit has turned into a surplus, and domestic savings have
begun to be mobilized.
b. To consolidate the gains in the monetary sphere, the
above policies have to be steadily followed over the medium
term. The recent reduction in interest rates is a matter of
some concern.
It is important that positive real interest
rates are maintained in order to provide a continuing stimulus
to the mobilization of savings.
c. As for non-bank financial intermediaries, the main
problem is the deficit of the Development Corporation (CODESA),
which has to be financed by the Central Bank. The Government
has decided to sell some of the enterprises controlled by
CODESA, but progress has been slow. This decision should be
implemented as soon as possible.
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EL SALVADOR - POLICY MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS
1.

An Overview (3.b of my October 18 memorandum)

Of the factors adversely affecting the economic growth of
Central America since 1979 (as outlined in Section 3.b of my
October 18 memorandum), the crucial negative factor in the case
of El Salvador during this period has been guerrilla warfare
and economic sabotage.
As a result, it is unrealistic to
discuss medium-term economic policies amidst the pervading
uncertainty~ most economic policy actions have to "hold the
line" as much as possible -- to keep up production and the
implementation of at least some developmment projects, to
repair the damage from economic sabotage, to restrain inflation
and to contain the balance of payments deficit.
In the case of
the public sector, the short-term priorities would be to
improve efficiency and to limit the budget deficit and the
deficits of the state enterprises.
In the case of the private
sector, agriculture and large-scale manufacturing have been
hard hit by the armed conflict and revival of production and
investment is not to be expected in the foreseeable future;
however, the remarkable dynamism of the Salvadoran private
sector is manifested in the mushrooming of medium and
small-scale production, much of which has not yet been
quantified statistically.
2.

Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum)

a.
The concentration of wealth and land ownership in the
hands of a few families has been a prime factor behind the
turmoil in El Salvador. Thus, meaningful land reform is a
political and economic imperative in El Salvador, especially
since many of the large land holdings have been utilized
inefficiently.
b.
The present regime drew up a land reform program and
has so far implemented Phase I (expropriation of holdings over
500 hectares) and Phase III (distribution of expropriated land
to tenant farmers renting the land). Phase I affected about 17
percent of total agricultural land; the expropriated land
produced more than half the sugar cane and about two-fifths of
the cotton crops.
Some 30,000 farmers (some eight percent of
farm families, two-thirds of which were organized in
cooperatives), were the beneficiaries of Phase III, receiving
about 1.7 hectares on the average.
Phase II (expropriation of
properties of 100 to 500 hectares) of the program has yet to be
implemented.
c. The implementation of even Phases I and III has
suffered from a lack of strong political will. The still
powerful oligarchy has done its utmost to disrupt the program,
including harassment of the new owners and land reform
officials and technicians, and attempts by former owners to
regain possession of the expropriated land.
The government has
seemed unwilling or unable effectively to counteract these
disruptive activities.
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d.
The experiences of land reform in many third world
countries shows that:
(i) A successful program must include
technical assistance and supervision, provision of inputs, bank
credit and price incentives; (ii) Even under the best of
conditions, there is an initial negative impact on production.
In the case of the successful programs, there has been a strong
recovery of agricultural production after the initial setback.
e.
As expected, there has been a drop in agricultural
production in El Salvador, particularly that of cotton. This
certainly does not prove that the program has been a failure,
as has been claimed in some circles. The reasons for this fall
in agricultural output after land reform may be summarized as:
(i) lack of strong political commitment and disruption by
vested interests (see 2.c. above); disruption by guerrillas;
uncertainty regarding the implementaton of Phase II;
deficiencies in technical assistance and supervision in the use
of inputs; and inadequate supply of inputs and of bank ~redit.
As for the drop in cotton production, an additional factor has
been the structure of relative prices which has favored a shift
to basic grains.
f.
The land reform program in El Salvador was well
designed but its implementation has fallen far short of what
was needed. The necessary policy actions are suggested by the
analysis in 2.e. above.
Most important is a strong political
commitment to land reform on the part of the Salvadoran
Government and its resolute implementation. Given the existing
political and security conditions, this implementation has to
be gradual but there must be sustained and visible progress in
order to have the desired political impact.
g. The first priority is the consolidation and full
implementation of the reforms, already undertaken (Phases I and
III).
Next, the implementation of Phase II should begin as
soon as possible. An expanded program of technical assistance
from the u.s. and international agencies would be vital for
proper administrative and technical implementation of the land
reform.
3.

Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum)

a.
Before the civil war, the public administration in El
Salvador was one of the most efficient in the region.
However,
the level of efficiency has greatly deteriorated during the
years of armed conflict and economic sabotage.
b.
The ministries, government agencies and state
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are: Ministry
of Finance; Ministry of Agriculture; Agrarian Reform Institute
(ISTA); Social Security Institute (ISSS); National
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Administration for Water and Sewerage (ANDA); Port Commission
(CEPA); Agricultural Development Bank (BFA); and Foreign Trade
Institute (ISCE).
4.

Technical Assistance (3.d.v. of my October 18 memorandum)

Same recommendations as in the case of Honduras.
El
Salvador needs large-scale technical assistance for projects as
well as for general administrative improvement. Technical
assistance requirements comprise specific task-related
expertise, short training courses for middle-level officials
and high-level experts with executive responsibilities. The
highest priority should be given to technical assistance
related to the implementation of land reform.
5.

Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum)

As a result of the civil war and the consequent
administrative laxity, there have been large and growing budget
deficits in the past three years.
New tax measures were
enacted in 1983, but they fell short of what was recommended in
the budget as presented to Congress.
Furthermore, the
implementation of these tax measures has been half-hearted,
particularly with respect to tax collection from the dominant
rich families.
Efforts for expenditure control have not made
much headway due largely to the war effort and economic
sabotage. The following actions are needed.
a. Tax laws: The first priority is the enactment of the
remaining measures recommended in the budget as presented to
Congress.
Next, the replacement of the stamp tax, a
cascade-type turnover tax, which is the largest single source
of the indirect taxes on domestic transactions) and of assorted
consumption taxes by a single-stage sales tax or a multi-stage
value-added tax would greatly increase the buoyancy of the tax
system.
b. Tax administration: The poor tax collection from the
high-income group is a political rather than an administrative
problem.
Improvement in this respect awaits high-level
political decisions.
c. Expenditure control: Efforts in this respect have been
rather feeble so far.
It is not an easy task in view of the
armed conflict and economic sabotage. Another complication is
that cuts in expenditures for social services would increase
discontent and thus run contrary to the war effort.
However,
there is a considerable margin for cuts in current expenditures
by reducing waste and increasing efficiency (see 3. above).
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d. Counterpart funds: Fiscal discipline would be improved
if USAID became less permissive in allowing diversion of
counterpart funds from their earmarked purposes (projects) to
general budget support.
e. Floating debt: The large increase in unpaid bills, a
reflection of the fiscal stringency, is an unhealthy
development and must be avoided.
6.

Domestic Financial System (3.c. vii and viii of my
October 18 memorandum)

Given the above-mentioned constraints, monetary
institutions have been performing their functions as
effectively as possible in the circumstances. Improvements are
possible in the following areas:
a. Because of severe liquidity problems, numerous
enterprises are not in a position to repay their outstanding
debts. A refinancing operation (domestic debt rescheduling) on
a limited scale was authorized by the Central Reserve Bank in
1983. It would be useful to amplify this scheme under the
sponsorship of the Central Reserve Bank with government
participation (budgetary funds or government guarantee),
co-financing by commercial banks, and possibly some help from
USAID funds.
b. In 1982, the Central Reserve Bank imposed legal reserve
requirements on the expanding trust funds portfolio of
commercial banks. Action is needed to extend the control·of
the mon~tary authorities over the rapidly expanding operations
of the nonbank financial intermediaries, whose outstanding
credit to the private sector has risen to the equivalent of
one-third of total financial system credit to that sector.
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GUATEMALA - POLICY MEASURES IN SELECTED AREAS
1.

Land Reform (3.c.ii of my October 18 memorandum)

Land reform has not figured as a priority item in the
policy mix of the previous or the present regime. Ownership of
arable land, while not characterized by the extreme inequality
of distribution of El Salvador, is concentrated in the hands of
relatively few families.
There is a large number of very
small, uneconomic land holdings of marginal fertility.
The
problem of landless peasants is acute in the mountainous and
sub-mountainous areas inhabited by the indigenous population,
in which the guerrillas find most of their recruits.
It is of
the highest political priority to provide land ownership to
this population. A phased, modest beginning can be made on the
lines of the land reform designed in El Salvador, with
supplementary policy actions recommended in the section on El
Salvador.
2.

Public Administration (3.c.iii of my October 18 memorandum)

a)
The quality of public administration, in spite of some
deterioration as a result of the present insurgency, is better
than that in El Salvador or Honduras.
b) The ministries, government agencies and state
enterprises with major administrative weaknesses are:
of Public Works; Ministry of Agriculture; Ministry of
Education; and Social Security Institute (IGSS).
3.

Ministry

Technical Assistance (3.d.v of my October 18 memorandum)

Same recommendations as in the case of Costa Rica.
Technical assistance is needed for projects as well as for
general administrative improvement.
Technical assistance
requirements comprise specific task-related expertise and short
training courses for middle-level officials, vvith relatively
little need for high-level experts with executive
responsibilities.
High priority should be assigned to
technical assistance related to the design and implementation
of a land reform program.
4.

Public Finance (3.c.iv and v of my October 18 memorandum)

Large budget deficits were incurred during the period
1979-81 (rising from one percent to 7.5 percent of GDP).
However, vigorous expenditure control measures, implemented in
1982 and 1983, have greatly reduced the size of the deficit.
It is remarkable that this improvement in budgetary performance
has been achieved through a reduction in expenditures.
Unfortunately, most of the cuts have been in capital
expenditures -- with obvious adverse impact on development.
The other major weakness is that revenues have remained
stagnant. There has been a serious erosion in "tax effort"
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over the last four years, since government revenues fell from
11 percent of GDP in 1978 to eight percent in 1982. Further
efforts are needed.
a. Tax laws: The lack of buoyancy in the tax system can
be explained by its heavy dependence on specific tax rates and
taxes on foreign trade.
Quick implementation of the following
changes, already being contemplated by the government, would
increase revenues: changing the base of selected excise taxes
from specific to ad valorem;
new selective consumption duties
on certain luxury-rtems; consolidation and reduction of
numerous exemptions from customs duties; replacement of the
stamp tax, a cascade-type turnover tax, by a new value-added
tax.
The last mentioned change is very important since it
would improve the buoyancy of the tax system in the future.
b. Tax administration: Quick implementation is needed of
measures, already being contemplated by the government, to
improve the collection of the property tax, the stamp tax, and
customs duties. Also essential is a political commitment to
make more serious efforts to collect taxes from the wealthy
classes. Technical assistance for improvements in tax
administration would be very valuable.
c.
Expenditure control: As mentioned earlier, expenditure
reductions in 1982 and 1983 were achieved largely at the
expense of capital expenditures. Efforts should be intensified
to plan and implement reductions in current expenditures.
Technical assistance is needed in this area.
5.

Domestic Financial System (3.c.vii and viii of my
October 18 memorandum)

Following a relatively lax monetary policy in the period
1979-81 (leading to a loss of net international reserves of
$600 million during the two years 1980 and 1981), tight
monetary policies were pursued in 1982 and 1983 leading to
balance of payments improvement. Since 1982, monetary policy
instruments have been used flexibly and competently and the
financial system has functioned relatively well. However,
there are some problem areas:
a.
Because of the depressed state of private sector
economic activity, many enterprises are not in a position to
repay their outstanding debts and there has been considerable
political pressure on the government to delcare a debt
moratorium or arrange a refinancing operation (domestic debt
rescheduling). At the end of 1982, a refinancing operation on
a modest scale was initiated by the Bank of Guatemala.
Consideration may be given to the expansion of this scheme
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under the sponsorship of the Bank of Guatemala with government
participation (budgetary funds or government guarantee),
co-financing by commercial banks, and possibly some help from
USAID funds.
b. Because of certain legal rigidities in the interest
rate structure (legal prohibition against increasing interest
rates on existing loans) and lack of competitiveness in the
banking system, domestic bank interest rates did not rise to
the maximum permitted by the increase in interest rate ceilings
authorized in 1981. The government is considering changes in
the Central Bank law and other banking laws to bring about more
interest rate flexibility and to encourage more competition
among banks. This reform of the banking laws should be
implemented as soon as possible. Technical assistance is
needed in this area.
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Preliminary Suggestions for the Kissinger Commission

A.

(1)

Trade Proposals

Export earnings of Central American countries will continue to
be dominated by earnings from primary products, particularly
agricultural commodities.

To stabilize these, consideration

should be given to a scheme guaranteeing commodity earnings
against shortfalls caused by developments outside the control
of developing countries.

A possible multilateral approach

could be for the United States to join the European Community
in the Lome STABEX system provided it is expanded to include
Central America.

Other alternatives include a softening of the

terms under which countries like those in Central America can
take advantage of the IMF facility for compensatory financing
or the establishment by the United States of its own bilateral
program for Central America.

429.

(2)

The United States affects prices of some of the region's
products through its participation or lack of participation in
the international coffee, cocoa and sugar agreements.

Given

the significance of the region to the United States and the
region's heavy reliance both on export earnings from specific
commodities and on the U.S. market, the United States should
insist that as a condition for its participation in and support
of these agreements it be allowed to show preference for the
region's exports in its quota allocations destined for the
United States market.

(3)

Again given the region's reliance on the U.S. market for its
exports of sugar, meat, and textiles, the United States should
provide more favorable access to its markets for these and other
products when access to the U.S. market is limited by quantitative restrictions.

Such ar.tion could be justified under the

GATT since the GATT allows special factors to be taken into
account.

For example, special allocations could be provided

for Central American sugar to take into account the almost 100
percent reliance of the region on the

u.s~

as an export market

and its security importance to the United States.

Gi~en

the

relatively small amount of sugar coming from this area
(compared to other suppliers such as Brazil, the Dominican
Republic, and Australia), such preferential access would not
have a significant adverse effect on them but would be very
beneficial to Central America.
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(4)

Textiles are by far the most important non-traditional export
coming from the region.

Although textiles were specifically

excluded from the CBI, the President announced more favorable
access would be provided for the region when he unveiled the
CBI before the OAS.

Since current or potential quantitative

restrictions under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) are a more
significant impediment to trade than tariffs, such a policy
could be of greater significance than duty free treatment.
Also, given the small volume of Central American textile
exports to the United States, this policy could be implemented
with minimal impact on the U.S. textile program, particularly
if its result were to be a transfer of some production from the
major suppliers in the Far East (China, Taiwan, Korea, Hong
Kong, and Singapore) to Central America.

A way to approach this would be to develop in concert with
Central America countries prospective export levels which would
allow these countries to guarantee sufficient sales to allow
the establishment of a specific number of production facilities.
To the extent these facilities relied on U.S. origin inputs or
represented production which would otherwise taken place in the
Far East, more generous U.S. market access could be provided.
Such treatment would be consisting with current U.S. policy to
be strict with the Far East while expanding benefits to lesser
developed regions.

(5)

One of the real innovations of the CBI is that for determining
product eligibility, U.S. origin content can count towards
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meeting up to 15 percent of the 35 percent local value added
processing requirement.

Moreover, Puerto Rican and

u.s.

Virgin

Island inputs can account for the whole 35 percent requirement.

However, the CBI requires that U.S. inputs receive final

finishing in the Caribbean.

In the real world, often the

production process requires the finishing to be done in the
United States.

I suggest the Commission consider proposing to

modify the rules of origin to allow U.S. inputs added in customs
free zones before entry into the United States customs territory
be allowed to be counted toward the required value added.

(6)

A special advantage of duty free treatment under the CBI is
that imports from the region can only be restricted by import
relief measures pursuant to Section 201 escape clause findings
if CBI imports themselves are proved to be causing injury.
Absent this provision, MFN or GSP rules would require all
imports, including CBI imports, be subject to import
restrictions pursuant to a Section 201 finding.

Consideration

should be given to extending this advantage to all CBI imports,
not just duty free imports.

Such an extension would provide

benefits to those products specifically excluded from duty free
treatment under the CBI (including textiles, leather products,
footwear, and tuna fish) without injuring the U.S. industry.

(7)

To provide additional security for CBI exports to the United
States as well as to counter opposition in the U.S. to greater
market access for Central American countries, these countries
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should condier joining the GATT or the MTN codes of conduct.
Participation in the GATT and the Codes, particularly the
subsidy code, should be on conditions less strict than normally
is the case.

Participation in the subsidy code would enable

Central American exports to receive the protection of the
injury test in U.S. countervailing duty proceedings.

(8)

At this stage of the economic development of Central America,
more government intervention and assistance is required than
would ideally be the case.

In consideration of this, the

Commission might consider recommending that the injury test in
unfair trade cases contain a threshold greater than the material
injury standard currently provided.

Since such a test would be

harder to meet, it would provide more security for Central
American exports but would still protect

u.s.

serious disruption from import competition.

industry from
Such a special

liberalization would perhaps be need only be in effect for a
few years to allow new industries in Central America to "get
off the ground."

(9) All handicraft products should receive CBI duty free treatment.
The legislation should be clarified to allow this in the
textile and apparel areas, providing suitable safeguards are
negotiated.

Similarly, Central American countries should

negotiate arrangements with the United States allowing
handicraft entries.
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(10) The European communities should be urged to extend Lome trade
preferences to Central America, particularly since the United
States is extending CBI benefits to Lome beneficiaries in the
Caribbean (Jamaica, Belize, Barbados, Trinidad and the Eastern
Caribbean).

Similarly, in view of our close relationship to

Japan, Japan should be urged to provide special benefits for
Central America in investment and trade promotion.

Japan

currently provides such special benefits to the ASEAN countries.

(11) Under ALADI, the Latin American Organization for Trade
Integration, Central American goods can receive preferential
access to the markets of the more advanced countries of Latin
America, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and
Venezuela, after appropriate negotiations.

These negotiations

should be undertaken and completed as soon as possible.

In

view of the necessity for Mexico and Venezuela to cut back on
the benefits to the region of the San Jose Accords, these
countries should particularly be urged to consider granting
trade preferences.

(12) Promote more efficient regional integration by:
(a)

promoting reintegration of Hounduras into CACM in a
way which recognizes Honduras' need to receive
special treatment in view of its lesser developed
status within the common market;

(b)

promote closer ties between Panama and the CACM;

(c)

allow Belize to join CACM;

434.

(d)

reduce the use of negative tariffs, which discourage
further processing in CACM; and

(e)

reduce overall level of CACM protection.

(13) Intensify AID efforts to promote exports through technical
assistance in market identification, particularly in matching
Central American production to market outlets and such product
specific assistance as to upgrading product quality to meet
U.S. standards or satisfy

u.s.

consumer demand.

Quality

control institutes can be established.

B.

Trade Related Initiatives

(14) Current U.S. Government efforts should be better coordinated.
Among the more important elements of this coordination should
be:
(a)

Continued leadership by Amb. Brock of the Trade Policy
Committee in implementing the CBI, and particularly
any Central American initiatives coming from the
Commission.

(b)

Closer coordination between the Department of Commerce
and AID in promoting Central America to the private
sector.

(c)

Fuller involvement of the resource of the EX-IM Bank,
OPIC, Small Business Administration (SBA), and Peace
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Corps,

in the overall effort to implement recommenda-

tions of the Commission.

(d)

Full information exchange among the concerned
agencies allowing "one stop shopping" for American
and Central American principals interested in
investing in, or exporting from, the region.

(e)

A small congressional advisory group should be
created to work with the Executive Branch in
implementing any Central American initiative as well
as in developing new initiatives.

(f)

The establishment in each embassy of an office
responsible for coordinating with the interagency
group in Washington.

(15) Private sector coordination with the government should be
established either through bodies similar to the advisory
structure for the trade policy or the more formal corporate
structure recommended by the Americas Society.

Such a group

should focus on publicizing efforts, incentives and advantages
for doing business with Central America, promoting venture
capital investments, revitalizing Central American banking and
financial facilities,

and developing indigenous managerial,

entrepreneurial and technical skills.
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(16) The most immediate need confronting the region is to obtain
more short term credit to permit the importation of raw
materials and intermediate goods necessary for production
within Central America, particularly production of nontraditional exports.

Ways to overcome this problem include:

1)

EX-IM bank credit similar to the recent $1.5 billion
credit extension to Mexico and Brazil.

2)

To the extent that EX-IM Bank is limited in its
exposure in Central America by its assessment of the
capacity for eventual repayment, AID and OPIC should
take up the slack.

3)

Commercial banks must be willing to expand their
exposure in Central America with appropriate U.S.G.
incentives.

(The drying up of resources recently has

been extraordinary.)

4)

The IDB could act as a catalyst to bring together
both public and private sector resources in making
available and guaranteeing funds for Central American
exporters needing imported inputs.
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(17) U.S. and Central American monetary authorities should work
together to stem the outflow of private capital from the
region.

New facilities should be developed to reverse the

outflow of capital and actually see funds flow back into
Central America.

Special foreign exchange deposits

shoul~

be

developed, perhaps jointly administred by American and Central
American banks, which would pool funds to be used exclusively
for Central American development.

(18) Intra-regional trade is still an important engine of growth.
Direct financial assistance should be provided to increase the
credit availabile for intra-regional trade.

Such facilities

are currently limited, forcing trade contraction.

(19) U.S. tax policy should be changed to encourage new investments
in Central America.

(a)

Two possibilities would be:

Allowing investment tax credits, and other tax
advantages, for investments in Central America.

(b)

Tax sparing, by which the U.S. Treasury would forego
taxing that portion of repatriated profits which is
exempt from Central American taxes as a result of
Central American government investment incentives.

(20) Allow Section 936 funds on deposit in Puerto Rico to be invested
in Central America, while maintaining their tax deferred status.
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Allow additional Section 936 funds to be created so as not to
drain productive resources from Puerto Rico.

(21) Promote improved shipping through temporary subsidies which
would allow shipping companies to offer (1) more frequent
service than would otherwise be justified, and (2) low
promotional rates between Central America and the United States
and between points within Central America.

This would allow

Central America to escape the conumdrum caused by lack of
competitive and regular transportation inhibiting exports, and
a lack of exports inhibiting competitive and regular transportation.

If transportation rates reflected distance rather than

traffic loads, the region would gain an advantage over the Far
East.

(22) Establish better coordination between aid donors and recipients.

(23) Tourism is a significant foreign exchange earner which could be
promoted through:

(a)

An "open skies" program to encourage air carriers to
service the region.

(b)

Providing technical and financial assistance to
encourage tourism in the area.
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(c)

Removing the link between the granting the convention
tax deduction and the necessity for negotiating tax
information exchange agreements.

If a linkage is

necessary, a more realistic linkage would be to
require beneficiary countries to cooperate with

u.s.

authorities in efforts to control the movement of
funds connected with narcotics trade as a prerequiste
for being deemed eligible for the convention tax
deduction.
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CENTRAL AMERICAN SECURITY ISSUES
by Angel Rabasa
Although political and socio-economic problems have
contributed to the growth of insurgencies and the present state
of civil disorder, the proximate source of the instability was
the revolutionary change in Nicaragua.
The emergence of a
revolutionary state with international ties in the heart of
Central America upset the internal political equilibrium in the
northern tier of Central American states.
It endangered the
security of neighboring states, particularly El Salvador,
through the Sandinistas politico-ideological challenge and
their support of revolutionary movements elsewhere. The
development of a military establishment of unprecedented size
added a conventional military dimension to the threat.
The Conventional Military Balance
Since coming to power in July 1979, the Sandinistas have
been attempting to consolidate their control of Nicaragua
through the militarization of society, the establishment of an
extensive internal security apparatus, and a large scale
conventional military buildup, backed up by a substantial Cuban
presence. The capabilities of the Nicaraguan ground forces
that now numbers about 25,000 regulars are now far superior to
those of any neighboring state and are improving steadily with
Soviet bloc training and increasingly sophisticated military
equipment.
The buildup, which is perceived as out of proportion to
that required to defend it against its neighbors, has alarmed
Central Americans, particularly Honduras.
Honduras' air edge
is its only counterweight to Nicaragua's superiority on the
ground.
But Honduras is aware that this edge could be easily
lost as the result of Nicaragua's acquisition of high
performance aircraft or of a successful terrorist attack on the
Honduran Air Force, such as the one which resulted in the
destruction of much of the Salvadoran Air Force on the ground
in January 1982.
Neither Nicaragua nor Honduras has the logistical support
capability to mount a sustained conventional attack on the
other.
Nonetheless, the Nicaraguan military buildup provides
the Sandinista leadership the security shield behind which it
can continue with relative safety its support of guerrilla and
terrorist movements in other Central American states as well as
an instrument of political intimidation and internal control.
Hhile it cannot serve as a shield against u.s. military power,
Nicaragua's military strength can render victory more
difficult, and be much more costly to the u.s. in political
terms.
The ambiguity of the Cuban response to an invasion of
Nicaragua also strengthens its position.

441.

The Nicaraguan Insurgency
The development of an anti-Sandinista insurgency in
Nicaragua has restored a degree of symmetry to the Central
American security situation. However, while this insurgency is
a thorn in the side of the Nicaraguan Government, it has not
grown to the extent that it threatens Sandinista survival.
Anti-Sandinista forces are active through the entire
northern border area and along the Rio San Juan, on the
Atlantic coast, across the border from Costa Rica. The
anti-Sandinista insurgents are divided into three major groups,
and unity of effort has been hampered by deep-seated
differences between the leaders of the largest anti-Sandinista
armed organizations, the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) and
Eden Pastora's ARDE. The Miskito and Suma Indian organization,
the Mitsura Revolutionary Front, has cooperated with both FDN
and ARDE.
FDN, with about 7,000 fighters, operates along the Honduran
border from Bocay, in north central Nicaragua, to the Pacific
coast, and down into the Matagalpa area.
FDN has recently
developed a capability for air and sea attacks, which
substantially complicates the Sandinistas counterinsurgency
problems. ARDE is the fastest growing anti-Sandinista
guerrilla organization, having surged from about 300 men
earlier this year to about 3,000 at the present time.
It has
expanded its de facto control over most of the remote Rio San
Juan area, placing the town of San Juan del Norte under virtual
siege.
It has operated as far north as the Bluefields area and
the Rama road, the only hard surface road connecting the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua. The Mitsura
Revolutionary Front, with 3,000 fighters, operates throughout
the countryside in northern Zelaya, on the Atlantic coast, and
along the Rio Coco border with Honduras. Mitsura operations
have reduced Sandinista control to the major towns, such as
Puerto Cabezas and Prinzapolka.
Hith the exception of periodic large scale efforts by FDN
forces to take the town of Jalapa, the northernmost town in
Nueva Segovia department, near the Honduran border, the tactics
of the anti-Sandinista forces have consisted of harrassment of
Sandinista units and economic sabotage.
Insurgent pressure on
the Sandinistas has increased substantially in recent months;
the insurgents have successfully attacked key economic
installations and inflicted heavy casualties on Sandinista
forces deployed against them. The insurgents, however, have
not been able to seize any major towns, to break out of the
relatively isolated areas where they operate or to generate
sufficient active support to threaten the survival of the
regime. The Sandinistas have so far only deployed Army
reserves or militia units against the insurgents, leaving their
conventionally trained front line forces defending the
populated areas in western Nicaragua.
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Time is probably on the side of the Sandinistas. Barring a
dramatic increase in material support available to the
insurgents, they are not likely to be able to carry the war to
the Pacific heartland, where civil conflicts have been
historically decided.
In the meantime, the Sandinistas will
continue their process of consolidation and their military
buildup. This said, the insurgency has to be viewed in its
regional context. At a minimum, it has distracted the
Sandinistas from their regional revolutionary objectives; it
must have been almost certainly taken into account in what they
see as a more unfavorable regional security environment.
In
effect, the insurgency has carved out a place as a political
reality that must be recognized in any future negations.
The War in El Salvador
In El Salvador, the war is at a stalemate. The guerrillas
have limited popular support, but can probably continue the war
as long as they receive external support. While there ia a
unified guerrilla military command with headquarters in
Managua, the strategies of the Salvadoran guerrilla groups have
been shaped by the doctrine and situation of each of the
groups. The Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the most
doctrinaire of the guerrilla groups, which maintains a strong
presence in Chalatenango, has been in disarray since the murder
and suicide of its leaders in Managua earlier this year. The
dominant group is now the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP),
which is active in eastern El Salvador. ERP strategy has
consisted of systematic attacks on the economic infrastructure,
in order to precipitate an economic and political collapse, and
military actions designed for political and psychological
effect. They are especially interested in the effect their
actions have on international public opinion, especially in the
u.s., where they hope to discourage further support for the El
Salvador Government.
The number of guerrillas has remained stationary for the
last two years:
there are an estimated 6,000 front line
guerrillas and a slightly larger number organized in militia
and support units. The guerrillas, however, have demonstrated
an increasing ability to maneuver and concentrate their forces,
and to react to Salvadoran Army moves. They are also involving
their militia units in operations together with their front
line forces.
In 1983, as in the past, the war has been characterized by
a cyclical pattern, in which the initiative has been
alternatively taken by government and guerrilla forces.
From
May to July, the government forces maintained the initiative
with a countrywide operation which succeeded in throwing the
guerrillas on the defensive everywhere and in severely
disrupting the guerrilla infrastructure in the strategically
important department of San Vicente, a north-south corridor for
the transshipment of seaborne supplies for the guerrillas in
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the northern area.
In October (a period which coincided with
the end of the u.s. fiscal year and uncertainty in El Salvador
regarding the expected levels of u.s. assistance), the Army
became less active and the guerrillas mounted a series of
attacks in the east, beginning with an attack on the garrison
in San Miguel, the country's third largest city.
Underlying the ebb and flow of field operations, there has
been over the past tvvo years a deepening of the guerrilla
presence in the eastern departments.
In the absence of
significant Salvadoran military forces, the guerrillas operate
at will throughout the countryside.
They have established the
rudiments of a civil administration and enforced a tax regime
in areas under their control.
Increasingly, they are able to
mass their forces and overwhelm isolated garrisons, ambush
relief columns, and in some recent cases, have inflicted heavy
casualties on two of the government's new cazadores (hunter)
battalions and on units of the u.s.-trained Atlacat battalion.
The severity of guerrilla attacks on the transportation and
electrical network in the eastern departments has resulted in
the effective isolation of much of the area east of the Lempa
River from the rest of the country. The nature and extent of
guerrilla operations in the east has led to speculation that
the military objective of the guerrillas in the eastern
departments might be the establishment of a liberated zone, as
a prelude to the extension of the war into the central
departments. Whether the guerrillas would venture to proclaim
a liberated zone until they are sufficiently strong to defend
it is something that cannot be answered at this time.
It should be noted, however, that the situation throughout
the country is not uniformly favorable to the guerrillas.
Apart from the disruption of their bases in San Vicente, the
guerrillas have lost their infrastructure in western El
Salvador and have been unable to reconstitute their support
network in the cities.
While the military situation continues to be essentially a
stalemate, the guerrillas' campaign of economic disruption and
sabotage has had devastating effects on the Salvadoran
economy:
the country's GDP has declined 25 percent in real
terms in the last two years.
In eastern El salvador, the
economic decline has been even more precipitous.
The Salvadoran military's new strategy, as reflected in the
campaign that was initiated in San Vicente in May 1983, is to
clear the guerrillas from the economically and strategically
important areas in San Vicente, Usulutan and other departments
and eventually reduce the insurgency to peripheral areas.
The
San Vicente operation was militarily successful, but the civic
action component apparently lagged.
It is unclear, in the wake
of the guerrillas' fall 1983 offensive, how soon the Salvadoran
armed forces will be able to implement the plan elsewhere.
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Part of the reason for the Salvadoran military's inability
to contain the guerrillas has been an insufficiency of manpower
and resources. About three quarters of the Salvadoran armed
forces are deployed in static positions that protect fixed
installations, and leave insufficient maneuver forces to carry
the war consistently to the guerrillas. This is an intractable
problem that can probably only be solved through a substantial
force expansion. Materiel is a serious problem. Even with the
present force structure, there are critical shortages of basic
equipment, including communications, medical equipment and
airlift assets.
The Salvadoran armed forces have also suffered from
inadequate command and control, coordination and leadership. A
recent major reorganization of the military command structure,
which included the appointment of one of the Army's most
competent and effective officers as Chief of Staff, the
establishment of a 24-hour-a-day liaison between the Army and
the Air Force in the General Staff and the assignment of some
of the Army's best officers to key field command positions, is
expected to improve command, control and coordination and to
lead to a more aggressive prosecution of the war.
The Public Order Situation in Guatemala
The insurgency in Guatemala is much better encapsulated by
the term terrorism than guerrilla warfare. There are about
2,500 guerrillas in four groups loosely organized under an
umbrella organization. The guerrillas lost critical ground in
the fall of 1982 and have not yet recovered. There is
guerrilla activity around Lake Atitlan (the Revolutionary
Organization of the People in Arms- ORPA), in northern El
Quiche and Huehuetenango (Guerrilla Army of the Poor - EGP) and
in western Peten (Revolutionary Armed Forces - FAR). The
guerrillas engage in harassment and terrorism (there has been a
recent increase in terrorism in Guatemala City), but make no
attempt to hold ground or to engage military units in sustained
combat.
The Guatemalan Army continues to apply the extremely
successful counterinsurgency tactics developed by Chief of
Staff Benedicta Lucas under the Lucas Garcia government and
continued by President Rios Montt. At the heart of Guatemalan
Army tactics are aggressive small unit patrolling and
counterinsurgency operations in areas of guerrilla activity.
Platoon size units are sent out for three to six weeks at a
time. They regularly uncover guerrilla encampments and engage
the guerrillas in firefights. The Guatemalan Army has been
extremely ruthless in dealing with suspected guerrilla
sympathizers. The most salient characteristic of the
Guatemalan counterinsurgency effort is the organization of
about 400,000 campesinos and Indians into Civil Defense
Forces. Civil Defense units are poorly armed--only about one
in ten is armed with a gun, usually an M-1 rifle--but they
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provide security for villagers, go on patrol regularly and have
taken heavy casualties in contacts with insurgents.
The positive aspect of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency
program is civic action. The Guatemalan Army has a long
tradition of involvement in civic action projects as well as of
severe violence. Under Rios Montt, in addition to becoming
less indiscriminate about killing, the armed forces provided
food and housing materials to villages participating in the
Civil Defense program.
The Guatemalan Government's financial
crisis, however, as well as possibly the Mejia government's
less complete commitment to the "beans" side of the Rios Montt
government "beans and bullets" policy, has led to a slowdown of
the civic action efforts. This could have a significant impact
on the future of the insurgency. The immediate prospects,
however, are for the persistence of a low level guerrilla
threat, together with possibly an increase in urban terrorism.
The contrast between the course of the insurgencies in
Guatemala and El Salvador and between the responses of the
Guatemalan and Salvadoran military to their respective
guerrilla challenges might shed some light on the nature of the
problem. A key factor is undoubtedly simple demographics. El
Salvador is much smaller and more densely populated than either
Guatemala or Nicaragua and consequently it was correspondingly
easier for the Salvadoran guerrillas to attain the critical
mass necessary for a major insurgency. Proximity to Nicaragua
was another factor:
it was probably not an accident that the
guerrillas are most active in the eastern third of the country,
vvhich is closest to the source of supplies in Nicaragua. A
third reason lies in the mindset and doctrine of the Salvadoran
armed forces.
Unlike the Guatemalan Army, which experienced
and defeated an insurgency in the 1960's, the Salvadoran
military confronted a serious insurgency with no previous
counterinsurgency experience and burdened by a doctrine which
emphasized conventional warfare with Honduras. Only in the
last year has the officer corps begun to assimilate the lessons
of the last two to three years and have field-level commanders
emerged whose primary experience has been in the area of
counterinsurgency.
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Statement of Robert L. Bernstein

My name is Robert L. Bernstein.

I am Chairman of the

Helsinki Watch and a founder of the Americas Watch.
The Helsinki Watch was organized in 1979 as a citizens'
group to monitor United States compliance with the Helsinki
Final Act and to maintain contact with citizens' groups
abroad that were trying to document compliance in their own
countries.

It was patterned directly on the original

Helsinki Watch founded in the Soviet Union by Yuri Orlov,
and on the Charter '77 group in Czechoslovakia.

Had those

groups been allowed to survive and continue their work, which
of course they had every right to do under the Helsinki
accords, they would have been the founders of the first
East-West movement for hurnan rights -- apart from government
and apart from ideology.

Unfortunately, as we all know,

their membership has been dispersed and their leaders
imprisoned.
The u.s. Helsinki Watch has not gone untouched by Soviet
hostility.

Our strong belief that the provisions relating to

human rights were the most important and fragile in the
Helsinki Final Act led us to active effort in their defense,
and to outspoken criticism of violations by the Soviet Union
and by its communist satellites, as well as by other
countries.

In retaliation, the soviets canceled both my
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visa and that of the Executive Director of the Helsinki
Watch, and published virulent personal attacks on us through
the state press.
Yet our work continued.

In 1981 we organized the

Americas Watch, when it became apparent that the theory that
we should respond differently to human rights abuses by
Marxist totalitarian governments and non-Marxist
authoritarian governments was becoming a basic tenet of

u.s.

foreign policy --stemming, perhaps, from the idea that it is
possible to change non-Marxist authoritarian governments and
that therefore we should cooperate with them.

We believe

that a policy that appears to accept human rights abuses in
any country, regardless of political complexion, is contrary
to American beliefs and American interests.

We believe

particularly that to vigorously criticize human rights abuses
in countries dominated by the Soviet Union and then to
over-look abuses in countries in our own hemisphere where
cruel dictatorships are aligned with the United States, would
be inhumane, unwise and indefensible.

We also believe that

these calculations have diluted the human rights element in
our foreign policy, and that they do not reflect the strenth
of our American tradition or the real feelings of the
American people.

Above all, we believe that promotion of

human rights should be a consistent
goal.

u.s.

foreign policy
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Our committees are firmly convinced that the great
struggle going on in the world today is not so much between
communism and capitalism as it is between totalitarian or
authoritarian government and human rights.

We believe that

communism was challenged and failed in Poland, that it failed
in Czechoslovakia, and that it failed in Hungary.

It wasn't

that the people did not rise up to assert their rights and
change the system: it was that Soviet tanks carne in to halt
the change.
In these and so many other struggles around the world,
the legitimacy and appeal of human rights is overwhelming.
World-wide concern with human rights is growing.

Think of

how often you read about and hear about human rights issues
now, reported from all the corners of the earth, as opposed
to only three or four years ago.

Human rights, as a matter

of international concern is, to cite the cliche, an idea
whose time has come.
The United States should be perceived in world forums
and in its dealings with all other countries as the leader in
defense of human rights --which are, after all, simply
internationally recognized civil liberties.

The basic civil

liberties battles that have been fought here at horne are well
known abroad, and the United States has stood for 200 years
as the great bastion of human rights.
the critical need:

Now, today, this is

to adapt our foreign policy to what have

450.
long been our real beliefs and to project those beliefs
evenly and firmly.

Yet by sponsoring such brutally

repressive regimes as those in El Salvador and Guatemala, the
outlines OT our true position have become blurred and our
credibility has been greatly damaged.
Many today wonder.about the effectiveness of the
Helsinki process in view of the deterioration of conditions
in the Soviet Union and their repeated disregard for the
meaning of their signature on the Helsinki Final Act.

But it

is precisely because of this that the Helsinki guarantees
have been invaluable, exposing Soviet hypocrisy and alerting
their citizens, and millions elsewhere, to the rights they
are denied.

The Helsinki talks in Madrid have provided a

forum for publicizing violations in various countries, and
for asserting the commitment of the United States to the
Final Act.

A way must be found to do this in Latin America;

our actions supporting the human rights advocates in those
countries must be as strong as they have been in Europe.
For years, many have considered human rights
organizations to be more idealistic than pragmatic.

I

believe that as you hear the reports of Aryeh Neier, Vice
Chairman of both the Helsinki Watch and the Americas Watch,
and Orville Schell, Vice Chairman of the Helsinki Watch and
Chairman of the Americas Watch, you will see that the work
our groups are doing is steadfastly tied to reality.
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The Americas Watch has sent many missions into Central
America and has published detailed, factual reports on what
they have seen and heard there.

These and other projects are

supervised by a board unlike almost any other I can think of.
This is not a staff-run operation, with a detached executive
committee.

Every week on Wednesday mornings from 8:45 to

10:30, and at other meetings, a group drawn from business
leaders, attorneys, university presidents, publishers and
clergy comes together to give its time and thought to the
place of human rights in an increasingly contentious world.
The specific issues they confront each week are by no means
always simple and clear.

But they share a bedrock

commitment that is always clear --one which I hope will play
a major part in the deliberations of your Commission and
which, if I may, I will end my remarks by repeating:

above

all, as calculations are made to deal with each new problem
we face, we believe that human rights should remain an
abiding and consistent

u.s.

foreign policy goal.
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Statement of Aryeh Neier

My name is Aryeh Neier.

I am Vice Chairman of the

Helsinki Watch and Vice Chairman of the Americas Watch.

I

will attempt to summarize the information that the Americas
Watch has assembled on the human rights situation in El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
First, a word about our information-gathering.

Over the

past two years, more than a dozen members of the Americas
Watch executive committee and staff have travelled to Central
America to gather information on the human rights situation.
At the moment that we appear before this Commission, four of
our researchers are in the region.

We have interviewed heads

of government, military commanders, police chiefs, prisoners,
rank and file soldiers, priests, journalists, lawyers,
judges, doctors, refugee workers and, most of all, victims of
human rights abuses and members of their families.

In

addition, we maintain close contact with domestic human
rights groups in those countries where they can operate.

In

the last two years, we have published eleven highly detailed
reports setting forth our findings about the human rights
situation in Central America.

The information set forth in

this testimony derives from those reports but has been
brought up to date to make it as current as possible.
In a number of instances, the information we have

453.
assembled is at odds with information that has been published
by the Department of State.

It is our view that the

gathering and reporting of information by the Department of
State is designed to further the policies of the Department
and accordingly is inadequate and biased.

Just two examples:

1) in reporting data on political murders in El Salvador, the
Department of State relies exclusively on the extreme right
wing Salvadoran press which in turn derives much of its
information from the Salvadoran government.

The State

Department rejects the meticulous and painstakingly
documented reporting by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San
Salvador that is exclusively based on first-hand testimony
from family members of those who have been murdered and
witnesses to the murders.

As is hardly surprising given the

State Department's sources, its body count is far lower than
that which we report; 2) in evaluating accounts of rural
massacres in Guatemala, the State Department dismisses the
testimony of refugees who have fled accross the border into
southern Mexico, labelling them "guerrilla sympathizers" -as if people would leave their land, their homes, and their
communities for the squalor of a refugee camp in order to aid
the guerrilla cause by telling lies about the Guatemalan
armed forces.
Here is what we have found out about the human rights
situation in Central America.
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EL SALVADOR

Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants
Since october 1979, human rights organizations affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Salvador
(until May 1982, socorro Juridico; since May 1982, Tutela
Legal) have tabulated more that 37,000 murders of civilian
non-combatants by government security forces and by
paramilitary forces allied with them.

In the past year,

political murders of civilian non-combatants tabulated by
Tutela Legal have continued at the rate of about a hundred a
week -- an astonishing number any place and all the more
horrifying given the tiny population of El Salvador and the
fact that the security forces should be running out of
politically suspect persons to murder.
In January, 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 430 murders of
civilian non-combatants by government security forces and by
paramilitary forces allied with them; in February, 1983,
Tutela Legal tabulated 537 such murders; in March, 1983, 329
such murders; in April, 1983, 386 such murders; in May, 1983,
503 such murders; in June, 1983, 342 such murders; in July,
~983,

424 such murders; in August, 1983, 318 such murders.
All told, therefore, during the first eight months of

1983, the Archdiocese of San Salvador recorded 3,269 murders
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of civilian non-combatants by the security forces of the
government of El Salvador and paramilitary forces allied with
them.

For purposes of comparison, the number of such murders

recorded by the Archdiocese during the previous eight months
--that is, May 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982 --was
3,070.

Accordingly, the number of recorded murders of

non-combatants is rising.
It should be noted, of course, that the number of
murders that the Archdiocese records understates the total.
The Archdiocese has difficulty obtaining information on
political murders in parts of the country remote from San
Salvador because it insists on obtaining first-hand testimony
from witnesses or family members if a murder is to be
included in its tabulations.

Disappearances
In addition to those known to have been murdered by the
security forces, since October 1979 some 2,300 Salvadorans
have "disappeared" following abduction by government ·security
forces.

In the past year, such tabulated disappearances

following abductions have continued at the rate of about
fifty a month.
Most recently, members of the faculty of the National
University appear to have been specially targetted by the
security forces.

On September 13, 1983, Professor Pedro
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Flores was abducted by the security forces; on September 14,
Professor of International Law, Hugo Francisco Carrillo was
abudcted by plainclothesmen; on September 19, Professor
Amilcar Martinez, chief of the Economics Section of the
Department of International Relations was abducted by the
security forces.

As of September 27, 1983 we have been able

to obtain no word on their whereabouts and fear that their
names may have to be added to the list of the disappeared.
In January, 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 56 disappearances; in March, 1983, 33 disappearances; in April, 1983, 48
disappearances; in May, 1983, 90 disappearances; in June,
1983, 67 disappearances; in July, 1983, 57 disappearances; in
August, 1983, 37 disappearances.
All told, therefore, there were 420 disappearances
following abductions by government security forces during the
first eight months of 1983.

For purposes of comparison, the

Archdiocese recorded 358 disappearances during the last eight
months of 1982.
Again, this indicates an increase.

Moreover, as those

who disappear after abduction by the security forces and do
not reappear within fifteen days (the criterion for
tabulation as a disappearance by the Archdiocese) almost
never reappear, by rights these should be included as
political murders.
If that were done, the number of recorded political
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murders by the government security forces and paramilitary
forces allied with them, since October 1979, would rise to
more than 39,000.

Torture
Many of the bodies of civilian non-combatants murdered
by government forces in El Salvador indicate that they were
severely tortured and mutilated before being killed.
Virtually all prisoners at Mariona -- where male political
prisoners are held -- say they were tortured, by electric
shock, beatings, simulated suffocations and hangings by the
wrists, and many bear physical marks of torture.

The

practice is so widespread as to be routine.

Political Prisoners
In El Salvador, political prisoners are considered lucky
that is, they are alive.

At present, there are some 350

acknowledged political prisoners.

Prior to May 1983, there

had been more than 700 political prisoners but, under an
amnesty law, some 533 had been released by June 24.

The

number is rising again as approximately 150 additional
political prisoners were confined between May and August
1983.

None of the 200 or so political prisoners not released

under the amnesty has had access to defense counsel since
Decree 507 was promulgated in 1980 and, though some have been

458.
confined for more than two years (a few as long as five
years) not one has been brought to trial.

Freedom of the Press
One opposition newspaper, La Cronica, was closed in 1980
after its editor and a photographer were hacked to death.
Another, El Independiente was closed in 1981 after several
assassination attempts against its editor and after army
tanks and trucks surrounded its building on January 15, 1981.
Many journalists have been attacked in El Salvador and some
have been killed, among them four Dutch journalists killed in
March 1982 and an American journalist, John Sullivan, who
disappeared and was murdered in 1980.

Freedom of expression

has been suspended in El Salvador and the surviving
newspapers -- which are extreme right-wing -- are subject to
censorship.
Freedom of Religion
Archbishop Romero was murdered in 1980 and subsequently,
there have been frequent attacks on the church by government
security forces, including the murders of four u.s. churchwomen in December 1980.

One consequence is that the Arch-

diocese of san Salvador today has 35% fewer clergy than in
1977.

In the past year, there have been several bombings and

machine-gunnings of religious institutions and several
pastoral workers have been murdered or have disappeared.
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During 1983, individuals employed by religious institutions
to provide care for displaced persons have been particularly
victimized by political repression.

Among the victims are

the director of medical services in the displaced persons
camp of the Lutheran Church of El Salvador who was abducted '
by the National Police in April 1983 and tortured and several
employees of camps operated by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of San Salvador who were abducted by the National Police in
August 1983 and tortured.

At this writing, the Lutheran

Church official and several of the Catholic Archdiocese
relief workers remain in prison.

Repression Against Human Rights Monitors
The staff members of organizations monitoring human
rights practices have been particular targets for repression.
Government security forces abducted and murdered two members
of the staff of the El Salvador Human Rights Commission in
1980; another disappeared in December 1981 (along with two
employees of the Archdiocese); the public relations director
of the Commission disappeared in August 1982 along with three
other persons after abduction by security forces; Dr. Roberto
Rivera Martelli, a founding member of the Commission whose
clinic regularly treated victims of human rights abuses sent
to him by the Commission, disappeared in February 1983 after
abduction by a paramilitary group; and the President of the
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Commission, Marinela Garcia Villas, was killed in March 1983
in disputed circumstances.

Patricia Cuellar, a United States

citizen who worked for socorro Juridico was abducted by
security forces with her father in July 1982 and disappeared.

The System of Government
National elections for a constitutional assembly were
held in March 1982 with a very large voter turnout.

The

left did not participate in the elections, at least in part
because it reasonably feared to participate.

Six leaders of

the left political coalition, the FDR, had been kidnapped
from a press conference by security forces in November 1980,
tortured, mutilated and murdered. The Christian Democrats
took part in the election, but were handicapped because many
of their leaders were murdered.
A right-wing coalition prevailed in the election but was
prevented from naming a provisional president by the
intervention of the United States and the armed forces.
Apparently, it was feared that the leader of the right-wing
coalition, Roberto D'Aubuisson, would alienate support within
the United States.
At this writing, Presidential elections that were
planned for late 1983 have been postponed.
set.

No date has been

Whether the left will participate when elections are

held is questionable.

The armed forces have never withdrawn
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a "hit list" in which they pledge to "relentlessly persecute"
the principal political leaders of the left and the
government has never even investigated the major episodes in
which the armed forces murdered FDR leaders.

In addition the

Christian Democrats have continued to be victimized by such
violence, diminishing their ability to fairly contest an
election.

In May 1982, the Christian Democratic Party

accused the security forces of killing nine party leaders,
six party activists and 22 peasant supporters during that
month alone.

In September 1982, the Christian Democratic

Party denounced the murder of 35 mayors from its party, 9 of
them in 1982.

Attacks on the Christian Democratic Party have

continued in 1983 including the murder of another Mayor in
April; the abduction of a former Mayor and several other
party leaders in June; and threats against the life of a
Christian Democratic member of the National Assembly who had
called for a crackdown on death squads in a May speech.

The

threats included the murder of a young man whose body was
dumped in the parking lot of the hotel where foreign
journalists stay with a press release in a pocket of the
victim.

One Christian Democratic mayor is known to have been

killed in a guerrilla attack.

An ARENA member of the

National Assembly was murdered by a guerrilla group in June
1983.
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The System of Justice
To all intents and purposes, there is no system of
justice in El Salvador.
killed.

Prisoners are rarely taken: most are

Those who are taken prisoner are never tried.

The

judiciary and the country's lawyers occupy themselves with
civil suits while the slaughter goes on around them.

Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations
No member of the regular security forces has been
criminally punished for a human rights violation.

In August

1983 a Civil Defense member was convicted for a political
murder, the first conviction for any of the 37,000 murders
since 1979.

Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross is
permitted to perform its humanitarian mission in El Salvador.
The ICRC had been prepared to leave El Salvador on its own
initiative in mid-1982 because of the failure of the
government to take prisoners.
part through

u.s.

intervention.

It was persuaded to stay, in
In addition to monitoring

the situation of prisoners, the ICRC returns prisoners
released by the guerrillas to the government and provides
food and medicine to some 90,000 displaced persons in combat
areas.
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Political Violence By Opposition Forces
Guerrillas in El Salvador regularly commit crimes
against property in an effort to disrupt the country's
economy.

Starting in May 1982, the human rights organization

affiliated with the Archdiocese of San Salvador, Tutela Legal,
began tabulating the killing of civilian non-combatants by
the guerrillas.
In January 1983, Tutela Legal tabulated 7 murders of
civilian non-combatants by the guerrillas; in February, 13
such murders; in March, 6 such murders; in April, 6 such
murders; in May, 7 such murders; in June, 4 such murders, in
July, 8 such murders; in August, 5 such murders.

All told,

during the first eight months of 1983, the Archdiocese of San
Salvador tabulated 56 murders of civilian non-combatants by
the guerrillas, an increase over the 40 tabulated during the
last eight months of 1982.
In addition, during June, July and August of 1983, the
Archdiocese tabulated 10 abductions by the guerrillas.
Prior to May 1983, the guerrillas had a very good record
of releasing captured prisoners to the International
Committee of the Red cross.

Their record contrasted

favorably with that of the Salvadoran government's armed
forces which only rarely take prisoners.

However in May,

June and July 1983, there were three incidents in which it is
credibly alleged that the guerrillas executed a number of
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captured prisoners.

Indeed, the guerrillas admitted

executing five civil defense members in one of these
incidents.
Another guerrilla abuse involves a number of incidents
of forceful recruitment in areas they have occupied.

Refugees -- Displaced Persons
More than a million Salvadorans -- twenty percent of the
population -- have been driven from their homes.
Approximately half have fled the country.

The remainder,

whose situation is especially desperate, live in displaced
persons camps or in places that barely deserve to be labelled
as camps within El Salvador.

The displaced persons are

disproportionately women and children as it is dangerous for
adult males to inhabit these camps.

The armed forces

periodically sweep through these camps and adult males found
there would be in danger as they might be suspected of being
guerrillas.

This ensures that family disruption is yet one

more of the travails inflicted on Salvadorans.
Very little of the enormous amount the United States
spends on economic aid to El Salvador makes its way to the
displaced persons.

Much of the care that is provided comes

from private agencies.

A Salvadoran government agency,

CONADES, operates some camps.
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General Comment
El Salvador is a human rights disaster area.
no prospect of significant improvement.

There is

Though the United

States has made strenuous efforts to persuade the security
forces to curtail human rights abuses, these efforts -- even
in such matters as the murder of
unavailing.
that

u.s.

u.s.

citizens -- have been

The Salvadoran security forces are confident

support will continue, no matter what.

they are not moved by

u.s.

Accordingly,

strictures about human rights

abuses.
The Salvadoran government's authority derives mainly from
its practice of terror.

This seems the only explanation for

the continuing enormous rate of political murders and
disappearances by its security forces.

By now, those forces

should be running out of politically suspect persons to kill.
They keep killing, however, to maintain the terror.
It is nonsense to assert, as the Department of State does
frequently, that El Salvador is undergoing a process of
democratic development.

Democracy implies choice and,

plainly, the security forces will not tolerate certain
choices.

Accordingly, they have murdered or driven into exile

the political leadership of the left and some of the political
leadership of the center.

Other principal targets for murder

include those who advocate negotiations with the left and
those who themselves denounce political murders.

Religious
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leaders, human rights workers, refugee and relief workers,
union leaders, teachers, journalists and doctors have also all
been special targets of political murders and disappearances.
A sufficient number of such persons has been killed so that,
in a tiny impoverished country such as El Salvador, it may
well be that the possibilities for democracy have been
eradicated for the foreseeable future.
The refusal of the security forces to tolerate so much as
a single conviction of one of their members for a political
murder -- even in cases that have jeopardized u.s. assistance,
such as the murders of the AIFLD representatives and the four
u.s. churchwomen -- demonstrates that there is no realistic
possibility of bringing about reform.

Accordingly, the choice

for the United states is to continue to sponsor the security
forces,

in full knowledge of their murderousness, or to end

military support for El Salvador and seek other means to
protect those security interests the United States may have in
the region.

The option of providing massive military support

while trying to promote reforms is no option at all.

It has

been tried for more than three years and there is not the
smallest sign of headway.

467.
GUATEMALA

Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants
At least 12,000 civilian non-combatants were killed by
Guatemalan government forces between 1978 and 1982 according
to Amnesty International.

In a single incident at Finca San

Francisco in June 1982, more than 300 Indian villagers were
massacred by Guatemalan soldiers.

It is difficult to say how

many have been killed in 1983 or how many are being killed now
since no human rights organization is able to operate within
Guatemala monitoring abuses.

Information gathered by

Americas Watch representatives indicates that the killings of
Indians in the countryside continues, but we have not been
able to monitor the situation systematically enough to provide
a count.

The most recent incident of mass killings of which

the Americas Watch is aware took place in early September 1983
at Chuabaj, in the vicinity of Chichicastenango, El Ouiche.
Twenty-eight men were rounded up by members of the civil
patrols from nearby communities and eight of them were killed.
The others were beaten, but escaped death.
An incident that has attracted widespread attention was
the murder of a Guatemalan linguist working on a
project, Patricio Ortiz Maldonado.

u.s.

AID

Along with three

companions, he was killed by the Guatemalan armed forces in
February 1983.
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Disappearances
Under the regime of President Lucas Garcia,
disappearances in Guatemala City had been very frequent.
These had been curtailed by the Rios Montt government during
its first few months but, in late 1982, started to take place
again.

Several scores of disappearances are known to have

taken place in 1983 but, again, the absence of a human rights
monitoring group within Guatemala makes a count impossible.
An example of a recent disappearance is the kidnapping of Jose
Saturnine Tajarito who was abducted from his office in
Chimaltenango on August 27, 19R3 by members of the Guatemalan
Army.

Two truckloads of soldiers took him from his office in

the Fundacion ULEU, a small development organization supported
by religious groups.
available.

No word of him has subsequently been

University students are among those particularly

victimized by disappearances.

Torture
The mutilation of Indians in the countryside by the
Guatemalan army before they are killed is routine.
women are systematically raped before being killed.

Similarly,
In

Guatemala City, many of those who were held for trial by the
special secret courts (see below) were first tortured.
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Political Prisoners
Under decrees that had been promulgated by the Rios Montt
government, there was no right to personal liberty and
arbitrary and unlimited detentions were permissible.

The

present situation is unclear and figures on the number of
political prisoners are not available.

There do not seem to

be many as the Guatemalan army takes few prisoners.

Freedom of the Press
On June 28, 1982 the office of Prensa Libre was machinegunned by unidentified men.

The government has prohibited the

publication of information on the war, rural conditions, or
political activity without permission.

In March 1983, the

Guatemalan newspapers were temporarily ordered not to print
any comments from the Pope or the vatican criticizing the
executions carried out after trials by secret courts.

Freedom of Religion
Under the Lucas Garcia regime, many priests were killed
and, in El Quiche, the diocese was closed by the Bishop who
went into exile.

President Rios Montt announced that exiled

priests may return to Guatemala on condition that they limit
their work to spiritual matters.
offer.

Few priests accepted this

General Mejia Victores said that the undue

influence of the verbo church was one of the reasons he
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overthrew Rios Montt.

At this writing, it is too soon to

evaluate religious freedom under Mejia.
Repression. Against Human Rights Monitors
No organization monitoring human rights operates above
ground in Guatemala today.

It is too dangerous.

Lawyers who

defended persons sentenced to death by the special secret
courts have themselves been fined because they filed legal
papers seeking to prevent the executions.

As a consequence,

no such legal efforts were made to stop the most recent
executions which took place on March 21, 1983.

Since the

Mejia Victores coup, death squad activity has increased in
Guatemala City and lawyers defending individuals accused of
subversion have been the targets of frequent threats.
The System of Government
General Mejia Victores was installed in office on
August 8, 1983 after a military coup.

He governs by decree.

He has pledged that constituent assembly elections will be
held in 1984.

It is too early to tell whether political

parties will enjoy the rights to function and compete freely
and safely for public support which would make elections
meaningful.
The System of Justice
President Rios Montt established special secret courts in
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which even the identities of the judges were unknown.

No

semblance of due process existed within these courts.

They

had the power to sentence defendants to death and, between
September 1982 and March 1983, fifteen persons were executed
after "trials" by these courts in which defendants never saw
either their defense attorneys (in those cases where they had
attorneys) or the judges who tried and sentenced them.

The

special secret courts violated Guatemala's international legal
obligations in a great many respects and, in September 1983,
the InterArnerican Court on Human Rights of the OAS found that
the executions violated Guatemala's obligations under the
American Convention on Human Rights.

At the time he seized

power, General Mejia Victores pledged to abolish the secret
courts.

At this writing, that pledge does not seem to have

affected the status of those imprisoned after convictions by
the secret courts nor the status of those who were imprisoned
pending trials by the secret courts.

Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations
In May 1982, two months after corning to power, President
Rios Montt issued an amnesty that provides the security forces
with immunity from prosecution for committing such crimes as
murder, torture and rape.

As a result of pressure from the

United States, an officer was detained for the murder of
Patricio Ortiz Maldonado and his colleagues but he was
acquitted.
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General Mejia Victores, then Defense Minister, had pledged to
other officers that an acquittal would be forthcoming.

Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross is denied
access to Guatemala and, accordingly, is unable to carry out
its humanitarian mission.

Political Violence By Opposition Forces
Several incidents have been documented in which
guerrillas have committed murder and other serious violations
of human rights.

The Government of Guatemala attempts to

attribute most such human rights violations to guerrillas,
claiming that the guerrillas attire themselves in army
uniforms.

Refugees say they have no difficulty in

distinguishing the army from guerrillas, pointing to command
structure, training, beari'ng, and weapons as among the ways
that they can differentiate.

In particular, refugees point

out that army assaults on their villages often are coordinated
with attacks by planes and helicopters and that guerrillas do
not have these weapons.
Refugees interviewed by Americas Watch representatives in
Chiapas, Mexico in March 1983 (where there are now close to
100,000 Guatemalan refugees, most of whom arrived in the last
year) were unanimous in insisting that they had been
victimized by the Guatemalan army.
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Refugees
In addition to the 100,000 or so refugees who have fled
across the border into Mexico, it was estimated in 1982 by
Catholic Church officials that close to a million Guatemalans
had become refugees in their own homeland.

The Guatemalan

government has resettled some displaced persons in villages
abandoned by those fleeing the armed forces.
At the Mexican border, the Guatemalan army has created a
free fire zone and many refugees have been killed.

In

addition, the Guatemalan army has conducted several raids
against refugee camps across the border.
Within Guatemala, the army controls the food supply to
refugees to coerce them to provide it with support.
General Comment
Over a period of several years, the Guatemalan armed
forces have practiced terror in the countryside to gain
control.

In the process, many thousands of Indians have been

killed and hundreds of thousands have fled their homes.

Those

who remain are forced to form civil partrols and must do
forced labor.

Crops are systematically destroyed so that the

only food that is available to many Indians is dispensed by
the army to those who become its allies and, in particular, to
those who do the dirty work of killing other Indians who are

less cooperative.

The cultures of the Indians of Guatemala
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are being destroyed and a significant portion of the Indian
population has been exterminated.
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HONDURAS

Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants
The incidence of extra-judicial killings by the security
forces in Honduras is rising.

Americas Watch has learned of

49 murders by members of the security forces that took place
from January 1983 to June 1983, 13 of which appear to be
politically motivated.
These cases include the murder in April 1983 of four
brothers named Bustamante whose bodies were found in Olahoe.
The family blames the police.

Earlier in the month, a

well-known economist, Salvador Diaz Valle, disappeared and his
body was discovered several days later showing signs of
torture.
On March 29, 1983, the President and three other members
of an agricultural union were killed near Progreso, Department
of Yoro.

Survivors attributed the killings to the military;

the military attributes the killings to company security
guards.

On January 1, 1983, a communist leader was

assassinated.

The family accuses FUSEP, a police agency.

Previously, in October, 1982, nine heavily armed men
abducted and killed a leftist, Jose Luis Rivera.

In June,

1982, eight persons were killed in similar fashion in Santa
Barbara.

Three student leaders and officers of the union of

university employees were abducted in August 1982 and their
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bodies were found a few days later.
Though such killings are infrequent in Honduras by
comparison with El Salvador and Guatemala, they are,
nevertheless, very disturbing, especially because they rarely
result in prosecutions.
Disappearances
The leading Honduran human rights organization, the
Comite para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CODEH)
reported 15 disappearances between January 1981 and January
1982 when a democratic civilian government took office.
Subsequently, during 1982, 31 Hondurans disappeared after
abduction by security forces; four subsequently reappeared
alive; three corpses were found.

In addition, 42 Salvadorans,

5 Costa Ricans, one venezuelan, one Ecuadorian and one
Guatemalan disappeared after abductions in 1981 and 1982.
Americas Watch has learned of 22 additional
disappearances during 1983, though in an encouraging
development possibly reflecting the efforts of human rights
groups, there were also 8 reappearances of persons who had
been listed as disappeared.

One of these was Inez Consuelo

Murillo, a 25 year old lawyer arrested in the presence of
witnesses in san Pedro Sula on March 13, 1983.

She reappeared

when she was brought to a court on May 31 where she testified
that she had been held in clandestine safehouses during her 79
days secret imprisonment.
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The most recent abduction that has come to our attention
was of Professor Joaquin Portillo of the University of San
Pedro Sula, past President of the union of University
employees.

He was abducted on September 22, 1983 and, as of

September 27, we have been unable to determine his
whereabouts.
The Honduran Congress has refused to acknowledge that
disappearances are a problem.

After many months of pressure,

the Congress has recently organized a special committee on
human rights but has conspicuously excluded from it Deputy
Efrain Diaz Arrivillaga, a Christian Democrat, even though
Diaz Arrivillaga had been the only member to request an
investigation into disappearances.
Torture
Police brutality appears to be common.
number of allegations of torture:

There have been a

on March 16, 1983, Raoul

Zuniga accused the DNI and on March 17, 1983, Antonio Martinez
accused FUSEP.
Political Prisoners
There have been a number of cases of arbitrary arrest and
detention and peasant and trade union leaders appear to be
particularly victimized.

In a letter to President Suazo, the

national peasant union (UNC) has claimed that 36 of its
members were in detention and 230 were being prosecuted -
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apparently as a result of peaceful demonstrations and work
stoppages.
Freedom of--the Press
Freedom of the press generally prevails in Honduras,
though there have been some disturbing developments recently,
including the arrest.of three photographers for Tiempo and El
Heraldo while covering police actions against demonstrators,
threats and the attempted shooting of journalist Nee Leiva on
June 10 by two intelligence officers, and the expulsion from
the country of UPI correspondent John Lantigua on May 5, 1983
on charges of "disinforming" the world about Honduras.
Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion prevails in Honduras.
Repression Against Human Rights Monitors
CODEH operates without restriction.

Some of the victims

of killings and disappearances have been lawyers, union
leaders and student leaders who have defended left-wingers.
The System of Government
After 20 years of nearly continuous military government,
Honduras elected a civilian government in November 1981 that
took office in late January 1982.

In spite of this welcome

return to democratic rule, the armed forces remain the
dominant power in the country.

The civilian government has
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done little to investigate charges of corruption and human
rights violations by the armed forces.

No serious

investigation was conducted when two large burial grounds were
discovered near Tegucigalpa in 1982.
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations
There is little or no investigation of human rights
abuses and effective remedies against those responsible are
unavailable.

An exception was the indictment of Honduran

military officers who abducted and abused a

u.s.

nurse,

Cynthia Morin, and a Guatemalan doctor, oscar Giron, who were
providing health care to Guatemalan refugees.
Access by the International Committee of the Red Cross
The ICRC has access and is able to carry out its
humanitarian mission.
Political Violence by Opposition Forces
There have been several spectacular terrorist incidents
in Honduras including kidnappings, an airplane hijacking, and
the assassination of the son of a leading publisher.
Refugees
The treatment of Salvadoran refugees has been among the
most serious human rights problems in Honduras.

Many have

been forcibly returned to El Salvador to face near certain
death.

Honduran armed forces have collaborated with
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Salvadoran armed forces in attacking refugee camps.
Salvadoran refugees have been victims of many killings and
disappearances.
Honduras also has thousands of Nicaraguan refugees and
several hundred Guatemalan refugees.
comparably mistreated.

They have not been

There are indications,, however, that ,

it has been Honduran policy to keep Miskito Indian refugees
from Nicaragua together at the Mocoron refugee camp in order
to foster their use in attacks against Nicaragua.
The Honduran government has refused to sign the UN
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
It does, however, permit the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and international relief agencies to provide care
for those displaced from neighboring countries.
Unfortunately the operations of these monitors and relief
workers have often been made extremely difficult by the
Honduran armed forces.

A particularly serious incident took

place on June 16, 1983 when the resident UNHCR officer was
physically abused when she intervened on behalf of Guatemalan
refugees who were being taken away from a refugee camp by
Honduran soldiers.
General Comment
The critical question in Honduras is whether the
civilian democratic government will demonstrate the strength
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and the will to control its armed forces and to punish those
responsible for human rights violations.
that question are not yet in sight.

Clear answers to

The possibility that

civilian democratic rule will prevail is increasingly remote
given the tremendous militarization of the country that is
underway.

In most matters affecting human rights, the

military commander, General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, is the
effective ruler of the country.
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NICARAGUA

Murders of Civilian Non-Combatants
In December 1981, up to 50 Miskito mineworkers were
allegedly murdered by soldiers at Leimus.

The Nicaraguan

government assured the Americas Watch a year and a half ago
that it would investigate this incident, but we have no
report on an investigation and no evidence that it has been
conducted.

A similar incident on a smaller scale is alleged

to have taken place at San Carlos at about the same time.
The more recent incidents that have come to the
attention of the Americas Watch are the killings in April
1982 of three persons in detention under circumstances that
are not clear, and a report that a number of prisoners were
executed at La Polvora prison in Granada.
Disappearances
Ten persons who disappeared in 1981 remain disappeared.
Fifteen additional persons disappeared in the first two
months of 1982, but they all turned up alive.

Additional

temporary disappearances continue to take place and it is
never certain whether the disappeared person will turn up.
Particularly in rural areas, authorities frequently fail to
inform families when they have made arrests.

The Permanent

Commission for Human Rights (CPDH), a private organization
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that has effectively monitored human rights both under Somoza
and under the Sandinistas has published a list of some 70
persons who have "disappeared" since mid-1982 from the
Atlantic Coast region where the Miskito population is
concentrated.

About half of these cases have the

characteristics normally associated with "disappearances"
-that is, they involve arrests, abductions, or detentions
following which the individual subsequently disappears.

No

information is provided as to the circumstances in which the
remainder of the persons on the list disappeared.
Accordingly, these may be disappearances or they may be cases
of missing persons.

CPDH reports that one of those who

disappeared after arrest in July 1982, Manuel Thompson Clark,
was seen alive by his family in May 1983 in a prison in
Puerto Cabezas.

It has been rumored that the remainder of

the Miskitos listed as disappeared were killed by government
soldiers and that the soldiers responsible were subsequently
secretly court-martialed and executed.

Americas Watch has

obtained no evidence that would confirm this rumor.

Torture
There have been a few documented instances of torture,
but it is not a routine practice.

The most serious abuses of

prisoners involve male Miskito Indians incarcerated in Puerto
Cabezas.

Credible accounts indicate that, for a period in
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1982, they were subjected to systematic physical abuse by
security personnel, including beatings.

CPDH has recently

reported threats and arbitrary punishment of prisoners in
Tipitapa and Zona Franca, the two major prisons.

Political Prisoners
Under the State of Emergency that has been in effect
since March 1982, prisoners may be detained without charges
for security-related reasons.

several hundred such

detentions have taken place during the past year.
those detained have since been released.

Some of

To date, the

practice has been to prosecute about 25% of those detained in
this way on various charges.
In late 1981, three officials of a business organization
and four leaders of a Communist trade union were imprisoned
for publishing statements about the country's economic
situation.

They were released in early 1982.

On May 5, 1983, some 18 leaders of the Central de
Trabajadores de Nicaragua, a labor federation, were imprisoned
under the Law for the Maintenance of Public Order and
Security.

Some have been subsequently released.

Freedom of the Press
An opposition newspaper, La Prensa, operates but it is
harassed and, since March 1982, has been subjected to prior
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censorship.

There are no discernible standards for

censorship.

In addition, two radio stations that broadcast

comments adverse to the Government were denied license
renewals.

A humor magazine, La Semana Comica, was recently

closed for a month.
Freedom of Religion
There has been considerable tension between the
Archbishop of Managua and the government, and difficulties
between some other religious groups .and the government,
particularly the Moravian Church to which the majority of the
Miskito Indians adhere.

The most severe interferences with

religious freedom involve restrictions on the right of
Moravian and other ministers to travel to East Coast regions
where the Miskito Indian population is concentrated.

Travel

restrictions appear to have been eased recently.
Repression Against Human Rights Monitors
A private human rights organization, the Comision
Permanente de Derechos Humanos, operates and effectively
documents human rights abuses.

In 1981, its former director,

Jose Esteban Gonzalez, had a number of confrontations with
the government, including an incident in which a mob that was
allegedly organized by the Sandinista party attacked him at
the airport when he returned to Nicaragua from a trip out of
the country.

Since then, the most serious interference with
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CPDH was the arrest of a CPDH employee in July 1982.

He

spent two months in prison, apparently for distributing CPDH
literature.
The System of Government
Since the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979,
Nicaragua has been governed by a directorate and a junta.
Elections have been promised for 1985 but they are unlikely
to be meaningful because opposition political parties have
operated under severe restrictions and the most prominent
political opponents of the Sandinistas have gone into exile.
Recently there has been some relaxation on the restrictions
under which opposition political parties operate, but there
is no guarantee against reimposition of these restrictions.
The System of Justice
Nicaragua's judicial system has preserved a measure of
independence.

Capital punishment has been abolished.

Appellate review of trial court decisions is sometimes
meaningful.
The most severe abuses in the last two years involve
about 130 Miskito defendants convicted between December 1981
and February 1982 in Puerto Cabezas in circumstances
involving procedural shortcomings (on appeal, sentences were
reversed or reduced and, at this writing, most have been
released

46 of them in July 1983): and the denial of
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habeas corpus in most judicial districts to prisoners
detained for security reasons without charges.

In addition a

disturbing development has been the reestablishment of
special courts, "Popular Tribunals" - apparently similar to
those that operated in 1979 and 1980 - to try prisoners
captured in current fighting against "contras" trying to
overthrow or destabilize the government.

It is not yet known

how these special courts are operating in practice and the
Nicaraguan government has thus far failed to cooperate with
Americas Watch's efforts to monitor these courts.
Apparently, however, their decisions are not subject to
review by the Supreme Court and their proceedings are
summary.
Punishment of Those Committing Human Rights Violations
There have been a number of instances in which those
responsible for human rights abuses have been criminally
prosecuted and punished but, so far as is known, no action
with respect to those who may have been responsible for the
most serious recent alleged abuse:

those who may have

executed up to 50 Miskito mineworkers at Leimus in December
1981 (see above).
Access By the International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross has access
and is able to carry out its humanitarian mission.
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Political Violence By Opposition Forces
There are many documented instances of violence against
civilian non-combatants, including medical personnel, by
opposition forces fighting the Nicaraguan government.

One

well-known case involves the Barreda family from Jalapa,
abducted with neighbors by the FDN (contras) in December
1982.

The Barredas were subsequently killed in Honduras.

On

August 23, Eden Pastora, leader of another group fighting the
Nicaraguan government, announced that "25 Cubans" fighting
with the Sandinistas were executed by firing squad in July.
Subsequently, a cable from Pastora's forces said that
"Commander Cero, who wants to demonstrate 'objectively' the
presence of foreigners in the Sandinista army, has admitted
that several Cuban prisoners have been executed, but said
that 'it was a mistake by the companeros.'"
Refugees
The Nicaraguan government has systematically relocated
Miskito Indians and other Indians from border regions.

These

relocations were carried out suddenly, without advance
consultation with those affected.
property were destroyed.

Their villages and

Thousands of Miskitos fled

Nicaragua and took refuge in Honduras.
The Nicaraguan government has established resettlement
camps in the interior for some 8,500 Miskitos it evacuated
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from the border with Honduras.

The most significant abuse at

these camps was that those resettled there were effectively
required to stay there.

Reports indicate that some

restrictions on movement have recently been eased, though
the Miskitos lack a realistic option of settling elsewhere.
In addition, Miskitos relocated have not been compensated for
their losses.

Ir late 1982, the Nicaraguan government

relocated an additional five thousand persons of varied ethnic
backgrounds from the Honduran border where heavy fighting was
taking place.

It was during this relocation that a

helicopter crashed killing some 80 Indian children.

As best

we can determine this relocation unlike the relocation in
1981, did not involve duress.

Most recently, there have been

relocations from villages in the vicinity of Puerto Cabezas, an
area where there is heavy fighting between the contras and
Nicaraguan government forces.

General Comment
The most serious abuses in Nicaragua involve the Miskito
Indians.

They have lost their villages and their homes; many

of them have been detained without .charges; they have
received the worst treatment by the courts and in the
prisons; some of them may have been massacred at Leimus in
19811 and they have been restricted in their movements.
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Nicaragua shows no signs of evolving in the direction of
a democratic society in which freedom of expression is
respected.

On the other hand, the Americas Watch has found

a drastic reduction in violent abuses since the overthrow of
the Somoza regime in 1979.

Again, the Miskito population

appears to have been particularly victimized by those abuses
that continue to occur.
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Statement of Orville Schell

My name is Orville Schell.

I am Chairman of the

Americas Watch and Vice Chairman of the Helsinki Watch.
Robert Bernstein has told you why we created the
Americas Watch and why the Helsinki Watch and the Americas
Watch believe that efforts to promote human rights have a
significant force in the world today. Aryeh Neier has
summarized the information that Americas watch has assembled
about the human rights situation in El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua.

My assignment is to tell you what

steps you might recommend that will promote human rights.

I

will proceed country by country.
El Salvador
In El Salvador, the unrelenting practice of murder,
kidnapping, disappearances and torture by the security forces
indicates that they rely principally on terror to maintain
their authority.

Their very policy is terror.

The refusal

of the security forces to permit a single one of their
members to be criminally punished for a human rights
violation -- even in cases that outraged Americans such as
the murders of the AIFLD advisors and of the four

u.s.

\
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churchwomen --demonstrates that they are impervious to human
rights pressure from the United States.

In our view, that is

because they do not take that human rights pressure
seriously.

Our actions have made them confident that our

support will continue no matter what.

Accordingly, we should

serve notice on El Salvador that our military support will
end unless:

disappearances stop: the army stops its free

fire practices in guerrilla controlled zones: torture ends:
and prosecutions and convictions of members of the security
forces responsible for abuses take place quickly and in
meaningful numbers.

To be credible the threat of a cut-off

of military support must be real.

That is, we must actually

end support if dramatic change does not take place quickly.
The statements by our Ambassadors that it will take a decade
or more to secure change are not good enough.
the,continuation of abuses.

They excuse

If we believe those statements

we should terminate all military support now.
Guatemala
In Guatemala, though the practices of the armed forces
have not been so exhaustively documented as in El Salvador
because of the absence of any domestic human rights group
operating within the country, the available evidence
indicates that overwhelming human rights abuses continue.
to a few months ago, rural massacres were taking place in
which entire Indian villages were destroyed and their

Up
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populations were wiped out.

Disappearances in Guatemala

City, which subsided during the early months of the Rios
Montt regime, have resumed in quantity.
government~s

policy is terror.

Again, the

Even in sections of the

country that appear to have been "pacified," it is a "peace"
that has been imposed and that is maintained by terror. To
the best of our knowledge, no effort is underway to punish
those responsible for massacring Indians.

100,000 Guatemalan

Indians have fled to Southern Mexico and many hundreds of
thousands are displaced persons in their own country.
Though the United States is far less centrally involved
in Guatemala than in El Salvador, our support provides the
only veneer of legitimacy to what should be a pariah nation.
We make it possible for governments that depend on us, such
as those of Taiwan and Israel, to supply its military needs.
We should end all military aid to Guatemala, and all economic
aid except for aid to meet basic human needs, and we should
organize an international arms boycott.

It should end only

when there is clear and convincing evidence that the
Guatemalan armed forces are not practicing terror against the
Guatemalan Indians.
Honduras

•

In Honduras, the human rights situation is not presently
so grave that respect for our own laws requires us to end

494.
military aid.

At the same time, we should recognize that the

human rights situation is deteriorating in Honduras.
Ironically, this has happened during the past two
years, jugt at a time when the human rights situation should
be improving because the country has returned to civilian
democratic rule.

During that period, however, the armed

forces have increased their dominance over the country.

The

elected civilian government has shown itself powerless to
deal with disappearances and other abuses committed by the
armed forces.

Though the Americas Watch does not oppose

military aid to Honduras, we do oppose militarization of
Honduras.

We call on this Commission to recommend a policy

towards Honduras that recognizes the need to draw a line
between military aid and militarization.

Military

subservience to the democratically elected civilian
government should be a condition for the continuation of
military aid.
Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, the human rights situation is bad and
continues to deteriorate.

The Sandinistas have steadily

eliminated the possibility of democratic development by
imposing prior censorship on the press, restricting
opposition political groups and labor unions, and by driving
many of their most prominent political critics into exile.
The worst abuses have been endured by the Miskito Indians and
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other Indians who have been forcibly removed from their
traditional lands and villages and required to live in
resettlement camps.

The Miskitos have also suffered

discrimination in their treatment by the courts and prisons.
At the same time, given the practices in the region, it
must be noted that Nicaragua has not engaged in the
systematic use of murder, massacres and disappearances.
Incidents of violent abuse have occurred in Nicaragua
-- again, especially victimizing the Miskitos -- but the
numbers are comparable to those in Honduras rather than to
those in El Salvador or Guatemala.
The Americas Watch believes that United States support
for the "contras" battling the government of Nicaragua is at
least questionable on human rights grounds.

First, some of

those we are supporting are Somocistas who committed terrible
abuses when they held power.

Second, our support for the

contras exacerbates the victimization of the Miskitos whose
traditional lands and villages are in the path of the
fighting.

In addition,

u.s.

support for the contras raises

questions about our adherence to our own laws and to our
treaty obligations.

Failure to adhere to law certainly has a

bearing on human rights.
In urging that you recommend these steps, we are not
calling for United States abandonment of Central America.
our view, the United States would retain many military,

In
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economic and diplomatic options.

We do not recommend

particular options to you because those matters are not our
p~ovince.

Members of this Commission are better qualified

than we are to consider those questions.

The steps we

recommend are those that we believe the United states should
adopt in order to promote human rights in the region.
Here is what we would achieve if we undertook a policy
designed to promote human rights.

We would let it be known

in Central America that we stand for human rights, not only
for ourselves, and not only for those who are victimized by
communist oppression, but also for those in nearby countries
who are victimized by brutally repressive governments that
claim to be our friends.

At present, much as we proclaim our

devotion to human rights, much as we practice human rights at
home, much as we denounce oppression in the Soviet Union,
Poland and Cuba, we have no credibility as friends of human
rights in Central America.

The victims of oppression in El

Salvador and Guatemala identify us as their oppressors or as
the accomplices of their oppressors.

Even most of the

victims of Marxist oppression in Nicaragua do not see us as
friends of human rights.

We may denounce denials of freedom

that they endure today, but many of them remember that we
were accomplices of Somoza and helped to sponsor the
oppression that they endured just a few years ago.

They may
l

also identify us as the sponsors of Somocistas seeking to
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return to power.
In addition to letting it be known in Central America
that we stand for human rights - again, not only for
ourselves, and not only for the victims of communist
oppression - we would also ·let thi~ be known throughout Latin
America and, indeed, throughout the world.

Those of us who

believe that the central struggle in the world today is
between human rights and totalitarianism must realize that our
side - what we like to think of as the human rights side -

is

crippled, perhaps fatally, by our identification with some of
the most brutally repressive regimes on earth in.our own
backyard.
We appear here as advocates of human rights.

We know

that the members of this Commission are also advocates of
human rights.

Where we may differ, however, is that some of

you may consider that at least in the short term, there is a
contradiction between assuring the national s~curity of the
United States and promoting human rights.

It is possible

that some of you have persuaded yourselves that, for now, we
must put up with even such dreadful regimes as thos~ of El
Salvador and Guatemala in order to maintain our national
security.

We take issue with this view because we believe

that the national security of the United States depends on
its credibility world-wide as a force for human rights.

If

their side is perceived as totalitarian, and the sponsor of
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oppression in Poland and Afghanistan, our case against them
is anything but strong if we are perceived as a democracy at
horne and the sponsor of oppression in El Salvador and
Guatemala.

Yet that is the way we are perceived not only by

much of the world but also by a significant number of
Americans.

Indeed, in my view and in the view of my

colleagues in the Americas Watch, it is an accurate
perception.
One of the lessons of the Vietnam era is that where a
significant segment of American public opinion vigorously
expresses harsh criticism of the morality of our stand in
another country, that criticism resounds throughout the
world.

As we are an open society, a moral society, committed

to human rights at horne, attempts to suppress such criticism
only serves to magnify it and, as we learned during the
Vietnam era, the consequence can be to tear the country
apart.
We say to you today that any solution for the problems
of Central America that continues to identify the United
States with brutal repression is no solution at all.

Far

from it.

And the

It will not end the turmoil in the region.

turmoil at horne may just be beginning.
Americans are beginning to discover what is being done
in our backyard by those whom we sponsor.

The very creation

of your Commission and the issuance of your report will
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heighten awareness of what is being done.

Either you will

deal forthrightly with the terror in Central America or the
information will emerge through attacks on the product of
your Commission.

The contradictions between our practice of

human rights at home and our sponsorship of repression nearby
will emerge more clearly.

The consequences of increased

awareness of those contradictions are, no doubt, as apparent
to you as they are to us.
Having stated our view that we believe that our national
security would be enhanced by our identification with the
cause of human rights for the people of Guatemala and El
Salvador, let me now turn to those who object that the human
rights situation would not improve if we withdrew our
sponsorship of those governments.
- it is objected that, though those governments
are terrible, the Marxist-Leninist governments
that would take their place if the guerrillas
prevail could be even worse.
In answering that objection, it must first be
pointed out that it is hard to conceive anything
worse than the governments of El Salvador and
Guatemala.

Matters may well be so far gone in El

Salvador that, without our support, a Marxist
revolution will prevail.

That seems far less
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likely in Guatemala, but is is also a possibility.
If that happens, it would certainly be undesirable.
The human rights situation will be bad, but
hardly worse.

In recent years, only the Pol Pot

regime of Cambodia may have murdered a larger
proportion of its own population than the
government of El Salvador.

As for the government

of Guatemala, we can only guess at how many Indians
it has killed.

Perhaps something worse is

possible, but that possibility does not seem a
compelling reason for us to support and identify
ourselves with such murderous governments.
- it is objected that regimes such as those in
El Salvador and Guatemala, bad as they are,
tend not to endure forever.

Marxist-Leninist

repression such as might take place if the
guerrillas triumph, on the other hand, tends
to be permanent.
In my view, those who make this comment misread
the history of Marxist-Leninist repression.
There is nothing inherent in Marxism-Leninism
which assures permanence.

What maintained such

repression in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981, was not
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the system itself but Soviet tanks.

Without

those tanks, the systems would have been
transformed.

Geography makes it impossible

for those tanks to play the same role in
Central America.

Accordingly, though

repressive Marxist-Leninist regimes may emerge
if the guerrillas triumph, their permanence is
far from assured.
- it is objected that, if the united States
withdraws from El Salvador, there will be no
restraint whatsoever on the armed forces and
a bloodbath will follow.
To this I can only respond that a bloodbath
has been underway for four years and that the
world holds us responsible for it.

We are not asserting, of course, that identification
with human rights is the only component of national security.
We are asserting, however, that identification with human
rights is an essential element of our national security.
Though we have refrained from recommending to you
economic programs for the region, there is one urgent human
rights need that should be considered in any recommendation

that you make.

Whatever the United States does should take
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into account the tragic situation of refugees and displaced
persons in the region.

In the past four years, at least ten

per cent of the people in the region have been forced to flee
their homes.

The majority remain as displaced persons in

their own lands.

Others have fled to nearby lands, including

the United States.

For urgent humanitarian reasons, as well

as for the stability of the region, their needs should loom
large in any thinking that this Commission does about
economic assistance.

Increasingly, prominent voices are heard calling for a
military solution to the problems of Central America.

We

note, particularly, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle's
recent speech in Baltimore.

In the view of Americas Watch,

such a solution would only compound the disaster of the
region.

We call on you to reject a military solution and to

endorse a human rights solution, both because it is right and
because we believe that it would serve the interests of the
United States.

Nothing else would bring so much credit to

the United States in Central America, in the rest of Latin
America, in the world, and with the American people.

We

recognize that the United States is allied with repressive
regimes in many parts of the world -- in Pakistan, in Turkey,
in South Korea, and in the Philippines -- and that those
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alliances dilute our claim to stand for human rights against
Soviet totalitarianism.

But the damage is far greater to us

from our support for repressive regimes in Central America
because our identification with those regimes is far greater.
The world holds us directly responsible for their murders,
their disappearances, their torture.

American citizens also

hold us responsible for their murders, their disappearances
their torture.

Unless we commit ourselves to a human rights

solution, it is a responsibility we cannot evade.
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STATEMENT OF Dr. Roland H. Ebel, Tulane University

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission:
I have been asked to comment before this commission on the
structural changes I see taking. place in the political systems
of Central America and indicate some of the implications for
American policy that might be drawn from an understandin,g of
these changes.
I believe, and have so expressed myself in print, that the
current problems in the region are part of a long-term process
of change in the fundamental economic, social and political
structures of the Central American nations.

If this is true,

it will require that the United States learn to live with and
adjust to a constantly changing and evolving situation that may
take a considerable period of time to work out.

At the same

time, we will be confronted with problems and crises of a m::>re
immediate and short-term character.
What is the nature of the fundamental socio-political
change in Central America?

Simply this:

the past 10 years

have witnessed a breakdown in a particular soci-political system
I have elsewhere termed the Central American city-state.
The Central American city-state can, be described as a
polity in which almost all of the elements of modern life are
either physically concentrated in the capital city, or, if
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physically located in other parts of the country, are closely
tied to it.
The Central American city-state was marked by a number of
particular characteristics.

First of all, almost all of the

essential features of modern life and the institutions which
carry them out were concentrated in a single
the capital city.

city~-usually

The bulk of industry, commerce, education,

mass communications, government and artistic and cultural institutions were located in a single urban complex.

These societies

became dual societies -- not so much in a class sense
class divisions. were clearly

mark~d)

but

mor~

(~lthough

importantly in a

geographic. sense in that a culturally and socially modernized
population was concentrated in a single urban complex while the
.rural areas, which .contained the mc;jority of the population
and natural.resour.ces, served as a resevoir of labor and materfel
for· the urban center.

Second, these urban centers, which not

on1y contained the more pri vile,ged segments of the population
but also had the greatest potential for modernization and growth,
were protected from the masses and mass demands by their.armed
forces. Third, these modernizing urban centers were linked to
each other and to the international economic and political
system through the multinational corporations, charitable foundations, and such regional organizations .as the Central American
Common Market, the Central American Defense Council, the Central
American Nutrition Institute, etc.

Ultimately, of course, these

linkages tied these city-states closely to the United States.
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Finally, this combination of a modernized urban core
(protected by the military and receiving economic and technical
inputs. from e~ternal industr'iai .· co:un.tries, .. coexisting with an
underdeveloped periphery of peasants and t<;>wnsfold) produced
the paradoxical mixture of stability and instabili'ty that
characteriz'ed Central American politics

unt~'l

the late 1970's.

On the one hand, these nations were subject to a seemingly
endless succession of strikes, demonstrations, coups and
threatened coups.

On the other hand, these polities were quite

resistant to ·re,al social and economic change and evidenced a
marked continuity in domestic poll.cy and international posture.
These polities were stablized by regular infusions of capital,
~echnology,

managerial expertise and military support-- primarily

from the United States.

They were unsettled periodically by the

political actions of the only partially integrated lower middle
sectors living in the urban centers (school teachers, students,
clerical workers, etc.) by the emerging trade unions (and,
occasionally, carnpesino organizations), and by the political
and economic rivalries of the elites.
A variety of political mechanisms were used during the
1960's and early 70's -- with a modicum of success -- in an
attempt to achieve greater stability.
1.

These, in brief, were:

A system of officially sanctioned (or "licensed")

political parties which rotated power among competing urban
civilian-military factions every four years.

(Guatemala)
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2.

A system of limited opposition, in which certain

parties were allowed to compete in politics as long as they
accepted minority status.
3.

(El Salvador)

A system of economic and political payoffs to middle

and upper sectors groupsin exchange for political quiescence.
(Nicaragua)
4.

Military populism by which the military sought to make

common cause
5.

with mass organizations.

Democratic reformism.

(Honduras)

(Costa Rica)

The Central American city-state system, stabilized by these
political mechanisms and

supporte~

by the United States, reached

the apogee of its development in the latter 1960's.
respects they were quite successful.

In many

First, they created fairly

flexible, resiliant and tough political systems that produced
at least a tolerable level of stability in the region and
avenues of participation for the more ambitious urban middle
class groups. Second, they generated fairly rapid economic
development and modernization.

(Central America showed up better

than the rest of Latin America on the economic indicators.)
Third, the system enabled economic integration to proceed.
The negative results were, o.f course, that these systems
which provided growing affluence and participation for the urban
middle sectors and elites, increaingly alienated the lower
classes and accellerated .·their mobilization into .radical groups:;
and also that these nations' dependency on .the international'
economic system was increased ,thus making them less self sufficient and more· vulnerable to .world· economic. crises.
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By the early 1970's i t became fairly evident that these
political systems were rapidly losing their viability.
the factors undermining them was economic g:x;owth itself.

Among
This

growth, while improving urban living standards substantially,
also created a much more diverse, multifaceted economy.

Because

of the importance of government 801 icy to the furtctioning of
a modern economy,, political rivalries between major interest
groups for control of the state increased considerably.

The

military, which .had often previously mediated conflicts between
these groups and protected them against mass demands, became
increasingly divided and drawn into intraelite contests for
economic advantage and by opportunities for personal enrichment.

These alliances (or "mafias" as one Guatemalan political

leader put it) of economic, military and party leaders often
had a paramilitary arm which was responsible for the numerous
assassinations of political leaders in that country during the
1970's.
A second factor -- the rapid mobilization of the masses -also was largely the result of economic growth.
and 1978 export agriculture grew considerably.

Between 1961
This came about

largely by the application of modern technology to larger and
larger tracts of land -- land which by usage and custom had
been available to the compesino for subsistence farming.

The

problem of land seizure was compounded by the continued growth
of population in the rural areas.

For

~ile,

the expansion of

industrial employment in the urban centers absorbed the rural
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migrant and functioned as a safety valve for potential-rural discontent, thus serving to shield the city;...state from excessive
mass demands.

The "oil shock" of 1973, however, had a catas-

trophic effect upon the urban lower classes.

Industrial

growth was almost halved, while between 19.72 and 1974 inflation
increased sixfold.

The result was a drop in real.wages which

has been fairly steady evetJ since.

Trade union organization

and militancy were a natural consequence of this situation,
particularly since the downward trend in wages and standards
of living among the urban working classes was accompanied by
increases in literacy, organizational techniques, and modern
communications •.
Urban working class militancy was matched in the countryside by the development of cooperatives, village

improvement

socieites and religious study groups, all of which tended to
politicize the campesino.
The third factor undermining the Central American citystate was the reduction of economic and political supports from
abroad.

This was composed of a number of elements:

the Soccer

War which seriously disrupted intraregional trade and industrial
growth; the rise in oil prices which launched a wave of doubledigit inflation; the drop in commodity prices which made it
difficult for the urban centers to earn the foreign exchange
necessary to pay for the goods on which their living standards
were based; and

u.s.

human rights policy which greatly reduced

military assistance to the nations of Central America.
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Given the many elements at work underming the area's
political systems, it is not surprising that the Machiavellian
forces of conflict and insurrection became dominant during the
1970's.

With the exception of Costa Rica, the failure of the

middle class democratic revolutions of the 1940's and 1950's to
establ$~h

the electoral process as the only

legi~imate

means

of achieving power and to open meaningful participation in
their nations' political life to the urban and rural lower
classes, created a city-state system that would last for a
period of time but ensured that the revolutionary process
would continue in other, less democratic forms.

By attempting

to wall off the modern urban center from the countryside and
from the urban lower classes as well, the middle class populists
not only failed to create an electoral base large enough to
control the politics of the city-state democratically, but also,
in the process, created an alienated group that eventually
would be large enough and strong enough to attack that state.
Still, during the 1960's the industrial working class was sufficiently optimistic about its future in the Central American
ci ty-s tate to keep it from making common cause with its rural
counterparts, thus dooming the guerilla foco strategy of the
1960's to failure.
of elite

During the 1970's, however, the intensification

rivalries and the failure of the partY: systems in

El Sal vader, Guatemala and Nicaragua to provide a viable .road to
power pushed many sectors of the urban middle and working classes
into making

common cause with .each other a:nd. with the revolu-

tionary groups based in the rural areas.
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It is the linkage of alienated urban groups with a politicized campesineato which pose the immediate critical threat
to the Central American city-state.

As long as urban groups

stick together they can probably protect the

city-s~ate.

However,

when coalitions are formed between rural and disaffected urban
groups, the system is in serious jeapordy.
What can be said about the future of the Central American
city-state?

Two broad possibilities present themselves.

The

first is the replacement of the city-state by the nation-state.
This could come about in at least two ways:

by the Nicaraguan

model, which involves the attempt to create a nation-state by
the defeat of the city-state and its principal supporters; or
by the Costa Rican model, which i·s based on the voluntary opening
up of the city-state to the political participation of all
sectors of the nation.

(While not·imposs·ible, there is not a

strong cultural foundation for the successful implementation
of the Costa Rican solution in most of Central America.)
A second possibility is .that the city-state will save
itself by becoming a fully developed garrison state.

The likli-.

hood of this happening in countries like El Salvador or Guatemala
depends on three factors:

the loyalty of the military 'to

the traditional city-state, the willingness of the United States
to support and finance it, and whether the bulk of the middle
class casts its lot with the

insurectionaries (as in Nicaragua)

or with the elite (as in El Salvador).
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u.s.

policy seems to be oriented toward the second course --

saving the. Cl.ty-state.

In reactib'n .. 9-gainst .succ.essful. re'volu~ion

in Nicaragua, its' strategy in the region

se~ms

largely to be

dedica;ted to strengthening the three legs of the tripod of
supports which have traditionally undergirded it:

en'co.uraging

elections (aimed at restoring some degree of consensus within
the urban groups), the military defeat of guerilla forces (aimed
at depoliticizing the masses), and economic and military assistance
(aimed at propping up the modern urban sectors and giving the
·ml.li tary the capability to protect them).

Whether this stra-

tegy will be successful over the short term or not will depend
on the future of the world economy and the tenacity of the American government and the various contending groups.

In the

meantime, the price of sustaining the Central American citystate is the thousands of innocent lives lost and the millions
of dollars of labor and resources destroyed by violence.
What are the implications that can be drawn from the
changes in the.socio-political structure of the area that I
have just described?

First of all, we may be able to protect

the existing city-state system over the short run through
economic, military and political support.

However, it cannot

be preserved over the long term because the forces undermining
i t are too strong.

Thus, just defeating the insurrectionary

movements militarily is not going to preserve the city-state
nor will it automatically produce a viable nation-state.

This

can only be achieved through political, economic, and socialpolicies hammered out by the nations .themselves.

At the same time,

513.

over-reliance on a military solution to the disintegration of
the city-state system runs the risk of turning these nations
into garrison states.

Furthermore, if such a policy simply

protects the current beneficiaries of this system,it will simply
initiate another cycle of insurrection.
A second implication that can be drawn from an understanding
of the history and structure of these natioRs is that:.economic
growth, if limited to the modernized urban centers·, is .no
panacea either.

We must help these nations ecomonically as

'best :we can, '.but within·

a ·context

of ·.a broader distribution of

national income.· Unfortunateiy,· it often takes a rather
thorough shake-up in the national power structure rto bring this
abOut~

I believe we. have to ·be prepared

.to.:·~ive

with .·this·

possibility if we want to see viable nations ·eventually .emerge
on the isthmus.
Of course, this raises the knotty problem of how to deal with
radical regimes which, while dedicated to forging viable nationstates out of city-states, threaten to strengthen their ties
with our enemies.

Here I believe we must separate our immediate

strategic interests from the long term political development of
these nations.

Regimes dedicated to achieving radical change

within·their socieites are not an intrinsic threat to the

u.s.

However, when they become a military base that threatens the
security of their neighbors or the United States, strong action
on our part may be required.

To date we have automatically

tended to equate domestic political radicalism with threats to
our security.

Although the two problems are not entirely
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separable, they are sufficiently so that constantly to equate
them will make it virtually impossible for us to deal adequately
with the long

~erm

processes currently underway to create viable

nation-states in the a•rea.
Relative to El Salvador, over the short term I believe
we should continue to help protect 'that •nation's· city-state
at least through the electoral period and probably for a reasonable length of time thereafter.

If a settlement cannot be

reached electorally, · we should· be. prepared tp accept a _power
sharing formula that respects the rights and protects the basic
interests of all, parties.

Power sharing enjoys a long tradi-

tion in Latin America and has been ·used successfully ih·-a
number of countries to solve endemic civil war and internecine conflict.

As a matter of fact, El Salvador's political

settlement of the 1960's

~-·a

quasi-power sharing arrangment

probably brought her the greatest· degree of social peace and
economic development in the century.

Over the long term, the

United States must be prepared to accept the alignment of
forces that comes out of whatever settlement is achieved
while, at the same

~ime,

making it clear that we will not tolerate

the positioning of offensive weapons in the area.
With respect to Honduras which, incidentally, has never
become a fully developed C.i ty-state, our policy there runs the
dual risk of converting

a fragile democratic opening into a

garrison state while, at the same time, provoking the Nicaraguans into becoming more militarized than they might otherwise
have been.

We should continue to supply sufficient military
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assistance to Honduras for its legitimate security needs, while at
the same time, encouraging the efforts of friendly Latin
American nations to find a means of achieving a wider regional
settlement.
With respect to Guatemala, we should insist that the
Mejia regime make good on its promise to hold fair elections
as the price for our continued support.

The social changes

taking place there are massive -- the growth of the middle
class, the politicization of the Indian and the remarkable
growth of Protestantism being the. mo.st nqticeal;>le.
Guatemalan city-state, as i t is now
not survive these changes.
changes constitute
democracy.

.9-

st~uctured,

The

will ultimately

At the same time, these social

possible. ,!:)ocio.logical ·fou,ndp.ti.on for

.The Guatemalans have had experience with el,ections,

having: transferred power peacefully that way seven times
since 1945.

Of those, five have been ·reasonably

hones~.

.There

is at least a 50-50 chance that ari electoral s,olution can work

in that country.
In conclusion, the difficult task facing this Commission
is to develop a policy that clearly distinguishes between the
short term and the long term requirements of these nations,
between their internal and external behavior, and between the
political wishes of the United States and our pressing security
interests.

A second task, and possibly its most important, is

to help the American people understand it.
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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND
HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY

Testimony of Professor Tom J. Farer* to be presented before the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America,
September 29, 1983

*

Professor Farer is a Fellow of The Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institution, on leave from
Rutgers University where he is Distinguished Professor of Law.
Currently a member of the Inter-American CommissJon-on Human Rights,
he served as its President from 1980-82.
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I

will

not

unenviable task.

begin

by

indulging

the

amiable

cliche

about

your

By definition public men aspire to serve the nation by

clarifying and prescribing policy.

So do most academics.

To call your task enviable is not to disparage its difficulties.
Both the President and most of his critics have announced goals for the
United States in Central America which are very difficult to reconcile.
Indeed, as I wrote recently in the journa 1 Foreign Policy, if democracy,
human

rights,

economic

development

and

security

objectives

can

be

reconciled at all, it is only through yet more intensive intervention in
the region's affairs,

11

for ends uncongenial

to conservatives, by means

unsettling to liberals, and at a cost disproportionate to any conventional
conception

of

the

national

interest 11 •

The

enormous

reconciliation stem directly from the political,

social

obstacles
and

to

economic

realities of Central America.

Before

trying

to

sketch

those

realities

and

to

suggest

their

implications for national policy, I probably owe you a mercifully brief
autobiographical
which

my

note which will

analysis

Administration

and

is

rooted.

renominated

suggest the values and experiences in
Nominated
four

years

originally
later

by

by
its

the

Ford

Democratic

successor, I have twice been elected by the Member-States of the OAS to
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

From 1980-82 I served as

the Commission's President, the first North American to be sele.cted by his
colleagues for

that post.

The Commission

consists

of

seven

people,

usually 1awyers and often with a background in government and academic
life, who are morally and 1ega 11 y obligated to promote and enforce the
human rights codified in relevant treaties and declarations, and to do so
completely independently of the governments of which they are citizens.

I am not telling tales out of school when I say quite frankly that in
the eight years I have served, the Commission has represented a broad
swathe of the Hemispheric political spectrum extending from the right to
the center-left, a space as wide as that which separates the right and
left wings of the Republican and Democratic Parties
Despite

our

ideological

differences,

we

have

in this country.

consistently

achieved

consensus about the situation of human rights in the many countries we
have examined.

In the course of the Commission's work I, myself, have

visited Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; three times in the latter
case.

I have also been in Costa Rica several times on human rights

matters.

The present Foreign Minister of Costa Rica, Fernando Volio, was

my colleague on the Commission from 1976-1979, and the Foreign Minister of
Honduras, Dr. Edgardo Paz Barnica, was for a number of years a lawyer on
our staff.

II.

~~hat

are the principal characteristics of the political institutions

and practices of the Central American countries?
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At least unti 1 the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, one
could usefully divide them into two categories: Costa Rica and the rest.
Costa

Rica

was

and

remains

an

authentic

political

democracy.

That

democracy coincides with three other societal characteristics: the absence
of a highly-concentrated pattern of land ownership; the absence of an
institutionalized
population.

officer

Since

corps;

other

and

countries

ethnically
with

a rather

homogeneous

comparatively

homogeneous

populations--most notably Argentina--have not yet managed to produce a
democratic political culture, I am inclined to discount albeit not to
exclude that factor as an explanation of Costa Rica's achievements.

The

other two factors are in conjunction unique not only for Central America
but for the whole of Latin America.

Even individually they are remarkable.

The dispersion of land ownership can be traced back to the colonial
period.

The

phenomenon.

elimination

of

the

officer

corps

is

a

more

recent

In 1948 when political adventurers attempted to set aside

constitutional and electoral restraints by calling in the country 1 s small
armed

forces,

Pepe

military victory.

Figueras

led

a coalition

of

citizen-soldiers

to

They then consolidated civilian rule by choosing not to

rep 1ace the officer corps.

They recognized that as they 1i ved under the

shadow of the United States, they lived as well under its protection from
e.xternal attack.

They recognized, in other 1-10rds, that historically the

only real function for armed forces in Central America has been to foster
social mobility for middle-class lads with a taste for violence and to
repress challenges to the distribution of \vealth and pmver.

Since there

520.

already

existed

in

Costa

Rica

a

rather

broad

consensus

that

the

distribution of values was not conspicuously unjust and since Figueres and
his colleagues were determined to use the political process to promote
consensus-building social justice, an officer corps represented to them a
cluster of vices without compensating virtues.

Costa Rica has a constabulary; but it is small, lightly armed, and
its most senior officers are non-professional apolitical appointees who
only expect to serve during the term of the President who appoints them.

I don't want to idealize this country which is, after all, run by men
not angels.

There is poverty despite welfare programs unusually broad for

a country at its per capita income level. There appears to be neglect of
H not outright discrimination against the black minority which lives on
the Atlantic Coast.

I am not blind to blemishes, but after a decade

llfting rocks in various Latin American countries to see what's crawling
around underneath, I cannot he 1p being deep 1y impressed by the c i vi 1i ty,
the tolerance, the commitment to majoritarian democaracy and the fair
application of

the

law and

the

aspiration

to social

justice which

characterize Costa Rican political elites.

Through bad management and bad luck, the country has been hard hit by
the global recession.

Some have criticised its politicians for spending

prolifigately to provide a very modest measure of economic security for
its middle and lower classes, as if political elites should be punitively
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singled out for such atypical
condition is doubtless grave.

concern.

Well, Costa Rica's financial

But we find the same illness ill- countries

whose leaders could never be accused of undue concern for the impact of
their policies on ordinary people.

We have discovered how hard it is to build democracy in the Third
World.

Her.e is one that has built itself.

If there is a scintilla of

truth to our claimed passsion for the spread of this political species,
then we should do what is necessary to help Costa Rica through this
difficult period.
III.

I turn now to Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

Before the fall

of Somoza, they had every ugly feature so notably absent from Costa Rica:
brut a 1 and parasitic armed forces; heavy concentration of 1and-ownership
and,

for

that matter,

all

other forms

of

wealth

and

status;

and

corresponding political institutions and processes which hid the substance
of tyranny behind the thin, mocking forms of constitutiona 1 democracy.
While sharing those primal characateristics, they differed in some not
inconsequential ways.

If El Sal vader was the country of the fourteen fami 1i es, Nicaragua
was the country of only one.

The Somoza family's acquisitive passions

achieved their apogee in the person of Anastasio whose achievements gave
new meaning to the term k1eptocracy, that is, government a.s theft.
appears

that the opportunities for profit created

by

the

It

disastrous
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earthquake of 1972 which practically wiped out the City of Managua turned
mere passion into mania.

Of the tens of millions of dollars poured into

the country by public and private
contributed to reconstruction.
had to be reassured
shattered

remains

philanthropies,

few

seem to

Arriving in Managua for the first time, I

that I had arrived in Managua rather

of

Intercontinental hotel.

an

have

extinct

civilization

grouped

than

the

around

the

It is estimated that by the time he resigned and

fled the country, Somoza contro 11 ed entities producing 25 percent of the
·gross nat1onal product.

Of course any such estimate would not take into

account the thin line between the national and the family budget.

During

most of

the

Somoza family's 47-year rule,

business, land-holding and professional
with

the

opposition

regime

or

formed

which,

by

participating

a

classes had either collaborated

tolerated,
in

the country's

conspicuously

elections

and

ineffectual

serving

in

the

National Congress, lent some credibility to what was in fact an electoral
farce.

But as Somoza's galloping greed discouraged foreign investment,

distorted

the economy (which nevertheless grew at a not unimpressive

rate), and progressively concentrated in his hands capital assets and
investment opportunities, the bulk of these classes united behind Pedro
Chamorro who had for years been Somoza' s most courageous, effective and
consistent opponent.

By the time Chamorro's assasination lit this tinder,

the regime had been reduced to the fam11y, its civilian retainers, and the
National Guard.

The Guard was nothing more than a private army owing

allegiance not to the abstraction of the state but to Somoza himself.
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Nicaragua was in effect a country occupied by a kind of Cosa Nostra.

And

the rising sparked by Chamorro•s death was nothing less than that rarist
of

phenomena,

an

authentic

multiclass

rebellion

against

a nominally

indigenous group seen to be as alien as a foreign army of occupation.

Since the revolution the Commission has, at the invitation of the
government of Nicaragua, conducted two

11

0bservations in loco 11 •

The first,

carried out almost exactly one year after Somoza•s departure, led to a
report presented to the 1982 General Assembly of the OAS.

It dealt with

all aspects of the post-revolutionary condition of human rights.

In June of 1982 I was member of a sub-commission which made a third
visit, this time focused on the situation of the Miskito Indians.

The

report stemming from this last visit and a related one carried out in
Honduras at the main refugee camp is still confidential because in the
interim, at _the request of the Nicaraguan Government, the Commission has
been attempting to arrange a friendly settlement of the complaints made
against the Government by various Miskitos.

I wi 11 be happy to answer questions about my observations of human
rights conditions if you deem them relevant to your inquiries.
I think they are.

Of course

But since the time for this initial presentation is

limited and since I anticipate some of you will in fact wish to pursue the
human rights question, let me refer briefly to several aspects of the
Nicaraguan situation which you might not elicit through questions and
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which are clearly relevant to the optimal shape of U.S. policy toward this
country.

First, I have been told not only by high officials of the present
government but also by members of the

credible opposition that

Sandinistas do in fact wish to preserve a private sector.

the

They grudgingly

recognize the need for its managerial and entrepreneurial skills.

What,

it seems to me, they have not vwrked out in their own minds is how to
maintain an effective private sector while attempting to deny it political
influence.

The

recent history of Brazil

and Chile demonstrate,

if

demonstration were needed, that a vigorous private sector can coexist very
cheerfully with harsh authoritarian government.

But those governments did

not have among their central political projects the promotion of equality
and mass welfare and the political isolation of what the Sandinistas would
call the "bourgeois classes ...

Second, the Sandinista leadership is for the most part insular and
inexperienced.

These are generally quite young men and women with little

direct knowledge of the world beyond Central America.

For them the United

States is personified by generations of U.S. ambassadors who hobnobbed
with Somoza and of U.S. officers who provided technical assistance to
Somoza•s goons.
~oviet

Conversely, they have a romantically-colored view of the

Union and Cuba.

But thirdly, despite being at the outset besotted with a naive,
~1arxist

conception of the universe and despite their provincialism not
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always untainted by arrogance, they apparently have begun to discover the
complexity not only of the outer world, but of their native land.

For

instance they apparently have stopped seeing the United States as a
monolith driven by a Procrustean passion to shape every nation into a cog
in a single vast capitalist machine.

They also have begun to learn that Nicaragua is not Cuba.

In Cuba at

the time of Castro's accession landless laborers on the sugar estates were
numerically

predominant

in

the

countryside.

Castro could

win

their

support without setting them up as successful, independent farmers.

In

Nicaragua, hmvever, even peasants who worked on estates usually had a
little

land.

After the revolution they

hoped

for

more.

Driven

by

ideology alone, determined not to produce what they saw as a Kulak class
of comfortable, organized and politically potent farmers,
leadership refused to solve the minifundia problem.

the Sandinist

And it added injured

pocketbooks to crippled hopes by suppressing the price of food produced by
sma 11 farmers for Nicaragua's urban markets.

As a result the wealthy

ex-Somoc i stas in Key Biscayne and the ex-Guardia officers who run the
"contras"

have

been

embittered peasantry.
the fighting .

able

to

be

building

pm~erful

from

among

this

But like all similarly circumstanced farmers, they fight

with

the

Momentum for land reform finally seems

Sandinist

leadership.

perspective this is only a tactical step.
create

fodder

Of course the great majority are not involved in

back by cutting back production.
to

recruit cannot

Probably

from

its

But such a tactical step v1ill

obstacles to the later socialization of agriculture.

~1y

pri.mary point, however, is that ideological hallucination is yielding in
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various

areas to the educative force of experience.

pragmatic inter-state deals with pragmatists.

One can strike

With fanatics there is no

hope.

Fourth, at least as of the time of my last visit and <according to my
sources) even today in the midst of war, the country itself is still very
accessible, almost transparent, and its political, social and economic
institutions still in flux.

Fifth, it clearly is the intention of the Sandinist Government to
educate and mobilize into heightened political awareness and permanent
political participation the great mass of the population which, until the
assassination of Pedro Chamorro, was essentially passive, excluded and
miserably poor.

The Sandinistas presumably assume that in doing so they

will facilitate perpetuation of their regime.
mobilized,

politically-aware

population

will

My own assessment is that a
not

for

long

submit

to

government by junta, even a junta which enjoys the glamour of military
victory and employs egalitarian rhetoric.

This is a Catholic country; and it is a country with only a very
small cadre of ideologically-committed activists.

And even within the

_cadre one senses considerable disparity in political vision as vtell as
£ompeting ambitions.
skills

required

economy function.

And it is a cadre without the resources or the

to make a centrally planned and managed and autarkic
The need to relate to the international economy, to

export to and import from capitalist countries and to encourage investment
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will reenforce domestic pressures for a more pluralistic regime.

But for

the time being these forces cutting against the sustained cen-tralization
of power are offset by the regime•s ability to invoke national pride and
-intense fear of the old National Guard which is

the backbone of the

military force we have armed, payed and organized to oppose the Sandinista
government.

Paradoxically, the economic sanctions organized by the Reagan

Administration also play into the hands of the most extreme Sandinistas;
for they deprive the economy of almost all essential goods other than the
ones the regime itself controls, and it justifies that control.

Obviously

monopoly control of food and heating oil and other necessities facilitates
the regime's efforts to mobilize people into the militia and the civilian
mass organizations.

I

think

that

one

root

of

present

policy

is

a

theologically

pessimistic assumption about the natural course of left-wing revolutionary
regimes,

in

particular about

their

ability

to

perpetuate

without evolving into more participatory political orders.

themselves
In light of

the many paths left-wing authoritarian regimes have followed after their
birth, I believe that assumption is unwarranted.

IV.

If one is interested in examples of stable, authoritarian rule, one
need only take the brief boat trip across the narrow Gulf of Fonseca to El
Salvador where a political and social order established several centuries
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earlier during the colonial era remained essentially uncha-nged until 1979
when a coup d'etat organized by younger officers offered the first promise
of fundamental change.

handfull

of

Independence from Spain had simply meant that the

landowning

families

bureaucrats, and had to use

il

could

rule

undisturbed

by

Spanish

home-gro'lm army rather than Spanish troops

as their instrument for repressing and disciplining the peasant masses.

As the World Bank has noted, among the several great pools of poverty
in the world, Latin America is distinguished by its intense concentration
of land holding.

But even in an area where concentration is the norm, El

Salvador's concentration was remarkable.

You know, of course, that the officers who led the 1979 coup, having
coopted leading members of the democratic political opposition to the new
government, announced a sweeping land reform.

This remarkable break with

the past occurred precisely 3 months after the collapse of the Nicaraguan
National

Guard and was

timed

to coincide with

the release of our

Commission's Report on human rights in El Salvador, a report known by the
El Salvadoran armed forces to be extremely critical.

Our earlier report

on the Somoza regime had, according to Somoza himself, been one of the
factors leading him to conclude that his regime was doomed.
this

circumstant1al

evidence

my

conversations

with

Aside from

civilians

who

participated in the post-coup government confirm that the dominating force
behind the coup was not moral regeneration through divine intervention, it
Vias fear, fear that \-Jhat had happened in Nicaragua could happen in El
Salvador:

If

the United States \.vere passive, the armed forces could be

defeuted by rebels enjoying broad support.
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The land reform, together with the nationalization of finance and
exporting companies, was designed to win the approval

of the United

States, to appease peasant hosti 1i ty and to break the po 1i ti ca 1 power of
an oligarchy rigidly hostile to social reform.

But all of these steps

were designed ultimately to preserve the military as an institution, a
self-perpetuating autonomous force, a state within the state.

Inside the

armed

are

forces

idealists.

there

may

have

been,

perhaps

there

still

a few

As a rule, however, idealists would not be much attracted to

an institution which had stolen the prior two Presidential elections,
massacred unarmed supporters of the defrauded candidates, and was

the

notoriously corrupt instrument of a tiny oligarchy.

Hhat has become evident in the disilusioning years since 1979 is that
the principal division within the armed forces was between those who
believed

that

they could

best survive through reform and those who

believed that massacre, a time-tested means, could continue to work.
me

the most significant fact about the post-1979 years

For

is that the

diminished momentum of social reform coincides almost perfectly with the
election of the Reagan Administration which even before it assumed office,
had

a1ready

sent

messages

throughout

Latin

America

that

lt

was

unconditionally committed to the defense of all right-wing regimes.

The

fundamental dilemma of policy in El Salvador, or, for that matter, in
Guatemala is how can we hope to reform systems of power which seem
responsive only to the threat of their destruction, v1hen we begin by
guaranteeing their survival.
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The only semblace of a theory I have heard consistently articulated
is that by training the officer corps our own officers will
inculcate them with democratic values.

somehow

If public, pundits and politicians

were not so amnesiac tn this country, the collective
assertion would be a yawn of deja vu.

respons~

to this

In the early days of the Kennedy

Administration I was responsible for the presentation of the military
assistance program to Congress.

Those were the days of the A11 i ance for

Progress with its theme of providing a shield behind which, under our
prodding, the Latin Governments would somehow reform themselves.

And one

point I wrote regularly into the pesentation books for Latin America was
the tremendous capacity we enjoyed for imparting democratic values to
decidedly undemocratic military officers.

Did I have a theory about how this might occur?

Had I even bothered

to investigate which officers with what sorts of ideas and using what
means were carrying out this training?

Of course not.

It was just a

well-intentioned slogan, although I don't think I quite appreciated it at
the time.

Since then I have had occasion to talk with Latin graduates of our
training schools and with U.S. military men who know something about the
programs.

And I can assure you, gentlemen,

that the

inculcation of

democratic va1ues does not rank high on the list of training priorities.
On

the contrary.

Programs,

to the

extent

they

have

an

ideological

content, reenforce the view instinct in Latin security forces that the
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communists

are

everywhere,

insinuating

their

way

institution. concealing themselves as reformists.
therefore

encouraged

to

develop

total

into every

social

And the milltary is

responses.

National

security

b.ecomes a fig 1eaf for mi 1i tary efforts to dominate or destroy every
institution which threatens the status quo.

Would anything change if you sent me down to give lectures on human
rights and democracy?

Only on the implicit theory that these chaps we are

training are fools who do not know what is in their interest.
they v1ere more professional,

If only

if only they were au courant with modern

methods of interrogation and sophisticated rules of engagement, I've heard
it said,

they would stop busting the skulls of babies,

raping their

mothers and castrating before garroting their fathers.

What an arrogant and cheap delusion.

Most of the Latin American

military men <not to mention Right-Wing civilians) I have spoken to in
countries where violations of human rights are epidemic are perfectly
rational men led by experience to conclude that as their own objectives
become

progressively

incongruent

with the demands of an increasingly

mobilized civilian population, ever more extreme forms of intimidation are
required to maintain the essentials of the status quo, above all

to

maintain the dominant role of the armed forces and of the agro-industrial
oligarchy on which they rely to make the economy work.

Another

conceivable

theory

justifying

dedicated to their own hegemonic role

is

U.S.

assistance

that somehow,

to

armies

someday,

if
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econom1c growth persists and the middle class expands, Central American
states will duplicate the experience of Northern Europe and North America
in producing welfare democracies and armies subject to civilian control.
This is a very pretty idea.

It could happen, but not I think unless these

societies first undergo changes which go to the institutional roots of the
status quo.
and

In brief, I propose that producing reasonably just, stable

democratic

requires

systems

changing

in

basic

El

Salvador,

institutions.

Guatemala,
Those

and

changes,

Honduras

too

including

the

reduction and transformation of the armed forces, in that they constitute
changes in bedrock features of those societies are literally "radical".
If they were

to occur,

then after the event one would say:

countries have experienced a revolution.

11

"These

I see no signs that the U.S. is

prepared to manage it.

I imagine that some of you, citing cases like Peru in the late
1960's, Turkey in the era of Ataturk or even Egypt's Nasser might wonder
why such nationalist

reformer~

leaders in Central America.

have not emerged as dominant military

Paradoxically, the one clear case of such a

phenomenon occurrred in a country which in the past 30 years has become a
synonym for state terror in the service of the status quo.
course, to Guatemala.

I refer, of

Even conservative, circumspect Latin diplomats and

lawyers and politicians refer privately to the typical Guatemalan officer
and his .:ivilian political allies as "savages", men with an unparalleled
instinct for butchery.

The extent of that butchery--indiscriminate murder

and unspeakable torture of professors, priests, students, labor leaders,
politicians, or anyone who questioned the existing order is recounted in a
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report of the Inter-American Commission covering the Lucas era.
on the Rios Montt period will be published shortly.

A report

No doubt there will

be a third. s i nee as awful as was the behaviour of the armed forces during
Rios Montt's ascendancy, he nevertheless took a few hesitant steps in the
direction of institutional change.

Now he has been replaced by officers

who are the old companions of General Lucas and in many cases tied to the
pro-fascist parties of the political right.

Where are the reformers in Guatemala?
1940's.

They emerged in the early

A reformist faction in the armed forces backed the distinguished

civilian

leader,

Juan

Jose

Arevalo.

He served a presidential

term,

initiated reforms in land tenure and the conditions of rural labor and was
succeeded

by a military officer, Jacobo Arbenz.

landowner in the country was United Fruit.

The single largest

Its old lawyer, John Foster

Dulles, by now Secretary of State, cynically or otherwise accepted United
Fruit's charge that Arbenz was a communist, and set about organizing his
overthrow.

The CIA coordinated the successful effort.

It led in turn to

a purge of reformist officers who had backed Arbenz. A second purge
occurred in 1960 when cadets and some younger officers, their nationalism
inflamed by the use of Guatemalan soil by the CIA for training the force
which would soon invade Cuba, staged a coup.

And that coup might well

have succeded if the rebe 1s had not been bombed and strafed by p1anes
flown by Cuban participants in the forces undergoing training.
who survived were purged.

Officers

Some including two outstanding men trained by

the U.S. went into the hills and formed the first, guerrilla movements.
Aided by us the Government launched the first of its counter-insurgency
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campaigns

using

the

time-honored

tactics

of massacring

population in the areas of guerrilla operations.

the

peasant

In Guatemala, the more

things change, the mqre they remain the same.

The situation in Guatemala underscores the pernicious illusion that
elections equal democracy and legitimacy.
necessary

condition

Elections are, of course, a

of democratic government;

but even the meagerest

experience in Central and, for that matter, South America reveals that
they are by themselves insufficient.

One of the reasons my Commission has

consistently rejected invitations to observe elections is our realization
that we could do 1ittle more than assure that the ballots were counted
accurately.

Yet we know that

in the social,

economic and political

conditions obtaining in many countries, the ways of fixing the outcome of
elections are as diverse as any other product of the human imagination.

In the past several decades the self perpetuating military government
of Guatemala has

generally resorted

to

the

cruder methods

thievery, in essence announcing the result deemed appropriate.

of open
But in

today's conditions a fair election could not be conducted even if ballots
were counted with i mpeccab 1e care.

Why?

Because during the past decade

the armed forces and paramilitary agents of right-wing political groupings
working in conjunction with various military factions have beheaded or
crippled where they have not annihilated the intermediate institutions of
the

center

cooperatives;

and
grass

left:
roots

political

parties;

organizations of

professoriat; student groups.

trade

unions;

the Catholic

peasant

Church;

the

When one of Guatemala's most distinguished
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diplomats, Dr. Alberto Fuentes Mohr, a former Foreign Minister of the
Country, attempted several years ago to register a new party,
allowed

this privilege.

And for his pains

a few days later he was

e-xecuted in broad daylight not far from the Presidential Pal ace.
Co l6n Argueta,

he was

t-A,anue 1

the former mayor of Guatemala City and another figure

around whom moderate reformers might have coalesced

was similarly gunned

down.

f~hen

I met with Christian Democratic leaders in Guatemala City about

a year ago, I asked them how they proposed
integration of the country's Indian majority.
me.

to achieve

We have tried, they told

We sent party members into the Indian centers.

and Indians as our representatives.
fled.

the political

~e

used both Ladinos

Some were butchered; the survivors

Our incipient networks were thus broken.

I anticipate that within a year elections will be held in Guatemala.
1-lithout doubt the fascist parties of the right, we 11-funded, we 11 armed
and organicallly connected to the armed forces will win.
then announced that

11

Should the U.S.

Democracy 11 has triumphed in Guatemala?

Let me cone 1ude with a word on Honduras, a country whose evo 1uti on
illustrates the tragic consequences of the policies we are pursuing in the
name

of

democracy.

On

the

one

hand,

underdeveloped country in Centra 1 America.

Honduras
~~hen

js

by far

the most

I last looked its per

capita income was the lowest in the Caribbean basin with the exception of
Haiti.

It was also widely perceived as the country for which the

term
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"banana republic" was conceived; not only or even primarily because of its
dependence on this export crop, but rather because of its passive almost
sycophantic relationship with U.S. interests controlling the growth and
export of bananas.

On the other hand,

by comparison with their counterparts

in El

Salvador, Guatemala and Somoza's Nicaragua, the Honduran military seemed
benign.

It tolerated the development of trade unions among its very small

working class and of peasant unions as well.
representatives of the poorer classes.

It at least dialogued with

It did not treat every effort to

organize the lower classes as a threat to be liquidated forthwith.
even began a trickle of land reform.

It

And in the wake of revelations that

the successor to United Fruit had paid the then President, a general of
course, a huge bribe in order to avoid the export tax on bananas, a group
of younger officers forced the thief's resignation and quickened the pace
of reform.

Prodded by the middle class and the trade unions, and pushed as well
by the Carter Administration, the armed forces finally resolved to restore
civilian government.
S\-lallow.

Full-fledged democracy was a bit much for them to

They manipulated the party registration laws to hamstring the

Christian Democratic Party, since they regarded it as too reformist and
uncontrollable.

And they allowed the liberal candidate, Roberto Suazo

Cordoba, to J.S sume offl ce on 1y after he had agreed not to exercise his
Constitutional power to replace officers whose commitment to civilian rule
was doubtful.

Neverthelesss, our Commission and everyone else in the

Hemisphere who we 1comes the spread of democracy fe 1t a surge of optimism
about the future of Honduras.

Optimism is dead.

It is now evident that all major policy decisions

in Honduran society--decisions about the budget, about foreign and defense
pol icy--are made by a national security counci 1 under the control
General Alvarez.

The civilian regime is now a facade.

of

When you take a

country with a long tradition of profound psychological dependence on the
United States, a country without any tradition of mi 1i tary subordination
to civilian rule,

a country with a small

middle class and

a still

essentially passive peasantry; a country that is miserably poor.

When the

U.S. takes such a country and pours resources into the hands of an
ambitious general and lends him the prestige of being our point man for
Central American policy, the U.S.
rule.

is· gutting the

It is doing more than that.

promise of civilian

Civilian government and the brief

flowering of hope created a wi 11 to resist..

Genera 1 A1varez and the

industrial interests with whom he is linked and with some support from the
Moonies has been moving to crush

incipient resistance.

Opponents of

Alvarez, critics of his policy of allowing Honduras to become a U.S. base
for

open

threatened.
~ciety

and

clandestine

There

have

is polarizing.

mi 1itary

been

beatings

And soon not

operations,
and
even

some

have

already

been

disappearances.

The

the fragile

tradition of

'dialogue will remain to commemorate a once hopeful experiment.

I have not painted a pretty picture.
wedded as I am to the ethics of realism.

~~hat

else could I do, being
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v.
It is fashionable in some circles to blame external forces for
C-entral America's convulsi,ons.

External forces have played an important

role; but the main extern,al force is not military and communist; it is
economic and capitalist.

During the two decades ending in the late 1970's

ripples from the dynamic centers of world capitalism coursed through
Central America, helping tme region's states experience a novel period of
sustained high growth.

While a good deal of the resulting \'lealth passed

through Central America lt.ke a dose of salts ending up in t·11ami, Geneva
and other developing areas, growth did, nevertheless, expand the middle
and industrial working classes.

While it vastly increased the wealth of a

few and modestly enhanced the income of a considerably larger number, its
net effect on the poorer c1as ses--60-to-80 percent of the population in
Guatemala,

Nicaragua,

Honduras and El

enhancement to absolute deprivation.

Salvador--varied from marginal

Rapid growth meant inflation which

is disastrous for those wlthout the means and 1ever age to keep ahead of
price

increases.

And rapid growth encouraged the rationalization of

agricultural enterprise through the substitution of machinery and wage
labor for tenant farmers.

When the appetite for profit maximization

penetrates less-developed areas it leads also to extra-legal land seizures
by officers and oligarchs in control of the state machinery.

As

it

displaces

peasants

and

mutilates

their

time-honored

expectations and as it expands the middle classes in countries \1here
officers and oligarchs treat their perquisites as if they were holy
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relics, growth generates revolutionary pressure.

If this is disturbing to

persons ready to sacrifice every American ideal on the altar of stability,
it

should

be

democracies.

good

news

for

those who welcome the proliferation of

For what growth has accomplished in conjunction with the

spread of the idea of human rights, thanks in part to the efforts of the
Catholic Church,

is

to

create

the

requisite for building democracy.
the men and

the

institutions

and

ideological

materials

But it cannot be built by reenforcing

consecrated to channeling change within

obsolet-e and anti-democratic forms.
the old order of things.

class

It can be built only by fracturing

To fracture it we must present its defenders

with the alternatives of change and defeat.

The authoritarian left is our

principa1 lever against the authoritarian right.

As I have argued elsewhere, traditionally conceived national security
interests do not require our involvement in Central America•s civil wars.
Our military, economic and political weight enables us to impose a pax
Finlandia on Nicaragua and any other Marxist regimes which may emerge.
Traditional

notions of security require only

that

such

regimes

deny

military faci 1i ties of any kind to extra-conti nenta 1 powers and do not
invade their neighbors.

However, if for idealistic reasons we wish to do

more than national security requires, then we must act like a great po'rter.

The place to begin is with language itself.

As we use 1--t today,

"non-intervention" means intervention to guarantee the survival
obsolete class of rulers.

of an

As building blocks for democracy the armed
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forces of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are about as adequate as
their Polish counterpart.

As long as we deceive ourselves with this sort

of newspeak, we wi 11 neither build democracy nor purchase security at a
rational cost.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the key factors leading to the present situation in Central America is the high rate of population growth in
the countries in the region. In most of these countries nearly half the population is made up of children under 15 years of
age.

Each year the number of these young people entering the labor force has exceeded the number of jobs the

economies can provide.

The numbers of the under-and unemployed have continually increased. Partly because of the

systems of land tenure, but largely because of rapidly growing numbers of young people, there h:1s been and is a swelling
flow from the rural to the urban areas.

It has been impossible to build the necessary infrastructure of water supply,

sewerage, streets, housing and administration.

The numbers without real jobs have increased.

Without adequate job

opportunities, many of these young people constitute a potential source of political and economic instability.

Many

others contribute to the pool of migrants moving north to Mexico or the United States.
A prompt and determined action to reduce birth rates would help alleviate these destabilizing demographic trends.
This is an analysis by The Futures Group, under a contract with the Agency for International Development, to
illustrate the exponential growth of the populations of the Central American Countries and its effects on the economic
and social development and the stability of those countries.
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1. POPULATION GROWTH IN CENTRAL AMERICA
The high fertility in past decades has produced very large annual increases in the number of children born. The
reduction in mortality has led to a rapid annual increase in population. Over the past 50 years, the population of about 5
million in 1930 has quadrupled to more than 20 million.
If the present annual increase of nearly 3% should continue, the population of Central America would double in only

23 years.
Year

Pop_ulation

1930 pop.

5,342,000
6,424,000
8,270,000

1940 1950 -

1960 1lJ/O 1980 1983 (Est.)
2000

11' 190,000
15,277,000
20,696,000
21,900,000
36,970,000

2010

47,760,000
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2. POPULATIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES
The populations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1980 and, as estimated, in 1983:
1980

1983

Costa Rica

2,213,000

2,400,000

El Salvador

4,797,000

4,700,000

Guatemala

7,262,000

7,900,000

Honduras

3,691,000

4,100,000

Nicaragua

2,733,000

2,800,000

Total Population

20,696,000

21,900,000

Source: United Nations. Demographic Indicators of Countries:
Estimates and Projections as Assessed in 1980. New York, 1982.
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3. TOTAL FERTILITY RATES, BIRTH RATES, DEATH RATES AND RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, 1930-1980
Population growth is the result of changes in fertility, mortality and migration.
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR), which is the number of children born alive to the average woman during her
reproductive life, is particularly important. It was exceptionally high during the 1930-1965 period. It has now dropped
but is still high at an average of 5.6 for the region.
The· Birth Rate (the number of children born per 1000 in the population) has been at a high rate even for developing
countries until the late 1960s when economic and social development and the beginnings of family planning programs
began to reduce it in some countries -particularly in Costa Rica.
The Death Rate (deaths per 1,000 in the population) has declined more rapidly, particularly as a result of reductions
of deaths of infants and young children. In 1930 it was 22.2 per 1000. By 1980 it had dropped to 8.6 per 1000.
The Natural Rate of Increase (NRI) is the difference between the birth rates and the death rates.

In Central

America the NRI increased to 1970 when it began to diminish slightly. The current rate is approximately 3% per year.
Migration is a component of population change.

Iri Central America migration has increased in importance in

recent years, but is not counted as a demograhic factor.

lll

"""

~

CF;N1'I~AIJ A11E;I~l Cl~.

BIRTH

RATES~

DEATH

RATES~

RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE

(1930-·1980)
Per thousand per year

Crude Birth
Rate

50

Crude Death
Rate

40

Rate of Natural Increase
38

2.4%
3.1%
3. O%

30

·----·---------........ .

20

... - ...... ~-..... - ............. ,~ ,. ...
·~.

. ..... -

10

9

0

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

Year

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980
Ul
Ul
0

.

4. AGE DISTRIBUTION AND CHILD DEPENDENCY- COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES
The age distribution of a population is as important in relation to economic and social development as changes in
size.

High fertility, producing numerous births, and decreasing infant and child mortality, generate a population with a

high percentage of chiid dependents, children under the age of 15.
Central America with a high total fertility rate of 5.6 (Honduras has 6.5) and a diminished mortality rate, has a
very high child dependency rate - about 45% of the population is under the age of 15 in contrast to about 23% in the
United States.
In Central America for every 100 adults of economically productive age there are about 90 children to be supported
and educated. A developed country typically has two to three adults of economically productive age for each dependent
child.
This difference in age distribution between Central American countries and the typcial industrialized country
makes a very large difference in the portion of its economic output that each country is required to use for caring for
dependent children and the portion it can invest in increasing its agricultural production and modernizing its economy.
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CENTRAL AM ERICA

Age Distribution and Child Dependency
Central America

United States

Age- Sex Distribution 1980

Age - Sex Distribution 1980
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For each dependent child in Central America there is only about one working- age adult.
For each dependent child in most industrialized countries, there are 2 or 3 working-age adults.
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5. MOMENTUM OF POPULATION GROWTH

In countries where· there has been a high fertilty rate for a number of years, there is an enormous built-in
momentum of population growth.
Each year as an age group of women moves out of their reproductive years, a younger group two to three times as
numerous enters their reproductive years.

The succeeding age groups of children already born who will reach

reproductive age in each of the next fifteen years or so will be even larger.
Even if by some dramatic change in fertility, starting to-day the women of this under 15 age group would have, on
the average, only two children during their reproductive life, the population would continue to grow for another 40 years
or so and would not level off until it had almost doubled.
Even though each woman would be having an average of only two children, there would be many more young women
so that more children would be born every year than older people would die.

The number of persons born every year

would continue to exceed the number dying for about 40 years or until these children- in smaller numbers- also passed
through their reproductive years.
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CENTRAL AMERICA

Population Momentum
Population Profile 2000

Population Profile 1980
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6. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE BIRTHS
Actual numbers of births are of course the basic generators of population growth. Future births can be calculated
from anticipated or assumed future fertility levels. For this analysis projections of future births are made under several
such assumptions. Three different assumptions are used to show the effects of population factors in Central America:
A

High fertility continued:
A Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 5.6 in 1980, reduced to 4.7 by 2000 and 4.4 by 2010.

B

A 3-child average attained by 2000 (and 2.55 by 2010).

C

A 2.1-child average attained by 2000 and continued.
With these assumptions of fertility, future births for Central America can be projected as in the chart.
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7. PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH

Using the same three assumptions of future fertility levels as in projecting future births, and considering a future
rise in longevity from 60.1 in 1980 to 65.7 in 2000 and 67.7 in 2010, it is possible to project future population growth as
shown in the chart.
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8. PROJECTIONS OF AGE DISTRIBUTION
As pointed out in Unit 4, above, age distribution is as important a factor in population as actual numbers.

The

differences in future age distribution with high fertility continued and with lower future fertility rates are very
significant.
With high fertility continued, as shown on the left-hand chart, the ratio between the numbers of people of
economically productive age and the child dependents will remain roughly the same.
With lower fertility, as shown on the right-hand chart, the ratio of people of economically productive age to the
child dependents would quickly improve.
developed/industrialized country.

By 2030, the population age pyramid will be essentially the same as for a

This change is the result of reduction in fertility and is an essential element of the

modernization of a country.
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CENTRAL AM ERICA

Population Pyramids Under Two Projections, 2010
75+

75+

70-74

70-74

65-69

65-69

-------------------

60-64

55-59

60-64

55-59

50-54

50-54

45-49

B=n

WORKING-AGE
ADULTS

30-34

25-291

5

J_____J 25-29

L-J 20-241
~~~

1

U:MMMiMll[--o-EPENDENT-- :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
!:;:;:;;!:;:?:;:;;;;;;;

Male

0

0

5

Projection Female

A

8,

I 35-39

I

CHIL D REN

10

45-49
40-44

30-34

I'

1s-1•~

N::::i:::wi:?w%1

i

1

• lr-''---1120-24

1 14
"

r----i
r-L--.....1

10

---

10

5
Male

0

15-19
10 14
5-9

I

I

1;1l:l:l:l:i;i:i:ill;l:l:i;f.l
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

·············--·

0

5

10

Projection
Female
B
l1l
0'1
0

.

9. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE OF ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE AGE-- PAST

The group of young people becoming 15-19 years of age is potentially the most volatile in the population of a
country. They contain the group of young people entering the labor market each year seeking jobs. They also contain
the largest group of young couples marrying and beginning their families.

They are the group who, if unsuccessful in

finding jobs or in obtaining the social equity they believe is due them constitutes a potential source of political and
economic instability.
With the high fertility levels of the past, this 15-19 age group has grown very rapidly.

It has increased from

886,000 in 1950 to 2,274,000 in 1980 or an increase of 257%.
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CENTRAL AMERICA
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10. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE OF ECONOMICALLY PRODUCTIVE AGE-- FUTURE
In 1980 there were 2,274,000 young people 15-19 years of age. With high fertility continued, the numbers of young
people moving into this potentially volatile age group each year will continue to increase dramatically.
With lowered fertility, the growth will continue for 15-20 years because the children are already born who will
enter this critical age group in the future.

Thereafter, however, the reduced fertility rates will result in significantly

smaller numbers entering this age group each year.
The differences between the numbers in the 15-19 year age groups under an assumption for high fertility continued
and for a 3-child family average attained by 2000 can be seen in the charts below.

If fertility continues its present

modest declining trend (Projection A), the 15-19 age group will grow to over 5 million youths by the year 2010.' With a
three-child average family by 2000 (Projection B), the young adult cohort will have about

4 million in 2010, or

one million

less than the current trend. With a 2-child family average attained by 2000, the 15-19 age group in 2010 would be only
3.4 million.
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CENTRAL AMERICA

Age Group 15-19 Entering Working Years, 2010
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11. URBANIZATION-MIGRATION
Urban areas are growing rapidly both in numbers and in percent of the population in all developing countries. This
is particularly true in Central America.
In 1950, of the 8.3 million population about 1.7 million, or 21% were in towns or cities over 10,000. By 1980, of
the nearly 21 million population, about 8.5 million or 41% were in urban areas. This urban growth has been augmented by
substantial migration from the rural areas. The rate of urban growth during these 30 years was about 6.5%, or twice the
rate of the country as a whole.
By 2000, of the 37 million total population if high fertility is continued, 19.5 miHion or 61% will live in cities. Of
that number about 13 million will have been born there and 6.5 million will have moved there.

These increases will

produce urban growth rates of about 4.5%, much higher than the overall growth rate •.
The very rapid urban growth has already put a heavy burden on cities to provide the basic requirements of streets,
water, sewers, houses, transportation and administration.

This task will become even more difficult with the much

larger numbers in the future.
Emigration
Legal emigration from Central America to the U.S. has grown tremendously over the past 30 years from about 2000
per year in the early 1950s to over 16,000 in 1980.
With the very large increases projected both for the size of the labor force and for the number of unemployed in
future years, Central Americans who are unsuccessful in finding work will have two options: remaining unemployed or
migra_ting to other more prosperous countries in search of work.
The numbers of clandestine entries into the U.S. every year is unknown. However, in the light of Mexican data, an
estimate of one illegal for every legal immigrant seems quite conservative.
immigrants to the labor force is about 0.5% per year.
mlg~ants

This suggests that the proportion of

With the anticipated growth in unemployment;-an increase in

to 1% of the labor force per year in the near future is highly possible. Thus, some 100,000 potential immigrants

per year is a distinct possiblity. The actual number will of course be determined as much by the policies of the United
States as by the pressures from Central America.
With lower fertility the future size of the labor force and of the unemployed and underemployed while still growing
would be much sma!ler than with high fertility continued.
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12. NEW JOB REQUIREMENTS- IN CENTRAL AMERICA
A primary objective in each of the countries of Central America is to increase employment and to reduce
unemployment and underemployment. High population growth makes this objective increasingly difficult to achieve.
The new job requirements each year are mostly needed by the young people of the 15-19 year age group who are
seeking to enter the labor force.

In the year 1960 the new jobs needed were about 90,000.

In 1970 the number was

140,000. In 1980 it was 190,000. New jobs required in future decades will be as indicated in the chart. Increased efforts
started now to reduce fertility will make little difference until after 199 5 because the children who will be entering the
labor market up to that time are already born. However, a reduction in fertility started now would make a substantial
difference in new job requirements after that time.
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13. NEW JOB REQUIREMENTS - IN URBAN AREAS

The movement of people from the rural areas into the urban areas seeking jobs makes the requirements for jobs in
the urban areas increase more rapidly than for the region as a whole.

The lack of productive jobs and the resulting

unemployment and underemployment contribute to more serious social instability. Under these circumstances:
o

It is impossible for nations to attain their objectives of reasonably equitable distribution of income
for their peoples.

o

The number of people and families in poverty continues to increase.

o

Many of them are unable to live decent human lives.

o

Many may resort to crime or become easy victims of radical and violent movements of right or left.

The new jobs required in future decades will substantially diminish if efforts to reduce fertility are increased now.
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14. INVESTMENT REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE TO CREATE NEW JOBS
As Central America's labor force grows, the region's economy must expand to help create new employment.
Investments are key to economic expansion and consequently to new job creation. At present, Central American nations
should be investing about 5 billion dollars annually to produce the economic expansion necessary to absorb a labor force
increasing at over 3% yearly. Central American nations are not able to invest this amount of money, and consequently
un- and underemplyoment has risen.
By examining the relationships among national investments, GDP and labor force growth rates, it is possible to
estimate future investments required and available to accommodate new job seekers. This estimate is accomplished by
using a savings rate of 15% of GDP and an incremental capital output ratio of 3.5%.

By the year 2000, there will be

major differences in investment needs under our three population growth projections. By 2010, the differences will be
startling.

With the continued high fertility assumption (A), Central American nations will have to invest 21 billion

dollars annually to accommodate labor force growth.
Under the optimistic projections of AID economists (5%-6% annual GDP growth through the end of the century) the
Central American economies will only generate about $16 billion for domestic investment.

Under projection A, then,

there will be an annual investment shortfall of $5 billion. Under the 3-child and 2-child family size projections, there
would be investment surpluses of $1 and $4 billion respectively in 2010.
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15. LABOR FORCE AND CHILD DEPENDENTS- HONDURAS
In Honduras, as in other Central American countries, high fertility is producing a very large annual increase in the
labor force. As noted earlier, because the children are already born who will enter the labor force up to about 199 5, an
increased effort started now to reduce fertility would not change the size of the labor force up to that year.

By 2000

and 2010 lower fertility rates would reduce the future projections, but not greatly. Even the lowest fertility projection
would provide a labor force of more than ample size to do the work of building the country.
On the other hand, the number of child dependents generated by the different fertility rates would change rapidly,
as shown in the chart.
o

With high fertility continued, by 2010, for every 100 members of the labor force there would be
about 140 child dependents;

o

With a 3-child average projected by 2000, by 2010 for every 100 members of the labor force there
would be about 89 child dependents;

o

With a 2-child average projected for 2000, by 2010 for every 100 members of the labor force there
would be about 70 child dependents.
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16. NEW JOBS AVAILABLE AND REQUIRED- HONDURAS
Critical to the future stabilty and development of the Central American region is the capability of providing
employment to the fast-growing group of young adult job seekers. At present, in Honduras some 40,000 job aspirants
enter the labor market each year.

By the year 2010, under continued high fertility, 114,000 people will be looking for

new employment opportunities annually.

Under the 3 child family projection, only 62,000 will enter the job market

annually after the year 2000, or a difference of over 50,000 per year.
Employment is largely a function of the growth in a nation's economy. There is a relationship between growth in
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment creation. In Latin America, this relationship, known as the elasticity of
employment, is about 0.5%. Thus, for each 1% of growth in GDP, the employed labor force can increase by about Yz%. It
takes, then, a GDP annual growth rate of 6% to absorb a labor force growing at 3% yearly.
In Honduras, economic performance has been poor in the 1980s. Its economy actually contracted in 1982 and is
continuing to contract in 1983. Its growth rate for 1980-85, then, will produce few if any new jobs. Using the optimistic
GDP growth projections of AID economists, we can project employment creation over the next several decades.
Assuming a 6% growth rate from 1985 to 2010 (equal to the highest rates every attained by Honduras). Honduras will
still experience major deficits in employment opportunities because the rate of growth of new entrants to the labor force
will outstrip the ability of Honduras' economy to provide jobs.

Under projection A (high fertility), 60,000 new jobs

seekers will become unemployed· or underemployed each year by 2010. If a 3-child family is attained by the year 2000,
only about 10,000 people will Jack full employment annually by 2010. Under projection C, a 2-child family by 2000, there
will be a surplus of new jobs thus resulting in a reduction of un-and underemployment.
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17. THE AGRARIAN REFORM
For centuries land has been the lifeblood of the Honduras campesino; however, rapid population growth tied with
uneven land distribution patterns made land inaccessible to much of the rural population. By 1972, well over half of the
rural families - about 240,000 - were landless or living on minifundia of less than 5 hectares. In an effort to solve the
problem of inequitable land distribution, the Honduras government launched an ambitious Agrarian Reform in 1972 (later
revised in 1975). The statutory basis for the program, Law 103, declares that each rural family unit will be provided not
less than 5 hectares nor more than 10 hectares of irrigated land or the equivalent in other kinds of land;. Ultimately,
under the Agrarian Reform, farms of less than 5 hectares would be abolished.
Although the land reform program has fallen substantially short of its goal, it did result in temporarily reducing the
intensity of demand for land. By 2000:
o

With high fertility continued, the number of landless families in the rural areas entitled to land
under the Agrarian Reform will exceed the total cultivable land available and more than half such
families, about 420,000, could be landless or living on minifundia.

o

If a 3-child family average were attained by the year 2000, it would be possibJ.e to attain the
Agrarian Reform objective for all rural families.
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Forest Land
A reduction in fertility will greatly reduce the pressure on the agricultural land base and, consequently, the
.forestry resources. To meet the Agrarian Reform objective, large tracts of forest land would have to be diverted from
forestry to various farm uses (e.g., for pasture, house plots, farm buildings, or even cultivation).
o

If high fertility continues, by 2000 about 1.2 million hectares of forest land, or 24 percent of the

total forested land, would have to be diverted to various farm uses.
hectares or 30%.

By 2010, about 1.7 million

o

If a 3-child family average were attained by 2000, just over half as much forestland (650,000
hectares) would have to be diverted to farm uses by that year as would be required if high fertility
continued.

o

If a 2-child family were achieved by 2000, only 530,000 hectares would have to be diverted to
farming by that year.

Although forest land that is used for farming nas a certain productive value, this value is only a small fraction of
the value that this same land might generate were it to be exploited for its wood products rather than farming.
o

The 1.2 milion hectares of forest land projected that would be required for farm uses if high fertility
continued to the year 2000, would yield about 4 billion lempiras if it were exploited for its wood
products; only about 870 million lempiras if put to agricultural use, a loss of about 3.1 billion
lempiras.

o

If a 3-child family average were attained by the year 2000, the net loss would be only 1.6 billion
lempiras. If a 2-child family average were attained by 2000, the net loss would be about 1.3 billion

lempiras.
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18. INFANT MORTALITY AND BIRTH INTERVAL- HONDURAS
As part of the National Development Plan, the Honduran Government seeks to create an adequate national health
service for the entire population, with particular emphasis on the provision of health care for rural communities. Rapid
population growth hinders this effort in two ways:
1. High fertility is itself an important cause of maternal and child illness and death. Studies done in
different countries of the world have documented the hazards of child bearing at very young and
older ages and with short intervals between births. Pregnancies occuring at too young or too old an
age (younger than 20, over 35), especially if repeated at short intervals (less than 2 years) or for
more than 4 children are risky for both mother and child. The risk is further compounded if the
mother is undernourished. While the degree of the problem varies from country to country, the
relative danger from these conditions is the same.
2. The high rate of growth makes it difficult for the Government to provide enough trained medical
personnel, hospitals and clinics, and other services to meet the health needs of the population.

*For a summary of this research see: Abdel R. Omran "Health Benefits of Family Planning for Mother and Child," World
·
Heal.th Organization (Washington, D.C.: January 1974).
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INFANT MORTALITY AND BIRTH ORDER- EL SALVADOR

In addition to child spacing and maternal age, the order of birth has been shown to be highly related to infant
mortality.

The technical term for birth order is parity.

The firstborn child of a woman has a parity of one, the

second born child a parity of two, and so forth.
Children of high parity are much more likely to die in infancy and childhood than their older siblings. In part, this
is because, particularly in poor families, fewer resources will be available to meet the basic needs of high-parity infants,
as compared to the first- or second born child.

Moreover, conditions .of high parity tend to be closely linked to early

childbearing and short birth intervals. In El Salvador, infant mortality is between 60 and 80 deaths per thousand live
births for the first four children.

For the fifth birth and above, the infant mortality rate more than doubles to 160

deaths per 1,000 births. Lower fertility would clearly help lower El Salvador's high infant mortality rate.
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19. POPULATION AT HIGH HEALTH RISK- HONDURAS
There are several ways to look at the burden of health care population growth places on a country. A particularly
appropriate measure is the increase in the size of the population at highest risk of sickness and death.-- the women of
reproductive age and the children under the age of five. In Honduras one out of every 10 infants dies within a year of
More than 41 percent of all deaths each year occur to children under the age of 5. Diarrhea, pneumonia and

birth.

malnutrition are the major causes of more than 50 percent of all deaths to children in this age group. High fertility is a
major factor in maternal and child illness and deaths. With lower fertility, health conditions would improve for mothers
and children. More of a mother's attention and a greater proportion of a family's resources could be used for the care of
each child.
Women in their reproductive years and children under the age of 5 totalled 1.4 million in 1980.
o

With high fertility continued, by 2010 there would be 4.0 million women and children in these age
groups.

o

With a 3-child average family size attained by 2000, the population at risk health risk in 2010 would
be 2.9 million. The reduction would be 27.5 %.

o

With a 2-child average family size attained by 2000, the population at high health risk in 2010 would
be 2.5 million. The reduction would be 37 .5%.
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20. NUTRITION - CALORIES PER FAMILY - HONDURAS

Among the wage-earning poor in developing countries, the family income is likely to reach its maximum
size early in the life of the family and increase little if any over the years. The continuing greatest daily
expenditure from a family's total income is for food. Generally, because of other essential household needs,
no more than 60% of a poor family's income can be spent on food. It is possible therefore to compute the
maximum calories per day such families can afford. For such families in Honduras this maximum is shown by
the horizontal line.
For an average family with seven children and assuming they are born two years apart, the family
requirments for calories would exceed ·the total supply available to the family by the time of the birth of the
fourth child. Thereafter, the entire family would be undernourished or, as is more usual, the youngest child
or children would suffer.
For a three child family, with children spaced four years apart, there would be sufficient calories even
until all three children were grown.
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21. COSTS TO MEET HEALTH REQUIREMENTS- HONDURAS
In 1980, the Government spent about 74 million lempiras in health services.

This averaged only 20

lempiras per person ($10). If that level of health spending should be continued, future expenditures would be:
o

With high fertility continued, 140 million lempiras in 2000 and 200 million lempiras by 2010.

o

With a 3-child family average attained by 2000, the expenditure would be 125 million lempiras in
that year and 150 million lempiras in 2010.

o

With a 2-child family average attained by 2000, the expenditure would be 120 million lempiras in
that year and 135 million lempiras in 2010.

In order to provide a higher level of health services in accord with the World Health Organization's
program of "Health For All By The Year 2000," the rate of expenditure per person would have to increase
substantially. Therefore the marginal difference in costs required to serve the population with high fertility
continued compared with the cost to serve the population with reduced fertility would be very great.
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22. PRIMARY AGE CHILDREN AND ENROLLENTS- HONDURAS
Honduras has made a grat effort to achieve its national educational goals, among them Universal
Primary Educaiton for its children up to the age of 14. RAPID population growth has made this expensive
and, as yet, unattainable.
In 1980 there were 723,000 children of primary school age (6-14). About 80% were enrolled in primary
and preparatory schools.
o

If high fertility continues, by 2000 there would be about 1,350,000 children 6-14, an increase of 87%.

o

If fertility declines to a 3-child family average by 2000, there would be about 1,070,000 children 6-

14 in that year, an increase of 48%.
o

If a 2-chld family average could be reached by 2000, there would be about 900,000 children 6-14 in
that year. Thereafter the number of children of primary school age would decline.

If fertility declines to a 3-child family average by 2000, it wouuld be possible to have all children of

primary school age enrolled by about 2000, at no more cost than to have 80% of the children enrolled with
high fertility continued.
The cross-hatched area on the chart represents savings in schools that would not have to be
constructed, teachers who would not have to be prepared, operating expenses that would not have to be paid.
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23. EFFECTS OF A DELAY IN STARTING A PROGRAM TO REDUCE FERTILITY

Because the popula,tion is growing so rapidly, and because of the momentum of population growth, any
delay in reducing the rate of growth will seriously affect the.future size of the Central America population.
As~;uming

that a program to reach a 2-child family"i:werage will take 20 years to implement, the demographic

effects of such a delay may be illustrated as follows:
o

If the program begins in 1985, the population in 2010 will be 40 million, and in 2050 it will be 54

million.
o

If the program begins in 1990, the population in 2010 will be 45 million, and in 2050 it will be 63
million. The five year delay will make adifference of 9 million' people by 2050.
·

o

If the program begins in 1995, the population will be 49 million in 2010, and in 2050 it will be 73

million. ·As a consequence of the ten year delay, Central Americawill have 19 million additional
people in 2050.
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24. FAMILY PLANNING- REQUIREMENTS FOR SMALLER FAMILY SIZE
A recent series of fertility surveys has provided considerable knowledgeable about family planning practices in
Central America. The practice has grown since 1950 when only about 10% of currently married women* were involved.
By 1980, about 30% of married women, or nearly 1 million women, were using some form of family planning method.
Despite this increase, the average married Central American woman still has about six live births during her
reproductive years.
There is a wide range of family planning practice in Central America. In Costa Rica, 65% of currently married
women practice family planning while in Guatemala, the figure is only 18%. In El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua,
practice is between 21% and 34%.
Not all women who want to limit their family sizes have me4ns available. The evidence indicates that for every
Central American woman using contraceptives, there is one who wants no more children and who does not use
contraceptives. This is the "unmet demand" for family planning services.**
The unmet demand is highest in Guatemala where 72% of women who want no more children are not using family
planning methods.

It is lowest in Costa Rica where 26% of married women who want no more children are not

contraceptives. In numerical terms, nearly 1 million married women are engaged in family planning in the 5 country
region.

About the same number of other women who desire no more children are not using contraceptives. There is

apparently a considerable and growing demand for family planning services currently unfilled.
In order to attain a 3-child average per woman by 2005, family planning practice will have to rise from the current
30% figure (about l.O million) to 60% of the married women of that year, or about 3.7 million women.
To attain a 2-child average .per woman by 2015, it would be necessary for family planning practice to increase to
7 5% of the currently married women of that year, or about 5.1 million women.

*Currently married women defined as those in formal marriages, consensual and visiting unions, and common law
marriages.
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**Estimates of "unrnet demand" also take into account the number of women not able to bear children, those currently
pregnant and those trying to become pregnant.
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25. THE COSTS TO ATTAIN A THREE CHILD FAMILY BY THE YEAR 2005

Family planning services are funded by the country itself and by outside donors. The United States contributes
approximately one-half of the outside assistance to public and private family planning programs in developing countries
directly or through international organizations. Approximately $39 million will be spent on population matters in Central
America in FY 1984. About two-thirds of this, $25 million, will be provided by the Central American countries.

The

United States and international donors will provide about one-third of the costs, or $14 million. The $43 million covers
mainly the provision of services and commodities, but also includes amounts for training, education and policy.

This

expenditure in FY 1984 is projected for a family planning prevalence rate of 32%. That is, it will provide the family
planning needs of 32% of married women at about $34 per woman.
To attain a 3-child goal by 2005, it will be necessary to provide family planning services to 60% of women in union
in that year.
At the midpoint of a 20 year program (1995), the annual cost will be approximately $70 million.

It can be

reasonably assumed that Central American countries can provide 50% of the costs, or about $35 million yearly.

The

other $35 million will have to come from outside sources.
By the year 2005 the annual cost to provide services to 3.7 million women will be $128 million. Local expenditures
will amount to about 40%, of the total or $51 million. Outside sources will have to provide approximately $77 million
yearly by 2005 to achieve a 3-chHd family goal.
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600.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission:
On behalf of the Catholic Bishops of the United States and
our President, Archbishop John R. Roach, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this National Commission on U.S.
Policy in Central America.
I.

Our Perspective

As you know, the American Catholic Bishops are not new to
this discussion. For more than four years the Bishops' Conference
has been consistently raising questions about U.S. policy in Central
America. I include for the record the Statement on Central America
overwhelmingly adopted by the U.S. Bishops in November of 1981,
which is the foundation of our frequent testimony. Speaking personally, I have been visiting and observing Central America for
more than eight years as I sought to support our missionary efforts
there and understand the forces at work in the region.
The American Catholic Bishops come to this discussion with
several perspectives. As Americahs, we want to see our vital·
national interests protected and our government's policies reflect
our national values and ideals. As citizens we want U.S. policies
to help bring about greater justice, democracy, and stability in
this hemisphere and to limit communist influence in the region.
As Catholics we start with the social teaching of our Church
which calls us to defend human dignity and human rights and to work
for social justice and peace as an integral part of our faith. Our
views have been shaped and our hearts moved by the inspiring witness of the Church in Central America as it seeks to defend the
poor, work for justice and search for peace and reconciliation in
the face of brutal violence, continuing conflict and frequent
repression from regimes of both right and left. As Catholics we
are not naive about Marxist influence or activity. We emphatically
reject any innuendo that the Church's defense of the poor and
advocacy of social justice serves Marxist interests. The Church's
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mission requires it to defend human rights whenever they are
threatened whether by dehumanizing ideologies or economic exploitation. Let me cite the activities of the Church in both
El Salvador and Nicaragua, in both Poland and the Philippines
as examples of this consistency.
As Bishops in the U.S. we are not experts or specialists,
but as pastors and religious leaders we have the right and
responsibility to judge the policies of our government by the
values articulated in our teaching. We have developed our position in dialogue with our brother Bishops in Central America,
but we speak as U.S. pastors to the U.S. government about U.S.
policies in the region.
II.

Our Concerns

For that reason and on that basis, we welcome this opportunity
to share our deep concerns about the future course of U.S. policy
and activity. We fear that future U.S. policy may be based on a
number of misconceptions regarding the basic issues and choices
in Central America.
The Roots of the Conflict
One concern is that the conflict in Central America is too
often seen as primarily a geo-political battle -- a struggle
between East and West, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
We have repeatedly pointed out that long before there was outside
intervention there was a legitimate struggle in El Salvador and
other parts of the region for social, political and economic
justice. The conflict has been over land, wages, the right to
organize and the issue of political participation. To ignore this
long struggle of people for justice, dignity and freedom is fundamentally to misunderstand the nature of the conflict today in
Central America.
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Because the conflicts in Central America are fundamentally
rooted in questions of social injustice and the persistent denial
of basic human rights for large sectors of the population,
the USCC has always opposed interpretations of the Salvadoran
and Central American conflict which place primary emphasis on
the superpower or East-West rivalry. This is not to ignore the
international implications and dimensions of the conflict. Nor
to deny the willingness of outside actors such as the Soviet
Union to take full advantage of the crisis. But we urge the
Commission to reject the notion that the geo-political struggle
is at the core of the problem in Central America.
The Search for a Military Solution
A second concern is the continuing pursuit of a military
solution for Central America. U.S. statements move back and
forth on this question, but our actions speak more clearly -- U.S.
policy still has hopes that military force can solve the problems.
In El Salvador victory by either side, which could only mean abject
surrender and bitter defeat for a large number of Salvadorans on
one side or the other, would not serve the interest of either
El Salvador or the United States. A society divided into victors
and vanquished is unlikely to result in either stable peace or
justice. Likewise, if the U.S. backed "contras" were to somehow
topple the government of the Sandinistas, do U.S. policymakers
really believe that would br·ing peace and stability to Nicaragua
or the region? We hope the Commission will make clear that a
continuing military struggle in an already devastated region is
not in our interests or Central America's.
A Wider War
A major concern of ours and of the Bishops of Latin America
is the imminent possibility of a wider war which will plunge the
entire region into armed conflict. The heightened tensions, strident
language and increased military activity make this threat a real
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danger.

Last August the Bishops of Latin America spoke of:

"the possibility of unleashing an open war covering the
whole subregion with sorrow and destruction. Militariza~
tion is increasing; nations are feverishly readying for
war, leading to serious deterioration of productive
activities; tensions grow, accusations are hurled back
and forth, border incidents multiply while, as a result,
misery grows and with it the risk of outside interventions."
(CELAM, August, 1983)
We hope the Commission will seek a way to help Central
America step back from the brink of regional war. We need to
find ways to reduce the tensions in the region which are turning
nations into armed camps with unfortunate consequences for their
domestic life as well as the region.
Intervention
When U.S. policymakers talk about the dangers of outside
interference in Central America -- they refer to the Soviet Union
and its proxies. When Central Americans talk about outside
interference they are talking about ~he Soviets to be sure, but
they are also talking about the United States. There is no need
to recite the sad history of U.S. intervention in the region, a
living memory for the people and leaders of Central America. The
present and past experience of intervention has led to the unified
opposition by the Latin American hierarchies to all outside intervention without exception. By outside intervention they do not
refer to the efforts of other Latin American states to facilitate
political dialogue; such efforts the bishops specifically endorse.
Rather, the unacceptable interference is that of the "foreign
powers," essentially the Soviet Union and the United States.
Latin America does not expect, nor desire, the United States simply
to forfeit any active role in the Latin American quest for peace
and development. Still less do they welcome expanded Soviet
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influence in any area of the hemisphere. What they oppose now
more strongly than ever in the past, is in the words of the
Central American Bishops, "the meddling of foreign powers who
come to support those in the countries who fit their own interests
which are generally far from, even opposed to, those of the great
majority."
To give a clearer sense of this nearly universal Latin
American episcopal concern, let me cite the relevant paragraphs
from the recent statements of the Bishops of Central and Latin
America.
The Bishops of Latin America stated in July:
"We desire that neither the governments nor opposition
groups invite foreign powers to intervene in this conflict,
and that those foreign powers, if already present, leave;
and if not present refrain from planning to do so.
In this way both will avoid the repeated calamity of other
historical experiences that have demonstrated the futility
of such interventions."
(CELAM, July, 1983)
Even more strongly the Central American Bishops wrote in
August:
"To the outside powers and ideological forces that are
interfering politically and militarily in Central America
contrary.to our cultural values, we demand that they do
not do so, so that our people and only they can end their
conflicts, overcome their differences and plot their course
toward the longed-for goal of peace."
"There must be absolute guarantees, now and for the future
that all of them leave. If not, the intervention of one
will automatically guarantee the intervention of the other
and thus the establishment of peace will become progressively
more difficult."
(SEDAC, August, 1983
full texts attached)
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The Commission must take into account the long history of
outside interference in Central America and our role in it.
Human Rights
One inconsistent aspect of the debate over Central America
is the use of human rights criteria for tactical advantage or
propaganda points rather than as a steady and consistent benchmark for governments in the region and our relationships with
them. Selective application of human rights standards depending
on our ideological preferences erodes our credibility both at
home and abroad. Human rights are being violated throughout the
region. The people of Central America are assaulted by death
squads, arbitrary imprisonment, uninvestigated murders, harassment of land reform efforts, restrictions on free union activity,
interference in education and journalism and other threats to
life and freedom. While life itself is threatened in some parts
of the region, human freedom and social justice are too often
violated by powerful interests and governments across Central
America. We need a consistent policy which sees human
rights as a principal focus of U.S. concern, not as debater's
points in our policy discussions. We hope this Commission will
make respect for human rights a fundamental criteria for U.S.
policy for all nations in the region.

III.

Criteria

In dealing with these concerns, we need a clear vision of our
goals and a way to judge which policies hold the best chance of
achieving them. Permit me to suggest some basic criteria for
evaluating both present and future policies:
Do they move the parties toward diplomatic rather than
military options, toward ceasefire, dialogue and negotiations? Toward free and open elections where all can
participate without the threat of violence or coercion?
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Do they increase respect for human rights and basic freedoms? Do they make respect for human rights a consistent
standard for governments in the region?
Do they address basic issues of social justice, genuine
land reform, broad participation in development and economic justice? Do they in fact offer hope of a better life
for the poor and dispossessed in the region?
Do they build the capacity of people and their governments in the region to deal wih their own problems? Do
they promote self-determination and self-sufficiency?
Do they respect and respond to the cultural, ethical and
religious values of the people of Central America or impose answers from a distance?
Do they respect and support the positive role of nongovernmental and local institutions (churches, small
business, trade unions, cooperatives, etc.)?
Do they strengthen the hand of moderate and democratic
forces or, by further polarization, help the extremes of
both right and left? Do they combat communism by offering
alternatives to Marxism as vehicles for needed reform?
Do they support effective civilian control of the military,
the rule of law and an effective criminal justice system?
IV.

Critique of Current Policy

In applying these criteria, we remain deeply disturbed by
the direction of current U.S. policy in Central America. Let me
cite policy toward El Salvador and Nicaragua as the two examples
I am most familiar with.

This is not to minimize the serious

problems in Guatemala and Honduras.
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El Salvador
The United States should use its influence to help bring
about a ceasefire and dialogue among the relevant parties leading to serious negotiations aimed at elections and a stable
government in El Salvador, as well as to begin the political,
social and economic reconstruction of the country. These three
elements have been stressed by the Salvadoran bishops and by
John Paul II in his visit to El Salvador.
These steps are, if anything more necessary today than ever
before. The violence has already taken the lives of 30,000-40,000
civilians, the majority killed by death squads or the security
forces. Thousands of Salvadorans have been driven into exile.
The tactics of the leftist opposition become more and more destructive as the war drags on. The U.S. role in El Salvador continues
primarily in a military direction. A continuation of the present course is exceedingly dangerous for both the United States
and for El Salvador. Archbishop Rivera Damas has described the
conflict as a war which cannot and should not be won. The political option, a negotiated settlement, is the humane and wise way
to-end this brutal conflict.
It is not clear to me, however, either from the content of
U.S. policy or from recent statements explaining it, that there
is a real determination in the U.S. policy process to pursue the
road of military force with a diplomatic facade, rather than a
political policy with a military component.
Nicaragua
U.S. policy gives the appearance of encouraging war in
Nicaragua. It seems clear that intensified military pressure,
through both overt measures and covert support of the "contras,"
is the principal element of U.S. policy.
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Let me make clear that I am deeply disturbed by the trends
inside Nicaragua. During my Nicaraguan visit last February
much in the direction of the country disturbed me and the two
other Archbishops accompanying me. I have shared my concerns
before the Congress: the expanding control of key sectors of
social life by the Nicaraguan government; the visits we had with
journalists, labor leaders and businessmen who described restrictions on their activities and the imprisonment of some colleagues;
and the harassment of Church leaders, including even the Holy
Father during his visit there. My concerns also include the
lack of positive commitment on the part of the Nicaraguan government to the promises for early and free elections together with
genuine political and economic pluralism. I still have these
same concerns; nothing in the intervening months has alleviated
them. Violations of human rights must be brought to light and
opposed. We have and are doing that.
I fear, U.S. policy is contributing to the deteriorating
internal situation in Nicaragua. It provides precisely the pretext for increased government control and surveillance. The
public rhetoric of our government toward Nicaragua, the cutoff
of bilatRral economic aid, U.S. support for a military buildup
on the Honduran border, and covert efforts to destabilize the
government employing even members of discredited Somosista elements, all contribute to a state-of-siege mentality which
reinforces misguided polices. U.S. Actions do not determine
internal Nicaraguan policy, but they exaggerate some of its
most troubling aspects. The forces of political moderation in
Nicaragua are being diminished by counterproductive U.S. policy.
Instead of a policy which isolates and provides an excuse for
the Sandinistas to consolidate their power, the USCC has advocated
that U.S. policy engage Nicaragua diplomatically. Our policy
should include the provision of economic assistance under the same
conditions we give aid to other countries, I refer especially to
their human rights performance. We see no reason to change this advice
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nor do we see reason to change our opposition to further funding
of covert activity against Nicaragua. Let me state personally
that as an American citizen and as a Catholic bishop, I find
use of U.S. tax dollars for the purpose of covert destabilization
of a recognized government to be unwise, unjustified and destructive
of the very values that a democratic nation should support in
the world. Such actions seem to be in violation of our treaty
pledges and our commitments under the U.N. Charter.
In these two cases and other parts of the region, U.S. policy
fails to respond to the criteria which we have laid out. It neglects the root causes of the problems, strengthens the extremists
of both right and left, relies on military force rather than
diplomatic creativity and applies human rights standards only
selectively. In ignoring these criteria I fear our policies isolate
us from our allies in the region and around the world, erode our
credibility at home and undermine our future role and influence
in the region.
V.

Choices for the Future

Peace: The Primary Goal
The first requirement for future U.S. policy in Central
America is to change the basic thrust of present policy and stop
the drift toward a regional war in Central America. Among our
goals in Central America should be a group of states developing
and maturing under viable political systems, enjoying good relations with one another and with us. Therefore, our policy should
foster regional stability through efforts which encourage the individual nations to reach an accommodation with one another and
settle their differences without outside intervention or arms.
In Central America there are some tasks the United States is
well suited to fulfill and other tasks which we should leave to
other actors. I believe the United States can set a tone and an
atmosphere in Central America which is conducive to diminishing
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the military elements of the struggle and encouraging the
opportunity for diplomatic dialogue. There are three dimensions
to this role for U.S. policy
First, there is a superpower or geo-political dimension. I
have argued throughout this testimony that this is not the way the
problem in Central America should be defined, nor is it the
principal aspect of the diplomatic agenda. But there is need for
a direct approach by the United States to the Soviet Union to address
Soviet intervention directly or by proxy in the Central American region. This aspect of U.S. policy has its greatest relevance in
terms of Nicaragua, but it is a mistake to focus U.S. pressure
only on Nicaragua. This puts us in the position of a superpower
squaring off against a small state,
it raises all the old memories of U.S. intervention
and it fails to address the key issue -- the Soviet Union's
conception of where its primary interests are in its relationship
with the United States. The overall state of U.S. - Soviet relations has deterioriated in recent months, but it is still
possible to recognize different levels of the relationship. Direct
Soviet intervention in Central America is no more welcome, legitimate or tolerable than direct U.S. intervention in Eastern
Europe. The point should be made clearly to the Soviets. Save
for this direct approach on a superpower basis to the Soviets,
the geo-political dimension of the problem should not be given
a more expansive role in our policy.
Second, the principal focus of U.S. efforts fo achieve
peace in the region should be a regional approach. U.S. efforts
should be primarily aimed at supporting the activity of the Contadora Group or a similar regional effort. The United States is
not in a position to play a mediator's role in Central America.
We are looked upon as partisans. The Contadora Group is a Latin
American initiative aimed at solving the Central American crisis
precisely because it has grave·consequences for all of Latin
America. The Contadora formula is aimed at disengaging the superpowers from the conflict, withdrawing all foreign military forces
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and assistance and then proceeding to a multi-dimensional
diplomatic dialogue.
Contadora nations can say and do things that the United
States would be either unable or unwilling to say or do. But the
Contadora initiative cannot succeed without strong, explicit,
consistent U.S. support. I realize that the U.S. government has
often said that it supports the Contadora activity, but U.S. warships in Central America and support for the "contras" do not
provide a convincing picture of support to anyone.
Present U.S. policy follows an independent course in El
Salvador, toward Nicaragua and in the region as a whole, while
still giving verbal support to Contadora. The recommendation of
this testimony is that the United States endorse the Contadora effort,
subscribe to its component elements and then shape U.S. policy so
that it supports at each stage the Contadora effort. Real progress
requires a belief in Central America that the U.S. is truly supporting Contadora, not just tolerating it.
Third, if the United States did move fully in support of the
Contadora process our policy toward individual countries in the
region would have to shift. As I have argued above, we should
seek genuine dialogue, ceasefire and negotiations in El Salvador
a3 part of our support for Contadora. Such an approach would
require pressure by the United States on the Salvadoran military
and pressure by the Contadora countries on the FDR-FMLN. In relation to NicaFagua, genuine U.S. support for Contadora would mean
first the stopping of covert support for the "contras" and, second,
the willingness to open serious high level diplomatic dialogue
designed to recast the U.S.-Nicaragua relationship. Such a reorientation would not signify U.S. support for Nicaraguan policy,
but it would be aimed at conducting diplomatic relations based on
the recognition of the right of self-determination and respect for
the principle of non-intervention by the Nicaraguans toward their
neighbors, and by us toward the Nicaraguans.
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A halt in the drift toward a regional war should
be the first priority for U.S. policy. It must be clearly understood that no significant economic program for the region can
be implemented when war rages in some countries and threatens
others. A political solution must precede large-scale and lasting economic programs. Likewise, a proposed economic effort
should not be used to justify more military aid for the region.
The need is not for a military policy to protect economic development,
but for a comprehensive policy which brings peace to
Central America and with it a real chance for economic reconstruction and development.
Social Justice and Democracy
A second essential choice for the future is the acceptance,
and more than that, the welcoming of dramatic social change to
achieve social justice and human rights in the region. We need
to define U.S. interest in a way which recognizes and supports
substantial political and economic change in countries needing
both. If we fail to define our interests to accommodate change,
we are fated to oppose it. This will place the United States in
opposition to the majority of the people in a region which cries
out for change, and in opposition to the Catholic Church there which
supports change. We must support genuine land reform and other
efforts to eliminate the enormous inequities in the region.
In addition, our long term choices should reflect the best
of our own political tradition. Not that we seek to impose it on
others but that we are committed to abide by our deepest values
in our policy toward others. We should strive to be seen as a
mature, democratic, stabilizing force in the region, not a
destabilizing bully. We should be confident enough of democratic
values and virtues that we support moderate democratic regimes and
that we use only democratic means in our support. Let us be known
in Central America by the finest line of our heritage: liberty and
justice for all.
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Fund for Central American Development: A Long-Term Policy
I realize the Bipartisan Commission is examining ideas for
a long-term approach to economic development in the Central
American region. I am convinced that such an approach is absolutely necessary, and I am equally convinced that it cannot
succeed unless it is linked to peace in the region. The United
States should not repeat the mistake of the Mekong Delta proposal
during the Vietnam era; it is not possible to carry out a largescale, well planned development effort while a war is going on.
I am sure that a serious long-term development effort on the
part of the United States would receive the support of the Church
in our country, if it were shaped in accord with some key principles.
My concern here is not to design a development program but to
specify the importance of these principles.
The first principle is that the short-range objective of such
economic assistance should be targeted to meet basic human needs.
Existing U.S. law as well as the approach of multilateral
agencies are presently geared toward a basic human needs approach.
The people throughout Central America are in dire need of help in
areas such as food, nutrition, health and housing. Given the
historic problem of institutionalized structures of inequity in
many countries of the region, a second principle for a development
effort should be a system of monitoring how both short-term and
long-term economic assistance are being used. Such a system of
monitoring would have to be carefully and cooperatively designed
with each country to protect both cultural antonomy and political
self-determination, but some oversight is needed to assure that
funds go to those most in need.
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Third, a long-term effort should seek to build and preserve
the human capital of the region through support for education,
training, cultural development as well as much needed assistance
for the reform of legal and justice systems. These efforts should
make extensive use of multilateral agencies like the InterAmerican Development Bank, The World Bank or other regional efforts.
No one expects an enlargement of the activities of these institutions without significant new U.S. support, but they can act as
mediating institutions which do not carry all the historic baggage
the United States brings to any Central American policy.
Fourth, a long-term economic strategy should be aimed at complementing our support for political self-determination with effective
action to enhance economic self-determination for the countries of
Central America. In an interdependent world, nations do not
achieve total independence, but they should not be forced to face a
permanent state of dependence, a condition which epitomizes exploitation for Latin Americans. It is crucial that the economic reconstruction and development of the region be controlled by the Central
Americans themselves, not by powerful outside interests or by the
remnants of an oligarchy.
Fifth, long-term economic planning should be respectful and
supportive of local institutions in Central America. These institutions which are social, educational, economic and religious often
embody key cultural and ethical values which must be preserved.
I know from my contact with El Salvador that key institutions of
higher education, for example, are already in place and should be
supported and not displaced. These efforts should involve and build
upon the strengths of local instituions, cooperatives, trade unions,
churches and non-governmental organizations. North American models
and structures cannot substitute for the development of local efforts
respectful of the values and beliefs of the people of the region.
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Refugees and Displaced Persons: A Special Crisis
An urgent concern for both the Church in Central America
and the Church in the United States is the question of refugees
and displaced persons.

.

first recommendation applies to the United States. The USCC
has long advocated a policy of Extended Voluntary Departure for
Salvadoran refugees in the United States. We find no good reason
why this status is applied to other groups in similar situations
and denied to Salvadorans. We hope the Commission will add its
weight to this just and humane proposal in your final report.
A

A second tremenaous tragedy and need is the situation
of the more than one million displaced persons and refugees. These
victims of the Central American crisis are throughout the region, but
concentrated in Southern Mexico, El Salvador and Honduras. A major
commitment is needed to meet the immediate human needs of these
people and offer training and relocation to them as they seek
to cope with the enormous trauma of displacement. Our own
Catholic Relief Services is already working to develop effective
assistance for these people. But our private efforts are not
enough. Refugees are at least theoretically eligible for some
assistance through the United Nations, but there is virtually no
adequate help for people displaced within their own country.
In short, for a seed to grow and develop one needs to
prepare the soil. The weeds and stones of past neglect,
injustice and violence in Central America must be removed so
as to permit the growth of those spiritual and social values
on which true democracy thrives.
VI.

Conclusion

In this testimony, we have outlined our concerns about current
policy, criteria for future choices and our own proposals for
peace and development in Central America. We are convinced they
lay the foundation for a new relationship between the United States
and Central America which will protect our national interests, help
meet the needs of this troubled region and serve also to curb Soviet
and Marxist inroads in this hemisphere.
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In the past, U.S. policy toward Central America has too
often been seen as defending the status quo and authoritarian
regimes. Future policies cannot ask people to choose between
the status quo and revolutionary violence, between continued
injustice and Marxism. U.S. policy, given our history and
traditional values, should stand as a beacon of hope, a force
for justice and a defender of human rights.
Years ago the Catholic Church was perceived by some as
distant from the struggles of ordinary people for justice, too
closely linked to the status quo and authoritarian regimes. By
reflecting on the Gospel and the situation in Latin America and
by applying the Church's teaching on justice and peace to their
own lands, the Church has renewed itself and become a leading
advocate for nonviolent social change, a defender of human rights.
The Church and its leaders are a powerful force for justice and
reconciliation in Central America. As a Catholic, I am proud
and deeply impressed by the witness of my Church. As an American,
I want to be equally proud of my country's contributions to
justice and peace in that region and in all the world.
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TO:

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

FROI~:

Irving Louis Horowitz

RE:

THE ROLE OF CUBA IN THE PACIFICATION OF CENTRAL AMERICA

Chairman Kissinger and members of the commission, my charge is
to discuss how Cuba can be involved in the Caribbean peacemaking process.
This is certainly not a topic of recent vintage.

Since Fidel Castro came

to power nearly a quarter century ago, diplomats from Latin America, politicians from North America,and academics from both hemispheres have been
asking this question.

More often than may be warranted by evidence, they

have assumed that Cuban interests are consonant with those of the other
member states of the Caribbean region.

To those for whom the word interests

is too strong, has come a rhetorical barraqe of arguments that at
least a modus vivendi is possible.

Cuban communism is a sore thumb not

easily disposed of by appeals to use the opposite hand.

To skirt the issue

of Cuba is to insure either clumsy ad hoc arrangements or to avoid resolution
of the very tasks with which the commission is charged.
From the outset of its revolution, Cuba viewed itself not
only as bringing a message of truth and hope to the hemisphere, but as a
revolutionary vanguard to be emulated and imitated.

In the post-revolutionary

phuse of the early 19G0s, Venezuela and Guatemala were rocked by Cuban

*Statement prepared and presented on October 1, 1983. Not for release
prior to this date and not for publication in this form without permission
from the author and the National Bipartisan Commission.
Portions of this
testimony are derived from my introduction to the fifth edition of Cuban
Comrnun ism (New 8 runswi ck and London, 1984).
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11

Warrior-proletarian 11 insurgency movements.

Even giants like Brazil found

themselves warmly embracing the causes and purposes of the Cuban Revolution
during the final gasp of the Goulart regime.

For nations as remote as

Chile and Bolivia, the Cuban model of revolution reared its head, weakly
in some instances and intimately in others.

But for all the contagion of

the Cuban Revolution and the charisma of Fidel, the successes during the
first twenty years of the Cuban Revolution were rather meager:

promissory

notes were issued without fulfillment, elites led without mass support,
foco groups existed without grounded support.

In the aftermath of the

Bolivian adventure of the mid-1960s, the model itself was finally called
into question with the shattering defeat and death of Ernesto 1'Che 11 Guevara
in the Bolivian interior.
The second phase, which occupied most of the 1970s, witnessed
the internationalization of Cuban foreign policy.

Senator Daniel Patrick

Moynihan, referring to Cuba's willingness to fight in far away places of
Africa and the Middle East, called its troops the 11 Gurkhas of the Russi an
Empire. 11 At the diplomatic level, Cuba took a central role in the various
summit meetings of the nonaligned nations.

On the economic front, Cuba

focused demands for a New International Economic Order, pushing the argument
that there is a natural alliance between the Third World and the communist
camp, and an equally natural antagonism between the Third World and the
West.

But this strategy found its limits with the Cuban stalking horse

isolating itself from Third World condemnation of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, which was crystallized by Cuba's failure to win support in
its bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council.
This set the stage, in turn, for a third phase in the 1980s,
one in which the Cuban praetorian guard shifted its goegraphical focus away
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from Africa and the Middle East and toward the Caribbean Basin.

Military

adventurism was replaced by Cuban developmental aid pro0rams; and concern
for Latin America as a whole became much more highly focused on critical
events in Central America.
serpentine tail:

The Cuban vanguard has begun to develop a

the Sandinista uprising in Nicaragua, however indigenous

in origin, soon took on Cuban features--from the organization of the military to the foreign policy of its leaders.

This was also true on the

small island of Grenada where an indigenous change of regimes rapidly
evolved into a powerful identification with Cuba as the center.
was expected to be similar in El Salvador.

The scenario

However, its people and politi-

cians foiled the designs of history and, albeit imperfectly, chose a path
of democratic realignment. 1
What

w~

have witnessed is the evolution of a grand strategy

carried forth by a satellite, Cuba, on behalf of its major supporter and
supplier, the Soviet Union.

Revolution has forced us not simply to changes

in our foreign policy but to a profound alteration in our strategic conclusions for what the hemisphere, and more specifically the Caribbean
region, might become if Soviet

grand strategy were allowed to play

out its hand unimpeded.
Cuba is the willing, enthusiastic executor of Soviet designs.
The wide level of tactical maneuverability granted Cuba by the Soviet
Union has given it a latitude of operations which can be easily misinterpreted as autonomy.

Cuban latitude, its seeming indifference to the

tactical styles of the Soviet Union, is what diplomats, politicians, and
academics are responcing to when they speak so casually of bringing Cuba
into the Caribbean peacemaking process.

Such figures often confuse

tactical maneuverability with overall strategic

conclusions.

Cuban
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tactics are often pragmatic and home grown, but Cuban strategies are very
definitely imported from the Soviets.

It is the special mission of Raul

Castro in Cuba to insure a clear distinction between tactical maneuverability and strategic coordination.
The idea of a peace process implies an ability on the part of
each national actor to act autonomously.

But the history of Cuba over the

past quarter century demonstrates that such independent behavior is no
longer feasible when Cuba has become, to all intents and purposes, a
satellite, surrogate, and sponsor of Soviet activities from Afghanistan
to Angola.

The revolution of 1959 was authentic; but the breakdown of

autonomy in Cuban actions in 1983 is a reality.
independent actor.

Cuba is simply not an

Hence determining how it can fit into a peace process

depends heavily on the Soviet Union

1

S

immediate sense of its limits.

Cuba

is the weathervane for the long-range potential which the Soviet Union
envisions for the Caribbean region.

Although the latter is geographically

remote, one must not think that the Soviet Union has no interest in the area
or in the expansion of Cuban power.

It would be as correct to suggest that

because the Philippines are geographically remote from the United States,
the United States has a flagging interest in Asian affairs.
too small to divide in neat geographic terms.

The world is

Spheres of influence have

become enlarged to the point where national concerns have become global
in character.

Nor is this particular question of autonomy and authenticity

simply a function of Cuban foreign policy commitments toward the Soviet
Union.

The internal structure of Cuban national life conspires to sharply

limit its Caribbean initiatives.
As one informed figure, Carlos Alberto Montaner, has pointed
out, the dorsal spine of Cuban society is its armed forces.

He speaks of
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the Cuban military as highly Prussianized.
by pointing out that while

2

I would modify this somewhat

the Paraguayan military is highly Prussianized,

the Cuban military is highly Russianized by virtue of its elite training
at Soviet military academies.

The near-shuttlelike trips of Raul Castro

between Havana and Moscow, along with the deepening sophistication and
strength of Cuban hardware, consrire to make Cuba one of the most powerful
armed forces in the hemisphere.

In Caribbean terms its military might is

greater than that of all other nations in Central America combined.
Since the mid-1970s, when Cuba intervened in Angola on a large
scale and the Soviet Union began to modernize Cuba's armed forces, the
Cuban military has evolved from a predominantly home defense force into a
formidable power relative to its Latin American neighbors.

The cost of

Soviet arms delivered to Castro since 1960 exceeds $2.5 billion.

These arms

deliveries, plus the annual $3 billion economic subsidy, are tied to Cuba's
ongoing military and political role abroad in support of Soviet objectives.
Cuba's armed forces total more than 225,000 personnel--200,000 army, 15,000
air force and air defense, and 10,000 navy--including those on active duty
either in Cuba or overseas and those belonging to the reserves, subject to
immediate mobilization. With a population of just under 10 million, Cuba
has the largest military force in the Caribbean Basin and the second largest
in Latin America after Brazil, with a population of more than 120 million.
More than 2 percent of the Cuban population belongs to the active-duty
military and ready reserves, compared with an average of less than 0.4
percent in other countries in the Caribbean Basin. In addition, Cuba's
large paramilitary organizations and reserves can provide internal support
t o th e m1., 1. t ary. 3
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The structure of the Cuban economy, again, does not suggest
easy participation in Caribbean regional planning.

The Cuban economy has

extremely high dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
85-90 percent of its economic trade is with that region.

Roughly

Cuba does indeed•

share similar problems with the Caribbean region, a single-crop economy,
relatively low levels of agrarian production, and the absence of accumulated
savings and wealth.

But while the problems of Cuba and the region may be

similar in the sense of being outside the market economy and inside the
planning economy, this places it in a unique position, one that not even
Nicaragua comes close to emulating.
The Cuban economy remains heavily determined by outside forces
over which its national leaders do not have significant control.

The Soviet

Union basically has the power to set prices, grant subsidies, and extend
credit.

A small part of Cuba 1 s trade is still with market economies and

hence the island is not totally removed from the international market in
terms of price fluctuations

and need of credit. Cuba remains a single-

crop economy which exports a few raw materials to the Soviets and buys
from them most of the needed intermediate and capital goods.

The island

has been unable to accumulate enough capital from domestic resources, has
shown little progress in the expansion of the capital goods sector, and
has been incapable of self-sustained economic growth.

To keep its economy

running, Cuba has had to borrow heavily and increasingly from the Soviets
and from other socialist and market economies, thus dramatically increasing
its foreign debt. 4
The structure of Cubals polity shows wide variances with the
rest of the Caribbean region.

It boasts a single Communist Party apparatus,

lacks voluntary associations, its social life is depoliticized, its ideology
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is routinized and ritualized, and the same family has been in power since
the onset of the revolution.

Cuba has a great deal in common with some of

the worst features of authoritarian regimes past and present in the
Caribbean.

One finds in Cuba the routinization of a revolution without

its institutionalization.

Events become regularized, expectations

leveled, and any hope of dramatic changes in the system virtually eliminated.

While a great show was made several years ago that this signifies

the institutionalization of the revolution, it is evident that devices
ensuring legitimacy (such as elections, oppositional parties, or a free
press) are absent.

What has been institutionalized is single-party

rule and vanguard political domination.

What has been routinized is

professions of faith and loyalty to the revolution.
foes of the regime deny this.
level, cleavages show:
pretenses.

Neither friends nor

Explanations are another matter.

At this

Cuba is a country small in size and large in

It plays a considerable role in hemispheric affairs, Caribbean

affairs, and even Third World activities.
of a hemispheric revolt against

11

Cuba considers itself the leader

Yankee imperialism 11 --a never-ending holy

war of an island David with the Goliath of the north--while it has
tremendous difficulty in coping with its own internal

mundan~

problems.

What intensifies this sense of routinization, this depoliticization of Cuban life, is the continued existence in power of the original
leadership.

The same figures who made the revolution, at least some of

them, retain power in that revolution.

Although many original revolution-

aries were purged, others are in exile, and still others died spuriously
heroic deaths in foreign guerrilla insurgency activities,
Cuba's leadership has endured over a quarter century--unbroken and intact.
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The routinization of the Cuban Revolution is thus scarcely the
same as asserting its normalization.

What has been sadly routinized is not

only an authoritarian substance but also a paranoid style.
meant invidiously:

Nor is this

Richard Hofstadter was able to write one of his most

brilliant essays on The Paranoid Style in American Politics.

Still, a

sense of frenetic, ceremonial mobilization, combined with a peculiar
inability to act on the presumption that Cuba may not always be at the
center of world events (a malady suffered by other small nations also
on a permanent war footing) is easily fed by random remarks.

When Senator

Barry GoldvJater announced that Cuba would be best off as the fifty-first
state in the Union, the response of the Cuban
across the banner of Granma:

Communis~

Party was emblazoned

"Whoever tries to conquer Cuba will gain

nothing but the dust of her bloodsoaked soil--if he doesn 1 t perish in the
struggle first!

11

It is not that threats are unreal, but that their quality

is uniformly misread and misunderstood.

Subtlety, humor, discounting

rhetorical claims, has like so much else, fallen victim to a revolution that
feeds on its own slogans; one in which complexity has become suspect and
simplicity the essential tool of political analysis and social living.
The political functions of the paranoid style are numerous and
complex, but above all can best be viewed as the essential mechanism of mass
mobilization.

Quite like the Stalinist doctrine of capitalist encirclement,

Castro is able to present Cuba as an island of socialist probity in a
hemisphere of imperialist aggression.

Whatever the exactitude of such a

definition, it has the effect of maintaining the Cuban people in a state
of high military and paramilitary alert; providing a practical role for
vanguard groups and a touchstone of regime loyalty.

The danger with the

constant pumping of the external threat syndrome is similar to the problem
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of apocalyptic religious cults:

when the cataclysmic event fails to mater-

ialize, questions of the soundness of the leadership are raised among some
(while others band even more tightly about their leader), followed by a
cynical withdrawal from the political process.

In the absence of market

incentives based on consumption rewards, the regime is compelled to manufacture escalated threats of disaster and destruction.
While continuity seems to best characterize the most recent
phase of the Cuban Revolution, this does not mean that stasis has set in.
Tendencies have hardened into trends. As dialecticians would have it:
quantitative changes have resulted in a qualitatively new situation.
The most decisive development is intensified Cuban dependency on the Soviet
Union.

Single-crop socialism has had to confront a weak world sugar market

and a series of natural disasters.

To overcome this dual situation without

disturbing current, relatively high, consumer levels, Cuba's trade with the
Soviet bloc is fast approaching 90 percent.

Soviet aid to Cuba is now at

$4 billion annually, roughly 25 percent of the Cuban gross national product.
The weakness of the Cuban export economy has driven up Cuba's debt to the
hard currency nations of the West and Japan to such a degree that it can no
longer pay the interest (much less the principal) due.

It would take an

extraordinarily naive view not to appreciate the extent to which Cuban
communism in order to survive must become increasingly communist (in the
sense of adherence to Soviet bloc politics and policies) and decreasingly
Cuban (in the sense of developing a nationalist standpoint).

The conse-

quences for the Castro regime of such a transformation in its overseas
patterns deserves close scrutiny.
Cuba is not China.

It does not have a ranqe of autonomous

behavior which would permit the evolution of an independent foreign policy.
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This is not simply a consequence of Castro's wishes but of deep social
structures.

Its demands while quite real, are developed within a larger

context of Soviet policy requirements.

On the basis of Cuban policy

materials, five policy pivots emerge:
(1) Complete acceptance by the Caribbean regions, and above all
by the United States, of the Sandinistas as the rightful, exclusive rulers
of Nicaragua and that no support be provided for the opponents of the
Sandinistas for such people as Eden Pastora, by Honduran authorities.
(2) Complete acceptance of the demands of the Farabundo group
in El Salvador and the disposition and dismantling of the present regime.
In other words, an El Salvador which would put the guerrillas in power and
provide them with a monopoly of military and political control.
(3) Cuban authorities would demand removal of any and all U.S.
military presence in the area, starting with its Guantanamo Naval Base in
Cuba and not ending until all U.S. troops, advisors, and other paramilitary elements were removed from the region.
(4) Free and unimpeded passage of weapons and hardware from the
Soviet Union to Cuba, and if necessary from Cuba to other parts of the
Caribbean region in the midst of insurgent struggles.
(5) Acceptance of guerrilla movements and Communist Party
groups as legitimate heirs to Caribbean rule especially in Guatemala,
which the Cubans perceive as the more immediately vulnerable Central American
nation.
If the United States is willing to pay the price outlined above,
or is able to coexist with such Cuban demands with respect to the political
process in the rest of the Caribbean, Cuba could be
process.

brou~ht

into the peace

But at that point, one is not examining a multilateral peace
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process with the region, but a bilateral process with the Soviet Union for
the capitulation and surrender of any and all vital interests which the
United States might deem important in the rest of the Caribbean region.

On

the presumtion that such Cuban policy demands are an acceptance by the
United States of

defeat and are thus unacceptable, one must

h~miliating

turn to other ways of discussing Cuba and the Caribbean.
The key issue in Central America is not war or peace, but
rather varieties of political systems.

The issue is between forms and

varieties of democratic rule versus the singular form and absence of
variety of totalitarian communism.

The vulgar economic determinisms we

inherited from the late nineteenth century have come to a crashing halt.
The issue before American society is not the struggle between free market
systems on one hand and planning systems on the other, but between free
peoples and enslaved ones.

We know enough to realize that nearly every

nation, large and small, nominally communist or capitalist,has a whole
range of mixes within its economic grasp, and that these are constantly
shifted about: strong capitalist trends in China, worker-management trends
in Yugoslavia, village handicraft socialism in India, high levels of public
sector involvement in Mexico.

The economic mix within which political

systems operate is no longer novel and should no longer be fearsome.

The

United States should be capable of living with a whole variety of economic
systems.· But thus far it has found itself less able to deal with a declining variety of political systems.
Public opinion data on American attitudes toward Central America
reveal an ambivalent pattern:

fear of greater military involvement, a

striking lack of information on the region, coupled with deep-seated beliefs
that Cuba and Nicaragua are sources of regional destabilization and
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.

su bvers 10n.

5

Policy options must be framed in a flexible manner which

both respects the tolerance of hemispheric differences and also recognizes
the firm commitments of this people to democratic values and sovereign
rights.

The policy sector of the United States would be well advised to

support popular movements for democracy wherever and whenever possible in
the Caribbean.

The touchstone of these regimes ought not be the specifics

of the economic production cycle but rather the specifics of commitments to
democratic shift on one hand and a totalitarian effort on the other.

The

smoke screen of north/south-east/west all comes to the simple fact that
the grave danger posed to peace

by the Cuban regime is not a function

of economic modes but rather of its political decisions.

The political

decisions made by the nations of the Caribbean--and not individual nuances
and varieties of economics--must be the touchstone by which an American
foreign policy for the region is measured.

We are in a period of breakup

not only of ideologies and systems, but also of the paradigm of what we
consider base and what we consider superstructure.
Given the intricate network of foreign policy considerations
it is naive to presume that Cuba can be dealt with by the United States
strictly within the context of multilateral regional negotiations.

While

such an approach is abstractly preferable to the big stick of a big brother,
the presence of a Soviet surrogate introduces big-power bilateral considerations through the proverbial back door.

Any solution to United States

participation in the stabilization of El Salvador or the destabilization
of Nicaragua for that matter, must entail the resolution of a longstanding
Soviet presence, in both large-scale military manpov1er and military hardware terms, in Cuban life.

The search for future autonomous forms of

political organization and social systems should not be confused with present

629.

dependencies.

Big-power interests are real and will not vanish as long

as the threat persists that every new guerrilla insurgency entails the
prospect of adding to Soviet power in the Caribbean.
There are two uncomfortable and quite risky policy conclusions that
emanate from my remarks:

first, that the Soviet Union, since it is

evidently part of the problem must become part of any Caribbean peace
process; and second, that the United States must avoid mechanistic
parallels with post-world-war two Europe and thus overcome the notion
that a Marshall Plan for Central America is a politica1 cure-all; it may
not even be an appropriate band-aid.

Let us probe such a paired conclusion

in greater depth.
There is a widespread feeling that if the Soviet Union joins a
Caribbean peace

pro~ess,

the United States will thus be legitimating a

role for the Russians in the region, and by so doing give them an easy
victory.

While this argument has some merit, it pales when confronted by

the obvious, empirical fact that the Soviets already have made a significant penetration of the region through Cuba and Nicaragua (especially the
former).

To think that bilateral discussions are feasible in the Middle

East or in Southeast Asia but not in Latin America is a dangerous illusion.
One cannot isolate Soviet power by evasive diplomatic techniques.
The Contadora position is that it is "undesirable for Caribbean conflicts to be incorporated into the context of the East-West confrontation."
However, since a key source of the present structures and processes in the
region derive from that conflict, Contadora has been unable to extract
anything but a general commitment to peace.

Since Cuba is laundered out

of consideration, what Contadora can effectively negotiate is solely a
dimunition of United States influence in the region; the Soviet role
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remains conspicuously unexamined or unexplained.

Thus, by a sheer act of

omission, the Contadora Group would conduct negotiations as if Cuba has
neither a role to play, nor losses to suffer in the event of an overall
settlement.

To bring the Russians into the negotiating process is to

permit a serious policy discussion between the contending parties, i.e.,
it is to make clear that the massive Soviet presence in Cuba is at least
as much an agenda item as the modest American presence in El Salvador.
In so doing, the education of American public opinion can dovetail with
the resolution of Central American issues of vital collective concern.
Large-scale economic aid to the region is a serious necessity.

For

example, Honduras has taken highly risky steps to inhibit an extension
or even consolidation of the Sandinista forces in Nicaragua.

Not to

support their repeated, and thus far unanswered, pleas for fiscal aid, is
certainly to destabilize a crucial American ally in the region.

But such

supports are essentially bilateral in character, given quite bluntly, for
real support rendered rather than the blackmail and threat that 1f such
aid is not rendered, revolutionary upheaval is inevitable.
The economic needs of Central America are real and great:

crop

diversification, rational urbanization and industrialization, reduction
of extremities in sectoral inequality and maldistribution of wealth.

But

to think that a Marshall Plan for Latin America, created in a political
vacuum will have more than very short term palliative results is not to
take the chronic history of the region seriously.

It is better to

accept systemic diversity in the economies of the region thatn attempt
an integration based on presumed free-market ideologies.

Again, American

public opinion will be happier to have such economic indigenization than
economic rationalization from the top down.
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Whatever specific policy options emerge from current United States
reconsiderations of Central America, they will be wiser, more produent, and
above all, more successful if the Soviet master and the Cuban proxy are
factored in at all levels of analysis.

Caribbean pacification clearly

rests first on a cease and desist in the export of armed revolution or
counterrevolution; second, the elimination of barriers to the free flow
of peoples and ideas in the region; and third, respect for the autonomy
and territorical integrity of all nations in the region.

The limits of

such premises, and of policy itself, is that these cornerstones do not
necessarily comprise a tight fit.

Hence building upon them becomes either

an exercise in futility or an excruciatingly painful series of choices
among worthy alternatives involving, more often than not, Draconian
consequences.

Yet the goal of Caribbean pacification is not of such

significance that, contradictory elements notwithstanding, the struggle
for a policy consensus within the context of new regional realities must
go forward.
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STATEMENT OF NATIONAL COMMANDER KEITH A, KREUL
THE AMERICAN LEGION
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
SEPTEr~BER 22, 1983
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSIONJ THE AMERICAN LEGION
WELCOMES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS VIEWS ON U.S, POLICY TOWARD
CENTRAL AMERICA TO THIS BIPARTISAN BODY,

AS THE NATION'S LARGEST

VETERANS' ORGANIZATIONJ WE HAVE A DEEP AND ABIDING INTEREST IN
PROTECTING AMERICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY,, .DEFENDING AND PROPAGATING
WESTERN IDEALS,, .AND ACHIEVING PEACE WITH FREEDOM,
IN PRESENTING OUR VIEWS THIS MORNINGJ AFTER DISCUSSING U.S,
INTERESTS AND A STRATEGIC EVALUATION OF THE AREAJ I SHALL GIVE YOU
OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT U,S, POLICIES AND CLOSE WITH PROPOSED
LONG-TERM POLICIES AND THOUGHTS ON BUILDING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS.
CENTRAL AMERICA IS IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL,,,POLITICAL.,,ECONOMIC.,,AND SECURITY REASONS,

U.S,

INABILITY TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF UNFRIENDLY REGIMES IN AN AREA
CLOSE TO OUR SHORES WOULD BE A SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL SETBACK.

COUPLED

WITH A LONG SERIES OF U,S, FAILURES IN VIETNAM,, .CAMBODIA,, .LAOS,,,
ANGOLA,,, IRAN,, ,AND AFGHANISTANJ UNSUCCESSFUL U,S, EFFORTS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA WOULD SERIOUSLY CALL INTO QUESTION OUR RELIABILITY AS AN ALLY,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR IS INTENSIFIED BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATION
HAS REPEATEDLY "DRAWN A LINE" IN EL SALVADOR AGAINST COMMUNIST
IMPERIALTSM.
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SINCE ABOUT

1972)

THE KREMLIN LEADERS HAVE EVALUATED THE

"CORRELAT10N OF FORCES" AS MOVING DECISIVELY IN THEIR DIRECTION.
THE SOVIETS' MASSIVE MILITARY-BUILDUP GAVE THEM AT LEAST EQUIVALENCE
IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES,, ,A DEFINITE SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL
FORCES,, .AND VASTLY IMPROVED CAPABILITIES TO PROJECT POWER,
SIMULTANEOUSLY) THE SOVIETS PERCEIVED A DRASTIC DECLINE IN U.S,
POLITICAL WILL.

THIS PERCEPTION STEMMED FROM:

I

U,S, FOREIGN POLICY SETBACKS

I

U,S, SELF-DOUBT AND SELF-EMASCULATION

I

INCREASING DISTRUST OF ALL GOVERNMENT

I

GROWING STRAINS IN OUR ALLIANCES

I

SEVERE CUTBACKS IN U,S, FUNDS ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE,

WITH THE BALANCE OF POWER MOVING IN THEIR DIRECTION) THE SOVIETS
TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE SANDINISTA
REVOLUTION TO EXPLOIT THE SOCIAL) POLITICAL) AND ECONOMIC TENSIONS
THAT HAD BEEN INTENSIFYING IN CENTRAL AMERICA FOR SEVERAL DECADES,
IN DOING SOJ THE SOVIETS HAD THE OBJECTIVES OF:
I

CAUSING THE UNITED STATES TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM
AREAS OF PRIME STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE IN EUROPE) THE MIDDLE
EASTJ AND EAST ASIA

I

DEMONSTRATING U.S, IMPOTENCE

I

ACQUIRING A MILITARY BASING INFRASTRUCTURE ENABLING THE
SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO THREATEN OR EFFECT AT LEAST
SHORT-TERM INTERDICTION OF U.S, SEA LINES OF
COMMUNICATION TO THE PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONTENTION,
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UNITED STATES POLICY OVER THE PAST 2~ YEARS HAS BEEN MOVING
IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION) BUT IT HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ADEQUATE,
ALTHOUGH ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT

TH~EE-FOURTHS

OF ALL U,S, AID TO

CENTRAL AMERICAJ OUR ECONOMIC AID HAS NOT BEEN UP TO THE LEVELS
NEEDED TO ALLEVIATE THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN CAUSED BY GUERRILLA
DEPREDATIONS AND THE WORLDWIDE RECESSION,

THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

INITIATIVE WAS AN EXCELLENT START IN DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE)
MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO CENTRAL AMERICA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS) BUT
MUCH MORE REMAINS TO BE DONE,
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INDISPENSABLE;
HOWEVER) IT APPEARS TO BE LIMITED BY ARBITRARY CEILINGS UNRELATED TO
THE SITUATION,

A STRIKING EXAMPLE OF THAT IS THE LIMIT OF

55

U,S,

TRAINERS IN EL SALVADOR,
IT IS ALSO VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY ECONOMIC AID TO
GUATEMALA CONTINUES AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE
HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING,

THOSE RESTRICTIONS DO NOT SEEM LOGICAL IN

VIEW OF GUATEMALA'S STRATEGIC LOCATION ON MEXICO'S SOUTHERN BORDER
AND THE PROGRESS GUATEMALA HAS MADE IN THE PAST 1~ YEARS,
IN SUM) WE SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONTINUING EFFORTS TO
EXPLAIN THE THREAT TO U.S, INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND TO PROVIDE
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO OUR FRIENDS,

HOWEVER) WE BELIEVE

THE CURRENT LEVELS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FUNDING AT BEST WILL
MAINTAIN A STALEMATE) WHICH IN THE LONG RUN MEANS DEFEAT FOR OUR
FRIENDS AND FOR OURSELVES.
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IN LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE) THE KEYSTONE OF U,S, POLICY FOR
CENTRAL AMERICA SHOULD BE A LONG-TERM "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN"
APPLICABLE TO THE ENTIRE CARIBBEAN BASIN,

SINCE WORLD WAR IIJ

U,S, POLICY TOWARD THE AREA HAS BEEN MARKED BY SHORT-LIVED) INTENSE
PERIODS OF ACTIVITY (SUCH AS THE BAY OF PIGSJ CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS)
DOMINICAN INTERVENTION) FOLLOWED BY NEGLECT,

OUR DECLINING INTEREST

HAS COINCIDED WITH EXPANDING SOVIET-CUBAN DIPLOMATIC) CULTURAL)
ECONOMIC) AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES,
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN NATIONS CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME
LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE,, ,INFRASTRUCTURE,, .AND COMMITMENT
TO DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES POSSESSED BY THE EUROPEAN NATIONS AFTER WORLD
WAR II,

NEVERTHELESS) THE MARSHALL PLAN ANALOGY IS APT--NOT FOR

SIMILARITY OF PRECONDITIONING--BUT FOR THE NEEDS OF U.S, POLICY,
TO HAVE A POSITIVE LONG-TERM EFFECT IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN) THE UNITED
STATES NEEDS TO INSTITUTE A "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" BECAUSE THAT APPROACH
WOULD BE:
FIRST) COMPREHENSIVE:

ADDRESSING ECONOMIC) SOCIAL)

POLITICAL) AND SECURITY NEEDS IN A COORDINATED MANNER,
SECOND) MULTILATERAL:

INSTEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DICTATING)

IMPOSING) OR DIRECTING SOLUTIONS,
THIRD) LONG-TERM:

BASED ON MULTI-YEAR FUNDING) THUS AVOIDING

THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTIES OF ANNUAL FUNDING,
FOURTH) UNDERSTANDABLE:

CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

WOULD KNOWINGLY BE UNDERTAKING A SPECIFIC PROGRAM)
BASED ON DESIGNATED PRINCIPLES) AND HAVING EXPLICIT
GOALS,
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FIFTH) MORALE-BUILDING:

OUR FRIENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN

BASIN WOULD BE HEARTENED BECAUSE THE U.S.
COMMITMENT WOULD

B~

BROAD) CLEAR) AND DEFINITE,

OF COURSE) THE "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE
CULTURAL) POLITICAL) AND ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES AMONG CARIBBEAN BASIN
NATIONS.

DIFFERING PROBLEMS CALL FOR NATIONAL SOLUTIONS BUT IN A

MULTILATERAL CONTEXT. PRIORITIES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED
BASED PRIMARILY ON U.S, NATIONAL INTERESTS,
THE USUAL ARGUMENT AGAINST A "MARSHALL-TYPE PLAN" IS THAT OF
UNDUE EXPENSE.

THE ONLY ANSWER TO THAT CONTENTION IS THAT WE MUST

BE WILLING TO DEVOTE THE NECESSARY RESOURCES IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE
OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS,

SOVIET SPENDING ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND

FOREIGN INFLUENCE IS CURRENTLY AT LEAST TWICE AS GREAT PROPORTIONATELY
AS IS OURS,

THEREFORE, IF WE HAVE SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS IN THE

CARIBBEAN) WE MUST BE WILLING TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO PURSUE THEM,
IT IS ABSURD

FOR OUR RICH SOCIETY TO DECLINE SPENDING A FEW BILLIONS

NOW AND RISK EITHER STRATEGIC DEFEAT OR THE NECESSITY TO SPEND
HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS AND TO SACRIFICE THOUSANDS OF LIVES OF OUR
SERVICE PERSONNEL LATER.
IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO OUR FRIENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA,

ULTIMATE VICTORY FOR

DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA DEPENDS UPON IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONDITIONS COUPLED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES,

NONE OF THOSE GOALS CAN BE TRULY ACHIEVED

WITHOUT INTERNAL SECURITY AND STABILITY.

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL

MILITARY FORCES TO PROVIDE A SECURITY SHIELD IS AN ABSOLUTE
PREREQUISITE FOR ACCOMPLISHING U,S, OBJECTIVES.
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MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE BASED ON A PROFESSIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF TRUE MILITARY NEEDS AND NOT RESTRICTED BY SOME ARBITRARY CEILING,
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH PROVISION OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES AND CONDUCT OF MILITARY TRAINING,
DEMOCRACY IS VERY DESIRABLE BUT NOT IMMEDIATELY ESSENTIAL FOR
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U,S, OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA,

NAIVE BELIEFS THAT

"AMERICAN-STYLE" DEMOCRACY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY
AND THAT IT CAN BE ACHIEVED QUICKLY WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY LEAD TO
DISAPPOINTMENT AND UNDERCUT OUR EFFORTS IN THE AREA·

CERTAINLY1 WE

SHOULD STRIVE TO ENCOURAGE THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY) BUT WE MUST
REALIZE SUCCESS IN THAT ENDEAVOR WILL REQUIRE A PATIENT) lUNG-TERM
EFFORT.
THE DEMOCRACY PROJECT .. ,PROPOSED BY THE ADMINISTRATION,,,
SHOULD BE FLESHED OUT AND FULLY SUPPORTED ON A BIPARTISAN BASIS BY
THE CONGRESS.

ALTHOUGH THE PROJECT WILL BE HELPFUL) THE MAIN IMPETUS

FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE MUST COME FROM A MYRIAD OF OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE
CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE FROM THE AREA THROUGH CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL
EXCHANGES,
SUCH EXCHANGES SHOULD BE A KEY PART OF U.S. POLICY,

ALTHOUGH

THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES IN CENTRAL AMERICA CONTINUE TO SEND
THEIR CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES FOR SECONDARY AND COLLEGE
EDUCATION) WE ARE OVERLOOKING THE CHILDREN OF THE POOR.

ON THE OTHER

HANDJ THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS HAVE LARGE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS FOR
CHILDREN OF POOR FAMILIES.
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IF CURRENT TRENDS

CONTINUE~

MARXIST-EDUCATED INDIVIDUALS WILL

INCREASINGLY OCCUPY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL AND BUSINESS POSITIONS
IN CENTRAL AMERICA,

UNFORTUNATELY; U.S, SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS HAVE

BEEN REPEATEDLY REDUCED IN RECENT YEARS,

ACTUALLY; EDUCATIONAL

EXCHANGES HAVE A VERY HIGH PAYOFF OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS FOR A
RELATIVELY LOW EXPENDITURE.

IN ADDITION TO

A~QUIRING

TECHNICAL

SKILLSJ STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY
TO LEARN DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXPERIENCE THE BENEFITS OF LIFE
IN A FREE SOCIETY.
A TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT TIED TO THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED A SECURITY THREAT IF IT:
I

PERMITS THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES OR
OTHER OPERATIONAL AREAS ON ITS TERRITORY,

I

DEVELOPS A MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE OBVIOUSLY EXCESSIVE
TO ITS NEEDS AND CAPABLE TO BEING RATHER QUICKLY
OCCUPIED BY THE SOVIETS,

I

TAKES ACTION CLEARLY HOSTILE TO THE UNITED STATES.

EACH SITUATION SHOULD BE EVALUATED SEPARATELYJ PLACING EMPHASIS ON
DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTICULAR NATION'S ACTION WILL ASSIST SOVIET
IMPERIALISM,

TO UPHOLD OUR BELIEF IN DEMOCRACYJ WE SHOULD NOT AID

ANY TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT} UNLESS COMPELLED TO DO SO BY IMPERATIVE
NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.
WHEREVER FEASIBLE AND CLEARLY IN OUR INTEREST,, .WE SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO ASSIST DEMOCRATICALLY-INCLINED LOCAL GROUPS OPPOSING
TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN THEIR OWN NATIONS.

FAILING THAT., .WE WOULD

BE IMPLICITEDLY ADMITTING THAT COMMUNIST CONTROL, .. ONCE ESTABLISHED,,,
IS IRREVERSIBLE.

640.

ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S.-SPECIFIED STANDARDS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
SHOULD NOT BE THE MAJOR DETERMINANT OF U,S, MILITARY ASSISTANCE
LEVELS,

WE SHOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE OUR FRIENDS TO OBSERVE HUMAN

RIGHTSJ BUT PROGRESS MAY BE SLOW IN COMING,

WE ARE DEALING WITH

SOCIETIES HAVING VERY DIFFERENT CULTURES AND TRADITIONS THAN OUR
OWN,

THEREFORE, .,WE SHOULD REALIZE THAT A PERSISTENT,, ,LONG-TERM

APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY,
WHENEVER OUR POLICIES ARE MUTUALLY CONSISTENT) WE SHOULD
ENCOURAGE COOPERATI9N OR INITIATIVES FROM THE CONTADORA GROUP AND
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

ONE OF OUR KEY OBJECTIVES

SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE ALL LATIN AMERICAN STATES--ESPECIALLY THE
LARGER ONES CLOSE TO CENTRAL AMERICAN TROUBLE SPOTS--SUCH AS MEXICOJ
VENEZUELA. AND COLOMBIA--TO REALIZE THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET-CUBAN
IMPERIALISM AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN
SECURITY,

WHILE SEEKING COOPERATION) HOWEVERJ THE UNITED STATES MUST

ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT IT BEARS ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY AS LEADER OF
THE FREE WORLD.
IF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE RECEIVE FULL AND ACCURATE INFORMATION
ON THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICAJ THEY WILL SUPPORT A SOUND,
LONG-TERM PROGRAM SUCH AS HAS BEEN OUTLINED ABOVE,

THEIR COMMITMENT

CERTAINLY WILL BE ENCOURAGED BY CONTINUED SOVIET IMPERIALISM AND
BARBARIC CONDUCT1 SUCH AS THE MASSACRE OF 269 INNOCENT PEOPLEJ
INCLUDING
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AMERICANS) ON THE KOREAN AIRLINER,

SOVIET IMPERIALISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA IS AN IMPORTANT CHALLENGE
TO U.S. INTERESTS) BUT POLICY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA MUST BECOME AN
INTEGRAL PART OF AN OVERALL U.S, STRATEGY TO BE IMPLEMENTED
CONSISTENTLY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
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THE UNITED STATES MUST DEVELOP A COHERENT STRATEGY) SUPPORTED
BY OUR ALLIES AND UNDERSTOOD BY OUR ADVERSARIES,

HISTORY SHOWS THAT

IS ONLY POSSIBLE WHEN CONGRESS PROVIDES STRONG BIPARTISAN SUPPORT
FOR U.S, FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY,

THE AMERICAN

LEGION WILL INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS TO HELP PROPERLY INFORM THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC ABOUT U.S, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA)
THE CHALLENGES TO THEMJ AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO ACHIEVE U,S,
OBJECTIVES,
AS THIS1COMMISSION IS CERTAINLY AWARE) DUE TO ITS BIPARTISAN
COMPOSITION) THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUE FAR TRANSCENDS THE IMPORTANCE
OF MOST CURRENT ISSUES IN AMERICAN POLITICS,

IN THIS BIPARTISAN

Sf :l!-4-l"VIL

VEINJ WE ENDORSE THE WORDS OF THE LATE SNEATOR HENRY M, JACKSON) WHO
PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COMMISSION.

SENATOR

JACKSON SAID -- QUOTE:
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN ONE WAY
ONLY: . IT IS A SHIELD BEHIND WHICH ENDANGERED NATIONS
CAN PROTECT THEIR PEOPLE FROM EXTERNAL THREATS AS THEY
WORK TO RECTIFY INJUSTICES) BUILD DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS
AND INCREASE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. ,,WHAT IS NEEDED IS
A COMMITMENT RIVALING THE MARSHALL PLAN IN ITS CREATIVITY
AND SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY., ,OUR POLICY MUST HAVE A
3(LTo-50 YEAR AIM:

EFFECTIVE HELP IN BUILDING DEMOCRACIES}

INCREASED ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND GREATER RESPECT FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS.
-- UNQUOTE
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THE AMERICAN LEGION STANDS READY TO PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THE
DRIVE

TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY,

WE ARE INDEED A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION,

UNIFIED BY A COMMON BOND OF

HAVING SERVED THE COLORS IN TIMES OF NATIONAL

CRISIS~

WE --

NEVERTHELESS -- COME FROM THE BROADEST SPECTRUM OF AMERICA.
ECONOMIC

LEVELS~

ALL

RELIGIONS) POLITICAL PARTIES) AND GEOGRAPHICAL

REGIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN OUR RANKS,

WE BELIEVE THERE IS A NEED

FOR UNITED ACTION AND WE STAND READY TO HELP FORM A LASTING
CONSENSUS,
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR, BEFORE
THE COMMISSION.
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EL SALVADOR

Background
For generations the goverTJirent of El Salvader has served as the guardian
of the

l~ed

oligarchy, suppressing by force any c.'1allenge to the nation • s

rigid social order.

'Ihe ariT!Y seized fX)~ in 1932 to crush a peasant rebellion,

which it accarplished at the cost of sorre 30,000 lives.

The military's

rronofOlY on ,IX)litical ,IX)wer was retained for the next half century through
alternating pericxls of rrodernization and eonservati ve retrenclirrent, but
throughout this period, two things held constant:

t:he policies of the regirre

never t:hreatened the socio-economic privileges of t:.Jle oligarchy; and the
military net all civilian demands for reform and de:u:x:racy with electoral
fraud and repression.
'Ihe origins of the current crisis trace back to the. 1960s when
economic develornent under the auspices of t;.be Central Arrcrican Cbnnon r.ur:ket
and the .Alliance for Progress expanded the middlecLass and the urh:m v..orking-
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class while at the same time stimulating political mobilization in the
countryside.

These changes led to the rise of reformist :POlitical parties--

especially the social dcrrocrats and the Christian Dc.rrocrats who joined
together to win the presidential elections of 1972..

'lhe election was

stolen by the arrred forces, which then unleashed a reign of terror against
its opponents lasting 'for rrost of the next decade.
The suppression of the reformist challenge to the reg.i.rre proch.lccd a
radical opposition conposed of several guerrilla groups and the "popular
organizations"- militant grassl:"CX:)ts groups dedicated to pressing dcm::mds
for reform through mass derronstrations and civil disobedience.

This radical

opposition gained strength rapidly during the late 1970s, to the point that
it regan

to pose a serious challenge

to the survival of the reg~.

In O::tober 1979, a coup. led by reformist mili tai:y officers and

rroderate civilians created a governrrEnt promising social reform, political
derrocracy, and reconciliation with the radical left.

Unfortunately, the

resistance of the oligarchy and rightists within the officers corps
Defense Minister Guillerrro G:rrcia paralyzed the new regi:tre.
unsuccessful shovilawn with the rightist officers in
resigned..

De~r,

1ed' by

After an
the civilians

Many of them subsequently joined the opposition, and the spiral

ta..vard.s civil war resurred.
Che faction of the Christian

~rats

rejoined the military goverTllrent,

which then errU:xrrked on a policy of "reform with repression"-- a strategy of

c;O'Tbining limited socio-econcmic refonns with an intensification of the war
against the left.

Through 1980-1981, rightist elements within the government

successfully marginalized the rroderate elerrents so that little progress ....us
ever rrade on agrarian reform or h1..ll1\311 rights ...
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Despite the efforts of the United States, particularly
during the Carter Administration, real political power in El
Salvador remained where it had been for half a century-- in the
officers corps.

Rightist officers led by General Garcia

consolidated t&eir eontrol by removing from positions of authority
the reformist officers who had launched the October 1979 coup.
This process, which former U.S. Ambassador Robert White has
described as a "rightist coup by degrees," was completed in
late 1980 when the leader of the reformist officers, Colonel
Majano, was removed from the governing junta, arrested, and sent
into exile.
The Christian Democrats who remained in the government
were left with only nominal authority, and were unable to press
ahead with either of their main objectives:

rapid implementation

of the agrarian reform or a reduction of human rights abuses.

The Current Regime
The elections of March 1982 were intended to strengthen
the position of civilian politicians, particularly the Christian
Democrats, relative to the armed forces.

In the United States,

it was hoped that this result would improve the prospects for
reform, thereby increasingly the legitimacy of the Salvadoran
government both at home and abroad.
Nominally the result of the 1982 elections, El

Salv~dor's

Government of National Unity is actually an artificial coalition
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produced by the intercession of the U.S. Embassy and the Salvadoran
Armed Forces.

The unexpected electoral victory of the extreme

right, led by Major Roberto D'Aubuisson's ARENA party, threatened
to produce a government headed by D'Aubuisson and excluding the
Christian Democrats.

Because such a regime was unacceptable to

the United States Congress, the Reagan Administration felt
compelled to set aside the election results by appealing to
the armed forces, which depend
against the guerrillas.

upon

u.s~

aid to fight the war

The military responded by imposing

Alvaro Magana, an apolitical banker, as President, by insisting
that the Christian Democrats remain in the government, and by
safeguarding the agrarian reform from efforts of the rightistdominated Constituent Assemby to repeal it.
In this way, the extreme right was prevented from capturing
control of the regime, but the dominant political role of the
armed forces was reinforced rather than being reduced.
Deprived of electoral victory by the military, the extreme
right moved to strengthen its position in the officers corps.
D'Aubuisson's immeqiate target was Defense Minister Garcia, who
was both an astute politician and an important political ally of
the United States.

By 1982, Garcia had become vulnerable

because of his willingness to publically back U.S. demands for
progress on human rights and agrarian reform, even though actual
progress was meager.

This vulnerability was exacerbated by the
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army's inability, under Garcia's leadership, to contain the
insurgency.

In early 1983, the extreme right assembled a broad

enough coalition within the officers corps to force Garcia's
ouster.

He was replaced by General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova,

an officer more sympathetic to the extreme right than Garcia, and
less

political~y

skilled at holding together the diverse

ideological tendencies within the military.

Casanova's

succession was followed by promotions for officers long
associated with D'Aubuisson.
The Government of National Unity is hardly unified;
because it includes parties with diametrically opposed policies
(i.e., ARENA and the Christian Democrats), it has been virtually
paralyzed since its creation.

President Magana has no political

base of his own, but serves as the de jure pleasure of the
Constituent Assembly and the de facto pleasure of the armed forces.
Defense Minister Casanova, himself a compromise candidate, has
not been able to offer strong leadership within the military.
Finally, realignments of party coalitions within the Constituent
Assembly have

left it divided almost evenly between ARENA and

the Christian Democrats.

The effort to move the next Salvadoran

election forward to 1983 were motivated largely by the desire to
remedy as quickly as possible the current political deadlock.
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The Opposition
Formed in early 1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front/
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FDR/FMLN) is a
broad, ideolo.g:ically heterogeneous coalition organized under the
political rubric of the FDR and the military command of the FMLN.
The FDR unites-moderate political parties such as the social
democratic National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by FDR
President Guillermo Ungo, the Popular Social Christian Movement
(MPSC) which split from the Christian Democrats in March 1980,
and the "popular organizations" of peasants, workers, and middle
class professionals formed during the late 1970s.
The FMLN unites five armed organizations: the Forces of
Popular Liberation (FPL), an orthodox Marxist-Leninist guerrilla
group founded in 1970; the People's Revolutionary Army, a formerly
Maoist group founded in 1971; the Armed Forces .of National
Resistance (FARN), a more nationalistic and less dogmatic group
which

spl~t

from the ERP in 1975; the Communist Party of El

Salvador (PCES), a small pro-Moscow party; and the Central
American Workers Party (PRTC), another small group founded in 1979.
The FDR/FMLN has been plagued with ideological and personal
divisions since its founding, though these seem to have diminished
as its military fortunes have improved.

Despite popular conception,

the principal differences have not been between the civilians of
the FDR and the soldiers of the FMLN, but rather among the armed
groups themselves.
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The political platform of the FDR/FMLN represents a compromise
between the traditional reformist demands of the FOR's constituent
parties and the revolutionary socialist demands of the armed
groups.

It calls for far-reaching socio-economic changes that

would break the economic dominance of the oligarchy, but promises
a longterm role for the private sector.

It calls for a pluralist

political system, though it is clear that political parties in a
governing coalition would have little role if the FDR/FMLN comes
to power by militarily defeating the armed forces.
for a foreign policy on "nonalignment,"

And it calls

though the precise

meaning of this would depend essentially upon U.S. attitudes toward
an FDR/FMLN regime.

Short Term Prospects
The political paralysis of the Government of National Unity
will continue at least until the next election.

Even then, the

military will almost certainly remain the real locus of political
power.

The extreme right, which is stronger now both in the

civilian and military sectors than it was before the 1982 elections,
will continue to hold effective veto power over any program of
significant reform.
The agrarian reform, which has been severely damaged by
ARENA's control over most of its administrative structure, will·
either stagnate or continue to erode.

The human rights situation

will be similar; after marginal improvements in 1982, it has
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once again been deteriorating in recent months.

These conditions

will, over time, alienate what little base of popular support
the government has been able to assemble.

The Popular Democratic

Union (UPD), a centrist coalition of trade unions and peasant
organizations which supported the March 1982 elections, is already
threatening to boycott the elections of 1984.
The military situation is the most difficult to judge
in the short term.

Since the failure of the guerrillas "final

offensive" in January 1981, the FDR/FI>-1LN has expanded its
military capacity considerably.

Its annual fall offensives in

1981 and 1982 produced substantial gains, far in excess of what

either the United States or the Salvadoran government expected.
Moreover, these gains were achieved despite substantial improvements
in both the equipment and training of the Salvadoran army.
The success which the army has had in San Vicente department
since June 1983 has produced considerable optimism about the
military

si~uation,

but prudence dictates that such optimism be

circumscribed by the fact that the FDR/FMLN has not yet launched
a response to the pacification plan.

Until the army demonstrates

its ability to hold newly won territory in the face of a counteroffensive, short term military prospects cannot be accurately
assessed.
Despite recent meetings between representatives of the
FDR/FMLN and the Salvadoran government's Peace Commission, the
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prospects for a negotiated end to the war are not noticeably
brighter.

The government continues to insist that the guerrillas

lay down their arms to participate in elections organized
and overseen by the existing regime and its military forces.
The FDR/FMLN refuses bn the grounds that such a demand amounts
to surrender.

It has no faith that the military would respect

the physical security of FDR/FMLN candidates or supporters, or
that it would be allowed to ''share power" if it did well in a
free election.

There are good reasons for skepticism.

The

history of Salvadoran elections and of the military's human
rights abuses do not inspire confidence.

In fact, it is at

present unclear whether the military would allow even Christian
Democratic candidate Napolean Duarte to assume the Presidency
again.
The negotiating position of the FDR/FMLN calls for an
interim regime to restructure the military and prepare for
elections.

The government refuses to consider any FDR/FMLN

participation in the government.

It will continue to do so

as long as the ext+eme right maintains its current positions
of influence in the Assembly and the armed forces.

Consequently,

the prospects for a negotiated settlement are dim, especially
so long as the United States lends its weight in opposition
to a "powersharing" solution.
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The most probable scenario in El Salvador over the course
of the next year is as follows:

The guerrillas will launch a

military challenge to the pacification plan with moderate success,
thereby demonstrating that the war is still stalemated and will
remain so for the indefinite future.

The Salvadoran government

will remain deadlocked between the extreme right and the center
right Christian Democrats, with no leader emerging who has the
capacity to mobilize broad support.

The agrarian reform and the

human rights situation will continue to go through cyclical
patterns of marginal improvement and marginal decline.

The

Salvadoran economy will continue to deteriorate under the dual
blows of war damage and decapitalization, forcing the United States
to continue to increase the level of its assistance in order to
simply maintain the status quo.

U.S. Policy Options
The

~entral

question which must be answered before alternative

options can be assessed is whether or not it is possible for the
United States to successfully stabilize the Salvadoran regime
in the face of insurgency and, at the same time, bring about
domestic changes that will produce long term stability.

There is

little doubt that the United States has the military capacity to
prevent an FMLN military victory indefinitely. However, unless
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military assistance is provided in a context that includes
significant domestic reform, the socioeconomic grievances which
gave rise to the insurgency in the first place will continue to
fuel it.

The United States could then find itself caught in an

endless cycle.of violence.

The principal dilemma faced by

both of the last two U.S. administrations is that the political
forces upon which the United States is depending to defeat
the insurgency are the very forces that have historically
blocked reform in El Salvador, and continue to block it today.
Hence a military victory, even if possible, would inevitably
be short-lived.
The best hope for long term stability in El Salvador is
offered by negotiations that would close the chasm now dividing
the Salvadoran political community.

For such negotiations to

succeed, however, the United States would have to be prepared
to accept some FDR/FMLN role in government and ultimately,
the political defeat of rightist forces that have done their
best for aecades to prevent even the moderate left from playing
any role in Salvadoran politics.
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NICARAGUA
Background
The National Government of Reconstruction which took power
in July 1979 after the fall of Anastasio Somoza represented an
unlikely alliance of conservative businessmen and Marxist
guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).
The partnership_ was fragile from the outset, resisted by people
on both sides, but consummated by circumstances.

The guerrillas

needed the private sector's prestige and influence to legitimate
their revolution both at home and abroad; the businessmen needed
the guerrillas' guns to defeat the dictatorship.
In the euphoria of a victory in which the entire nation
rose up against Somoza, guerrillas and businessmen alike pledged
to sustain their partnership, dedicating themselves to the task
of rebuilding an economy devastated by war.

Both the program

and the composition of the new government were painstakingly
negotiated and delicately balanced between the two partners.
An essentially social democratic program promised a mixed economy,
political pluralism, and a foreign policy of nonalignment, but
it remained purposefully vague on what these would mean in
practice.

The platform's ambiguity reflected its origins as a

compromise between the radicalism of the FSLN and the conservatism
of the private sector.
social democracy.

It was not the product of a consensus for
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As in every post-revolutionary regime, the anti-Somoza
coalition began to show signs of strain almost immediately.

While

formal power was shared-- representatives of the private sector
sat on the executive Junta and predominated in the cabinet-it soon became clear· that real power lay in the nine-member
National Directorate of the FSLN.

The businessmen, who had

opposed Somoza because he froze them out of the government and
encroached upon their business ventures, began to wonder if they
had gained much.

The Sandinistas seemed no more willing to

share political power, and their commitment to improving the
living conditions of the poor posed a serious threat to the
private sector's wealth and income.

Before the revolution had

reached its first anniversary, most of the private sector had
gone into opposition.
Through 1980 and 1981, the central dynamic of Nicaraguan
politics was the struggle between the FSLN-dominated government
and the private sector opposition for the right to define the
nature of post-Somoza Nicaragua.
The FSLN's ''popular project" is socialist.

At a minimum,

it entails a radical redistribution of wealth and income, and
the creation of an extensive social welfare system.
end, the government has conducted a national literacy

To this
camp~ign,

made basic health care and education free, and begun an agrarian
reform.

Beyond this basic program, however, the FSLN is

divided over the shape of things to come.

Pragmatists in the

National Directorate hope to reach a lasting accommodation with
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the private sector in which it will contribute to economic
development in exchange for the right to make a limited profit
and the right to limited participation in politics.

The

pragmatists are motivated by necessity; they doubt the government
has the technical capacity to run a nationalized economy, and
they doubt that they can obtain needed financial aid from
Latin America or Western Europe if they adopt a Cuban model of
development.
Hardliners in the Directorate, who were in the minority
during 1980 and 1981, don't believe an accommodation with the
private sector is possible or desirable.

They would resolve

the conflict by doing away with the private sector and building
Nicaragua in the image of Cuba.

Ironically, it was the Cubans

who cautioned against such a strategy in the early years of
the revolution.
The private sector, for its part, is searching for a way to
regain

enou~h

interests.

political power to safeguard its basic economic

It, too, is divided into pragmatists who would settle

for some form of accommodation with the FSLt1 based on democratic
socialism, and hardliners who hope to see the Sandinistas overthrown.
In their battle with the opposition, the Sandinistas hold
a near monopoly on political power.

They control the state

apparatus, including the armed forces; they command a broad
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network of organized supporters in the "mass organizations;"
and perhaps most importantly, they enjoy the legitimacy that
springs from having defeated a hated dictator.

While the private

sector contributed to the insurrection politically and financially,
the FSLN contr1buted· in blood, fighting and dying at the
barricades.

Four years of economic hardship and increasing

authoritarianism have been a substantial drain on this reservoir
of legitimacy, but they have by no means dried it up.
The opposition to the FSLN has little political organization.
It must rely on the same weapons it used to good effect against
Somoza:

control over 60% of the economy and enough foreign

contacts to make or break the international reputation of the
regime.
The Sandinistas have used their control of the state to
try to bend the private sector into cooperating with the government's
economic plans, offering tax incentives and cheap credit for
compliance, while threatening expropriation as the penalty for
decapitalization.

The private sector has tried to use its

economic muscle tQ extract political concessions from the regime,
warning that the "rules of the game," both economically and
politically, must be codified in law before business confidence
will improve enough to spur production.
Through 1980 and 1981, this political tug-of-war erupted
every six months or so into crisis as one side or the other
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sought to test the political will of its adversary.

Yet neither

side was willing to leap into the abyss by pushing one of these
crises to the breaking point, since both had too much to lose.
Each crisis subsided with the initiation of dialogue followed
by limited concessions aimed at keeping alive the hope of
eventual accommodation.

But each crisis left in its wake the

residue of higher tension and deeper polarization.

The Current Regime
This pattern of confrontation followed by conciliation was
ruptured in 1982 with the g-rowth of a serious military
from counterrevolutionary forces based in Honduras.

In March

1982, the FSLN declared a state of emergency which included
severe limitations on the right of opposition political parties
to organize, and provided for prior censorship of the
press (the newspaper La Prensa in particular) .
As the•attacks from counterrevolutionaries in both the north
and south have escalated, the internal political situation has
hardened considerably.

Opposition political parties continue to

exist, as does the private sector opposition group, the Supreme
Council of Private Enterprise, but the scope of allowable activities
has narrowed.

Opposition leaders who once held out hope for

internal accommodation now look to the counterrevolution as their
salvation.
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The Sandinistas' tolerance for internal opposition has
declined as well; it appears too much like a fifth column willing
to ally with the government's armed opponents.

As the war has

gone on, the pragmatists in both the FSLN and in the opposition
have lost ground politically to those who seek the eradication
of their adversaries.
But the counterrevolutionary forces of the quasi-Somocista
Nicaraguan Democratic Force {FDN) and of Eden Pastora's
Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) have not been able to
pose a serious military threat to the regime.

They are no match

for the Sandinista army, and have been unable to mount any
significant political appeal.

On the contrary, the FSLN has

been able to improve its own political standing by rallying the
population around a nationalist appeal to defend the homeland
against a return of Somocistas backed by Gringos.

The existence

of the counterrevolutionaries has allowed the FSLN to rationalize
both its tougher stance towards domestic opponents, and the
deteriorating economic situation.
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Nicaraguan Foreign Policy
While both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have voiced
concern over the issues of political freedom and human rights in
Nicaragua since·the revolution, the fundamental concern of the
United States has been the FSLN's foreign policy.

President

Carter's policy of constructive engagement with the Sandinistas
was designed in large measure to ~void forcing the FSLN into
an alliance with the Soviet Union.

It was hoped that if the

United States did not react to Nicaragua with reflexive hostility,
the Sandinistas might limit their military relationship with
the Soviet bloc and their active support of revolutionary
movements elsewhere in Central America.

Within limits, this

seemed to work reasonably well until late 1980.
In the wake of Ronald Reagan's election, the Salvadoran
guerrillas began planning their "final offensive'' to present
the incoming Administration with a fait accompli in El Salvador .
•

The Sandinistas, perhaps believing that the Reagan Administration
would be hostile to them in any event, abandoned the policy of
limited support for the Salvadoran insurrection and allowed
Nicaragua to be used as a major channel for arms smuggling to the
FMLN.
For a brief period at the outset of the Reagan Administration,
it appeared that the earlier understandings might be reestablished--
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that the FSLN would refrain from playing any significant role in
aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas in return for the maintenance of
constructive relations with the United States.

This effort,

however, failed; by the end of 1981, the United States had
adopted a policy of pressures against Nicaragua designed to
coerce the FSLN into halting aid to the Salvadoran left.
The public record regarding the extent of Nicaraguan aid
is difficult to read.

There is general agreement that Nicaraguan

assistance was limited prior to November 1980, that it was
substantial from November 1980 to February 1981, and that it
was halted between February and 'April.
there is disagreement.

From that point onward,

The Reagan Administration has contended

that substantial aid has continued.

Some members of Congress

and former government officials who have seen the classified
evidence find it persuasive, others do not.

In addition, there

have been repeated stories in the press quoting U.S. officials
in

Centra~

America and in Washington to the effect that the flow

of arms from Nicaragua is minimal.
There is no doubt, however, that Nicaraguan reliance on
military assistance from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other
allied nations has increased as the armed attacks from Honduras
have escalated.

The Nicaraguan military buildup, which began

during 1980, has increased sharply s1nce the U.S. covert action
program was put in place in 1982.
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Short Term Prospects
Internally, the conflict between the FSLN and its opponents
has become severely polarized over the past two years.

That

trend is likely to continue, though it is unlikely that the FSLN
will take the radical step of nationalizing the private sector
or closing down·the internal political opposition entirely.
Instead, the Sandinistas will continue their efforts to mobilize
support by appealing to nationalism, characterizing their opponents
as tools of the United States, and building their military forces.
The elections scheduled for 1985 will probably take place, with
the FSLN winning a signifieant victory, since none of the
opposition parties have any real political infrastructure.
The Nicaraguan economy, now in serious difficulty due to
shortages of foreign exchange, will at best achieve zero growth.
One crucial political variable is whether economic austerity is
translated into popular disaffection with the regime or whether
the

Sandin~stas

can successfully place the blame on the United

States.
Internationaily, the Sandinistas will continue to allow the
Salvadoran guerrillas to use Managua as a meeting place.

They

may or may not escalate their material aid to the FMLN, depending
upon the situation in El Salvador itself and upon the course
of international negotiations such as Contadora.
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The Sandinistas are following a two-track strategy for
dealing with U.S. hostility.

Militarily, they are creating a

force which, they hope, will be so formidable that neither
Honduras nor the United States will be willing to pay the cost
of attacking them.

'This requires closer relations with their

principle arms suppliers.

Diplomatically, they have tried to

cooperate as much as possible with the Contadora countries, since
they see that initiative as a diplomatic obstacle to an escalation
of U.S. military action against them.

The recent Nicaraguan

offers to negotiate such issues as arms buildup, foreign military
advisors, and support for insurrections against neighboring
countries, must be seen as a response to the Contadora agenda
rather than a direct response to U.S. pressures.

In fact,

the Nicaraguans do not believe that any concession will produce
an end to U.S. hostility; they are convinced that U.S. policy
is aimed at their overthrow.

U.S. Policy Options
Medium and long-term U.S. policy towards Nicaragua must be
based upon a clearer notion of what, exactly, the United States
hopes to achieve.

If the central objective of U.S. policy is,

in fact, to overthrow the Sandinista regime, the cost and
feasibility of such a policy must be carefully examined.

The

counterrevolutionary forces do not have the military capacity
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to achieve such a goal, and the. FSLN can expand its own military
capacity faster than the contras can expand theirs.

The Honduran

military could inflict serious damage upon the Nicaraguan economy,.
but it does not have the capacity to oust the FSLN either.
Moreover, a Nicaraguan-Honduran war would probably prove more
destabilizing for Honduras than for Nicaragua.

The only serious

prospect for overthrowing the Nicaraguan regime would be for the
United States itself to intervene directly and massively.

Even

then, we would have to be prepared to weather a long and bloody
occupation, since the Sandinistas would wage a protracted guerrilla
war against U.S. forces.

Internationally, such an action would

be regarded as naked aggression, and the diplomatic costs,
especially in western Europe and the Third World, would be high.
Given the already significant domestic opposition to current

u.s.

policy in Central America, one has to assume that the

domestic debate over an invasion of Nicaragua would be heated
and divisive.
If the objective of

u.s.

policy is to force the FSLN to

cease its support for other revolutionary movements in Central
America, such an objective can best be achieved through a
diplomatic process such as Contadora.

The Nicaraguans seem

prepared to accept the idea that the United States has certain
legitimate security concerns in the region that must not be
transgressed.
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It can be argued that a policy of pressures against Nicaragua
makes the Sandinistas more willing to behave internationally,
but such a policy carries costs as well.

The military buildup

in Nicaragua, which has accelerated in response to U.S. pressures,
ties Nicaragua closer to Cuba and the Soviet Union-- an outcome
which is not in the interests of the United States.

It also

produces deeper internal polarization with a consequent reduction
of political liberties.

Moreover, if a policy of pressures is to

have any benefit, it must be "cashed in" at some point in return
for concessions from the Sandinistas.

Whether because of U.S.

pressure or because of Contadora, the Nicaraguans now appear
willing to seriously address the issues which the United States
is concerned about.

If the United States is willing to coexist

with Nicaragua on the basis of understandings about Nicaraguan
foreign policy, agreement can be reached.

If, however, the

United States insists upon hegotiating about the internal
character of the Nicaraguan political system, the drift towards
war in Central America will continue.
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Statement by
Sol M. Linowitz
before
President's Commission on Central America
September 1, 1983
I am very pleased to have been invited to meet with your
Commission in order to talk about some of the critical problems we
face in Central America.

Let me say at the outset that I believe

the only way to understand the problems of Central America and \>lhat
lies behind them is to view them against the backdrop of United
States-Latin American relations over the years.

For I submit to you

that it will not be possible to deal effectively and thoughtfully
with the challenges we confront in Central America today unless we
have some sense of what has gone before in our Hemispheric
relationships:
Unhappily, Latin America is an area of the world which has been
largely overlooked, ignored or disregarded in the United States.
James Reston once said that Americans will do anything for Latin
America except read about it,
accurate.

and I am afraid that he is all too

No responsible American leader since the days of President

Monroe has dared to tell the American people that we can neglect or
ignore Latin America,

yet we have consistently relegated Latin America

to the backwash of history - focusing on it only in moments of crisis.
Over the years we have tended to take Latin America for granted or to
use the region to score points and teach lessons rather than to build
constructive relationships.
Ask most

~~ericans

about Latin

~~erica

and you get a glazed look.

?ew can r.ame as many c.s ter. .Lati:-1 ;.. .:Tteric.J.n countries.
i::'.mense di:::: erences - cul tura.l,

;:hysical,

political,

sociological
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that separate the countries and permit you to change five centuries
by crossing a border.

Relatively few recognize that Latin America

consists of individual nations at critical points in their history
determined to fulfill their destiny in their own way.
Now we have suddenly rediscovered Latin America and its
significance to the United States.

The strife in Central America;

the aftermath of the war in the South Atlantic; the financial
upheavals in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and elsewhere;
the dramatic flow of migrants from Mexico,

Haiti, Cuba and other

countries - reveal all too clearly that what happens in Latin
America deeply affects the security, welfare, culture and politics
of the United States.

And by the same token, what happens in the

United States has a great impact on Latin America.
Because of my own concern about these problems and my own
involvement in Latin American relations over the years,

some months

ago I talked to a number of men and women both in the United States
and in Latin America - people of different parties from different
professional perspectives and different generations - about the
need to come together in order to exchange ideas on how we might
approach the problems in inter-American relations today.
I was struck by how much had changed in Hemispheric relationships since the 1970's when I had served as Chairman of the

Co~.ission

on United States-Latin American relations.
In the mid-1970's we thought that
Treaty was the most
~elatio~s.

~rsent

r~visinc

the Panama Canal

issue in United States-Latin

Today that pyoblem is largely behind us.
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In the mid-1970's because of Latin America's dynamic grmvth
and prospects, we viewed Latin America's economic future with
great optimism.

Today we know all too well that Latin America

faces a severe economic downturn and an acute crisis of overwhelming debts and high unemployment.
In the mid-1970's, territorial conflicts were not regarded as
particularly significant.

Today these questions are hard to avoid,

and they in turn raise other issues such as the arms races,

peace-

keeping capabilities and the like.
In the mid-1970's, we were disturbed by what we called a
"plague of repression" sweeping the Americas.

Today we are aware

of deep stirrings for a return to democracy in many countries,

and

the struggle in many nations to achieve progress toward a fuller
respect for human rights.
In the 1970's, we paid little attention to Central America
which we regarded as a reiatively tranquil corner of the Hemisphere.
Today we know all too well that we did not have enough understanding
to anticipate the fierce struggles now being waged in that region.
And in the 1970's, while we were aware that the so-called
"special relationship" in the Hemisphere was declining, we could
not have imagined that the United States and major Latin American
countries would actually line up on opposite sides of a war.
All these developments made unmistakably clear that there had
been drastic changes in inter-American relations in a
:ew years,

and what was :--,eeded ,_·as a new look,

anC. prejudices.

rela~i~ely

:ree of :;:reconcep::::..cns
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Dr. Galo Plaza,

former President of Ecuador and former Sec::-etary

General of the Organization of American States,

joined me in convening

a group of distinguished opinion leaders from all over the Hemis?here
in order to examine the issues in an Inter-American Dialogue.
four leaders from 15 countries of Latin America,

one Canadian and 23

from the United States responded to our invitation.
included two former Latin American Presidents,
Ministers,
&~ericans

six former Finance Ministers,
-

T\venty-

Our group

four former Foreign

and such distinguished North

Republicans and Democrats alike - as David Rockefeller;

General David Jones; Father Theodore Hesburgh; Cyrus Vance; Edmund
Muskie; Elliot Richardson; Robert McNamara; Ralph Davidson,
of Time,

Chai~an

Inc.; Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of the Heritage Foundation;

and Mayor Henry Cisneros,

a member of this Commission.

Our studies and deliberations went on for a period of six
months,

and during that time we consulted extensively with high
In the United States,

officials in a number of countries.

-

for example,

we met with Secretary of State Shultz,

Vice President Bush,

Assistant

Secretary of State Enders and others.

Working together in the

Dialogue, we had a chance to look beyond today's headlines and to
think hard and carefully about the kind of tomorrow we wanted in the
Americas,

and how to help achieve it.

The opening words of our Report were these:

"The 'ives"'C.e::-n

Hemisphere today faces challenges more serlous than

an~·

War II,

or perhaps even the Great Depression''.

w~

~xarnine

some of the rnos"'C.

i~pcr"'C.ant

sec'-'.ri":.y problems cor::ro::ting "'C.he

And

economic, political,
A..~eric2s.

since Ko::-ld
undert==~

to

. " a::.c"
soc.:..::...;..
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We started with the grave economic and financial crisis in
Latin America today - a crisis which,

in my judgment,

is no less

serious and threatening to the security and stability of the
Americas than the wars being fought in Central America.
To put it briefly,
plunged Mexico,
among others,

the debt crisis in Latin America which has

Brazil, Argentina,

Venezuela,

Chile and Costa Rica,

into deep trouble is also a serious problem for the

United States; and our entire closely interlinked financial system
is under challenge.

To address these problems, we suggested

measures to deal with the immediate liquidity crisis and also
offered recommendations for resuming the sustained economic gro>vth
and development which will be required for a longer term solution.
Let me just mention some of the specific recommendations on which
we focused attention in our Report.
The strengthening of the International Monetary Fund; the
expansion of the role of the multi-lateral

~evelopment

banks;

extension of the maturities of existing debt in various Latin
American countries; an increase in flows of private, direct investment; resistance to protectionist sentiment both in the Hemisphere
and worldwide; the stabilization of commodity export earninc;s; and
the speedy approval of the Administration's Caribbean Basin
Initiative.
I suggest that all of these are relevant to your own cnarce
as a Commission to

,?olicies.

re"~:iev-;

the econowic problems af:ecti::c; Ce:-.-:r::.l
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development.

And economic austerity programs imposed insensitively

can have drastic social and political effects.
In recent weeks we have heard much about a possible Marshall
Plan for Central America.
The term is appealing,

but I submit that it is very important

to be clear as to exactly what it means and what it does not mean.
The simple fact is that the problems of Central America and
of Latin America are not like those of Europe a generation ago
when we evolved the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction o= Europe.
There is too little to reconstruct, recover or rebuild in Central
America.

What can be borrowed from the Marshall Plan is the over-

riding objective - a multi-lateral undertaking not directed
against any countrv or ideology, but against povertv,
distress.

chaos and

This is essentially the goal set forth in the OAS Charter

which enunciates our joint objectives in the Americas in these Hords:
"A united effort to insure social justice in the Hemisphere and
dynamic and balanced economic development for their peoples, as
conditions essential for peace and security".
In that connection, we must recognize that Latin America is
today at a political crossroads.

During the last several years,

much of Latin America has moved toward more open and

rePrese~ta~ive

policies, and the bases are being laid for a renewal of cemocracv
ir. much of the Western Hemisphere.
If these democratic openings are to take held,

gcvern~en~s
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majority of Latin Americans by responding to their desire for
improved conditions of life.

Latin American countries have mace

substantial gains in recent years in such areas as health and
education.

But World Bank estimates still show that 1/2 of

Lati~

America's rural population and 1/4 of its city dwellers remain in
"absolute poverty''.

At least another 1/3 of the region's popula-

tion is poor by contemporary standards.
The persistent poverty of 2/3 of the people of Latin America
is the major cause of the

H~uisphere's

social unrest,

Poverty,

inequality and injustice lead to political protest and polarization.
Polarization,

in turn,

frequently leads to repression,

cycles of violent opposition,
and greater social injustice.

followed by

widespread violations of human rights,
To break this cycle,

the opportunities for human fulfillment,

to increase

and to build more stable

societies, sustained commitments to alleviate poverty will have to
be made throughout the Americas.
The renewal and expansion of democratic procedures offer the
best hope of progress toward greater social justice.

But

democratization is by its nature a national process for which
individuals and institutions within each country must be

respo~sible.

Democracy is not a set of formal mechanisms and procedures
can be sent abroad.

It is a process,

a set of

in the history and culture of a nation,
nu~tured

sho~ld

encourage the

i::sti -:.u tio~s,

all

tha~

of the

~as~

~owe~~~l

·---~

.........

-_

.....

'-'-'-·•--:.·

~ooted

a process that can be

and encouraged but not transplanted or

outside countries can and

co;.~it~ents

tha~

i~posed.
g~o~~h

of

Whi:e

673.

direct way undertake to build democratic political

institu~ions

in

other countries.
Accordingly,

reco~~endations

the

"
.
in our Report for aava::1c:.::.g

democracy in the Hemisphere were quite modest.
First, we oppose any activities - covert or overt - by
poli~ical

government and other institutions which undermine the
autonomy or integrity of any country.

We believe that the

principle of non-intervention is vital for safeguarding
democratization.
Second, we believe that foreign governments, internatio::1al
impo~tan~ly

organizations and private institutions can contribute

but indirectly to democratization through support of equitable
economic and social development.
Third, we believe that-governments can help create a climate
favorable to democracy through the tone
We hope that

diplomatic relations.

and~uality

d~mocratic

of

thei~

countries i::1

Americas will maintain warmer and more supportive relations
other democracies.

dipl~~atic

But we would counsel against breaking

relations with authoritarian governments, since this tends
rally nationalist support for a regime and to
On the issue of human rights,

clearly the

wit~

~o

rei::1for~e rigidi~y.

protec~io::. ~::.d

advancement of human rights
0 :-

~he
-..

•n-t~'o·
a - •nal

cc~cerr:.

q~ve~~Men~
_v
- '.... • -

And this should

and

~

.....

•

B!l~
--

is

also~
-

~e

re~lec~cd

in the

-it
-

-

~r~
-lec~ti_ - ---

...

-~.. ~------.-~---~~~_,
- ......
-
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For carefully considered multi-lateral action to protect
human rights is not intervention,

but an international

f~~da~ental

obligat~on.

Direct unilateral intervention of any government in the domestic
affairs of others,
consequences.

even on behalf of human rights,

can have unfortunate

But silence and inaction in the face of clear

are inexcusable.

ab~ses

For these can threaten both the security and the

stability of the Hemisphere.
In focusing on the issue of security,
points:

First,

we agreed on two important

that the basic roots of insecurity - and the basic

problems of security - in the Hemisphere are primarily economic,
social and political,

not military.

are mainly internal to each nation,

Second,

that sources of insecurity

and external influences are

secondary.
It was also our firm conviction that even when there is a
military dimension to conflict as in Central America,

the solutions

ultimately lie in economic and social development and political
dialogue and not in weapons or military advisors.
support for insurrection clearly is present,

Even when external

as in El Salvador,

the

underlying problems remain domestic.
There are significant differences in the way security is
conceived and defined in the United States as against the way
understood in Latin America.

of border issues

wi~h

is

hTien Latin Americans think

most of them tend to think of the internal challenges of
unity,

~-

neighboring

sta~es,

::_ :1.

~a~ional

s o:7. e

c 2. s e s,
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In the United States,
global and strategic.

the focus on security is external,

Because of its worldwide interest and rcle,

the United States generally seeks to assure political stability by
supporting the status quo under sharp internal or regional challenge.
Many Latin Americans, on the other hand,

feel that profound cha:::ge

in the region is inevitable and that an emphasis on
stability is,

i~~ediate

therefore, misguided.

These differences are reconcilable.

For both North Arnerica:::s

and Latin Americans stress self-determination and

non-intervent~on

Both favor keeping Latin America and the Caribbean

as norms.

of the East-West conflict to the greatest extent possible.

o~t

Both

understand that social and economic progress is vital for achie\·ing
political stability and protecting national and international security.
Our approach .toward the Central American conflict \vas baseC: on
two major premises.

First, that most citizens and governments

throughout the Hemisphere oppose an expansion of Soviet and Cuban
military presence in.the Americas.

Second,

that the United States

could do much to foster a climate of security in the region by
making unequivocally clear its commitment to respect national
sovereignty.
Accordingly,
Colombia,

Mexico,

we strongly endorsed the initiative taken bv
Panama and Venezuela in the Ccnt2dora

offering their good offices in seeking peaceful
~~erica's

supper~

problems.

~or

We urced the United States

Declara~~on,

solu~icns

tc

"
"
ce--c
J..a::e

::.~

Cen~ral

.:... :.s

the ContcCo~2 c~oup's effor~s a~d i~s r22d~~ess ~~

c- ·-.2 e2ec:-
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Such an American commitment must make unmistakably clear by
word and deed that this regional approach is central to our

pla~~ing

for the resolution of the conflicts - and not just peripheral to it;
and that we stand resolutely with the Contadora countries as
partners in this common effort.

I

commi~~ent

am afraid that such a

is still lacking.
We also made a further recommendation,

suggesting that it rr.ight

be worth exploring the possibility that the United States-Soviet
understandings of 1962, 1970 and 1979 with respect to Cuba might
provide a basis for a wider accord that could enhance the
collective security of the entire region.

We proposed that this
Un~on

could be explored informally and quietly with both the Soviet
and Cuba in order to determine the possibility of arriving at
understandings.

Recent statements by Fidel Castro appear to encourage such an
approach and suggest that we should indeed, jn the President's
words,

give Castro "the benefit of the doubt" and ask our Contadora

friends to explore the seriousness of his own proposal along this line.
Of course, we cannot be sure that such discussions would succeed.
But we are sure that the perils and costs of allowing the

Cen~~2l

American conflicts to grow are grave and raise the specter of \\ider
conflicts.
of peace.

And the dangers are growing - for time is not on
Accordingly,

we firDly believe - all of us

fro~ Nor~~

.

South ."-..Inerica and coveri:1g - wide spectn:m of vieHs a:1c
tha~

~egotiations

shc~ld

a~= ~us~

~e

tried -

en all

~~e

.

side
and

ex;;e~:-2:-:ce

l~vels.

-
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In both El Salvador and Nicaragua,

negotiations should be

pursued with the help of the Contadora countries to

ar~ange

secu~~~y

free internationally supervised elections on the basis of
guarantees for all parties and participants.
a whole,

fo~

And in the region as
wit~

a major effort should be undertaken in conjunction

our Latin American friends to find a way to settle the conflicts.
All of this suggests a few basic principles which I believe
should guide us in dealing with the Central American situation today.
First,

we must recognize that the problems of Central

a~erica

are primarily regional ones, affecting all of the countries in the
area and not just the United States.

Accordingly, we cannot and

must not undertake unilaterally to deal with the issue as if

...

".j..

~

were ours alone to solve.
Second,

as a regional issue it is a problem which must and can

be dealt with only on a regibnal and cooperative basis.

The

Contadora countries have taken leadership in-exploring avenues for
peaceful negotiation of the conflicts and we should make

unequi~ocally

clear our full commitment to their efforts.
Third, we must understand that the basic problem of

Ce~tra~

America today is essentially a political problem with a mili 'ta:::::-\·
dimension rather than - as our present policy seems to
military problem with a political dimension.
recognize that a

mili'ta~y

itself achi8ve a solut:ion.

respo~se

in Central

sugges~

Acccrdi~gly,
Ame~ica

will

we

- _
~~s~
...... ":

-'

.
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Fourth,

we must be clear about what we seek to achieve in

Central America and consistent in our words and actions moving
toward that objective.

We cannot,

for example,

committed to regional cooperation and,

assert that we are

at the same time,

pursue

our own course without regard to the views of our friends and
allies.

We cannot maintain that we are committed to self-

determination and freedom of choice for the people of Central
A.;11erica, yet as Sllille we can undertake to prescribe \vhat that choice
must be.
In short,

the United States of America must stand for the

peaceful resolution of the conflicts through negotiation, making
unmistakably clear our commitment to non-intervention and selfdetermination as fundamental principles.
I believe that Central America is less a test of our resolve
to stand up to the Soviet Union than of our capacity

fo~

farsighted

leadershiP and cooPeration within our hernisohere - \\rhether \ve can
conduct ourselves with requisite vision,

restraint,

flexibility and

self-confidence, not just as a great power - but as a great

democ~acv.

It may be significant that all who participated in our Report
agreed that the security of the Americas had probably been advanced
more in recent years by the Panama Canal Treaties than by any

o~her

single development.
For the Treaties did much to enhance the
between the two halves o:

cc,~..::tensur-3.:.~

Wl-:.n

::.hei~

Arne~ic2.;

stc.~~es.

and they

spi~it

o:

~ein:o~ced

coope~a~~~n

tr.e

s~a~es
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That was the essence of the approach in our Report - not to
deny differences in interest and perspective between the United
States and Latin America, but to emphasize the
we share,

impo~tant

interests

and the importance of mutual respect for vital concerns.

For as the Mexican patriot

Be~ito

Juarez once said:

"Resnect. for

the rights of others is peace".
Today we are at a moment of crisis in Central
the Hemisphere at large.

.~erica

a~d

in

When conditions of crisis are faced

imaginatively, opportunities for progress exist.
do exist - especially for the United States.

Such opportunities

The question is how

we will respond to them.
Many years ago,

President Theodore Roosevelt described those

opporturiities in some words singularly applicable to our role in
Latin America today

and to your role as members of this

Co~~ission.

"The United States does not have the option as to whether it
will or will not play a great part.

It

m~st

play a great part.

only question is whether it will play that part well or badly."

The
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STATEMENT OF THOMAS CLIFTON MANN
August 31, 1983

I.

1. United States policy of opposition to attempts by
states hostile to our form of government to impose their
systems on independent American states is as valid today as
it ever was. The basis of that policy was that such attempts
to gain footholds in this hemisphere would constitute a threat
to the security of the United States.

2. This policy was first announced by Monroe in 1823 when
certain European states were rumored to be considering the
reimposition of monarchical systems on American republics. It
was followed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1940-1941 when Nazi Fifth
Columns were operating in American states with the purpose of
diminishing the will of those states to resist Nazi aggressions.
It was followed by John Kennedy during the October, 1962 missile
crisis. It was followed by Johnson during the 1955 Dominican
crisis.
3. On only two occasions has the US failed to follow this
policy. One was in 1961 when a division of opinion amongst the
leaders of our Democratic party caused a paralysis in the White
House decision-making process. The result was the Bay of~igs
fiasco, the consolidation of Marxists-Leninists in power in
Cuba, and the formation of military ties between Cuba and the
USSR. The other was the support of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries
in Nicaragua and El Salvador with the result that Marxists-Leninists
were able to gain control of a second American state (Nicaragua)
and to launch a class war against the Salvadoran middle class against all those who owned property which produced goods or
services or employed labor.
4. These two failures to follow traditional US policy created
the conditions which presumably made it necessary for these hearings
to be conducted.
II.

1. During the two decades 1945-1965 other American states
essentially declared that the activities of revolutionary groups,
particularily guerrillas and terrorists, which were in the service
of a Communist state, constituted intervention and aggression; and
that an act of aggression against one American state would be considered an act of aggression against all American states.
2. During the same period, a majority of American states
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often recognized that collective action by the OAS did not impair
any state's individual right of self-defense which is inherent in
sovereignty. Thus the right of the US to defend itself against
an act of aggression does not depend upon affirmative action
by any international body.
3. Nor does the US have to wait until its own territory
is attacked by a hostile power. In the words of Elihu Root every
state has a right to protect itself ·"by preventing a condition
of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself." In
the words of Franklin Roosevelt, it would be suicide to wait
until the enemy is in our front yard. "Anyone with an atlas and
a reasonable knowledge of modern war, knows that it would be
stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold
from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the
use of a strategy which will prevent such an enemy from gaining
a foothold in the first place."
III.
1. The USSR represents a threat to the security of the
US because its leaders have consistently affirmed that their
country has a mission to promote class wars for the purpose
of gradually creating a one-world socialist state and, in the
process, destroy the governments and political, economic and
social systems of all states which are not Marxist-Leninist
in character. This sense of mission has become, for those
leaders, a kind of secular religion.
2. There is no cogent evidence that Soviet leaders have
abandoned Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, strategy or
tactics. On the contrary, the evidence that Soviet leaders
are pursuing their goal with undiminished zeal is overwhelmning.
3. All rational Americans prefer peace to the horrors of
war, particularily those who have lived through wartime periods
and have learned that even victory has its price. But it takes
two to keep the peace - the aggressor and the victim. Targets
of aggressor states who are strong and able to defend themselves
have a much better chance of surviving than those who are weak
or who have lost their will to defend themselves.
4. More particularily, those who lived through the long,
dark months following Pearl Harbor when the US lost control of
the sea and air in the Caribbean do not need to be convinced
of the importance of the area to our survival. Those who did not
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would do well to read accurate historical accounts of the ships
and lives lost in those dark days when the US was trying to keep
open sea lanes vital to the US and other American states.
5. During the Second World War, we learned, or should have
learned,that the power that controls the seas adjacent to our
coasts, and the skies above them, controls access to many of
our ports, the Panama Canal, and to our ability to buy materials
in the hemisphere which are in short supply here at home and
essential to our ability to mobilize our military strength.

IV.
1. Not being privy to such plans that may exist for resisting Communist penetration in Central America, no opinion
is expressed concerning any plan that may exist on a contingency
or other basis.
2. Subject to conditions described later, the following
general opinions are, however, expressed:
3. In respect of El Salvador, we should (a) try to persuade
all anti-communist factions to unite under leadership chosen by
themselves; (b) refrain from additional interventions in the
domesti~ affairs of that country; (c) lend the Salvadoran government !'·the military and economic assistance it wants and needs
to defeat and expel Communist guerrillas and terrorists; (d)
if the Salvadorans are unable to accomplish this end, land
US armed forces in strength to assist them; (e) try to persuade
the Salvadoran government that it should hold elections as soon
as feasible.after order has been restored; (f) ask that government to permit foreigners to observe whether the elections are
free and without coercion; (g) leave the fate of the so-called
"reforms" imposed by Washington to the decisions of the elected
representatives of the Salvadoran people.
4. In respect of Nicaragua, the US should support counterrevolutionary groups which seek to restore the sovereignty and
independence of that state until (a) positive steps are taken
to hold free elections ~4 (b) the government of that state .
demonstrates that it isNfonger supporting guerrillas in neighboring
states, including El Saivador.
5. In a Marxist-Leninist society such as Nicaragua, in order
to eliminate the fear of reprisals it would be necessary for the
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following steps (or their equivalent) to be taken: (a) elections
should be controlled by an international group or organization
which is impartial in the sense it does not favor or oppose the
candidate of any particular faction or party; (b) such group or
organization should be supported by a military force, preferably
international in character, capable of maintaining order and
preventing coercion of any faction or individual; (c) the military
power of the present government of Nicaragua would be neutralized
during the electoral process in a manner to be agreed upon; (d)
ballots would be secret; (e) foreign observers of the electoral
process would be welcomed; (f) all Nicaraguan political parties
and factions (including Marxists-Leninists using whatever name or
names they wished) would be allowed to participate in the electoral
process but popular fronts which include Marxists-Leninists would
be prohibited; (g) political parties and factions, and the candidates
of their choice, would be free to advocate, and the Nicaraguan
people free to choose, whatever kind of political, economic or social
system they~wish __ but candidates - would be required to pledge they
would be nationalists and would not associate themselves in any
way with the international Communist movement; (h) all Nicaraguan
citizens, including civilians in the Nicaraguan bureaucracy, would
have the right to vote - except members of the Nicaraguan police,
military and militia which, being under discipline, may be expected
to vote as directed.
6. As it has been demonstrated that promises of the present
government of Nicaragua have little value, it would be necessary
for that government to take positive steps adequate to convince
a prudent person that elections will be held promptly under the
conditions described (or their equivalent) - and to demonstrate
that it has ceased to supply arms to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas
in neighboring states or to give them other kinds of assistance.
7. If the Nicaraguan government should refuse to hold
elections in the near future, and if the counterrevolutionaries
should fail to achieve their goals, then, depending upon circumstances, the government of the United States should give consideration to invading Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring that
country to full independence and sovereignty, and on the pledge
that United States troops would be withdrawn as soon as this
is accomplished.
8. In respect of the governments of other Central American
states, the US should lend them such military and economic
assistance as they may request, and which we think they require,
for the purpose of defending themselves against Communist aggression.
9. In my opinion, all of the measures proposed would be
legally permitted under rules of traditional law because they
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would be taken in the legitimate exercise of the right which all
states have to defend themselves against aggressions. The basis
of this opinion are described in two draft chapters of a book
which I am writing copies of ~hich will be made available to
Commission staff. ne of the chapters deals with the nonintervention rule. And the other deals with the individual right of
self-defense.

6

v.
1. The suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV of
this statement rest .on two assumptions: (a) The US currently
has nuclear weapons capable of wrecking great destruction on
the USSR if that state should launch a nuclear strike on the
US itself with long-range missiles based in Russian territory;
(b) the USSR does not have, and will not have, shorter range
nuclear missiles which could be launched from land bases in
this hemisphere. I do not know whether these assumptions are
correct.
2. If they are incorrect, then the US is already in great
peril and our ability to prevent additional ·communist penetrations
in this hemisphere ought to be considered in light of this fact.
I would then wish to reconsider the suggestions made in the
paragraphs of part IV.
3. If the two assu~ptions are correct, then it seems prudent
to assume that Soviet military reaction to US defensive actions
in this hemisphere, if any, would come in the form of the use of
conventional weapons. In this case, geography would give the US
an important advantage.
4. Whether or not these assumptions are correct, before
additional measures are taken in this hemisphere by the US
an effort should be made by the US to reach an agreement with
the USSR that both powers will refrain from intruding into
areas that threaten the security of the other. Particular actions
the US could take are described iri. the paragraphs that follow.
5. Even in the unlikely event that it would be possible to
reach such an agreement, it would mean a temporary truce rather
than an abandonment by the USSR of its doctrines, strategies and
goals of world domination.
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VI.
1. At the end of the Second World War, the US was the most
powerful state in the world both militarily and economically.
This condition. created what a perceptive English writer called
"an illusion of omnipotence" - a belief there was literally
nothing the US could not do. This misconception was gradually
replaced by a feeling of complacency concerning our own security
which is reminiscent of the popular mood preceding the months
before Pearl Harbor.
2. It would be tedious to list the failures of our foreign
policy even at the height of-our power which were related to
these popular attitudes. Illustrative of them are two misconceptions in a single year. At the Yalta Conference in 1945,
an imperfect understanding by the US of Soviet doctrines, strategy
and tactics led to the loss of the independence of a number of
Eastern European states, and to an extension of Russian territory
or control of territory that extended some six or seven hundred
miles westward in Europe. In the same year, the same misconceptions
led to the creation of the UN in the belief that the new world
organization would usher in a long period of universal peace
enforced by an international military force under the direction
of the Security Council - a force which never came into being.
3. The failure of the UN to accomplish the primary purpose
for which it was created was followed by a confident feeling on
the part of Americans that the US should use its power to
prevent aggressions which twice in a single generation had
caused two world wars.
4. In the period 1947-1959, the US therefore entered into
a number of defense treaties which were one-sided in the sense
they committed the US to defend other states against aggression
but did not contemplate that the other signatory states would
help defend the US if it were attacked.
5. With minimal aid from other states, the US also defended
states which were not signatory to the treaties mentioned and
which were not demonstrably related to our own security. The
wars in South Korea and South Vietnam are examples.
6. In addition, the US acquired military bases in far-away
places, and attempted to act as world peacekeeper in places such
as the Lebanon where violence was endemic and there was little
or no prospect of a pacific settlement of the complex issues
that separated warring factions arid states.
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7. Meanwhile, the balance of military power gradually tilted
in favor of the USSR. After 1945, the Soviet Union continued to
give priority to the production of military equipment at the
expense of consumer production; US industry was quickly reconverted
to the production of consumer goods. The USSR maintained a large
standing army by conscription and armed it with new conventional
weapons of all kinds; the US demobilized its army and, having·
abandoned the draft, replaced it with a small volunteer army
attracted by material rewards the quality of whi~b has not been
tested. The USSR enlarged and modernized its navy .and air force;
the US neglected both. The USSR developed sophist[cated nuclear
weapons systems and space technology; the US neglected its
nuclear weapons systems. The USSR launched an extensive and
prolongued propaganda campaign designed to create fear in
non-Communist countries and to weaken their will to resist
Communist expansion and aggression; the US did little to
counter this propaganda and, at times, appeared to promote it.
8. In relative terms, the US economy declined in strength.
For many reasons which space does not permit to be listed here,
the Soviet economy is inefficient and noncompetitive. But the
total power which the Soviet government exercises over the
minds and bodies of its people enables it 'to pursue its goals
by reducing the living standards of the masses of its people to
a subsistence level. By contrast, the American people have for
decades been unwilling to exercise self-restraint in terms of
living within their means. As a result of borrowing to cover
budgetary deficits, the debt of the national government, and
the percentage of the national budget required to service the
debt, are now excessive and constantly growing. This is the greatest
single internal threat to the viability of our economy in the
future - a danger which our founding fathers, liberals and conservatives alike, warned against.
9. In sum, conditions in 1983 are not comparable to those
which existed in 1945. The US is no longer a superpower able to
act as the policeman of the world. Indeed, the US is today already
overextended- in both a military and economic sense. Conditions
have changed. But foreign policies remain largely the same.
VII.

1. Consideration should be given to withdrawing from all
of the defense treaties negotiated in the period 1947-1959, including NATO and the Rio Treaty. The basic purpose of those
treaties was to defend states against Communist aggression.
Some of the states which are signatory to those treaties are
now members of the Third World which initially expressed its
neutrality in what was apparently viewed not as a struggle for
individual liberties and national independence but as a power
struggle between the US and the USSR. Others have expressed their
dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the defense treaties.
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Other governments have supported guerrillas in the service of
a Communist state. In other signatory states there appears to
be significant opposition to the introduction of US missiles
which are designed to deter the use of Soviet missiles already
in place. These and other changes suggest that the treaties in
question have been overtaken by events. Why should the·us seek
to convince other states they should defend themselves in the
way we think best?
2. At the same time, the US should consider offering new
mutual defense arrangements with governments that desire them
and who have something of defense value to offer (e.g., the
will and ability to defend themselves against the aggressions
of their neighbors, materials which are in short supply in the
US, a strategic location.'which is defensible). Generally speaking,
the purpose would be to shift policy away from defending the
weak and helpless to building positions of-strength.
3. Consideration should also be given to withdrawing as
many US troops currently assigned abroad as feasible and returning therr
to help defend the homeland. For example, if Indochina is not
deemed vital to the defense of the US why should US troops be
posted in South Korea?
Another example: If Russian troops have
the ability to march to the English cha~nel using only conventional
weapons, should not our troops be withdrawn from West Germany?
- and sliould not the West Germans themselves have the exclusive
right to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons to defend
themselves?
4. Each time the USSR extends the area which it controls
it collides with nationalism and increases the drain on the
Russian economy. The ability of the Soviet Empire to expand is
not infinite.
5. A reorientation of US defense policy along these lines
could be used' as the-basis of an approach to the Soviet Union to
discover whether or not they would be willing to refrain from
intruding (either directly or through surrogate states) militarily
into the Western hemisphere, which is vital to the security of
the United States, in exchange for our undertaking to refrain
from intruding militarily into territory currently controlled
by the Soviet Union or intervening in the internal affairs of
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., which the USSR obviously
considers vital to its security. Other possible concessions which
might be considered would be to withdraw the US military presence
from Greece and Turkey, including US bases in those two countries
and any US -controlled missiles that we currently might have
there or which we could introduce if those stateAso desired. Still
another inducement could be to refrain from introducing US-controlled missiles into West Germany without prejudice to the right
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of the US to sell such missiles to that or other responsible
democracies--provided the USSR made it clear that such an agreement was· considered by it essential to its security. Presumably
France has its own weapons and would not desire US assistance.
No other Western European state can reasonably be considered a
threat to the security of the USSR; all of them, including
West Germany, are, in any case, independent,sovereign states
which is all that we desire in the Western Hemisphere.
6. Whether or not proposals along these general lines (with
details to be determined) would be acceptable to the USSR is
questionable. If they were accepted, we should not deceive ourselves that this would imply any change in Soviet doctrine,
strategy or tactics; all we could hope for is to decrease the
risk of dealing with the Central American and Caribbean problems
(except Cuba which would only be expected to discontinue its
support of subversion in the area). If it is rejected, the
Soviet Union would be put at a propaganda disadvantage. Neither
the US nor the USSR would lose a great deal by agreeing to
refrain from conducting military operations in areas geographically
adjacent to the other which would be folly in any case.
7. By agreeing to refrain from intervening in the domestic
affairs of other countries, neither side would agree to abandon
support of its basic principles. In our case, it would simply
mean returning to the policy which was followed for the first
hundred years after our independence: we stand for individual
freedom and national independence and sympathize with those
struggling to achieve them but, in the words of John Quincy
Adams, we would not go in search of monsters to destroy. We would
not expect the USSR to cease to be Marxists-Leninists but only
cease to commit interventions and aggressions in areas vital
to our national security.
8. Consideration should be given to warning the USSR not
to miscalculate the determination of the US to defend itself
against aggressions in this hemisphere which threaten its
security - or be misled by those Americans who appear to
favor unilateral disarmament or believe that peace can be
secured by being militarily and economically weak and indecisive.
VIII.
1. Only a brief comment need be made about the various
claims that have been made concerning the economic and social
problems of Latin America.
2. Every sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction within
its own territory. This means it has the right to choose its
own government, its political, economic and social systems and
policies and manage its own domestic and foreign affairs free
of the coercion of other states. It follows automatically that,
having the exclusive right to manage its own affairs, no state,
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including the United States, can escape primary responsibility
for the way it manages those affairs.
3. One of the malaises that affect some Latin American
economies at the present time is identical with our own mismanagement of our fiscal affairs with all the economic
ills that follow in the train of an individual or a government
living beyond its means . and accumulating debts that it cannot
service. It is an exercise in futility for the United States or
any other country to attempt to pass the blame to some mysterious
force operating in the markets of the world, or to try to place
the blame on other states. In the words of the comic strip
character, Pogo, " I have met the enemy and he is us." It is
nonsense to claim that when the US, or US private banks, do not
lend money in the amounts other states may desire, they are
Shylocks demanding their pound of flesh; and, on the other hand,
when they lend large amounts to claim they are responsible for
the size of the debts accumulated. One cannot have it both ways.
4. Dean Acheson correctly observed that the United States
can, within the limits permitted by its resources, supply missing
.components (principally foreign exchange) in a situation otherwise
favorable to rapid economic and social progress. But it cannot
create in another sovereign state the conditions that are essential
to rapid economic and social progress.
5. The countries, again including the United States, which
have the largest debts are not, generally speaking, the poorer
countries in the hemisphere. They are the richer ones. The way
they choose to distribute the national wealth is for them to ·
decide.
6. The United States is not responsible for the rate of
population growth in other states, or for graft and corruption
in official circles when it exists, or for any of the other
vices inherent in human nature. Nor can it force people in
other lands to practice the cardinal virtues; if it could it
would presumably begin at home.
7. No state in history has been as generous with its
neighbors as the United States.or tried harder to be a good
neighbor. All of the international lending institutions were
formed at the initiative of the US. No American state has
trade policies which are more liberal; many have trade policies
which are protectionist. No other American state has tried
harder, or as long, to give technical assistance or financial
assistance on such favorable terms. No other state has made
greater efforts to stabilize the prices of raw materials at
a level fair to producer and consumer alike.
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LEGAL REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Statement of James H. Michel,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs,
before the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America
washington, D.C.
November 2, 1983
This Commission has now spent considerable time
familiarizing itself with the root causes of the turmoil that
Central America finds itself in today.
These are large and at
times seemingly intractable issues. They are issues of war and
peace, the willingness of neighbors to overcome historical
animosities and lingering disputes and to pursue paths of
regional cooperation. They are issues of ideology, and the
willingness of proponents of radically conflicting theories of
history and development to tolerate each other. They are
issues of traditional political strife, and the exploitation of
this strife by neighboring countries which, contrary to
inter-American agreements over 50 years old, assist
international subversion and terrorism. They are issues of
cold economic reality, grossly unequal distribution of incomes
and land, limited social mobility and opportunity,
long-standing regional problems on top of which the
contemporary period has added the burdens of debt service,
depressed export markets, and the high cost of energy. They
are issues of still unsilenced resistance to the political and
economic changes that must come to the region if democratic
institutions and greater economic opportunities are to
flourish, and if the exploitation of misery and strife by
external forces and extreme i9eologies is to cease.
I come before you today to focus on one small aspect
of this interlocking set of complicated issues, which is at the
same time a part of the problem and a concrete part of any
solution.
No society will be free of lawlessness or secure in
its democratic vocation, nor can the fruits of labor and
enterprise be protected, unless there is a fair and effective
system for the administration of justice. What we Americans so
easily take for granted is but a vision for legal reformers in
many countries in Latin America.
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This results not from any inherent failure of the
system of civil law, which has followed the Spanish heritage of
most of the hemisphere. One need only to have some familiarity
with our continental European allies to see that, whatever
parochial view a common law lawyer may have about the virtues
of his own system of law and practice, the civil law system can
be a vigorous basis for a modern and progressive society. What
has happened in Latin America?
The answer is in part historical.
A system of justice
is seldom likely to produce better results than the political,
social and economic context in which it finds itself. Where
power has traditionally been concentrated in few hands, where
violence has often been resorted to in order to maintain the
dominance of elites, one expects that the legal system will be
supportive of that dominance. Access to justice remains
difficult for the many without means or power.
Legal theory is
also at work.
In such a context, where judicial institutions
will be in the shadow of power and influence, there are
features of the civil law system that tend to compound their
lack of effectiveness.
The civil law system accentuates the
role of the legislator, after all, and not the judiciary.
There is no reliance on judicial precedent as a separate source
of law apart from the code book.
Judicial inventiveness
normally does not go beyond the confines of a specific case.
From the perspective of an American, used to judge-made law and
judicial activism, the civil law system seems comparatively
passive in any event.
In these circumstances, passivity shades
into irrelevance in politically or otherwise sensitive cases.
These root problems are further compounded by practical
problems facing the judiciary, in terms of its budget,
resources, training and competence, outmoded procedures and
investigative tools, and dependent relationships with the
political arms of government and the security forces.
In Central America today, these historical and
continuing problems, which are shared by many other countries
in the hemisphere, are exacerbated by levels of terrorism and
political violence that would challenge any legal system, and
by the current acute economic constraints faced by the
governments of the region. Most observers would probably range
the legal systems of Central America along a continuum with
Costa Rica as the model, a committed democracy whose legal
system is both reasonably efficient and politically
independent, and, at the other extreme, perhaps, Guatemala, a
country where political violence has been particularly acute in
recent periods. The other countries in the region would fall
somewhere in between.
(I intentionally omit Belize, as the
sole common law country in the region, which is really a
special case; so, for that matter, is Nicaragua, where legal
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"reform" is geared to the expansion of Sandinista control over
the legal system and a lessening of judicial independence.)
But all share budgetary problems, and most have common problems
that seem to receive surprisingly little coordinated regional
attention.
This is where I believe there is more to be done, and
where discreet u.s. assistance may be able to make a positive
contribution to helping these countries to build over the
long-term strong democratic institutions.
Let us look at some of these common problems which may
be susceptible of practical solutions:
Judicial independence must be enhanced, by such
concrete changes as adequately long tenure of senior judges; a
non·~partisan process of selection based on merit, drawing fully
on the resources of the bar, the law faculties and the
judiciary to identify the best candidates; salary levels that
deter conflicts of interest arising from having to maintain a
separate private law practice to survive; and by changes in the
law designed to enhance the judicial career and to provide the
courts with expanded investigative and review authority, in
particular powers of constitutional review beyond specific
cases, and clearer lines of authority over the security forces.
All these judicial systems lack resources; they
cannot afford needed office equipment and supplies, staff,
research materials, training programs, or even--in many
cases--full time operation. Modern means of case and courtroom
management are largely unknown.
In El Salvador, for example,
the courts operate only half days for budgetary reasons, and at
that local court judges are forced to subsidize their
operational budget--maybe $5 a month--in order to pay utilities
and basic expenses;
In criminal cases, the failure of most Central
American legal systems is most acute.
In part this is a
reflection of the political nature of much of the violence, or
of carefully observed limits of judicial intrusion into the
activities of powerful persons.
In part, it reflects the fact
that there is little prestige or money in the practice of
criminal law or criminal trial practice.
In part, it reflects
the inability of many security forces to prepare a cogent case
for trial because of inadequate training, unfamiliarity with
professional investigative techniques, and a lack of modern
laboratory facilities.
In the classic civil law tradition, the
judiciary itself conducts the investigation, traditionally
through heavy dependence on testimonial and documentary
evidence. Times have changed, and means of criminal
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investigation have outdistanced the ability of a sitting judge
to manage the process. There are solut~ons to this compatible
with civil law theory, notably the Judicial Police under the
jurisdiction of the courts in Costa Rica, or the special
technical police of Venezuela under the authority of the
Attorney General.
But in most countries of Central America,
the judiciary cannot call on the security forces as an arm of
the court in case preparation and investigation, and no part of
the system--police, fiscalia (prosecutors), or the courts--has
the requisite technical capability. The acquisition of needed
training and technical means, preferably under judicial,
fiscalia or independent auspices, is a high priority.
Judicial training is a key deficiency. There is
no law school or in-house judicial training program in any
Central American country other than Costa Rica, where it is
just starting. Standards for judicial appointment are
minimal.
The greatest weakness of the system lies at its
heart--local judges and justices of the peace who too
frequently in Central America lack legal training, and
sometimes even an elementary education.
The prosecutorial function of the attorney general
or fiscalia is also a source of concern, for many of the same
reasons that affect the judiciary: low wages, lack of budgetary
and other resources, inadequate training and career
development, lack of authority, and a lack of modern means of
criminal investigation.
Law code revisions are also required in many
countries. Code modernization is particularly important in
civil law systems. Some have already taken the initiative,
costa Rica some years ago, Honduras very recently in a major
revision of its 70 year old criminal code.
El Salvador's
comparatively modern codes are to be reviewed by a new Supreme
Court commission. There are areas of deficiencies, even in
newer codes, particularly in terms of means of proof and
admissible evidence, often very antiquated; criminalization and
definition of modern crimes; and procedures to deal with the
unique challenges of political violence, including provision
for secure trials, and the protection for judges, jurors,
witnesses and other participants.
Bar associations tend to play no major role in the
legal system, except in Costa Rica.
In other countries, they
range from mere social clubs to organizations with minimal
services for members.
In all cases, they are a potentially
potent factor for legal reform. While admission standards may
be loose or non-existent, lawyers and jurists are far better
educated as a group and more aware of the latent power of the
judicial system than is the general public. Largely for
financial reasons, membership services such as publications,
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continuing legal education programs, and the like are scarce.
The Bar plays little role in such issues as legal reform,
enforcement of professional standards and judicial selection.
There are, however, changes at work.
In El Salvador, for
example, a legal reform commission has been appointed by
President Magana with ample private sector leadership and
representation, which may help serve to reinvigorate the bar
there.
Law schools have suffered from lax standards and
financial difficulties, and as a consequence law school
graduates are uneven in competence.
In El Salvador, for
instance, the term of legal study has been cut back, and
graduation criteria are loose. There are few programs of
graduate legal study in the region, and nothing adequate in the
way of training for a judicial career. Schools lack adequate
libraries and facilities, and normally do not have full-time
professors. Scholarships are scarce.
The legal systems of many countries in the region
function with inadequate availablity of basic legal materials.
Frequently, it can be a frustrating problem to find an up to
date code, let alone key judicial decisions (which of course,
play a lesser role in civil law countries but are still
valuable). The American lawyer, who enjoys many private
constantly updated legal research publications , and computer
research capability, would be shocked at the very basic level
of legal information available in most Central American legal
systems.
Penal reform is an urgent problem. The vast
majority of persons incarcerated in Central America have not
been tried. Prison conditions, with such surprising exceptions
as Mariona and Ilopango in El Salvador, are generally grim. We
are aware of concern in many countries, such as Honduras and
Costa Rica, for greater attention to alternatives to
incarceration in lesser crimes, and prison modernization.
I have catalogued a range of problems, some nuts and
bolts, some not.
Some systems are in need of little more than
financial assistance, such as Costa Rica's; but others, for
example, El Salvador, raise the question of whether any
assistance program can do any good whatsoever unless and until
there is political receptivity.
I know that this has been the
attitude of those in the Bar Association of the City of New
York who have interested themselves in and published on the
conditions of the administration of justice in that country.
My answer to such skepticism is that we must start
somewhere. Changes can accumulate. The organized bar and the
judiciary, reinforced by some self-confidence, better
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organization and greater material means, can asssume a much
greater role and bolster processes of democratization. To
stand aside is to ensure that neither legal reform, nor any
meaningful and lasting democratic change, will occur. Periodic
elections will mean little in themselves if the administration
of justice is a failure.
I would like to urge upon you the proposition that
assistance to judicial and other legal institutions should be a
component of u.s. assistance programs in Central America--and
indeed in other regions.
It is fundamental to democratic
institution-building and defense of human rights.
It is
inherently a long-range investment, but the dividends may prove
to be even longer-range. When a country is buffeted by serious
political disturbance, the legal system can serve as an
essential ballast. For example, the Chilean judiciary has
asserted its independence as the will grows for a transition to
democratic institutions after years of military rule. We have
seen a reassertion of judicial institutions prior to democratic
governmental changes in Argentina.
But any u.s. assistance must be undertaken with a
sense of prudence and clear objectives. We must recognize that
any country will be understandably cautious about foreign
involvement in matters affecting its legal system and sovereign
institutions. We, as a common law country, with very different
socio-economic and historical circumstances, must recognize the
limits on direct transference of our experience. Our role, I
believe, must be as a catalyst of regional cooperative efforts
to address what are, in most cases, common problems. Where
financial support is a key to progress, we can seek to assist.
But we must work with existing and new regional institutions,
and rely on the involvement of Latin Americans who themselves
have the required expertise in the areas to be addressed.
With these considerations in mind, the united States,
in close consultation with the governments and leading legal
figures of El Salvador, Honduras and costa Rica, has embarked
on a number of pilot projects and activities:
An interagency assessment team visited these three
countries in April to better enable us to understand the
problems and possible solutions. We have been implementing
their general recommendations. Attorney General William French
Smith visited san Salvador also in April to underline the u.s.
commitment to support of legal reform.
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We have contracted with the United Nations Latin
American Institute for the Prevention of Crime ~nd the
Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), based in San Jose, Costa Rica,
to perform detailed evaluations of possible projects in the
initial three target countries.
ILANUD is the regional body
most heavily engaged in legal reform activity at the present
time, primarily in the criminal law area, and has already
conducted similar project assessment studies. The team
assembled by ILANUD from Latin America will focus on the court
system; legal information; bar associations; attorneys general
offices; and legal education.
In consultation with government
and private sector legal figures, and legal reform commissions,
they will seek to elicit suggestions and work with them to
define "home-grown" proposals which they and ILANUD can follow
up, with u.s. assistance as appropriate.
The Colegio de Abogados of Costa Rica is hosting a
conference of central American bar associations early next year
in San Jose. Bar groups from Panama, Honduras, El Salvador and
Guatemala will participate. The theme is the role, actual and
potential, of the organized bar in each country. Observers
have been invited from the Bar Association of the City of New
York, the American Bar Association, the Inter-American Bar
Association, and the OAS.
We have begun to provide grants for international
visitors to undertake legal programs, including a visit to the
u.s. this summer by several Salvadoran judges, fiscales, and
lawyers, and a Salvadoran participant at a recent Montreal
conference of the Canadian Bar Association on the independence
of the judiciary (that participant, by the way, has since been
asked to serve as Executive Secretary of the Salvadoran legal
reform commission) •
We are discussing funding of graduate legal
scholarships with the University of Costa Rica law school, to
be available to students from the three initial target
countries of Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador. These would
be initially in the areas of criminal and agrarian law. We are
discussing other projects with the law school, including law
library assistance and funding of travel of Jessup
International Law Moot court teams from that school and others
in the region, in a program long sponsored by the American
Society of International Law.
ILANUD is developing, in concert with the Costa
Rican Supreme Court's Judicial Scool, a trial program for
training of judges on a regional basis. We hope to fund a
proposal in the very near future.
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we have offered positions in several United States
government training courses to eligible candidates from the
region, where despite differences in the legal systems,
technical skills might usefully be transferred.
We have encouraged greater OAS activity in the
area of legal services, and supported a resolution at the
XIIIth OAS General Assembly creating an OAS legal development
program. We have received a proposal from the American Society
of International Law to convene a panel of regional academic
experts to work with regional institutions and ourselves in
advancing legal reform assistance efforts. We have also been
in contact with the Inter-American Bar Association in planning
for legal reform items on the agenda of their forthcoming
annual meeting in Panama.
These are, I stress, still only the outlines of a
program with united States government support, preliminary
steps to begin to respond to urgent problems and to identify
worthwhile concrete projects of national and regional
institutions. We hope to have an even more vigorous program in
place by this time next year, and intend to expand activities
to additional countries as soon as our experience with this
program and our resources permit. We are not without
difficulties, including identification of sources of funding
for more ambitious regional programs, and possible legislative
constraints, including Section 660 ot the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, prohibiting aid to "law enforcement
forces".
More work is entailed to make of this a truly
effective program. But we have made a start. I am certain
that the members of this Commission have now heard a great deal
about the problems of the region, and I know you are not
unfamiliar with the challenges facing the legal systems of
Central America which I have described. But I also suspect
that you have found answers and concrete suggestions, even
small ones,. harder to come by. I offer this proposal, active
u.s. assistance to judicial and other legal institutions,
within the constraints I have suggested, as a perhaps small,
but nonetheless essential element of a coherent u.s. policy
towards the Central American region.

698.

Europe and the Crisis in Central America
Eusebio Mujal-Leon

I should like to thank the Commission for this opportunity to speak
before it and to express my views on the subject of West European attitudes
and policies toward the conflict in Central America.

I am an Assistant

Prcfessor of Government at Georgetown University and a specialist in European
politics.

As a Cuban-American, however, I have a particular interest in

Latin American politics and I have recently completed a study of European
Socialist and Social Democratic efforts to influence the course of events
in Central America.
of the

l~est

My intention today is to present a general analysis

European role in Central America and to assess the implications

these might have for European-American relations.
European involvement in Central America (and, more generally, in Latin
America) is the consequence of a decades-long evolution in the self-perception and role of the United States, Latin America and West Europe in the
international system.

The most important and mutually reinforcing charac-

teristics of this process have been the erosion of American leadership, the
growth of nationalism and the search for greater economic and political independence from the United States in Latin America, and growing European
political assertiveness as manifested by the activities of individual countries and the European Economic Community as well as by those of

Socialis~

and Christian Democratic parties and foundations.
European involvement in the l.Jestern Hemisphere should be viewed in its
economic and political dimensions.
latter.

The former is less important than the

Specifically with respect to Central America, there is not much European

economic investment in that region.

To the degree that the Europeans have
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developed substantive economic ties, these have been vdth South America.
Nevertheless, although European banks provided nearly $18 billion in funds
to Latin America between 1978 and 1980, European economic ties with Latin
American countries have not grown as impressively as many expected.

Indeed,

while the value of Latin America's exports to the European Community increased
in nominal terms between 1958 and 1976, its share of that market dropped
from 11 to 5.5 percent in those years.

This trend has been reinforced by

a European desire to maintain close ties with their former colonies (particularly in Africa), the growing protectionism of the EEC, and the contined
importance of the United States as a market and source of imports for
Latin America and particularly for Central America.
The political dimension of the European-Latin American relationship
has been much more important during this period.

On the one hand, there

is the sense that Latin America is perhaps the most "European" area in
the Third World, with institutions and values that resemble in many respects
those found in Southern European countries.

The problem of how to build

a liberal democratic state (of how to render the military and bureaucracy
responsive to civilian power and of how to weaken extremist elements on
both

P~ght

and Left) is similar to the one experienced by many Southern European

countries in the late 19th and 20th centuries.

Europeans also generally

view the establishment of closer relations with Latin America as a way of
modifying the bipolar logic of the international system and of increasing
the autonomy of both regions.
European political activity in Central America has manifested itself
most clearly with the involvement of Socialist and Christian Democratic groups.
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They have made substantial funds available (directly and through foundations)
to their co-religionists in the region and have provided a number of parties
and trade unions there with important international contacts as well as legitimacy.

This has been particularly evident in the case of the Socialist Inter-

national and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the

}lli~

in El Salvador.

For their part, the European Socialists (and allowances must be made
here since not all parties hold these views with the same intensity and
they do not approach relations with the United States and Latin America in
the same way) share certain attitudes that have special relevance in
the context of Central America.

They believe (1) that the United States does

not understand (and in its more extreme form cannot or will not understand)
what is happening in the Third World; (2) that the conflict in Central America
is for the most part locally generated and results from profound social and
economic disparities; (3) that the Soviet Union and Cuba play a secondary
role in maintaining the insurgencies in El Salvador and elsewhere; (4) that
the United States is eager to bring the East-West conflict into Third World
areas in part because it is eager to reassert its faltering hegemony over the
western alliance; and (5) that East-West confrontation

over Central America

and elsewhere in the Third World will torpedo negotiations over arms control
(not to say trade), ultimately therefore weakening Western Europe's capac'ity
to maintain both an effective security tie to the United States and a
fruitful commercial relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
These views find the greatest support in the Dutch, Swedish and German
Social Democratic parties, but are also visible to a lesser or greater extent
in the French, Italian, and Spanish Socialist parties.

Among the latter,

how'ever, the party leaderships (specifically, Hi tterr.:ud, Craxi and Gonzalez)
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have moderated the rhetoric of their parties.

Of the parties we have mentioned,

the most active in Central America have been the French, the. German and Spanish
parties. After an initial burst of activism which included an almost incendiary
speech in Mexico City in October 1981, the signing of a joint statement with
Mexico that recognized a state of belligerence in El Salvador and the sale
of various arms and equipment to Nicaragua, however, the French Socialists
and government have assumed a less public posture.
are many.

The reasons for this

Suffice it to point out here the French desire not to antagonize

the United States over an area where they have very little direct concern
(by contrast, they have a keen interest in Africa and the Middle East) and
the fact that

~litterrand

shares many of the Reagan Administration's concerns

about Soviet expansionism in the Third World.

Caution has also been the

hallmark of Spanish Socialist foreign policy, especially after the PSOE
assumed power in November 1982.

The Spanish government lacks instruments

to influence events in Central America.

Moreover, given the fragility of

Spanish democracy and the sensitive foreign policy issues (participation
in NATO, the Gibraltar question, and the defense of Ceuta and Melilla on
the North African coast) that Spain must address in the next few years,
it is not interested in direct confrontation with the United States.
The most active Social Democratic party on Central American issues has been
the West German SPD.

It spurred the Socialist International's involvement

in Latin America in the mid-1970s and, through its Ebert Foundation, has played
a major role in training and providing organizational infrastructure for
left-wing movements in Central

~uerica.

Since leaving the government in

October 1982, the SPD has stepped up its criticism of Reagan Administration
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foreign policies.

Linking up forces with the Evangelical churches (with

whom they have been allied on the nuclear deployment issue), the SPD has
vigorously criticized United States policies in Central America, with some
important party federations sponsoring solidarity campaigns and collecting
funds for Nicaragua.
The enthusiasm that accompanied the first European Socialist efforts
in Central America in the late 1970s has largely dissipated.

Toward El

Salvador, it has been replaced by frustration with the failure of negotiations to materialize.

No European Socialist leader has recently called for

an outright guerrilla victory; most of them pointedly couple calls for
negotiations with an explicit endorsement of future elections to lay the
foundations for a representative democracy there.

With respect to Nicaragua,

the Socialists cling to the hope that the Sandinistas can be persuaded
or at least moved to adhere to their original statement of principles.

But

even as their skepticism of the Sandinistas has increased, European Socialist
leaders have refused to support American policy toward Nicaragua.
objections are two-fold.

Their

On the one hand, they believe that United States

policies will encourage the Sandinistas to adopt more radical policies.
(Even so, many European Socialists see such a development as almost inevitable.)
What really impels their opposition is the fear that, confronted by such a
radicalization, the United States would respond by sending in troops.
European Christian Democratic parties have been generally more supportive
of American policy in Central America.

The two most important parties --

the DC in Italy and the CDU/CSU in West Germany -- have sought to elaborate
a

strategy of collaboration with the United States and what they have inter-
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preted as its policy of "support(ing) forces of democracy."

Although calling

for structural economic and social reforms and regarding them as vital to the
building of democracy, the Christian Democratics in Europe have not hesitated
(in contrast to the Socialist International) to criticize Cuba and Nicaragua
for their alignment with the Soviet Union and their efforts to encourage
de-stabilization in Central America.

Both European and Latin American Chris-

tian Democrats have become more cautious in their support for American
policy in El Salvador after March 1982, when Jose Napoleon Duarte and the
PDC were displaced from the center of power.
are also apparent, however.

The limits of disagreement

As Peter Bazing, Vice-Chairman of the Planning

Committee in the German Foreign Office, vnote recently:
policy toward Latin America were only possible at the

"If a particular

pri~e

of major differences

with the United States, {~ppositio~7 would not be a realistic option for
German foreign policy.

The price would be too high."

Because Central American issues are developing a domestic momentum in
Western Europe (as is demonstrated by a number of surveys taken in the last
few months), most European governments, even when led by parties that are
broadly

S}~pathetic

to American security needs and interests, have marked

their distance from Reagan Administration policies.

}fest European governments,

for example, voted against the United States in the United Nations' Third
Committee when resolutions criticizing the Salvadoran government's handling
of human rights were put forward; and only the United Kingdom voted with the
United States against a January 1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution that
called for the suspension of aid to El Salvador.

A similar pattern was

evident in international lending agencies where European governments have
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supported the granting of loahs and credits to Nicaragua.

Notably, through

mid-1983 no European country cut off economic assistance to Nicaragua (or
started it to El Salvador) in response to American requests.

Not even the

Christian Democratic party in West Germany resumed development aid to El
Salvador after it won the March 1983 Bundestag election.
The European presence in Central America has generated much publicity
and controversy, but the impact that these parties have had on events has
been limited.

West Europe has no significant military presence or projection

in the region and, given the present structure of international trade and
commerce, individual European countries and even the European Economic
Community are in position to direct substantial economic assistance or
benefits to Central American nations.

These constraints limit activism.

So does the fact that Central America is an area where the United States
has been traditionally strong and in which vital American security interests
are at stake.

For the Europeans, of course, Central American issues have

a preeminently symbolic value.

Needing to collaborate with the Reagan

Administration on other, more pressing foreign policy concerns and being
ultimately dependent on the American security umbrella, many European parties
and governments wish to avoid overly sharp criticisms of the United States.
For those parties in power, moreover, there is a concern that, if the debate
over American policy in Central America becomes a major bone of domestic
contention, it will limit their room for naneuver on other domestic and
foreign policy questions.
The call for negotiations in Central

P~erica

(and endorsement of initia-

tives like the one associated with the Contadora group) is likely to remain at
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the core of European policies toward the region.

Moreover, if negotiations

between various groups are begun, some European governments (perhaps the
Spanish) might be used either as mediators or as participants in a possible
multinational peacekeeping force.

Unless there is an unprovoked and massive

American intervention, however, caution and restraint will continue to
characterize European efforts there.
The United States should consider European concerns and views when
elaborating its policy with respect to Central America, but in the final
analysis, complete agreement between this country and West European nations
on Central American issues is an impractical goal.
but they do not coincide.

Our interests converge

Nevertheless, European countries can and should

play a role in the formulation and execution of development projects for
the region and in opening up otherwise difficult channels of communication
for the United States.

Socialist and Christian Democratic parties can

strengthen democratic traditions and values by continuing to support and
provide assistance to their homologues in the region.

Whatever the

specific policy choices it makes with respect to Central America, the United
States should strive to maintain open lines of communication with the
Europeans.

In the end, the best this Administration or any other can do

is to adopt a coherent, consistent and predictable policy toward Central
America; a tempered policy that, while not rejecting the use of military
instruments to defend vital security interests, nevertheless relies more on
political and economic forms of assistance.

Such a policy would rally a

national consensus and strengthen as well the bonds of the Alliance.
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U.S. POLICY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
Edward Gonzalez
David Ronfeldt

Brian Michael Jenkins
Caesar Sereseres

PREFACE

The conclusions and judgments offered in this briefing paper are
based on several years of Rand research.

In 1980, The Rand Corporation

initiated research on several security issues in the Caribbean Basin,
including Central America.

This research effort was later supported by

the Air Force, and has continued this year with corporate funding.
The individual studies produced under the Caribbean Basin security
issues project were sent to The National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America, chaired by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, in late summer
1983.

1

Responding to the interests expressed by the Commission, a

preliminary version of this briefing paper was then prepared.

It was

presented orally·to the Commission on October 21, 1983.

1

The other Caribbean Basin studies are: A Strategy for Dealing
with Cuba in the 1980s (R-2954-DOS/AF), Ed~ard Gonzalez, September 1982;
Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin David F.
Ronfeldt, (R-2997-AF), forthcoming, fall 1983. Venezuela's Pursuit of
Caribbean Basin Interests: Implications for United States National
Security (R-2994-AF), David J. ~yers, forthcoming, fall 1983; Profiles
of the Caribbean Basin 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and
Geostrategic Dimensions (~-2058-AF), Joseph H. Stodder and Kevin F.
McCarthy, forthcoming, fall 1983. nilitary Politics, Internal Warfare,
and U.S. Policy in Guatemala (R-2996-AF), Caesar D. Sereseres,
forthcoming, winter 1983; and Nicaragua: The Internationalization bt
Conflict and Polit1.'cs in Central America (R-2998-AF), Adriana Bosch,
forthcoming, winter 1983.
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SUMMARY

U.S. INTERESTS AND VALUES AT STAKE

Just how important are U.S. security interests in Central America?
Viewed in isolation, they seem to be modest.

From a strategic

viewpoint, however, they assume importance because Central America is
part of our strategic rear area, the Caribbean Basin, because the Soviet
Union is seeking targets of opportunity there, and because adverse
regional trends may ultimately erode the strategic position of the
United States.

This does not mean that U.S. global credibility ought to

be seen as a key stake in what promises to be a long struggle in the
region.

But it does mean that U.S. security depends heavily on

preventing the consolidation of hostile regimes in Central America;
maintaining secure lines of communication throughout the Basin; and
ensuring continued access to strategic raw materials, primarily oil and
natural gas in Venezuela and Nexico.
A relatively secure Southern perimeter has greatly facilit1ted U.S.
roles as a world power, enabling us to focus attention on Europe and
Asia.

It is strategically imperative that we prevent threats from

arising in Central America which would require us to divert military and
other resources to the detriment of our strength and flexibility
elsewhere.
U.S. security is not the only issue.

The United States also seeks

to promote a set of political and economic values: respect for human
rights, the development of democratic societies, and economic progress
and social justice.

Hence, the United States has a moral obligation to

protect and support those moderate forces who share our basic commitment
to human rights and other democratic values--our natural allies.
There is no ,easy way to achieve public consensus on how to
reconcile this strategic imperative and moral obligation in U.S.
dealings with Central America's governments and peoples.

Yet there

should be public consensus at least that the United States has important
interests and values at stake--and that these merit U.S. involvement,
not disengagement, in Central America.
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EMERGING THREATS AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Three adverse security trends affect U.S. interests in Central
America:
•

a growth in low-intensity conficts including terrorism,
guerrilla wars, and government repression;

•

the development of a militarized hostile axis between Cuba and
Nicaragua, supported by the Soviets;

•

and an increasing capacity by the Soviet Union and Cuba to
project power into the region through conventional military
force and revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

Two scenarios show how these trends might materialize in the near future
and jeopardize U.S. interests.
The first scenario examines the implications if MiGs and Cuban
combat forces are deployed to Nicaragua.

This would escalate the threat

to Nicaragua's neighbors and potentially to the PanAma Canal and
adjoining sea lanes.

It would provide Cuba with a precedent for a Cuban

combat presence in Nicaragua.

And, depending on the U.S. response, it

could affect world- wide perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet
politico-military balance .
. If the U.S. government were to ignore these developments, it would
probably risk a further militarization of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan
axis.

If the U.S. government were to threaten air strikes unless the

MiGs and Cuban combat presence are removed, it would probably face heavy
domestic and international opposition.

If the U.S. government instead

were just to take defensive measures, U.S. defense planners would
probably have deploy additional U.S forces to the area to ensure
regional security in the event of an international crisis.

This,

however, would divert military assets from high priority areas beyond
the Hemisphere.
The second scenario examines the fall of El Salvador, a possibility
that would represent a momentous defeat for the United States.
thousands of Salvadorans would likely flee.

Tens of

The victorious

revolutionaries would probably call for a protracted war to "liberate"
.all of Central America.

Guatemala would probably redouble its efforts
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to destroy the guerrilla threat by military means, but Honduras, Costa
Rica, and Panama would probably respond by adopting neutralist or
accommodationist postures.

The Salvadoran collapse would probably

encourage the expansionist tendencies in both Cuban and Soviet policies.
The fall of El Salvador would narrow the range and raise the cost
of U.S. policy choices.

Because political and economic instruments

would probably become increasingly ineffective at stemming the
revolutionary tide, a large U.S. military presence may be required to
restore security and stability in the region.

Yet a large military

deployment to Central Amerfca could provoke widespread hostility
throughout Latin America, and reduce U.S. ability to respond to crises
in other priority areas.
As the scenarios demonstrate, current adverse trends, if unchecked,
could lead to a later situation where critical U.S. interests are
jeopardized, and the means for protecting those interests become
increasingly constrained.
U.S. POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA

The current crisis is neither so acute nor uniform in character,
however, that the United States must automatically accept the security
and economic agenda presented by Central American governments, and the
bill that goes with it.

Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama are not

presently threatened by insurgent movements; and Guatemala has thus far
successfully contained the guerrilla struggle there.
What guidelines should U.S. policy follow in order to head off a
further deterioration of Central America, and to build constructive longterm relationships with our neighbors there?

Our proposals are divided

into two parts: one for Central America in general, the other for
Nicaragua.

The proposals on Central America aim at strengthening the

capacity of local governments and societies not only to cope with
Marxist-Leninist forces, but also to bring about needed social change.
In order for U.S. policy to become effective and sustainable over
the long-term, it should adhere to three broad guidelines:
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•

First, the United States should restore its presence and
participation in Central America to traditional levels. This
is essential to our ability to promote both the strategic and
moral imperatives.

•

Second, the United States should promote collective
responsibiity for regional security and development. U.S.
leadership is necessary in the area, but the United States
cannot resort to unilateral hegemony.

•

Third, U.S. policy should set aside the debate about which
sources are primary. Local elites have traditionally sought to
augment their power bv enlisting the support of external
actors, only more so in recent years. The current
revolutionary violence stems from both local and external
factors; attempts that seek to single out and weigh them are a
waste of time.

What specific policy instruments can we employ?
Engage Latin American nationalism: As first steps, U.S. policy
should recognize that developing the State often takes priority ovAr the
private sector.

Also, the United States needs to make clear that it can

accept and even cooperate with nationalist revolutionary regimes if they
do not promote revolutionary upheavals in the region and align
themselves militarily with our global adversaries.
Support the moderates:

United States policy needs to strengthen

civilian and military elites that share our values and support moderate,
democratic solutions.

Technical and financial assistance for the

development of political parties, labor unions, community groups, and
agricultural cooperatives needs to be increased through the auspices of
AID, AFL-CIO, the Inter-American Foundation, and other organizations.
Training opportunities and fellowships in the United States should be
offered to military and civilian leaders.

Above all, the United States

needs to actively shield moderate forces: If right-wing extremists will
not stop murdering their more moderate political opponents, the United
States may have to employ punitive measures directed against the
personal interests of their leaders.
Foster economic development:

Because the region's long-term

problems are largely socio-economic, a large-scale U.S. assistance
program is needed to generate economic growth and satisfy the
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aspirations of the lower and middle classes, particularly the basic
human needs of the rural population.

Increased support should be given

to agrarian reform measures throughout the region by providing technical
and financial assistance, including supplying funds for compensation to
expropriated property-owners.

Private sector development also needs to

be stimulated in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, commerce, and
service industries through AID, and by enlisting the assistance of the
U.S. private sector.
Bu~ld

constructive military ties.

Over the long-run, the United

States should seek coalitional arrangements that enlist the
participation of Basin states in multilateral security activities.

In

the meantime, U.S. security programs should aim at increasing the
capabilities and professionalism of the local armed forces.

•

Continue economic and security assistance to defeat leftwing
guerrillas, keep rightwing political extemists in check, and
instill greater respect for civilian institutions by local
military officers.

•

Military leadership and professional and organizational skills
need to be strengthened through expanded U.S. military training
programs in the United States, School of the Americas, and
individual Central American countries.

..

Restrain the introduction of advanced weapons systems into the
region, improve intelligence gathering and analysis by both the
local armed forces and U.S. intelligence personnel, and provide
professional police training (presently prohibited by U.S.
legislation).

These and other security assistance efforts should be undertaken
with care so as to strengthen rather than weaken fragile civilian
political institutions and forces in Central America.
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NICARAGUA

Two separate issues are involved with respect to Nicaragua:

Can we

learn to live with radical nationalist regimes in our "backyard" if they
learn to live with us?

And, how do we prevent hostile extra-hemispheric

powers like the Soviet Union from gaining military position in Central
America?

These two issues, and their respective U.S. policy options,

are addressed separatively.
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Several options are available for dealing with the Sandinistas:
1. Seek accommodation.

This would require that Nicaragua halt its

assistance to Marxist guerrillas and not become a platform for Soviet or
Cuban military expansion.

In return, the United States would cease its

diplomatic, political, and economic campaign against the Sandinista
regime.

The advantage of this approach is that it is cheap, and would

elicit widespread public support.

The principal problem with this

approach is that the Sandinistas do not have sufficient incentives for
curtailing their oojectives.

Having won in Nicaragua, they are

convinced that they can exploit divisions in the United States to
undermine any U.S. effort against them, while securing sufficient
assistance from Europe and the Soviet bloc to ensure regime survival.
2. Oppose the Sandinistas with primarily non-military measures.

Here, the United States would employ diplomatic efforts to isolate the
regime both politically and economically, while providing some continued
financial support for anti-Sandinista elements.

It is a low-cost

approach that does not directly involve the U.S. in any military
a.;tivities, but by itself, it may not be very effective.

It guarantees

continued hostility without providing sufficient incentives for the
Sandinistas to modify their behavior.
3. Support the rebels in concentrated attacks on economic targets.

This approach would exact an economic penalty on the Sandinista regime
as a price for its alignment with Cuba and its support for guerrillas
elsewhere.

It is a feasible strategy but it could provoke a backlash in

Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America, and it only makes the
Sandinistas more dependent on Cuban and Soviet aid.
4. Support the rebels in an all-out effort to overthrow the regime.

If successful, this option would eliminate a major source of subversion
in Central America and alleviate U.S. security concerns.

But it is not

clear that domestic discontent in Nicaragua is so widespread that latent
guerrillas lack only guns.

Nor is it clear that with or without

discontent a force capable of toppling the Sandinistas can be created.
The attempt could drag us into an open-ended conflict that might
ultimately fail.

Or American impatience with long struggles could

ultimately force the United States to abandon the rebels.
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5. Intervene with U.S. Forces.

This is the surest way of

eliminating Nicaragua as a threat to U.S. security interests, but it
could be an enormously costly undertaking, diverting upwards of 100,000
combat troops or more, and causing heavy casualties on both sides.
Continued Sandinista resistance in the countryside could bog down the
United States in a military occupation and counterinsurgency campaign
taking years with all the attendant political fallout that this would
bring at home and abroad.
Nicaragua is not a military threat now anymore than Cuba was in the
early 1960s, but like Cuba, it could become one as Cubans and the
Soviets gradually and ambiguously supply the Sandinistas with advanced
weapons and increase their own presence.

Ultimately the United States

would have to deploy more forces to the area thus diverting them from
other missions.

Several options for preventing a Cuban-Soviet military

buldup in Nicaragua may be considered:
1. Negotiate or declare a weapons ceiling.

Under this approach,

limitations on the origin, amount and kind of military equipment
Nicaragua would receive would be negotiated, or, in the absence of
agreement, the United States would unilaterally declare certain
prohibitions.

Such an approach addresses our principal security

concerns and later could become part of a broader arms limitation
agreement for Central America.

However, as has occurred with Cuba, arms

that are not expressly prohibited become permissible, and those that are
permissible will be deployed.

Also, a declaratory policy would commit

the United States to action in every violation.
2. Impose a quarantine.

A land and sea cordon around Nicaragua

could reduce the amount of arms delivered to Nicaragua, particularly
heavy weapons.

But a quarantine may be difficult to enforce, it would

be a long-term operation lasting years, and would be a large-scale
deployment of U.S, military units.
3. Selectively attack Cuban or Soviet military material in

Nicaragua.

This approach would utilize indigenous paramilitary forces

under U.S. control, or regular U.S. forces or special operations, to
destroy select weapon systems.

This action would demonstrate U.S.

determination without committing the United States to action in every
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case and would minimize the danger to civilians.

But it may involve

U.S. forces, thereby risking casualties and POW problems.

Also, it

invites retaliation--possibly sabotage of military or civilian targets
in the United States.
4. Intervene with U.S. forces. The pros and cons of this option
have already been discussed.
On the basis of our review of the current situation, we suggest
maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas through primarily non-military
means, continuing to provide some financial support to anti-Sandinista
elements, while selectively targeting Cuban or Soviet weapon systems
introduced into Nicaragua.

This combination should be coupled with our

proposals for strengthening the other Central American countries.

Such

a strategy provides some flexibility in that other options can be
adopted

later; it is low cost; it can be sustained for the long run;

and it is most likely to gain widespread support in this country.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Because a well-armed Narxist government has emerged in Nicaragua
and guerrilla warfare is escalating in El Salvador, the 1980s seem to be
repeating the 1960s when Castro aligned Cuba with Noscow and promoted
guerrilla warfare throughout Latin America.

At that time the United

States responded with a host of military, economic, and symbolic
measures:

the Green Berets, the Peace Corps, military assistance, and

economic aid under the Alliance for Progress.
keep Castro's revolution from spreading.

These programs helped

But as the guerrilla movements

waned and U.S. attention shifted to Southeast Asia and the Middle East,
Central America was increasingly ignored.
This neglect permitted adverse developments to take root.

If these

remain unchecked, the United States may face additional crises in which
the stakes will be higher, the options will be fewer, and the cost of
any sort of intervention will be greater.

What should the United States

do this time?
In this briefing we analyze changes in the policy environment,
examine U.S. interests in Central America, and describe some scenarios
to illustrate the possible consequences of existing threats.

We then

outline what we believe are realistic long-term policy directions to
arrest these adverse trends and advance U.S. interests under a twopart approach:
1.

For countries friendly to the United States, we propose a
number of measures to strengthen their capacity to cope with
guerrilla warfare, and to promote needed social change.

2.

We address Nicaragua separately, and analyze options for
containing its subversive influence and preventing its
conversion into a platform for Cuban and Soviet military
expansion.

The conclusions and judgments we offer are based on several years
of Rand research.

In 1980, using corporate funds, The Rand Corporation

initiated research on security issues in Central America and the
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Caribbean Basin.

This research was supported for awhile by the Air

Force, and has continued this year with corporate funding.
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II.

THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF THE 19805

In the years since Castro's rise to power, crucial changes have
occurred in the global, regional, and domestic environments affecting
U.S. interests and policies.

The sum of these environmental changes is

that:
Our Adversaries Have Become More Powerful

•

In 1960, the Soviet Union did not have a global military
presence. Today it does, including in the Caribbean.

•

In 1960, Cuba had a small, poorly equipped army. Today, Cuba
possesses a modernized force--more tha 225,000 strong, with
over 200 MiG fighters, including MiG-23s--that has engaged in
large-scale combat operations overseas.

•

In 1960, Castro espoused a guerrilla warfare theory that the
Soviets opposed and that ultimately failed. Today, Marxist
guerrillas employ a sophisticated revolutionary warfare
strategy that has Soviet as well as Cuban backing, combines
military and civilian fronts, and enlists broad international
support.

Our European and Latin American Friends Are Less Malleable

•

In 1960, the Catholic Church was a unified, essentially
conservative force in the area's politics. Today, the Church
is divided. Radical priests, some committed to Marxist ideals
and the theology of liberation, actively support revolutionary
violence in Central America.

•

In 1960, the European nations had little influence in the area.
Today, they back Christian and Social Democratic parties. They
provide economic assistance. Sometimes they oppose U.S.
policies in the area.

•

In 1960, Mexico and Venezuela either supported U.S. policy or
did not actively contest it. Today, they have become assertive
regional actors whose policies are sometimes at variance with
those of the United States.

718.

Our Ability to Influence Events in the Region has Diminished

•

In 1960, the United States was confident of its role as the
leading world power. Today, the American public remains shaken
and divided by the Vietnam experience, less willing to support
the application of U.S. power abroad.

•

In 1960, the American economy was largely self-sufficient and
expanding. Today, it has become dependent on foreign economic
relations and energy imports.

•

In 1960, Americans rem~ined essentially insulated from
conditions in Central America and the Caribbean. Today, the
area's conflicts intrude into our domestic scene, mainly
through large immigration flows.

What do these changes mean for the United States?
1. U.S. stakes in the region are rising:

In particular, there are

greater interests in containing hostile force expansion, sustaining
petroleum supplies, and constraining the flows of people from the
region.
2. Potential threats to U.S. interests are growing:
Cuban military capabilities have expanded dramatically.

Soviet and
A hostile

military axis, backed by the Soviets, may be developing between Cuba and
Nicaragua.

And Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union, and other

non-Communist actors, such as Libya are supporting revolutionary
conflict in Central America.
3. U.S. ability to respond to threats and problems has diminished:

While Cuban and Soviet influence has been increasing, U.S. policies have
been constrained and the U.S. presence has correspondingly declined in
the area.

For example, the number of U.S. military personnel assigned

to the Caribbean Basin declined sharply between 1960 and 1980: 22,000
personnel were stationed in the Basin in 1960, rising to over 25,000 in
1968, with the number then dropping to under 16,000 by 1981.
The United States has only recently begun to reverse this trend by
authorizing higher levels of military and economic assistance, and
intelligence activities.

In order to restore U.S. involvement in the

area to traditional levels, however, the U.S. government will need
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greater public consensus on the importance of U.S. interests and the
nature of the emerging threats.
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Ill.

U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Many Americans, across the political spectrum, remain unconvinced
that important U.S. interests are at stake in the region.

Their reasons

for this skepticism are many:

•

Since being persuaded to support the Panama Canal Treaties,
many Americans no longer regard the Canal and the surrounding
region as vital to U.S. security interests.

•

Central America is not viewed as possessing strategic raw
materials or economic investments that are critical to the
United States.

•

The Central American states are not perceived as posing a
credible threat to the sea lanes of communication in the
Caribbean, much less to the physical security of the United
States.

•

Many believe that the United States could overwhelm any
conventional military threat that may arise in Central America.

Indeed, U.S. interests in Central America itself are currently
modest.

The region assumes critical importance, however, when viewed

from a dynamic strategic perspective which takes into account:
•

That Central America forms an integral part of the larger
Caribbean Basin;

•

That the Soviet Union seeks to exploit new targets of
opportunity in the U.S. "strategic backyard" and

•

That over time, adverse regional trends will erode the
strategic position of the United States.

In taking this broad perspective, however, it is essential to guard
against treating Central America as though U.S. credibility in the
global strategic struggle is the central stake.

The rhetoric that has
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been necessary to mobilize Congressional and public support for U.S.
involvement in Central America has made U.S. credibility an issue.
provides an incentive for not failing; but it also sets a trap.

That

To

prevent a loss of credibility, the U.S. may have to invest more;
investing more puts more credibility on the line.

The current turmoil

stems primarily from local economic, social, and political problems over
which the United States has little control, and which are likely to
persist for may years.

U.S. global credibility ought not to be at stake

in every setback of what promises to be a long regional struggle.
STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS

U.S. security interests in Central America and the Caribbean Basin .
involve the ability to defend the physical security of the United
States, prevent expansion by any hostile power in the Basin, and project
U.S. power abroad.

These interests have often been served by

maintaining the status quo.

1.

Four interests in particular are at stake:

Prevent the consolidation of any hostile regime in Central
America that is allied with the military foes of the United
States.

Nicaragua, allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and dedicated to
revolutionary expansion, constitutes a chronic source of local conflict
and renewed crises in the region.

It could provide another base for the

projection of Cuban-Soviet power thereby complicating U.S.

global

defense requirements much as Castro's Cuba does today.
2.

Maintain secure lines of communication, primarily the Panama
Canal and the sea lanes in the Caribbean.

The emplacement of offensive weapons such as MiGs or missiles, in
Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America would represent a potential
threat to the security of the Panama Canal and the adjoining sea lanes.
Vast amounts of commercial trade, petroleum, minerals and other raw
materials travel these channels, linking the U.S. coasts to South
America, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and Japan.

It seems unlikely that

Nicaragua or Cuba would attack the Canal or American shipping.

But if
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offensive weapons appear in Central America, U.S. defense planners could
not risk the potential threat of "strategic denial" and would have to
deploy additional U.S. forces to the area.
3.

Ensure continued access to strategic raw materials, primarily
oil and natural gas in nearby Venezuela and Mexico.

In 1982, the Caribbean Basin supplied the United States with 1. 7
million barrels of petroleum per day, amounting to over 11 percent of
total U.S. consumption.

Oil 1mports from Venezuela and Hexico could

become critical if supplies from the Persian Gulf are cut off.

For the

conflict in Central America to jeopardize these petroleum supplies, we
have to presume that the conflict spreads either to Venezuela, which
seems unlikely, or to southern Hexico, which is a distant possibility if
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala should all succumb to Harxist
revolution.
4.

Prevent uncontrolled refugee flows
States.

coming to the United

Conditions in the Basin have already produced flows of refugees
from Cuba, Haiti, Hexico, and El Salvador.

The United States could

absorb any population flow from Central America, although it could cause
local problems.

But were civil strife also to spread to Hexico, the

United States could ultimately confront a potential population influx of
unmanageable proportions.
In sum, a relatively secure Southern perimeter has facilitated our
role as a world power, enabling us to deal with problems in Europe and
Asia, while treating Central America and the Caribbean as a secure
region demanding little U.S. military commitment.

Hence, it is

strategically imperative that the United States prevent

extra-hemispheric threats from developing in the region so as to avoid
the diversion of U.S. military and other resources that will diminish
U.S. global strength and flexibility.
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MORAL AND INSTITUTIONAL VALUES

The United States has also sought to promote a set of political and
economic values in Central America.

These values have led the U.S.

government at times to attempt to transform the status quo--partly to
bring international reality into greater conformity with our democratic
traditions, and partly because we perceive democratic states as the
natural allies of the United States.

Consequently,

u,s.

policy

generally attempts:
1.

To oblige governments to respect the human rights of their
citizens.

The observance of human rights is not only valued for itself, but
also is necessary for a viable U.S. policy in Central America.

Repeated

abuses by regimes we support generate growing opposition within this
country to assisting such governments.
2.

To promote the development of pluralist, democratic societies.

In the long run, we believe this is the best way to build allies in
Central America that are responsive to their people's needs, and that
can cope with subversion and promote economic justice.

The local

commitment to democratic values, in turn, facilitates a sustainable U.S.
involvement in the region.

We also see democracy as in our immediate

security interest:

no enemies who adhere to democratic values.

3.

We

hav~

To bring about economic progress and social justice with in a
Western framework .

This, we believe, is the best way

~o

promote growth, as attested by

the negative examples of Cuba and now Nicaragua.

Economic and political

reforms should also reduce the threat posed by Harxist guerrillas and
may lessen emigration.
In sum, the United States has a moral obligation to protect and
support those forces who share a basic commitment to human rights and
democratic values.
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BALANCING INTERESTS AND VALUES

How to reconcile the strategic imperative with the moral obligation
represents a fundamental policy challenge.

It is especially so in

Central America, where the United States must deal with regimes that
usually do not measure up to U.S. standards of behavior with regard to
human rights, where brutal guerrilla wars continue, and where the Cuban
and Soviet presence grows slowly, presenting creeping fait acompli.s,
permitting no lines to be drawn.
The United States is further hampered by its own deep-seated
ideological divisions.

In this country, Central America is a political

battleground where partisans confirm their own prejudices and seek to
further their own agendas.

The result is too often schizophrenia rather

than consensus.
Yet there should be public consensus at least that the United
States has important, if not critical interests at stake--interests that
merit involvement, not disengagement, in Central America.

To illustrate

how Central American crises may affect U.S. interests, two scenarios
have been developed to demonstrate the
emerging threats in the region.

potent~al

consequences costs of
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IV.

EMERGING THREATS AND POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Adverse demographic, socio-economic, and political trends in
Central America provide fertile ground for Marxist revolutionaries.
need to cope with these problems is addressed later.

The

For now, we shall

concentrate on three adverse security trends affecting U.S. interests in
Central America and the broader Caribbean Basin:
•

A growth in low-intensity conflicts within states and across
national borders, including terrorism by both the extreme right
and left, guerrilla wars, border clashes, and government
repression;

•

The development of a militarized hostile axis between Cuba and
Nicaragua, linked to the Soviets, and that until recently would
have included Grenada; and

•

An increasing Soviet and Cuban capacity to project power into
the region through conventional military force, revolutionary
warfare, and trained cadr<s. 1

We considered various possible scenarios to show how these trends
might later materialize in new Central American crises. 2 We chose two as
1

Although less visible, technical training and academic fellowship
programs can help Cuba and USSR project their power more readily through
the creation of thousands of skilled cadres who obtained their schooling
and political formation--including intelligence training in some cases-in communist countries. Havana has long worked to attract Caribbean,
and Central and South American students by offering them technical
training in such fields as education, agronomy, and public health. Less
well known is the magnitude of the Soviet and East European bloc effort:
although figures remain classified, their combined programs in 1981 had
enrolled well over 3,000 students from throughout the Basin, excluding
Cuba, Grenada, and Nicaragua.
2
These include the closure of U.S. basing facilities in the Panama
Canal Area as a result of internal and external pressures on the
Panamanian government; the eruption of a major war between Nicaragua and
Honduras; a border war between Mexico and Guatemala as a result of
refugee flows and guerrilla sanctuaries in southern Mexico; and a
conflict between Guatemala and Belize following British withdrawal from
_the latter, with or without Cuban involvement in Belize.
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best for illustrating the ways in which U.S. interests could be
jeopardized over the short to medium term.

It must be understood,

however, that the two scenarios are not predictive of future events.
They are posed only as reasonable, credible contingencies that could
confront the United States during the next five years or so.

In making

these projections, therefore, our purpose is to demonstrate (1) the
critical importance of the region for U.S. interests, and (2) the need
for U.S.

policy to get ahead of events in the region.

Three assumptions are common to both scenarios:

•

First, we assume that hardline elements dominate the Sandinista
regime, and that they will increasingly align Nicaragua with
Cuba to promote a "revolution without borders" in Central
America.

•

Second, we assume that Cuba will remain a close military ally
of the Soviet Union, and a proponent of violent revolution in
Central America. Cuba's activist policies are too important
for Castro to forego: they provide his regime with leverage in
dealing with Moscow; they hold out the prospect of securing new
revolutionary allies to overcome Cuba's hemispheric isolation;
and they further his ambitions as a global actor.

•

Third, we assume that even acting cautiously, the Soviets see
Central America as a vulnerable part of the U.S. strategic
backyard where they can exploit opportunities to disrupt
U.S.-hemisipheric relations, divert U.S. attention and military
resources, and further expand the Soviet military presence in
the Basin.

SCENARIO 1:

Situation.

CUBAN COMBAT FORCES IN NICARAGUA

Proclaiming a right of self-defense against perceived

external threats,

~lanagua

acquires a squadron of MiGs from Cuba, perhaps

accompanied by a squadron of Cuban MiG-2ls, and units from Castro's
elite Special Troop Batallion.

For any number of reasons, the United

States is initially prevented from responding immediately to the
Nicaraguan-Cuban action.
3

3

Militarily, for example, the United States might be distracted
and tied down by an international crisis elsewwhere in the world. Or
the U.S. Government is divided over what policy measures to adopt. Or a
future administration is less inclined to respond to the
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Repercussions: This development would have far-reaching

ramifications:

In Central America, it would escalate the conventional military
threat, further increase the military imbalance in the region, and pose
a potential danger to the security of the Panama Canal and adjoining
SLOGs on both sides of the isthmus.

In the Basin, the Sandinista government would have provided Havana
with a legal precedent for a Cuban combat presence in Nicaragua.
meantime, Nicaragua's Central American neighbors,

Mexi~o,

In the

Venezuela,

Colombia, and other local governments, would surely be alarmed by the
Nicaraguan and Cuban action, and by the prospect of U.S. reaction.

Globally, the military equation may be affected if it is perceived
that: (1) Central America, the Panama Canal and other SLOGs are no
longer secure from conventional threat in the region; (2) Cuba has
established a combat force in Central America; and (3) only an enlarged
U.S. military presence can assure regional security.

West European

governments may fear a weakening of U.S. military capabilities in Europe
and the Middle East; but they may aho be unwilling to expand
NATO-related exercises and patrols in the Caribbean.
Policy implications:

The fait acompl i of MiGs in Nicaragua, and a

Cuban air and ground combat presence there, would thus present the
United States with difficult policy choices.

For example:

•

The United States could ignore these developments, but only at
the cost of accelerating and legitimizing two of the adverse
trends: the militarization of the Cuban-Nicaraguan axis, and
the projection of Soviet-Cuban military power into Central
America. A "do-nothing" posture could also erode the
confidence of Basin governments concerning U.S. resolve to
ensure their external security concerns.

•

Alternatively, the United States could threaten air strikes
against Nicaragua unless the MiGs and Cuban combat presence are
removed. This retaliatory option might arouse strong domestic
and international opposition if Nicaragua seems to have a
legitimate case for taking protective measures against external
aggression--for example, in the event of air attacks from
Honduras.

Nicaraguan-Cuban action with military force. Or the Nicaraguan
development comes on the heels of Honduran military attacks, which
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If the United States is unable to force the removal of the MiGs and
Cuban troops, and if the hostile axis seems likely to expand, what kinds
of military options might U.S. defense planners consider as
countervailing measures?
•

Have NORAD develop an additional surveillance capacity for the
Central American and Caribbean area?

•

Send U.S. A\vACs and fighter aircraft to Honduras and/or other
regional locations?

•

Deploy additional naval units, perhaps including a carrier for
air cover, to stand-off the coasts of Nicaragua?

•

Strengthen the defenses of the Panama Canal Area, which are
virtually nonexistent at present, through the emplacement of
radar sites, surface-to-air missiles, and interceptor aircraft?

Such measures would be expensive.

Nevertheless, it may be

necessary to undertake them particularly to ensure regional security in
the event of an international crisis with the USSR.

Yet, adopting these

measures in an era of scarce resources and the growing global Soviet
military presence may require diverting military assets from high
priority areas beyond the Hemisphere.
SCENARIO 2: THE FALL OF EL SALVADOR

Situation:

U.S. security assistance to El Salvador diminishes and

U.S. leverage over the Salvadoran armed 1orces lessens.

4

As a

consequence, the extreme right and hardline army commanders seize power
and begin a second matanza to kill thousands of suspected leftists and
guerrilla sympathizers.

Popular alienation from the government grows,

recruits flock to the guerrillas, and the Salvadoran armed forces
disintegrate.

The right-wing government collapses.

The guerrillas

assume power.
strengthens Managua's claim to self-defense.
4
Given the apparent inability of the Salvadoran army to turn the
tide against the guerrillas, it is also possible for the same scenario
to develop under current levels of U.S. security assistance.
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Repercussions:
~oint

The fall of El Salvador would represent a turning

for the region and a momentous defeat for the United States.

In El Salvador, former government officials, military officers, and
leaders of the centrist parties and trade unions--precisely the people
who had aligned themselves with the United States--would be endangered.
Tens of thousands of Salvadorans would likely flee as refugees into
Honduras and Guatemala.

Hardline revolutionaries would probably

dominate the new government and call for a protracted revolutionary war
to "liberate" all of Central America.

For the rest of Central America, the politico-military balance
would appear to have shifted decisively in favor of Marxist-Leninist
forces.

But the responses of individual countries might vary:

•

In Guatemala, the. military government would probably redouble
its efforts to destroy the guerrilla threat by military means,
dealing harshly with the civilian and especially Indian
population of the Altiplano.

•

The governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama would
probably aiopt neutralist or accomodationist postures.

Elsewhere in the Basin, the Salvadoran collapse would surely
reinforce the expansionist, messianic tendency in Cuban foreign policy.
Having gained a second ally, Fidel Castro would become irrevocably
committed to promoting armed struggle in Central America as a new Simon
Bolivar leading the "Second Liberation."

Cuba would send military and

security advisors and technical assistance teams to help the new
Salvadoran regime consolidate.
The prospect of an increasingly unstable and Communist Central
America would alarm the governments of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela,
but domestic political constraints and divisions would probably inhibit
them from joining regional security arrangements to contain the
revolutionary threat.

Globally, Moscow would surely see the Salvadoran revolution as a
further confirmation that the correlation of international forces is
shifting in its favor.

Working through Cuba and

Nicaragua~

the USSR

tould furnish economic credits, subsidized petroleum, and arms shipments

730.

to the new regime, and also join with Cuba in a new offensive to promote
armed struggle in the Hemisphere.
Policy Implications:

For the United States, the fall of El

Salvador would represent a severe worsening of the three adverse trends:

•

Low-intensity conflict would have toppled still another proU.S. regime in the region;

•

The hostile axis in the Basin would
Salvador;

•

Cuba and the USSR would acquire an additional site from which
to project military and revolutionary power in the region.

en~arge

to include El

The deterioration of the U.S. position in the region would narrow
the range and raise the cost of policy choices:
(1) Nonmilitary policy instruments would lose effectiveness.

For

example:

•

The prospect of internal wars and Marxist revolutions would
discourage private domestic and foreign investments and keep
economic assistance from shoring-up beleagured governments.

•

Security assistance programs could take too long to improve the
counterinsurgency capabilities of Central American armies
against guerrillas that may, in the meantime, be winning on the
battlefield.

•

Local governments, and civilian and military elites, may not
believe that Communist expansion can be prevented without the
commitment of U.S. combat troops.

(2) A large U.S. military presence may be required to stabilize the

region.

•

An attempt to roll back Marxist-Leninist gains in Nicaragua and
El Salvador would require a large-scale commitment of U.S.
combat forces, perhaps numbering 100,000 men--equivalent to
five Army divisions-~to invade and pacify Nicaragua alone.

731.

•

Even a deterrence mission, as in Honduras, could require a
significant U.S. contingent, while becoming a likely target of
attacks.

(3) A major military deployment to Central America would pose

several security dilemmas for U.S. defense planners.

•

The traditional U.S. "economy of force" principle would be
violated, and our ab:;_lity to respond to simultaneous crises in
both the Caribbean Basin and other high-priority theaters might
be constrained.

•

U.S. combat forces in Central America would certainly provoke
widespread hostility throughout Latin America, far greater than
has occurred wit~ the U.S. action in Grenada. Such a reaction
could enable Harxist movements to mobilize popular support, and
leave the United States bereft of "Good Neighbors" over the
long-term.

These scenarios show that the United States could face future
crises in which (1) the stakes are higher, (2) the options fewer, and
(3) the costs greater than at present.

In sum, if not arrested soon,

the current adverse trends could lead to situations where critical U.S.
interests are clearly jeopardized, but the means of protecting those
interests become increasingly constrained.

Hence, it is our belief that

U.S. policy needs to develop preventive measures to head-off a further
deterioration of the Central American situation.
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V.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND GUIDELINES

We propose a two-part approach for a long-term policy towards
Central America:

•

One part addresses the long-term structural problems
confronting the Central American states. The objective, here,
is to strengthen the capacity of local governments and
societies not only to cope with Marxist-Leninist forces, but
also to bring about needed social change.

•

The second part focuses on the problems presented by Nicaragua
as a subversive and military threat in the region. Here, the
objective is to make sure that Nicaragua ceases being a
platform for subversion and the extension of Cuban and Soviet
power.

Although presented separately, both parts are needed for developing
an integrated, coordinated U.S. policy and sustaining public consensus
for it.

We shall first present general policy guidelines for dealing

with Central America.
SETTING THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AGENDA

If not restrained, the adverse security trends that we have
identified point to potential Central American crises in the medium to
long-term future.

In the worst of cases, El Salvador may thus represent

the future for Central America.

But at present, Central America is not

El Salvador:

•

Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panana are not presently threatened
by insurgent movements.

•

Guatemala has thus far successfully contained the guerrilla
struggle.

Hence, the dangers in the region are neither so acute nor uniform
in character that the United States ought to accept the security and
economic agenda presented by Central American governments.
1

As suggested during

th~

1

U.S.

visit to Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras
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interests must remain paramount in U.S. policies to help the region cope
with subversion and deter further Cuban-Soviet military expansion.
In our estimation, Central America will continue to be in turmoil
for the remainder of the 1980s.

Virtually all the countries confront

one or more structural problems that undermine the viablity of
governments and provide fertile ground for political violence.

Among

these are:
•

Extreme demographic pressures: in El Salvador the population
density is on a par with that of Lndia, and the population will
double in less than 25 years to over 10 million.

•

Large youthful populations: the under-14 year old age group
accounts for 45 percent or more of the populations (over 22
million) of all the Central American countries.

•

Weak export economies: Agrarian and non-petroleum producing
economies remain critically vulnerable to world market
conditions, as evidenced by the depressed condition of Costa
Rica and other countries in the region.

•

Rigid and regressive socio-economic systems: land holdings are
concentrated among a fraction of the population, especially in
El Salvador and Guatemala, and avenues for social mobility are
often blocked by class, ethnic and racial barriers.

•

Save for Costa Rica, governments are brittle and cannot
accommodate to change; civilian institutions remain weak; and
societies are too polarized to achieve consensus on the form
and purpose of government.

The choice facing the United States is whether it is possible to
avoid a potential worse-case situation and deal instead with a still
messy but manageable situation.

To achieve this, the United States will

need a long-term, well-coordinated policy to achieve this.

by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, these
governments will tend to seize upon the existence of a Marxist-Leninist
regime in ~icaragua as a means of pressuring Washington for
multi-billion dollar U.S. economic assistance programs.
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BASIC GUIDELINES FOR A LONG-TERM POLICY

The ability of the United States to affect the ultimate outcome of
local struggles, and to help shape Central America's development, will
be limited by the investments made and the priorities given to crises in
other parts of the world.

The likelihood of political and military

setbacks along the way will have to be accepted.

These considerations,

coupled with problems inherent in the American political process,
suggest that it will become difficult for us to perservere in any longterm undertaking.

Nevertheless, to develop both a more effective and

sustainable policy, three broad guidelines should be followed:
Expand U.S. Participation in Central America Affairs.

To promote

its strategic imperative and moral obligations, the United States shall
have to restore its presence and participation in Central America to
higher levels:

•

The disengagement of the United States from the Basin during
the 1970s contributed to the internationalization of conflict
in Central America as regional and global actors involved
themselves in the Nicaraguan Revolution and today in El
Salvador.

•

To offset these external forces, as well as to counter the
adverse trends in the region, the United States must remain the
paramount power in the region, while avoiding over-commitments
and an excessive military presence.

Engage the Cooperation of other Basin States.

While exercising

leadership, the United States can no longer rely on unilateral hegemony.
Collective responsibility for regional security and development needs to
be promoted and supported:

•

The Organization of American States seems too weak and divided
to effectively serve this purpose well.

•

Sub-regional groupings, such as the Contadora Group, the
Central American Forum for Peace and Democracy, the Central
American Common Market, and the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States, may provide better approaches to coalitionbuilding in the Basin.
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Address both the internal and the external sources of conflict.

The debate about whether the sources of conflict in Central America are
internal or externa needs to be set aside:

•

Local elites traditionally have sought to augment their power
by enlisting support of external actors, only more so in recent
years.

•

Led by the experience of the Sandinistas, today's
revolutionaries deliberately internationalize the region's
conflicts.

•

The current revolutionarv violence thus stems from both local
and external factors; attempts that seek to single out and
weight them are sterile exercises.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

What are some of the specific measures that need to be adopted to
stengthen Central American governments and societies?

While the

proposals may look conventional, they respond to four major policy
challenges that have faced the United States in the region for decades:
1. Engage Nationalism in Central America.

It remains difficult for

the United States to deal with Latin American nationalism.

Yet that

nationalism can provide a powerful barrier against extra-hemispheric
intrusions.

Hence, in order to engage the region's cooperation, it is

necessary to accept the central nationalistic desire for political
sovereignty, economic independence, and national dignity.

As first

steps, U.S. policy should

•

Recognize that developing the State, including state
enterprises and the military as an institution, often takes
priority over the private sector.

•

Make clear that the United States can live and even cooperate
with nationalist revolutionary regimes in so far as they
refrain from promoting revolutionary warfare in the region, and
do not align themselves militarily with the global adversaries
of the United States.
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2. Strengthen Moderate Forces.

We cannot simply oppose left- and

right-wing extremism in Central America if our policy is to remain
viable both in the region and within the United States itself.

Hence,

we need to strengthen those elites and institutions--both civilian and
military--that share our values and support moderate, democratic
solutions. 2 Such an effort will have to proceed on several fronts:

•

Promote "Project Democracy" and efforts by regional institutes
to provide leadership training and electoral assistance.

•

Provide technical and financial assistance for the development
of institutional infrastructures--political parties, labor
unions, community orgaizations and agricultural cooperatives-through the auspices of AID, AFL-CIO, the Inter-American
Foundation, and other governmental as well as private
organizations.

•

Expand training opportunities and fellowships in the United
States br military and civilian leaders, especially among the
young, in order to create professional cadres that are
favorably disposed towards the United States.

•

Break the historic ties between the military and security
forces and the oligarchy in El Salvador and elsewhere in the
region--if not in this generation of officers, in the next-by continuing to provide security assistance and military
training.

The United States is the only nation that has the influence,
resources, and interests to shield the growth of moderate forces: that
kind of protection cannot be offered by the European states, the
Socialist International, or the Contadora countries.

Ultimately, if

right-wing extremists will not stop murdering moderate political
opponents, it may become necessary to employ punitive measures directed
2

The label "moderates" is difficult to define in the Central
American political context. However, it could encompass not only
centrists, but also left- and right-wing civilian and military elites
who are committed to the existence of an open pluralisticic society,
promote mechanisms for political participation, adhere to non-violent
political processes, and accept constraints on the exercise of political
power. Such "moderate" practices may fall sort of American liberalism
and formal democratic institutions, but are a step in that direction.
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against the personal interests of right-wing leaders.
such a policy is Santo Domingo:

The

The model for

United States played a key

supportive role in the reassignment of extreme right-wing senior
officers, along with more junior left-wing officers, in the Dominican
military to diplomatic posts abroad in order to promote peace and a
democratic outcome following the 1965 Dominican revolt.
3. Foster Economic Development.

The region's long-term problems

are largely socio-economic, and so must be the solutions.

The land

reform in El Salvador and the Caribbean Basin initiative are modest
steps in the right d:i,.rection, but programs of even greater magnitude and
duration are needed:

•

Support agrarian reform measures throughout the region by
providing technical and financial assistance, including
supplying funds for compensation to expropriated propertyowners.3

•

Stimulate private sector development in agriculture,
construction, manufacturing, commerce, and service industries
through AID and by enlisting the assistance of the U.S. private
sector.

•

Adopt a large-scale program like the Marshall Plan or the
Alliance for Progress to generate economic growth and satisfy
the aspirations of the lower and middle classes, particularly
the basic human needs of the rural population.

While expanding its developmental assistance, the United States
must also ensure that its aid not become a means by which local
governments and elites postpone hard decisions on the need for
redistributive reforms.

In addition, aid should be tailored to local

absorptive capacities, while being aware of attempts to exaggerate
threats in order to obtain greater amounts of U.S. aid.
4. Foster Constructive Military Ties.

The United States should

consider new coalitional defense mechanisms that enlist the
participation of Basin states in collective security activities.
3

Such

Congressional legislation barring such assistance needs to be
removed. Conditions might also be attached to compensation: for
example, property owners might be required to reinvest a specified
portion of the money received in local industries to qualify for
compensation.
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activities could involve intelligence sharing, sea and air patrols, and
peace-keeping missions, among others, in order to contain low-intensity
conflicts and hostile force expansion.

Multilateral activities such as

these are likely to take years to evolve, however.
In the meantime, key tasks for U.S. security assistance programs
should be to improve the counter-insurgency, economic defense, and
nation-building capabilities of local military organizations:
•

Continue economic and security assistance to defeat leftwing
guerrillas, keep rightwing political extremists ~n check, and
instill greater respect for civilian institutions by the
military and security forces

•

Strengthen military leadership training, and professional and
organizational skills, through expanded U.S. military training
programs in the United States, the School of the Americas, and
individual Central American countries.

•

Restrain the introduction of advanced weapons systems into the
region, including those from Western arms suppliers.

•

Improve intelligence gathering and analysis by both the local
armed forces and U.S. intelligence personnel.

•

Provide professional police training (presently prohibited by
U.S. legislation) to security forces personnel.

Such security assistance and military measures as these should be
undertaken with care, so as to strengthen rather than weaken fragile
civilian political institutions in Central America.

The

professionalization of the local military and security forces, including
their subordination to civilian authorities, should thus become a key
objective of a larger U.S. security role in the region.
These broad policy directions would respond to both our security
concerns and moral obligations, and should therefore evoke support from
much of the American people.
~ontroversial

The following section addresses the

issues posed by Nicaragua.
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VI.

THE CHALLENGE OF NICARAGUA

Even if we succeed in pursuing these broad policy directions, we
still face the question:

What is to be done about Nicaragua?

This is

part of two more fundamental questions that have long troubled U.S.
polic~y:

•

Can we learn to live with radical nationalist regimes in our
"backyard" if they learn to live with us?

•

How do we prevent hostile extra-hemispheric powers (like the
Soviet Union) from gaining military positions in Central
America and the Caribbean?

The Cuban Revolution raised these questions in the early 1960s.
U.S.

policy responded by supporting (and later dropping) the Cuban

exile forces, enacting an economic embargo, isolating Cuba
diplomatically, and limiting (but not preventing) a Soviet-Cuban
military build-up.

For almost two decades, U.S. policy succeeded in

containing Cuba and raising the costs of its policies.
Nicaragua is not Cuba, however, and the 1980s are not like the
1960s.

Although the United States should be able to live with radical

nationalist change in Central America, the Sandinista regime poses
serious problems:

•

The Sandinistas are led by trained, dedicated Marxist-Leninists
who are strongly anti-U.S., whereas Castro was not so clearly
committed from the start.

•

Nicaragua is on the mainland, has traditionally been closely
linked to its Central American neighbors, and therefore may be
more difficult to contain than Cuba.

•

The Soviets may be caught in a resource bind, and may be less
inclined to prop up another Cuba. But Nicaragua has
opportunities to tap European resources that were not available
to Cuba in the 1960s.
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•

Nicaragua may enlarge the Soviet-Cuban military presence in a
time when, mainly because of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity,
regional military balances matter. In contrast, Cuba gave the
Soviets a new military position in a time when the United
States was the paramount superpower and regional balances
mattered much less.

•

The American public is very divided over Nicaragua, in part
because of Vietnam and the existence of solidarity networks.
In contrast, a strong anti-communist consensus existed in the
early 1960s.

U.S. policy has
did to Castro.

recen~ly

responded to the Sandinistas much as it

Our government has:

•

curtailed U.S. financial and economic assistance to their
regime;

•

sought to block funding from international organizations;

•

terminated Nicaragua's sugar quota;

•

sent diplomatic delegations to Europe and elsewhere to
discourage foreign support for the regime;

•

backed the anti-Sandinista rebels, first in their efforts to
gain territory and popular support, more recently to destroy
economic targets;

•

and held large-scale military maneuvers around Nicaragua while
building the military capablities of its neighbors.

With this background, we examine selected options for dealing with
the Sandinista regime and, separately, for preventing a Soviet-Cuban
military buildup in Nicaragua.
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OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THE SANDINISTAS
AS A REVOLUTIONARY SANCTUARY

Critics err when they state that only the installation of Soviet
offensive weaponry would threaten U.S. security interests in Central
America and the Basin.

As suggested by our scenarios, the spread of low-

intensity conflict alone would destabilize the region, and could require
the United States to deploy new forces there.
There are five approaches to dealing with the Sandinistas:
1. Accommodation: This would have the United States accepting the

regime, if it, too, learns to live with the United States and its
neighbors.

Each side would need to make compromises to respect key

interests of the other.

The critical consideration for U.S. security

interests is that Nicaragua not enable an expansion of Soviet power in
the region, by providing military bases, developing local armed forces
under Soviet or Cuban auspices, or assisting neighboring Marxist
revolutionary forces.
The United States, in return, would not actively support antiSandinista forces in Nicaragua and would cease its diplomatic,
political, and economic campaign against the Sandinista regime.

The

expectation would be that, perhaps in a few years, the revolutionary
ardor and anti-American sentiments of the Sandinistas might cool, and
thus Nicaragua, which faces many of the same problems

~s

its Central

American neighbors, will find it in its long-term interest to cooperate
with them.

The original platform of the Sandinista movement, which

called for democratic pluralism, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned
foreign policy, would have been acceptable.
The attractions of accommodation to the United States are obvious.

•

It may lower the level of hostility in the region .

•

It would be cheaper than efforts to overthrow the regime,
though it may require U.S. economic assistance and trade
benefits for Nicaragua.
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•

It would be widely supported in Latin America and Europe .

•

It would have considerable support in the United States .

•

It would permit a genuine rapprochement at some future date .

Accommodation also raises several problems:
•

It means abandoning the non-Sandinista democratic elements in
Nicaragua. The United States would have to tolerate Nicaragua
as an authoritarian, probably repressive, Socialist state.

•

It is not clear that conservative elements in the United States
would accept this.

•

It depends on Nicaragua altering its behavior. Right now, the
Sandinistas do not appear to have sufficient incentives for
curtailing tb.eir objectives: They believe that the United
States can do little to overthrow them, that they can exploit
divisions in th~ United States to undermine any U.S. effort
against them, that they can exploit anti-U.S. feelings in
Nicaragua to consolidate domestic political support, and that
they can attract West European and Soviet economic support to
make up for the absence of U.S. assistance.

2. Oppose the Sandinistas primarily with non-military measures:

This approach would emphasize diplomatic efforts to isolate the regime,
raise its economic costs, reduce the support it receives from Latin
America and Europe, and undermine it through continued support for antiSandinista elements (with money, not weapons).
The attractions of such an approach are:

•

It is comparatively cheap .

•

It avoids U.S. military or paramilitary involvement .

•

It arouses less opposition in Latin America, Europe, and the
United States.
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The principal problem with the approach is that, as with Cuba, it
may have to be sustained for years and by itself, it may not be
effective:

It guarantees continued hostility and increasing dependence

on the Soviet bloc and Europe without providing sufficient incentives
for the Sandinistas to modify their behavior.
3. Support rebels; concentrate on selective economic targeting: To
impose an economic penalty on the Sandinistas as a price for their
alignment with Cuba and support of Harxist insurgencies elsewhere, the
United States could support the rebels pressuring them to concentrate
their attacks on economic targets like power grids, oil supplies,
bridges, and port facilities.
The attractions:

•

It has some symmetry: Nicaraguan-backed Salvadoran guerrillas
have waged a similar campaign virtually destroying El
Salvador's economy.

•

It is feasible and promises a quick impact. Such an effort may
already be hurting Nicaragua and causing the Sandinistas to
somewhat reconsider their support for guerrillas in El
Salvador.

The problems:

•

It imposes a heavy burden on the Nicaraguan people .

•

It could provoke widespread anti-American sentiments in
Nicaragua, Latin America, and the United States.

•

It leaves in place a hostile regime in Hanagua .

•

It makes the Sandinistas more dependent on Cuban, Soviet, and
European aid.

•

It makes U.S. policy depend on the anti-Sandinistas .

4. Increase support to rebels in effort to overthrow the
Sandinistas: If successful, an anti-Sandinista operation to topple the
regime would eliminate a revolutionary sanctuary in Central America,
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assist the Salvadoran government's counterinsurgency efforts, and
present a major political and military setback for Cuba and the Soviets.
But there are also costs.
•

It would increase the bloodshed and destruction and could
associate the United States with acts of terrorism if the
guerrillas begin to kill civilians or resort to terrorist
tactics.

•

It could arouse anti-Yankee emotions that assist the Sandinista
regime's consolidation and alienate much of Latin America.

•

It increases the risk of war between Nicaragua and Honduras .

•

It could result in an increased Cuban role, possibly Cuban
volunteers in Sandinista combat units, especially if war with
Honduras seemed more likely.

•

It would intensify political debate in the United States which
could imperil other defense and foreign policy goals.

This risky venture would depend largely on the degree of discontent
in Nicaragua and the ability of the rebels to weld that into an
effective fighting force capable of defeating the Sandinistas.

•

It is not clear that discontent in Nicaragua is so widespread
that, by providing, weapons, money, and organization, the armed
opposition will grow.

•

It is also not clear that, with or without domestic discontent
in Nicaragua, a force capable of toppling the Sandinistas can
be created by infusing it with sufficient money and weapons.

•

This side of the colonial era only a few guerrilla movements
have succeeded, and all of these have required great patience.
Would we stick with it?

Would we risk escalating?

willing to use U.S. combat forces?

Would we be

Our own history of

impatience with such ordeals suggests that we would ultimately
tire of the conflict and learn to live with the Sandinistas (as
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we have done with Cuba).

We may thus end up abandoning the

anti-Sandinista rebels, or seeing them turn on us.
•

The rebels have their own agenda.

Even if they were dependent

on U.S. support, they are not likely to be the willing pawns of
the United States.

Can we control them?

Unless we can give postive answers to these questions, then a
strategy that relies primarily on anti-Sandinista forces to overthrow
the Nicaraguan regime seems unlikely to succeed and may not be worth the
probable cost of the effort.

5. Intervene with U.S. Forces.

At the far end of the scale would

be a full-scale, U.S.-led military intervention.

The attractions of

military intervention are:

•

It would end the principal source of subversion in Central
America

•

It would facilitate El Salvador's counterinsurgency efforts .

•

It would present Cuba and the Soviet Union with a major
political and military setback.

Apart from the diplomatic problem--that this approach would be
denounced throughout Latin America and much of the rest of the world-it may also create many military problems:

•

It would be an enormously costly undertaking. U.S .
intervention in Santo Domingo involved over 23,000 men to
restore order in a single city, and there the United States
faced virtually no opposition. Full-scale intervention in
Nicaragua could require 100,000 men and conceivably more, to
fight against the well-armed Sandinista army and popular
militia.

•

It would thus divert the entire U.S. strategic reserve thereby
weakening U.S. global commitments.
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•

Unlike Grenada, there could be heavy U.S. and Nicaraguan
casualties.

•

It could bog the United States down in a lengthy military
occupation and counterinsurgency campaign taking years.

OPTIONS TO PREVENT A CUBAN-SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN NICARAGUA

The conventional military threat that may be posed by Nicaragua,
and the difficulties that the United States might encounter in
responding to such a threat, cannLt be discounted: Nicaragua is not a
military threat now any more than Cuba was in the early 1960s, but like
Cuba, it could become one.

The Soviets and Cubans may gradually and

ambiguously develop a routine, basin-wide military presence for
reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, tactical air,
transport, and naval patrolling.

Still later, these incremental moves

could be followed by their acquisition of local ports and bases for
defensive and potentially offensive missions.
As has occurred with Cuba over the past 14 years, the United States
may find that it cannot prevent such an incremental expansion, extended
over time, by simply, "drawing the line" because the threat remains too
nebulou~.

Eventually, the United States would be compelled to increase

its military presence by rendering increased military assistance to
countries in the region, enlarging its air defense and naval patrols,
and by strengthening its basing facilities and perhaps acquiring new
ones.

With a low resource investment in the region, the Soviets could

thus oblige the United States to make a large, costly countervailing
investment.
Four approaches for preventing a Cuban-Soviet military buildup in
Nicaragua can be considered:
1. A Negotiated or Declared U.S. Weapons Ceiling.

In this

approach, the United States would seek to negotiate with the Sandinista
regime a ceiling on the origin, amount and kind of military equipment
Nicaragua would acquire.

Or in the absence of such an agreement, the

United States would declare certain prohibitions, warning that a
violation of the limits would result in U.S. countermeasures.
This approach has several advantages:
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•

It addresses our principal security concern setting aside the
issue of whether the United States can tolerate radical
revolutionary governments.

•

It could form part of a broader arms limitation agreement among
the countries of Central America.

•

Thus far, U.S. warnings against the deployment of MiGs to
Nicaragua appear to have worked.

The approach also raises several problems:

2.

•

The Sandinistas may not consider U.S. threats, if they violate
the limits on weaponry, to be credible.

•

As we have learned from experience with Cuba, that which is not
expressly prohibited automatically becomes permissible; that
which is permissible will be deployed.

•

A declaratory policy automatically commits the United States to
action in every violation. The United States may not want to
take action in every case. To not take action, for whatever
reason, would be perceived as a reversal of policy, a loss of
credibility. The uncertainty should lie with the Nicaraguans,
Cubans, and Soviets.

A Quarantine
Under this approach, the United States would impose a land and sea

quarantine to prevent the introduction of heavy weapons into Nicaragua
by both Western Europe and the Soviet bloc.

The selective blockade of

specific types of weapons and support systems would allow the United
States to act prior to their arrival in Nicaragua.

Such an approach has

several advantages:

•

It would dissuade European allies from providing the advanced
weapons.

•

It may discourage or at least delay Cuban and Soviet support .
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Implementing a quarantine also poses serious problems:
A quarantine would be difficult and costly to enforce; it may
require a large deployment of air, sea, and ground units.

..

It risks confrontation with the Soviets .
In the case of Cuba, there were specific large weapons on the
way. The quarantine had only to last a short period of time. A
cordon around Nicaragua to prevent the introduction of certain
weapons would require a long-term operation, lasting years.

3.

Selective Targeting
In this approach, the United States would utilize indigenous

paramilitary forces, under U.S. control, or U.S. regular air or naval
forces, or special U.S. operations capabilities to attack Soviet or
Cuban military equipment now in Nicaragua or that may be introduced
later.

While the Soviet weapons already there do not threaten the

security of the United States, they do represent a decision by the
Nicaraguan regime to align itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union.

If

the United States does not quickly demonstrate a willingness to prevent
Nicaragua's gradual conversion into a Soviet-Cuban military platform, we
could be faced later with a succession of fait acomplis similar to what
has transpired in Cuba over the past decade and a half.
The advantages of such an approach are:
It would demonstrate U.S. determination.

"

It can be done overtly or covertly.

.

The uncertainty remains on other side .
It does not automatically commit the United States to action in
every case.

•

It is relatively clean or "surgical" in targeting weapon
systems and not the civilian population.
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•

It is more likely to be understood by the American public than
efforts to overthrow a regime.

•

It may indirectly help the rebels.

Such an approach, however, raises several problems:
•

It would involve the United States more directly as compared to
merely supporting rebels.

•

U.S. participants could be taken prisoner by the Sandinistas,
creating a POW problem.

•

It invites retaliation--possibly attacks against military or
non-military targets in the United States.

•

It could imperil the American Embassy in Managua and thousands
of U.S. citizens in Nicaragua.

4. Full-scale U.S. military intervention.

The fourth option is full-sr.ale U.S. military intervention.

The pros

and cons of this option have already been discussed.
The particular measures that might be adopted towards Nicaragua
depend upon a host of considerations that are likely to change over
time.

Still, on the basis of our current review of the Nicaraguan

situation, we would suggest the following combination of options:

•

Maintain pressure on the Sandinista regime, relying primarily
on non-military means although continuing to provide financial
support to the anti-Sandinista rebels.

•

Selectively target Cuban and Soviet military equipment (or any
other military hardware considered threatening to U.S.
interests).

These measures would be coupled with continued U.S. support of
friendly Central American governments in defeating Marxist insurgents
and at the same time strengthening regional economic and institutional
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capabilities to respond to legitimate demands for change rather than
reliance on authoritarian, repressive responses.

Testimony by
David Rockefeller, Chairman,
The Americas Society
Before the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America
Washington, D.C.
October 21, 1983

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission:
My name is David Rockefeller, and I am appearing before you
in my role as Chairman of the Americas Society and its
affiliates, Council of the Americas, Caribbean/Central American
Action, the u.s. Business Committee on Jamaica, Center for
Inter-American Relations, and Pan American Society of the
United States.
I should add that the crisis in Central America
is also of grave concern to other groups I chair at this time
-- including the Council on Foreign Relations, and The Chase
Manhattan International Advisory Committee.
I believe it is fair to say that Central America
historically has been an area largely neglected by the u.s. and
others. And, if it were not for the security problems there
today, it undoubtedly would continue to be so. The challenge
-- and opportunity -- is to transform this new interest into a
solid, lasting concern that will lead to effective longer-term
ties of cooperation and pragmatic strategies for development,
job creation and political stability.
Improving relations is, I should add, not simply a
challenge with respect to Central America, but rather a
challenge concerning u.s. relationships with our neighbors
throughout the hemisphere.
Perhaps because the roots of so
many Americans are in Europe, we have tended to focus our
attention there.
Latin America receives little attention in
our schools, and, except in times of crisis, little attention
in our media.
Much the same situation is also true with
respect to Canada to the north. As a result, we have only a
slight understanding of our neighbors and have never developed
a consistent, bipartisan commitment and policy toward our own
hemisphere. While this is perhaps understandable in an
historic context, I would suggest it is no longer acceptable in
today's world.
The last time I can recall a consistent and close u.s.
relationship with Latin America that enjoyed broad public
backing was during World War II when all nations of our
hemisphere faced a common threat.
This also was a bipartisan
effort within the u.s. -- a fact that I can attest to since my
late brother, Nelson, a Republican, worked hard to cement our
Latin relations on behalf of a Democratic administration.
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After the war, however, the u.s. went back to paying attention
to Latin America, the Caribbean and Canada primarily in times
of perceived need or threat to us.
Needless to say, such attitudes build resentment among our
neighbors who believe, with some justice, that most of the time
we either tend to take them for granted or ignore them. Thus,
while today we focus on Central America, I hope we will take
the opportunity to build a firmer commitment and a broader
policy toward the hemisphere at large.
If we had had a
consistent overall policy, even ten years ago, it would have
been far less likely that we Hould be facing the crisis we do
today in Central America.
Security, economic and political issues in the Central
American area are sometimes treated as if they were independent
of each other.
This, to me, is a serious mistake since all
three obviously are closely intertwined.
The region and those
interested in it are, I believe, engaged in three simultaneous
battles:
the battle for stability, involving military and
security factors; the battle for tangible improvements in the
quality of life, involving economic and political factors; and
the battle of ideas involving factors of ideology and
perception. As with a stool resting on three legs, the neglect
of any one of the concerns will probably lead to the ultimate
collapse of the entire structure.
Let me say something about
each of these three areas.
First, the battle for stability: while not an expert on
military or security matters, I think a few points should be
made that relate to both economic and political considerations.
Neither economic nor political stability is possible in the
midst of armed conflict. There can be no economic recovery
and, particularly, no significant new private investment or
commercial bank lending to the region unless the fighting
stops and some degree of political stability is achieved.
How to achieve these goals is a matter of intense debate
within the u.s. A negotiated solution that meets our
security concerns is obviously preferred, but we must do
our best to ensure that such a solution is solid and not
just another interim stepping stone to externally directed
Marxist domination.
Such a situation is profoundly
difficult to achieve so long as Nicaragua remains committed
to waging a revolution beyond its borders with the help of
foreign assistance in both arms and men.
Whatever the U.S. does in Central America will be
unpopular, but it will be less unpopular if it is
successful. Our nation historically has been very
ambivalent about military involvement.
The disastrous
results we have seen of half-hearted interventions would
suggest we might be wiser to have no military involvement
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than one which is not decisive.
But, is it realistic to
rule out the use of arms under any and all circumstances?
I believe that deserves careful consideration.
A similar ambivalence exists among our friends in Latin
America. Privately, many welcome and respect a firm stance
on the part of the u.s.
Unfortunately, however, for
political reasons, this support is rarely stated in public.
Despite this, we should attempt to the extent possible to
make military and security efforts -- if they appear to be
called for -- a multilateral undertaking, involving others
with similar concerns for the stability of the region.
Such an approach both properly spreads the responsibility
and increases the chances of success.
Finally, whatever military and political solutions are
necessary should reflect the social and political points of
view of the nations concerned.
"Solutions" which ignore
the interests of the people involved can only be
ineffective, transitory, and lead to greater resentment and
problems in the future.
In this regard, there is a heated debate in the u.s.
regarding the desirability and feasibility of democratic
political solutions. While it is clear that the u.s.
private sector is able to operate successfully under a
variety of regimes, our preference, while the situation is
still fluid, certainly should be some form of democratic
pluralism.
I do not, however, believe we should try to
dictate to people how they should be governed or refuse to
work with forms of government other than our own.
Nor is it realistic to assume that we shall soon find
democracy practiced in Central America as we know it in
Vermont or New Hampshire. The emphasis, I believe, should
be less on form and more on the existence of basic freedoms
of speech, the press and political choice.
The key
differentiation to my mind in terms of u.s. interests is
less the type of government than the degree to which
hostile outside forces such as the Soviets and the Cubans
are in control and are creating situations that threaten
u.s. security. When such threats occur, I believe we have
a national self-interest to do all we can to contain or
eliminate them.
At the same time, I also believe we should do all we can to
support both friends with strong democratic institutions
such as Costa Rica and those who are committed to
strengthening democratic structures that are still weak,
such as Panama and Honduras. We must make it clearer than
we have in the past that we value democracy because we
believe it is the best system of government, and not
because it is an expedient alternative to Marxist rule.
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Second, the battle for tangible economic improvements: if
an end to hostilities is essential to attracting capital to the
region, the reverse also is true -- a resumption of economic
growth and tangible improvements in job opportunities are
necessary to maintain whatever political order is established.
My Americas Society colleagues, Seymour Milstein and Sam
Segnar, have testified before you on the economic aspects
of the situation, and have made a very interesting proposal
for a new public-private entity to spur economic
development in the entire Caribbean Basin. They have
submitted substantial follow-up materials on this concept
today, so I will not myself elaborate on the idea at this
time. I do, however, urge your careful and constructive
consideration of the concept they have proposed. Such an
ambitious program may well be in the best interest of the
United States at the present time.
Spectacular economic growth and the complete and immediate
eradication of poverty are not necessary to political
stability in Central America. Indeed, overly rapid growth
has in the past often proved destabilizing. On the other
hand, moderate and sustained growth is necessary to reduce
tensions and give people a confidence in the future which
will permit political compromise in the present.
In the intermediate and longer terms, I believe existing
institutions and programs can be built upon very fruitfully
at the same time that new mechanisms are considered and
developed. We should build upon what exists in the
following ways:
Support efforts to revive the Central American Common
Market in order to increase intraregional trade.
This institution has been highly successful in the
past, and it could help reinforce rules of
cooperative behavior that would buttress moves to
maintain peace if it were revived.
Build upon the Caribbean Basin Initiative, perhaps by
allowing additional products to enter the u.s. duty
free, and by providing additional incentives for
private sector investment -- such as, for example,
the investment tax credit which was eliminated from
the bill as it was finally passed.
support the new Investment Corporation of the
Inter-American Development Bank.
Consider mechanisms for stabilizing the prices of the
commodities on whose export Central America is
particularly dependent. This must be done with
caution so as to interfere to a minimum with market
mechanisms, but such an expedient cannot be rejected
out of hand.
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But there is also a short-term problem that is very serious
and must be addressed through more direct and innovative
economic assistance. While it is usually difficult to get
such foreign assistance programs approved by the Congress,
the current crisis and the threat it entails to our
security interests provide a unique opportunity to mobilize
support for and implement programs and policies involving
both bilateral and multilateral economic assistance. Among
the measures that should be considered are:
First, and most urgent, Congress should approve the
proposed increase in the U.S. quota for the I.M.F.
Economic recovery in Central America is not feasible
without the balance of payments support and
structural adjustment loans which the I.M.F. can
provide if its funds are not curtailed. Without our
going along with all the other members of the I.M.F.
in increasing their quota, the I.M.F. will be
hamstrung at a time when its active involvement is
vital.
Second, it would be desirable to creat a "trade
credit insurance program" to ensure short-term trade
credits, which, under present uncertain conditions,
are not being provided by u.s. commercial banks to
Central American and Caribbean countries. A program
involving $500 million of insurance has been
proposed, and I believe it would do a lot toward
bringing about a restoration of credit which is vital
to stern further economic hardships and demonstrate
u.s. support for the private sectors of the nations
concerned. The case for such a facility -- as well
as for positive u.s. action on the I.M.F. -- was made
forcefully in an excellent editorial in Wednesday's
washington Post.
Third, there is a need for immediate debt relief in
the form of longer periods for repayment of debt and
lower interest rates for the Central American
countries. This would allow them to devote more of
their export earnings to internal development and
reduce their need for outside assistance.
Fourth, there should be additional subsidized credits
to facilitate the import and export of goods to and
from Central America. This is particularly crucial
to ensure the continued viability of the Central
American private sectors, which are important
generators of employment and national wealth. Added
resources for the Export-Import Bank would be
desirable in this regard.
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Fifth, dramatic increases in more direct forms of aid
are essential to help friendly governments avoid
serious economic deterioration during the current
crisis and improve their economic performance as
greater political order is achieved.
At a moment
when our government is experiencing huge budgetary
deficits at home, I realize this proposal is hard to
sell, but without it the ultimate cost to our country
will be far greater.
The focus of assistance should be on existing fields with
high employment potential.
The aims at this time should
not be highly sophisticated, such as nurturing new
industries, but rather focus on visible and rapid results
in terms of job creation.
In this regard, I believe our
efforts should pay far more attention to the needs of
smaller and medium-sized firms than we have in the past.
At the same time, however, aid and related concessions
should be part of a longer-term strategy to establish the
groundwork for regional cooperation.
Consideration might
be given to tying concessions to regional cooperation
somewhat as the Alliance for Progress did through the
charter Punta del Este.
Finally, we must keep in mind that economic recovery and
the building of democratic and stable political
institutions require a long-term commitment of at least ten
to fifteen years by the u.s.
Such a commitment will be
difficult for the u.s. to make in the absence of a
bipartisan consensus on Central America such as that I
mentioned earlier.
From the point of view of the private
sector, there is a particular need for some predictability
if private capital is to reenter Central America and
contribute to the area's development. We can no longer
afford the luxury of wide swings in U.S. foreign policy.
Our primary task, again, must be to establish in our own
minds and those of our neighbors just what our policy
toward Latin America is, including the identification of
what we consider to be hostile and unacceptable
activities.
Then we must be consistent in the
implementation of that policy.
Continued inconsistency and
neglect can only lead to greater confusion and distrust on
the part of our neighbors.
Last we come to the battle of ideas: whatever successes
are achieved in terms of security or economic development will
be short-lived unless we do a far better job of selling the
virtues of democracy and private enterprise than we have in the
past. We have been fighting a losing battle in this area for
many years.
The creation and consistent application of a concerned and
caring foreign policy -- a policy based on partnership, not
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paternalism -- is essential if we are to achieve a very
basic objective: making being "anti-American"
unfashionable and politically unrewarding. Given the
demonstrated strengths of democracy and free enterprise, it
is absurd to think that Marxism has achieved the hold it
has on the educational institutions, intellectuals and
media of so many of our neighbors. Yet this is the case,
and I would suggest it is largely our own fault.
We have
been clumsy, inept and neglectful.
Many leaders in Latin America, and especially in Central
America, view democracy and private enterprise as having
been so distorted by us in their application as to exploit
rather than improve the conditions of the majority of the
area's population.
Even though the private sector for many
years now has played, for the most part, an enlightened and
constructive role in Latin America, these perceptions from
the past still persist.
It is essential that we correct
the outdated, simplistic and severely distorted image that
prevails of U.S. business.
The results of neglect and misguided past policies cannot
be corrected overnight, but there is much that can be done
quickly.
The Americas Society, for instance, already has a
program of cultural and intellectual exchange, yet it is
severely limited because of inadequate resources.
If
others were involved, including the u.s. government, and if
resources increased, the impact could be multiplied many,
many times.
In another area, both the public sector and the private
sector should immediately take steps to increase
dramatically u.s. support of student exchange programs.
In
1980, the soviets and their Eastern Bloc allies provided
some 7,000 education grants for students from Latin
America, in addition to 7,000 more for Cuban students.
Cuba, in turn, educated some 2,500 additional Latin
American students in its universities, plus 1,100 secondary
students from Nicaragua on its "Isle of Youth."
In the
same period, the u.s. supported fewer than 750 exchange
students from Latin America. The soviets spend over four
times as much as the u.s. on overseas education and related
activities, and the results show it.
More attention and
resources must be directed to u.s. student exchange
programs.
In addition to A.I.D. and the U.S.I.A., the u.s. has other
public sector entities that could be major participants in
an intensified education effort. R.O.T.C. scholarships,
for instance, have been suggested, and it seems to me that
the Department of Agriculture also could play a key role.
Equally importantly, the various concerned parts of the
private sector -- including foundations, universities,
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groups like the Americas Society, and corporations -should be brought more clearly into the picture and
integrated into a substantially increased effort.
Many other things can be done that are relatively simple
and relatively inexpensive, yet would have lasting impacts
on people's perceptions.
The government and the private
sector can for example join together to:
Tell the story in Central America of what the u.s.
has already contributed in the field of health and
launch far-reaching new health programs.
Tell the similar story with respect to agriculture
and significantly increase agricultural assistance.
Highlight case histories of joint ventures and
cooperation between the u.s. and its neighbors that
have been successful so as to dispel the
imperialistic myth.
Encourage the creation of more u.s. study programs
within Latin American institutions so as to help
students there overcome the stereotypes that are
currently dominant.
Beyond expanding exchange programs for students, we
could also sharply step up similar programs for
professors, intellectuals and other leaders of today
and tomorrow.
Most importantly, I believe that in conjunction with other
democratic nations we should initiate a large-scale program
of popular education aimed at countering the Marxist
propaganda that continues to win the minds of young people
around the world. A major reason for the allure of Marxism
is that both its self-proclaimed successes and its negative
caricatures of private enterprise remain unchallenged by
those who know better. The "big lie" once again has proven
its effectiveness.
In conclusion, I want to underscore two points I made
earlier.
First, security, development and education are all
interdependent.
It is impossible to have development and
confidence in democracy and private enterprise without
education, and educated people in turn require meaningful
employment opportunities. At the same time, little or nothing
positive is possible when armed conflict prevails.
Second, there are no quick or easy solutions to the
problems of Central America.
This is frustrating to me, as I
am sure it is to all of you as well. on the other hand, I
believe it points to a vital and long-neglected goal that the
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u.s.

must achieve -- the creation of a coherent, concerned and
consistent policy toward our neighbors in the hemisphere, which
is based on bipartisan support. It must be crafted with vision
and based on reality and a true sense of partnership. If it
is, I am convinced such a policy can both help alleviate
existing problems and produce lasting mutual opportunities in
the years ahead. Your Commission, Mr. Chairman, could provide
the basis for such a policy.
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October 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM
To:

The National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America

From:

The Americas Society Ad Hoc Committee
on Central America
Notes on a Public-Private Sector Mechanism
To Address the Central American Economic Crisis

In testimony before the National Bipartisan Commission

September

12; Americas Society trustees Sam F:. Segnar and Seymour Milstein presented
on behalf of the Society's Ad Hoc Committee on Central America a proposal
for the creation of a unique public-private sector corporate entity to
serve as a mechanism for tapping the resources of the U.S. Government
and business community in addressing Central America's financial and
economic crisis.
At that time the witnesses offered .to have prepared--and members of
the Commission expressed interest in receiving--a follow-up document
spelling out with greater specificity the structural composition and
funding requirements of such an entity.

This document is intended to

serve that purpose.
Structural Principles
As outlined in the testimony, the type of mechanism we believe is
required would have the following characteristics:
1. To provide both public and private sector leadership and authority,
both the U.S. Government and the U.S. private sector must be
substantially involved--in policy direction, in management, and
in the provision of resources.
2. The mechanism must have a distinct legal identity, its own
management, and its own funding. It would have a charter outlining the areas in which it is authorized to act, would be
governed by a board of directors, and would be run on a daily
basis by a management with broad executive powers and responsibilities.
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3. To enable the U.S. Government to take a major funding and management
role, and to insure that the undertaking is and is seen as an
expression of U.S. policy responsiveness to the region's needs,
the entity should be set up initially by an Act of Congress, coupled
with a specific appropriation.
4. tVhile substantially funded by a public appropriation, the entity
would incorporate devices for tapping and leveraging various types
of private resources.
5. The governing board should include representatives of key U.S. Government agencies, the U.S. business community, the U.S. labor movement,
and relevant non-profit institutions. (The Commission can consider
the question of whether or not inclusion of non-U.S. nationals--such
as Central American business leaders, international financial institution officials, or Canadian and Contadora Group representatives-would be feasible or appropriate.)
6. The board of directors must function as a corporate board, setting
broad management policy for the entity's management team, with each
member of the board exercising his/her best individual judgment in
the interest of the entity and its tasks, not serving in a representative capacity to defend the interests of the institutions they may
represent.
7. The entity would be authorized to perform a range of activities--such
' as the eight here proposed--identified as highly useful in meeting
Central America's economic crisis. However, it would undertake
specific programs only if it determined that no public or private
sector organization were able and willing to undertake them immediately
on an effective and concerted basis. Many of these programs by their
nature could be performed by an existing government agency or private
profit-making firm--and eventually would be under this concept.
8. The entity should be given a limited duration of 3 to 5 years. Over
time, as programs prove themselves in action, they could be spun out
to the private sector or spun in to the public sector, whichever may
be most appropriate. The entity would meet a critical need for
intensive, creative, concerted action at the outset, but would not
become a self-perpetuating bureac~acy.
On the basis of these structural principles we propose the following specific
applications for the entity's composition and management:
The role of the U.S. Government must be the ultimately controlling one,
since

the entity would be launched by a government initiative with government

funds, and would be undertaken in response to the perceived national interests
of the United States in Central American economic survival and regeneration.

762.

Recognizing that role, the U.S. Government should be given a majority
and the chairmanship on the entity's governing board.

Government agencies

that should be represented on the board include the departments of State, Treasury,
Commerce,

Labor,

and Agriculture; the Agency for International Development;

the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; the Export-Import Bank; the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the National Security Council.
Representatives of other U.S. agencies, or U.S. representatives on relevanu
international agencies, may also be appropriate.
represented by their highest-ranking official.

Agencies would be
In some instances, distinct

programs within the same department of agency may warrant more than one
official of that agency on the board.

The U.S. Government component of the

board should also include members of the Senate and House of Representatives.
The role of the private sector as a major characteristic of the new
entity is important to carry forward

private~sector

thrust and orientation

of the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative, and is also important
to the\most effective implementation of several aspects of the entity's
specific mission:
a. Management expertise. Because most of the entity's specific program
tasks would involve marshalling and disbursing of various types of
financial resources for ultimately business purposes, the management
of the entity requires the experience, expertise, and streamlined
management style of the business community.
b. Non-Bureaucratic Procedures. The entity is needed to perform certain
things that existing government agencies are unable to do, and some
of their inability is rooted in the inherent impediments of governmental procedures rather than in specific policy restrictions. The
new entity should be structured in such a way to avoid those impediments
by being classifiable at least for some purposes as quasi- or nongovernmental. The public-private entity, for instance, should not
be subject to government salary ceilings in its recruitment of top
management, and it should not follow cumbersome and time-consuming
government bidding and contracting procedures in getting short-term
infrastructure projects built.
c. Tapping of Private Resources. Strong private sector policy involvement and management predominance will facilitate the integration of
private sector resources in numerous specific program areas where
these could be obtained. Examples include lending of personnel,
participation in scholarship/internship programs, possible contribution of equity to program components with commercial potential
(particularly the trading company), providing space, etc.
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d. Leveraging of Trade and Investment Confidence. If the program
is run properly, the initial public investment will be a sinall
portion of the total resources generated in new and revived
trade and investment. Loan and insurance guarantees will release
private-sector credit and capital for the region. Infrastructure
investments will be coupled with commitments from private-sector
investors to finance and build the specific productive facilities
the infrastructure is to serve. Unfreezing of short-term business
credit will not only multiply the productive sector in the region,
but revive and expand U.S. export earnings from the region,
boosting the U.S. economy and saving and creating jobs here.
However, to produce this result, the undertaking needs to generate
the maximum level of confidence from the U.S. business community.
The best way to insure this is by placing the operation management
of the program in the hands of top-calibre U.S. business leadership.
Public-Private Roles in Operation--Applications to the Board and Management Team.

The governing board would be small enough to meet and make deliberative

decisions, but

larg~

enough to tap a broad range of public and private talent,

and too large to attempt the day-to-day management of the entity's affairs.
The U.S. Government would hold a bare majority to provide ultimate policy
accountability.

Of the non-governmental membership, at least half and perhaps

more would be successful top executives from the mainstream for-profit U.S.
business sector.

This business contingent would include individuals whose

experience and/or current affiliation run the range on several spectra--both
large and smaller, both productive enterprises and financial institutions,
both financially interested and disinterested in Central America, and representing a range of economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, service, etc.).
The board should also include a substantial contingent from the U.S. labor
movement, including some institutional participation by the AFL-CIO.

The

latter would be important not only from the point of view of developing a
broad constituency for the undertaking, but also to insure that labor resources
are tapped in the development of specific programs (as in the case of training
programs) and that the potential beneficial impact on U.S. export industries
is factored in and realized.

Remaining non-governmental seats on the board

can be used to tap the talents and experience of individuals from relevant
foundation and non-profit sectors, the academic community or other distinguished
individuals.

A board of, let us say, 45 members would thus look like:
23 U.S. Government (perhaps 15 Executive Branch, 8 Congress)
22 Private Sector, of which:
12 or more Business leaders
4-6
Labor leaders
4-6
Leaders from non-profit and other sectors
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The board would govern the entity within the terms of its charter
(which would designate authorized but not obligatory program activity areas),
and within the funding level appropriated (the appropriation itself should
be non-program-specific, as is suitable in a situation where discretion is
given to pursue some programs and decline others).

The board would be the

type of governing board that meets two to four times a year and makes decisions
on the recommendation of management on such fundamental points as which
programs to pursue and howmuchmoney to allocate to each.

The board would

also be responsible for hiring and firing the top management.

(The fact

that these would not be presidential appointees would be another feature
non-governmentalizing the entity and reinforcing its public-private character.)
It is anticipated that a staff of no more than 50 individuals maximum
could carry out all the intended tasks of the entity.

The board would recruit

and hire the top management, with a mandate to recruit a top-calibre person
from the U.S. corporate community and the authority to offer a salary necessary
to do so.

The top management would have complete authority to hire everyone

else, both professional and support staff, and to set up the operation in
a businesslike manner, using accepted private-sector (as opposed to GSA)
methods of space acquisition, procurement, accounting, hiring, etc.
The lean staffing would be possible in spite of the variety of program
areas to be undertaken because all program activity would be at a "wholesale"
level, operating through a variety of existing or newly created institutional
channels at the point-of-benefit level.
Program Operations and Funding Requirements
The entity's broad mandate would be to spur economic regeneration in
Central America by

putting financial resources in place to close the loop

where gaps have broken the normal commercial chain--gaps in the form of
inability to obtain commercial credit, investment capital, business insurance,
tlained manpower, import credit, needed infrastructure developments, etc.
The entity would pursue its mandate in two ways--by identifying
existing private or public entities with programs that could meet one or
more of these needs and exhorting them to more creative effort in respect
to Central America; and by implementing specific programs in areas where
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such action is authorized by its charter.
As part of the latter responsibility, the entity would administer

a variety of distinct programs, some of which would involve overlapping
beneficiaries and possibly shared staff.

The following three operating

principles would guide its operations:
a. All programs would involve discretionary funds rather than entitlements, with the result that discretion would need to be exercised to select
the most appropriate recipients for various types of help from among a
much larger number of those potentially eligible.
b. Case-by-case decisions on individual beneficiaries of credit or
project funding would not be made directly by the entity's staff except
in the most large-scale cases.

it would wholesale its credit or

Rath~r,

stimulate other institutions through a system of guarantees, exercising
only the degree of involvement necessary for prudent oversight.

In

implementing its programs it would seek out existing channels, employing
both traditional and non-traditional institutions and where necessary
stimulating the creation of new ones.

Different types of institutions

would be used for different purposes, tailored to the most effective
reaching of the ultimate beneficiaries.

Examples can be found below

in the individual program descriptions.
c. The entity would develop standards and criteria to be applied
at the various decision levels in each of the program areas.

A common

priority would be the revitalization of Central American trade by fostering
enterprises that involve one or more of three critical elements:

export

earning potential, rapid start-up, and intensive job-creation potential.
In the testimony presented by Mr. Milstein and Mr. Segnar, we
identified eight areas where immediate needs for breaking a financial
logjam are not being met, and have little prospect of being met, by existing
public or private agencies and programs.

These are areas which the

relevant U.S. Government agencies have themselves recognized as crucial
to getting Central America past its financial crisis, but which for a
variety of legal, technical or practical reason$, these agencies (for
instance, AID, OPIC, Eximbank) do not feel they can or should undertake.
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The following eight program areas are those proposed in our earlier
testimony.

In the interim we have endeavored to determine in the case

of each a minimum amount of financial resources needed to do the job,
what form the resources should take (capital, credit, guarantees, insurance,
etc.), where they should come from, and to what extent they would be selfreplenishing or would require additional funding after the initial
appropriation.
1. A short-term trade credit facility
This would provide supplier's credit for exports and imports to be
repaid within the year.
funds would suffice.

A system of guarantees rather than actual lending

Beneficiaries would be credit-worthy enterprises

able to pay commercial rates but currently unable to obtain loans.

An

immediate start-up for the flow of credit would unfreeze Central America's
private sector, start trade moving again, and stave off further bankruptcies.
A recent U.S. Government study determined it would take $500 million to
\

do this job.

Because of the currently depressed state of trade and resultant

lag in absorptive capacity, we believe a figure of $300 million would be
adequate.

Because of the short-term nature of the credit and the viability

of the targeted enterprises, this fund would be self-replenishing for
subsequent years after being kicked off by the first-year $300 million.
2. A venture capital financing facility
This would provide seed capital or risk capital to enable U.S. firms
to invest, expand their holdings, or take on Central American joint venture
partners, particularly in non-traditional areas, and would make such eapital
available to Central American firms as well.

Both the risk element and the

non-U.S. participation would take this outside the range of OPIC programs.
This credit could be wholesaled through regional institutions such as
CABEl as well as various types of local or U.S. entities capable of
handling relatively long-term or non-traditionally packaged credit.
Some effort would be required to target and develop appropriate ventures.
If an average of ten such ventures per country were funded the first year,
with an average investment of $50,000 per project, the initial funding
requirement would be $3 million.

We feel with creativity and strong private

sector involvement, that target could be exceeded, and an initial amount of
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$5 million would be appropriate.

Because the investments would not be

recovered within a year, the fund would not be self-replenishing in the
short term, and similar $5 million appropriations would be needed to
maintain the effort at the same level in subsequent years.
3. An export trading company
This program or entity would function as a trading company itself
or facilitate the creation of one or more such companies in the private
sector specifically targeted on the Central American/Caribbean area.
It would be product-oriented, purchasing from Central American suppliers
and introducing the products into U.S. markets.

Since it would operate

on a profit basis, it would require only an initial amount to capitalize
itself and begin operations; we would place that amount at $2 million.
It would not only be self-sustaining, but would accumulate funds which
it could use to invest in projects for which it saw or created an
immediate demand--export trading zones within Central American countries,
for instance, or production facilities for newly marketable products.
One option would be to work through existing U.S. firms with existing
or evolving world trade operations.

In any event, because of the

business-like nature of the trading company program, this would be an
early candidate for spinning off into the private sector once it was
launched and demonstrated as effective.
4. A program of infrastructure investment/development
This program would undertake and complete projects that are traditionally
public-sector in nature, but would focus narrowly on projects which are
intrinsically interlinked with private-sector projects that require their
completion.

Several other criteria would also be employed to narrow the

field of the new entity's involvement.

It would undertake only projects

capable of short-term execution and impact, and would involve itself only if
actual commitments from identified private-sector firms to proceed with
their part of the complex were in hand or obtained.

An example would be a

commitment from a manufacturer to build a processing plant if a port
improvement were completed at the same time.
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The entity would coordinate closely with other agencies involved
in infrastructure projects in the region (AID, IDB, \vorld Bank, UNDP) to
insure absence of duplication and to spur these agencies to complete
or undertake such projects where appropriate.

The new entity would take

care to maintain streamlined procedures so that its own constructionstimulating efforts would not end up taking the same months and years to
complete as the agencies from whose long-term approach relief is sought.
Creative ways would be explored to involve the potential private-sector
beneficiaries in planning, developing, and possibly financing aspects of
the infrastructure projects.
Because of the scale and expense of infrastructure projects, it is
anticipated that the entity would only be involved in an average of one
per country in its initial year, but that this activity would require
a minimum of $100 million.
to guarantees.

This would have to be actual funds as opposed

Because of its long-term nature, the funds would not

replenish themselves during the lifetime of the entity, and similar amounts
would he required in subsequent years to maintain the same level of
activity.
5. A new approach to·educational assistance
Two elements of the educational challenge in Central America are
particularly appropriate targets for the U.S. public-private sector
cooperative effort.

There is a need for highly specific education and

training for present and future employees of productive enterprise (skilled
labor, technical, and managerial).

There is also an opportunity for the

private sector to play a role if the U.S. comes to adopt at least a
minimally competitive scholarship program to expose the next generation
of young leaders to the American system.
To address the first challenge and train personnel for immediate needs
of Central American economic development, the new entity could assist
some existing programs such as INCAE at the managerial level, and develop
new types of approaches to the whole area of vocational training.

These

could include internships in U.S. workplaces, in-community or in-plant
training programs in Central America, and experimental learning programs
utilizing new technology.

U.S. labor organizations could be tapped for

a major role in organizing and
training opportunities.

implemen~bothon-site

and U.S. based
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To address the second challenge, the new entity would play a catalytic
role in devising and packaging innovative approaches to the provision of
U.S. educational experiences for Central::Am.erican young people who represent
the region's potential leaders (whether still in school or in the early
stages of a career).

While not attempting the role of being a major

channel of traditional scholarship funds, it would develop model programs
combining the resources of government, academia and the business community,
in which a Central American participant would have some classroom experience
as well as some practical working experience in his or her chosen field,
along with some financial assistance.

Several experimental projects of

this nature currently being funded by AID could be enhanced and led in
creative new directions by the new entity.
Funding for the new entity's educational programs would be based on
the assumption that its activities would be largely focused on areas of
education and training with some short-term relevance to the region's
economic revitalization, and would combine public funding with extensive
marshalling of human and in-kind resources from a range of business, labor, and

.,

academic instititions both in the U.S. and in the region.

While U.S. firms

operating in the region feel keenly the need for a better-funded general
U.S. scholarship program to compete effectively with the massive programs
offered by the Soviet bloc nations, funding for such an effort might better
be attempted through the Democracy Program or traditional program channels.
To carry

ou~

the innovative, catalytic, industrially targeted efforts of

the new entity, an annual appropriation of $45 million would be ample.
6. Credit for small independent enterprises
This program would fill a major gap by making credit available to the
large sector of Central American businesses that are capable of paying
commercial rates but are unable to get loans because they have no collateral.
This type of enterprise poses administrative problems for commercial
lenders (high paperwork load for tiny loan amounts), but collectively it
represents an enormous sector capable of quick expansion and job-creation.
The new entity would not fund this credit directly, but would operate a
system of guarantees for lines of credit targeted toward this market.

It
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would work through a variety of disbursing channels, selecting local
institutions whether of a financial or developmental nature which meet
two criteria--institutional and cultural rapport with the micro-entrepreneur,
and a record of sound financial management.

An initial amount of $5 million

would be adequate to initiate this program on a large scale, since the
individual loan amounts tend to be small. And because these loans tend
to be relatively short-term and the micro-entrepreneur typically has a
high repayment record, the fund would be self-replenishing.
7. A reconstruction and development fund for financieras
This fund would assist responsible medium-term lending institutions
in the region to get past current problems that threaten their survival
but are not the result of poor management.

The help might be directed

toward restructuring the debt of the lending institution itself, or helping
it provide restructuring for responsible borrower firms that are commercially
viable but got caught in the foreign exchange squeeze.

The proposed entity

would engage in direct lending (as opposed to guarantees) for this effort,
but would not take an equity position in any of the aided institutions.
Because only fundamentally sound institutions would be aided, the funds
would be repaid once Central American trade starts moving again, and the
fund would be self-replenishing.

It could also be used to develop new

financiera-type institutions where they do not now exist and a need is
found.

A revolving fund adequate to the task could be set up by an

initial appropriation of $200 million.
8. A system of ineurance guarantees
This non-cash assistance, which could be channeled through insurance
firms already working in the region, would reach two groups whose current
needs are not being met--U.S. firms unable to obtain OPIC insurance because
the ventures are in countries past OPIC's ceiling, and Central American-owned
firms and joint ventures unable to obtain commercial insurance at attractive
rates, particularly when their operations are located in areas considered
to be high-risk.

The guarantee program would remove the obstacle that
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the unavailability of such insurance currently poses to the making of
new investments in projects that otherwise have low risk and every
prospect for commercial success.

This program would not require cash

outlays, and since the reserve fund would require replenishing only to
cover payments against actual losses, it could replenish itself from
its own operations.

An initial guarantee level of $40 million would be

adequate to launch the program.
Summary of Funding Requirements
The amounts described above for the eight task areas can be summarized
as follows:
INITIAL YEAR
Guarantee
Cash
1. Short-term trade credit

YEAR 3

(Cash)

(Cash)

300M

2. Venture capital financing

5M

3. Trading company

2M

4. Infrastructure development
.

YEAR 2

'

5. Educational programs

5M

5M

lOOM

lOOM

lOOM

45M

45M

45M

150M

150M

6. Small enterprise credit

5M

7. Reconstruction fund

200M

8. Insurance guarantees

40M

PROGRAM TOTALS

352M

345M

In addition to the program funding, it is projected that an annual
expense of $3 million would be ample to cover the administrative expense of
the entity's staff and operations.

This would need to be included in the

initial appropriation, although in subsequent years it may well be coverable
out of the entity's earnings on invested reserve funds, trading company
profits, and savings in program areas from donations in kind.
From this it can be seen that an initial appropriation of $700 million
would be required to fund the first year's program operations and administration,
if the entire amount represented by guarantee programs were to be included.
Approximately half the $700 million would require actual expenditure of funds.
In subsequent years, the same level of activity in all program areas
could be obtained by annual funding of $150 million, exclusive of additional
administrative funding requirements if any.

All other elements would be
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self-replenishing.

Thus the entire program over its three-year period

of minimum life would represent a public investment of approximately
one billion dollars, of which two thirds would be expended and the
remaining third merely the potential expenditure represented by guarantees.
This public investment would in turn leverage substantial inputs
of human,'. business, labor and academic resources in the areas of program
activity, and more significantly leverage far greater amounts in private
sector trade and investment transactions, these in turn producing economic
revitalization in the region along with increased exports, earnings and
jobs in the United States.
Developing a Consensus
Such an effort could be undertaken successfully only with the
leadership of the Administration and the support of Congress as well
as major segments of the business and labor communities whose involvement
would be critical to the success of the undertaking.

Developing a

consensus for such an undertaking, and the commitment of the required
U.S. Government funds on its behalf, would be premised on convincing
the various relevant constituencies of the following facts:
1. That Central American economic revival is critical to the
national security and economic wellbeing of theUnited States.
2. It is impossible without dramatic intervention of the types
described.
3. The described programs and expenditures will in fact result
in the expected substantial increases in trade and investment
activity, with the anticipated benefits to both the region's
and the U.S. economy.
4. A broad-based constituency of bipartisan leadership, business,
labor and other relevant.institutional sectors are prepared
to support and take active part in such an effort.
We believe the second and third of these premises can be demonstrated
cs a factual matter.

The persuasiveness of the first premise will depend

largely on the conclusions of your Commission and the forcefulness and
urgency with which those conclusions are projected.

The burden of

demonstrating the fourth premise is one which our Ad Hoc Committee is
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prepared to undertake. convinced that the work of developing the nucleus
of such a constituency must begin at once if the Commission's final report
is to be greeted by a U.S. private sector prepared to act upon it.
We are persuaded that, if those four premises are accepted,
it will not be difficult to gain acceptance of the conclusion that
the substantial expenditure of tax money we are calling for is justified
and necessary, on the grounds that (a) the protection of our vital national
interest is worth it; (b) we will recover the entire cost and more anyway
from increased export earnings; and (c) the potential cost of doing
nothing is far greater.
Aside from the funding challenge, the major remaining task we see
in refining this proposal from the conceptual stage to an enactable one
is devising a structural format to implement the public-private sector
board and management concept that will meet legal and constitutional
requirements along with the test of practicality.

While that task will

require careful attention and some creativity, we have been content to
leave those issues for later resolution, persuaded on the basis of
historical precedent that once a consensus of purpose is reached at
the policy level, the resolution of structural issue·s can follow at
a technical level.
The Americas Society Ad Hoc Committee on Central America will continue
to explore both sets of issues raised by our proposal, and are prepared
to assist the work of the Commission in any way you might find useful.
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REMARKS

LORET MILLCR RUPPE
I AM VERY HAPPY TO BE HERE_TODAY TO PRESENT THIS COMMISSION

WITH WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE THE POTENTIAL FOR SIGNIFICANT FURTHER
CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEACE CORPS TO LONG-RANGE UNITED STATES
OBJECTIVES IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT A NEW VISION

0~

THE PEACE CORPS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA; A VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS
AS PLAYING AN EXPANDED ROLE IN THE PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES
ECONOMIC~

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CONCERNS IN THIS

REGION,

MY TRAVELS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS
HAVE GIVEN ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE FIRST-HAND THE PROBLEMS
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH EXIST IN THE AREA.
AT THE SAME
OFFICIALS~

VOLUNTEERS~

YEARS'

TIME~

MY DISCUSSIONS WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

AS WELL AS WITH OUR OWN AMBASSADORS AND PEACE CORPS
CONVINCE ME THAT THIS

EXPERIENCE~

AGENCY~

WITH TWENTY-THREE

REMAINS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS AN

EVEN MORE IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OVERALL U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE
REGION,

ALTHOUGH NOT MANDATED AS

SUCH~

THERE IS NOT DOUBT THAT THE

PEACE CORPS IS A "POLITICAL PRESENCE" WHEN THE VOLUNTEER LIVES
AND WORKS AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL.

AT A TIME WHEN THE CUBANS

HAVE MOVED MASSIVELY IN THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AREA OF CENTRAL AMERICA)
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WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK OUR PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERSJ THESE ORDINARY
AMERICANS WITH EXTRAORDINARY COMMITMENT

WHO LIVE AND WORK

SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH PEOPLE AT THE VILLAGE LEVELj SPEAKING THEIR
LANGUAGEJ RESPECTING THEIR CULTURAL TRADITIONS AND CARING ABOUT
THEIR WELL-BEING; THE LASTING FRIENDSHIPSJ UNDERSTANDING AND
RESPECT CREATED BY THE PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERSJ NOT ONLY WITH THE
PEOPLE BUT ALSO WITH THEIR COUNTRY'S LEADERSJ IS OF PARAMOUNT
IMPORTANCE TO OUR LONG TERM FOREiGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.
SEVERAL MONTHS AGOJ THE PEACE CORPSJ IN COLLABORATION WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATEJ PREPARED A REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON
HOW THE PEACE CORPS CONTRIBUTES TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.
INCORPORATED IN THIS REPORT WERE COMMENTS FROM VARIOUS U.S.
AMBASSADORSJ IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHEREJ CONCERNING HOW
THEY SEE PEACE CORPS CONTRIBUTING TO U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVESJ
AT THE SAME TIME IT REMAINS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC
ORBIT.

LET ME QUOTE A FEW OF THESE COMMENTS WHICHJ 1 BELIEVEJ MIGHT

SERVE AS A FOCUS FOR THIS COMMITTEE'S DELIBERATIONS ON THE PEACE
CORPS' ROLE IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
- FROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA:
"MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS LIVING IN
REMOTEJ AND OFTEN DIFFICULTJ CIRCUMSTANCES IN RURAL AREAS OF
GUATEMALA ARE THE LIE TO PROPAGANDA BEAMED FROM HAVANA AND MANAGUA
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TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS ONLY TO EXPLOIT
GUATEMALANS AS PART OF AN IMPERIALIST DESIGN ... PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS
HAVE REMINDED THOUSANDS OF GUATEMALANS AND ALL SUCCESSIVE CABINETS
THAT AMERICANS DO IDENTIFY WITH THEIR PROBLEMS AND ARE READY TO
WORK SHOULDER-TO-SHOULDER TO ADDRESS THEM.H

-FROM ANOTHffi

~BASSADOR:

HTHE PEACE CORPS IS WITHOUT DOUBT

THE MOST IMPORTANT EVIDENCE WE CAN FURNISH OF OUR DEDICATION TO
PEACEJ DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN IDEALS,H

FROM THE

U.S~

AMBASSADOR TO BELIZE:

CAN ALLEVIATE BELIZE'S PROBLEMS.

HECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

IF BELIZE CAN ACHIEVE A

MEASURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTHJ ITS CITIZENS WILL FEEL A GREATER STAKE
IN ITS FUTURE.

IT WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO FALL PREY TO INTERNAL

DISSENSION AND IT WILL HAVE A GREATER FEELING OF SECURITYJ
MAKING IT LESS LIKELY TO SEE A NEED TO CALL ON COUNTRIES SUCH
AS CUBA OR NICARAGUA FOR SUPPORT.

(IN THIS REGARD) THE PEACE

CORPS IS IDEALLY EQUIPPED TO CONTRIBUTE TO BELIZE'S DEVELOPMENT.H

THESE EXAMPLES PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF HOW THE PEACE CORPSJ
DESPITE ITS AUTONOMOUS POSITION SOMEWHAT APART FROM THE DAY-TODAY CONCERNS OF TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY, CONTRIBUTES TO LONG RANGE
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES,
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WHAT IS MOST INTERESTING ABOUT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSES
-

IS THAT THEY COVER A WIDE RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES; GRASS
DEVELOPMENT~

ROOTS

ECONOMIC

IMPROVEMENT~

INITIATIVES~

LOCAL

THE LIE TO CUBAN AND NICARAGUAN PROPAGANDA" AMONG OTHERS.

uGIVING

So THIS

NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS THAT WE SEE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
IN MANY

WAYS~

IS~

A REAFFIRMATION OF WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING ALL

ALONG WITHOUT PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT RECOGNITION.

BUT IT IS MORE

THAN THAT; IT IS A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO DOING MORE TO DIRECTLY
CONTRIBUTE TO

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA AND

THAT IS WHY I AM HERE TODAY.

THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE LORPS

FOR CENTRAL AMERICA SUPERCEDES ANY MISPERCEPTIONS OF THE LONG-HAIRED
HIPPIE IMAGE OF PEACE CORPS OF THE 1960s.
VOLUNTEER OF THE 1980s:

IT INTRODUCES TODAY'S

OLDER~ BETTER-TRAINED~

A HIGHER

PERCENTAGE HIGHLY SKILLED AND BETTER PROGRAMMED IN COLLABORATION
WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT WHERE HE/SHE CAN DO THE MOST GOOD.

THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA
CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE THE uHUMAN ELEMENTu AND AT THE SAME TIME
INCREASES THE ATTENTION TO THE AREA'S ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENTAL
NEEDS,

I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU TODAY THAT DURING YOUR DELIBERATIONS

PERTAINING TO SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
uHUMAN

ELEMENT~u

CONCERNS~

THAT YOU CONSIDER THE

THIS PERSON-TO-PERSON GRASS ROOTS CONTACT BETWEEN

NORTH AMERICANS AND CENTRAL AMERICANS.

AT TH1S POINT I BELIEVE

YOU WILL WANT TO GIVE SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO AN EXPANDED PEACE CORPS
ROLE IN THE REGION.
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I WOULD LIKE TO SUBMIT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION NOW A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF OUR PRESENT PROGRAM IN THE REGION) TOGETHER WITH
NEW INITIATIVES WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE WITH APPROPRIATE
BUDGETARY INCREASES) AND SOME THOUGHTS ON SPECIAL PROGRAMS WE
COULD CONSIDER TO FURTHER ENHANCE OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LONG
RANGE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL
AMERICA,

THESE SUGGESTIONS ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE ALL-INCLUSIVE

BUT THEY ARE EVIDENCE OF THE DIRECTION WE FEEL MOST QUALIFIED TO
PURSUE,

THIS NEW VISION OF THE PEACE CORPS FOR THE

AREA~

MORE

CLOSELY INTERWOVEN INTO THE FABRIC OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECtiVES
AND UNITED STATES· INTERESTS FOR CENTRAL AMERICA) IS WHAT WE ARE
ALL ABOUT TODAY AND WHERE WE WOULD LIKE TO BE HEADING TOMORROW,
AT THE PRESENT TIME1 TWO MAIN THEMES CHARACTERIZE THE PEACE
CORPS PROGRAM STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL AMERICA,

ONE IS STANDARD

OF LIVING IMPROVEMENT -- PROGRAMS TO INCREASE THE

HEALTH~

EDUCATION)

AND OPTIONS FOR A BETTER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA,
THE OTHER MAIN THRUST IS DIRECTED TOWARD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THAT IS1 PROGRAMS AIMED AT DIRECTLY INCREASING THE

~COMES

OF

FAMILIES,

IN THE AREA OF STANDARD OF LIVING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS) THE
PEACE CORPS CONTINUES TO HAVE ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS
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IN RURAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION EDUCATION AND SANITATION IN
BELIZE) GUATEMALA) AND HONDURAS.

OVER FIFTY PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS

ARE ENGAGED IN REFORESTATION EFFORTS TO STEM WIDESPREAD EROSION
CAUSED BY THE RAVAGES OF UNCONTROLLED DEFORESTATION,

THESE

EFFORTS ARE COUPLED WITH FOREST AND FIREWOOD CONSERVATION EDUCATION
PROGRAMS,

PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ARE WORKING TO INCREASE RURAL

YOUTH AGRICULTRUAL AND LEADERSHIP SKILLS TO PROVIDE INCREASED
OPTIONS IN THEIR RURAL ENVIRONMENT,

IN THE CATEGORY OF ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT -- OVER
ONE HUNDRED PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS ARE INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURAL
AND BUSINESS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BRINGING
SMALL FARMERS FROM SUBSISTENCE INTO A CASH ECONOMY WITH INCREASED
LOCAL FOOD SUPPLIES.

IN SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT) PEACE CORPS

VOLUNTEERS ARE WORKING TO ASSIST SMALL BUSINESSES AND COOPERATIVES
TO LEARN AND TO UPGRADE BUSINESS MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES.

THE

GOAL HERE IS STABILIZATION) EXPANSION) AND DIVERSIFICATION OF
PRODUCTION OF PROCESSED AND MANUFACTURED GOODS) ESPECIALLY IN
RURAL AREAS.

THE PEACE CORPS HAS ALSO DEVELOPED A LINKAGE WITH

A NUMBER OF U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS AND FIRMS TO
PROVIDE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE IN THIS CARIBBEAN BASIN
INITIATIVE EFFORT.

FOR EXAMPLE) WE HAVE JOINED WITH 120 UNITED

STATES HISPANIC CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE ON A PROJECT TO INCREASE
BUSINESS SKILLS AND MARKET OUTLETS FOR PROMISING SMALL AND MEDIUM
SIZED CENTRAL AMERICAN BUSINESSES.
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FINALLY~

IN THE AREA OF

HOUSING~

A TEAM OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS

IN COSTA RICA HAS BEGUN AN INNOVATIVE PILOT SELF-HELP HOUSING
PROJECT DESIGNED TO ASSIST POOR RURAL FAMILIES TO BUILD THEIR
OWN HOMES.
THIS

OVER

PROJECT~

2~500

PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT FROM THIS ENDEAVOR.

OF WHICH WE ARE PARTICULARLY

PROUD~

IS A COMPREHENSIVE

APPROACH TO ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY SELF-HELP
EFFORT THAT ADDRESSES A VARIETY OF NEEDS.
IS DONATED BY THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
TO FINANCE MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES.

LAND~

FOR

EXAMPLE~

AID HAS DONATED

$300~000

THIS MONEY GOES INTO A

REVOLVING LOAN FUND TO PROVIDE THE HOMEBUILDERS A LOW INTEREST
MORTGAGE.

OVER EIGHTY HOUSES ARE NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION.

JUST LEARNED TODAY THAT THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN SO

I

SUCCESSFUL~

THAT

AID HAS SET ASIDE OVER 1 MILLION DOLLARS TO EXPAND THE PROJECT
IN 1984, WITH A GOAL OF EXPANDING THE NUMBER OF HOUSES TO 2,000.

THESE PROGRAMS, AND THEIR EXPANSION, REPRESENT THE PEACE
CORPS' QUICK AND EFFECTIVE REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE, A CALL FOR INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE
REGION.

SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, THE PEACE CORPS HAS

SENT FIFTY ADDITIONAL HIGHLY SKILLED VOLUNTEERS TO WORK ON THE CBI IN
CENTRAL AMERICA.

THIS INITIATIVE, FOCUSING ON SUCH KEY TARGETS

AS BRINGING THE RURAL POOR FROM SUBSISTENCE LEVEL FARMING TO
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS WHICH EARN MONEY AND INCREASE LOCAL FOOD
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SUPPLIES WHILE DECREASING THE NEED FOR COSTLY FOOD

IMPORTS~

HAS

MERGED EFFICIENTLY WITH ONGOING PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS IN CENTRAL
AMERICA,

THIS INITIATIVE HAS GIVEN THE PEACE CORPS AN OPPORTUNITY

TO SUPPLEMENT WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN DOING WITH MORE VOLUNTEERS
AND MORE FOCUS TO ALIGN OUR PROGRAMS MORE CLOSELY WITH THE PRESIDENT'S
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE OBJECTIVES.

MANIFESTING THE PEACE CORPS DESIRE TO MORE CLOSELY COLLABORATE
WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WITH MUTUAL

OBJECTIVES~

PETER McPHERSON AND I IN 1981 INITIATED AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
AND A SERIES OF STAFF PLANNING CONFERENCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF
EXPLORING WAYS IN WHICH THE TWO AGENCIES COULD COMPLEMENT EACH
OTHER IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EFFORT,

THIS INTERCHANGE HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN THREE JOINT PROGRAM
INITIATIVES.
FUND."

ONE OF THESE IS THE "SMALL PROJECTS ASSISTANCE

UNDER THIS

AGREEMENT~

AID HAS SET ASIDE FORTY THOUSAND

DOLLARS THIS YEAR IN EACH OVERSEAS MISSION FOR USE IN BEGINNING
SMALL PEACE CORPS ASSISTED PROJECTS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION)
SMALL BUSINESS AND ENERGY.
MINISCULE~

WHILE THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS MAY SEEM

FROM THE MICRO-PERSPECTIVE OF THE PEACE

CONSIDERABLE; FOR

EXAMPLE~

CORPS~

IT IS

A WOMEN'S COOPERATIVE MAY NEED ONLY

THREE THOUSAND DOLLARS TO START A BUTTER-MAKING BUSINESS IN AN
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ISOLATED RURAL VILLAGE.

CONCEPT~

HERE WE EMPHASIZE THE

THE "COMPLEMENTARY" ASPECT OF THE PEACE CORPS; WHILE
OF ITS SUPERIOR FUNDING LEVELS

CAN~

AGAIN~

AID~

OF

BECAUSE

AND DOES1 OPERATE ON A MACRO-

ECONOMIC LEVEL1 THE PEACE CORPS STANDS PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE
OFTEN MISSING INGREDIENT--THE GRASS

ROOTS~

PERSON-TO-PERSON

MICRO-ECONOMIC INPUT1 NOW SO HIGHLY PRAISED BY DEVELOPMENT
EXPERTS~

THAT IS OFTEN LACKING IN MANY OF OUR LARGER FOREIGN

ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

THE PEACE CORPS WOULD BE READY TO TAKE A

LONG~

HARD LOOK AT

ENGAGING OURSELVES MORE ACTIVELY IN LITERACY PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT
CENTRAL AMERICA.

ADULT EDUCATION -- LITERACY CAMPAIGNS -- CAN

PROVIDE A MORE IMMEDIATE BENEFIT TO THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE IN A
COUNTRY'S

CIVIC~

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION.

THIS IS SOMETHING

THe CUBANS DO SO WELL IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL
A CONCEPT ON WHICH THEY PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS.

AMERICA~

AND

THIS CERTAINLY

WOULD BE AN AREA WHERE (ffiA AND ITS SOCIALIST DOCTRINE WOULD EXIST
IN DIRECT COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE STANDARD
OF EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO WHAT
OUR COUNTRY IS TODAY.

THIS IS NEITHER THE TIME NOR PLACE TO ENGAGE IN ONE OF
THOSE LONG ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHETHER -- OR HOW MUCH

THE UNITED

STATES SHOULD EXPORT ITS VALUE SYSTEMS TO OTHER COUNTRIES.
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HOWEVER1 AN EXPORT OF CERTAIN ¥ALUE SYSTEMS IS IMPLIED IN THE PEACE
CORPS CONCEPT1 PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF LITERACY.

EDUCATION HELPS

MAKE A FREE MAN1 FREE TO CHOOSE AMONG COMPETING POLITICAL SYSTEMS1
FREE TO CHOOSE HIS OWN WAY.
DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS1 PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS HAVE
PARTICIPATED ON A LIMITED SCALE IN ADULT EDUCATION IN SOME
CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES.
IF THE PEACE CORPS WERE INVITED BY THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL
AMERICA TO TAKE ON A LARGER ROLE IN LITERACY CAMPAIGNS IN THE
REGION1 WE COULD RESPOND QUICKLY BY PROVIDING VOLUNTEERS WITH THE
APPROPRIATE KINDS OF SKILLS.

WITH AUGMENTED RESOURCES1 THE PEACE

CORPS COULD CONDUCT SPECIAL RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO
ATTRACT HISPANIC-AMERICANS ALREADY FLUENT IN THE SPANISH LANGUAGE
ONE OF

T~OBVIOUS

ADVANTAGES THE CUBANS HAVE IN THIS REGARD --

AND OTHER COMPETENT SPANISH-SPEAKING AMERICANS.

WE COULD ALSO

DRAW ON THE LARGE NUMBER OF U.S. CITIZENS WHO ARE TRAINED AND HAVE
WORKED IN ADULT EDUCATION.

MOST OF THIS PROPOSED LITERACY PROGRAM WOULD TAKE PLACE
IN THE RURAL AREAS WHERE THE NEED IS GREATEST}

THIS IS WHERE

THE PEACE CORPS HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN AT ITS BEST AND THIS
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SPECIALIZATION AND TALENT IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD BE EASILY
TRANSFERRED TO A LITERACY PROGRAM IN THESE SAME PARTS OF THE
COUNTRIES,

IN MY PREVIOUS REMARKS I HAVE NOTED THE PEACE'CORPS' ABILITY
AND WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND CURRENT PROGRAMMING IN CENTRAL AMERICAN
COUNTRIES IN WHICH WE ARE ALREADY WELL ESTABLISHED -- AT THIS
TIME BELIZEJ COSTA RICAJ HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA.

I WOULD HERE

LIKE TO STATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO RE-ESTABLISH PROGRAMS
WHERE THE NEED IS GREATJ THE INTEREST IN HAVING US IS

I~

COUNTRIES

THERE;~R

HAS

BEEN RECENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE GOVERNMENT -- FOR EXAMPLEJ PANAMA -AND WHEREJ OF COURSEJ CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT OUR VOLUNTEERS COULD
BE CONSIDERED SAFE.

IN ADDITION TO ALL THISJ WITH RELAT1VELY MODERATE

INCREASES IN RESOURCES, THE PEACE CORPS COULD UNDERTAKE SEVERAL
NEW INITIATIVES TO MEET THE EXPRESSED NEEDS OF OUR NEIGHBORS IN
CENTRAL AMERICA AS WELL AS TO INVOLVE A WIDER RANGE OF AMERICANS IN
OUR PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE AND TECHNICAL DIPLOMACY EFFORTS.

FIRSTJ MIDCAREER TECHNICIANS AND PROFESSIONALS:

THE PEACE

CORPSJ IN OUR LAST COMPLETED FISCAL YEARJ 1982J SUPPLIED TO THE
DEVELOPING WORLD ALMOST 5,000 VOLUNTEERS OF WHICH NEARLY 50% PERCENT
WERE IN AREAS WE CONSIDER SCARCE SKILLS.

CENTRAL AMERICA HAS A

HIGH NEED FOR MANY OF THESE HIGH SKILL AREAS; PARTICULARLY THOSE
RELATED TO AGRICULTURE AND HEALTH,

EXPERIENCED WORKERS IN MANY
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OF THESE AREASJ BY THE TIME THEY HAVE COMPLETED THEIR EDUCATIONS
AND HAVE FIVE OR MORE YEARS OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OFTEN FALL IN
THE 30 TO 50 YEAR OLD RANGE -- A DIFFICULT AREA TO RECRUIT
NORMALLY DUE TO HEAVY FAMILY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES,

WE

ARE IN THE EARLY STAGES OF EXPLORING A NEW INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA
WHICH WOULD:
-- ATTRACT THE MID-LEVEL TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONAL WORKER
\~ITH

SEVERAL OR MORE YEARS OF RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE; AND
--HELP FILL THE DEVELOPING WORLD'S CRITICAL NEED FOR PEOPLE

WITH TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE ANDPRACTICAL EXPERIENCE.
ANOTHER POOL OF AMERICANS THE PEACE CORPS IS EAGER TO TAP
FOR THE VARIED NEEDS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND WHICH COULD BE DONE
WITH MODERATE RESOURCE INCREASES FOR FOCUSED RECRUITMENT
AND SPECIAL TRAININGJ IS THE SKILLED TRADES WORKER AND THE
EXPERIENCED RETIRED TECHNICIANS,

THE PEACE CORPS WOULD LIKE TO --

AND CAN -- REACH OUT FURTHER TO THE RETIRED AMERICAN AND TO BOTH
THE MID-CAREER AND YOUNGER SKILLED TRADES WORKER,

THE DEMAND FOR SKILLED TEACHERS IN SCIENTIFIC AND VOCATIONAL
AREAS EXISTS AT THE UNIVERSITY AND RELATED HIGHER EDUCATION LEVELS
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IN CENTRAL AMERICA,

THE PEACE CORPS1 INTHIS REGARD1 IS WILLING

TO EXPLORE A ONE YEAR TEACHING PROGRAM WITH APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE
AND CROSS CULTURAL TRAINING.

IN THIS MANNER THE PEACE CORPS COULD:

--UTILIZE ITS ALREADY CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH UNIVERSITIES TO
ATTRACT SEASONED PROFESSORS

P~ANNING

SABB~TICAL

YEARS1 INTO A

ONE YEAR SPECIAL SERVICE ARRANGEMENT;
-- PURSUE AN ALREADY OPENED DIALOGUE WITH THE ASSOCIATION
OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE PRESIDENTS TO ATTRACT PROFESSIONALS
CURRENTLY TEACHING VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL SKILLS.
ON A RELATED SUBJECT1 THE ABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO FIELD
FAMILIES IN PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE
CUTS ACROSS A NUMBER OF THE NEW INITIATIVES I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED.
EXTREMELY LIMITED FUNDING HAS FOR THE PAST HALF DOZEN YEARS FORCED
THE PEACE CORPS TO RESTRICT SEVERELY THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES IT
COULD ACCEPT INTO THE PEACE CORPS.

HOWEVER, WITH AUGMENTED

FUNDING, WE COULD PROFIT BY THE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES OF FAMILIES
LIVING AND WORKING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS -- A
REAL NEIGHBOR-TO-NEIGHBOR PROGRAM.

THE PEACE CORPS HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN READY AND ABLE TO
PROVIDE VOLUNTEERS TO DIRECT SERVICE AREAS SUCH AS WORK WITH
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REFUGEE POPULATIONS,

WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE HOST

GOVERNMENT~

THE PEACE CORPS COULD DO EVEN MORE TO MEET THIS AREA'S CRITICAL
NEEDS,

ANY OR ALL OF THE

EXPANDED~

NEW AND RENEWED INITIATIVES I

HAVE MENTIONED ARE AREAS THAT THE PEACE CORPS IS WILLING AND ABLE
TO EXPLORE IN ORDER TO ENSURE AN EXPANDED AND POSITIVE PRESENCE
OF U.S. CITIZENS OF ALL BACKGROUNDS AND NEEDED SKILL AREAS IN THE
IMPORTANT uPERSON TO PERSONu DEVELOPMENT WORK SO NECESSARY FOR
PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

FORMER AMBASSADOR TO A PEACE CORPS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. CHAMBER OF

COUNTRY~

COMMERCE~

DR.

SAMUEL~

WHO IS A MEMBER

OF THE CARLUCCI COMMISSION HAS SAID THAT THE "EXPENDITURES
THAT THE U.S, GOVERNMENT MAKES OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' MONEY ON THE
PEACB CORPS ARE PERHAPS THE BEST EXPENDITURES THAT ARE MADE IN
INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS~

WITH THIS IN

MIND~

AND

CLEARLY~

THE MOST EFFECTIVE."

LET ME GIVE YOU NOW AN EXAMPLE OF THE KIND

OF FUNDING WE ARE TALKING ABOUT:

FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED

MILLION DOLLARS OVER FOUR YEARS -- OR 25 MILLION DOLLARS PER
YEAR -- WE COULD TRIPLE THE NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS IN CENTRAL
UNDERTAKE INCREASED HEALTH PROGRAMS AND FURTHER BEEF UP OUR

AMERICA~
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CBI PROGRAM1 PURSUE INCREASED RECRUITING EFFORTS AIMED AT
HISPANICS AND OTHER SPANISH-SPEAKING AMERICANS TO DEVELOP
LITERACY PROGRAMS IN THE REGION; AND BEGIN SPECIAL PROGRAMS AIMED
AT MEETING THE SPECIAL NEEDS Of AMERICAN OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA.
ONE OF THE PEACE CORPS' THEMES IS "BUILDING BRIDGES."

AT

A TIME WHEN THIS COMMISSION MEETS TO DETERMINE NOT ONLY LONGRANGE OBJECTIVES BUT ALSO THE STRATEGY NEEDED TO MEET THESE
GOALS1 "BUILDING BRIDGES" WOULD SEEM TO BE AN APPROPRIATE THEME.
WE AT THE PEACE CORPS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THIS AGENCY CAN
SERVE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN OBJECTIVES AND

STRATEGY~

GOALS AND POLICY1 AND FURNISH AN INPUT IN THE BEST
AMERICAN TRADITION.

BETWEEN
A~HIGHEST

THE PEACE CORPS HAS COME A LONG WAY IN 23

YEARS1 AND1 IF YOU WISH1 WE ARE PREPARED TO DO EVEN MORE TO CONTRIBUTE
TO THE REALIZATION AND PROMOTION OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND
INTERESTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
I'LL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

789.
ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
Remarks before Central American Commission
September 13, 1983

I will not bore you by reiterating points that the Commission has
surely heard all too often in recent days. I imagine that most of us
can agree that the underlying cause of the Central American tragedy is
history's awful legacy of poverty, oppression and underdevelopment;
that an immediate cause is the not unreasonable desire of people living
in Central America to rebel against their historic fate; and that a
contributing cause may well be the exploitation of this rebellion by
outsiders eager, among other things, to make trouble for the United
States.
The question arises whether the United States can take effective
steps to get at those underlying causes of Central American unrest:
poverty, oppression and underdevelopment. I speak with diffidence,
for I am far from being a Central American expert. But in the early
1960s I was involved in these matters as an adviser to President Kennedy
on hemisphere affairs, and I am therefore a veteran of the attempt made
twenty years ago to improve Latin American conditions through the Alliance
for Progress. That experience may still have relevance to your deliberations today.
The Alliance for Progress represented a belated U.S. recognition
of the fact that the persistence in the western hemisphere of savage
contrasts between poverty and oligarchy both guaranteed local unrest
and invited extracontinental meddling. Based on ideas drawn from Latin
American economists and political leaders, the Alliance proposed three
goals: economic growth, structural change, political democratization.
These goals were, in theory, reciprocally dependent. Structural change
and political democratization were deemed indispensable in order to
incorporate the campesinos into the national community, in order to
create a modern market and in order to assure more efficient distribution of the gains of and therefore of incentives for economic growth.
The implication was that U.S. economic assistance would be conditioned
on, or at least associated with, reform performance -- tax and land
reform in particular.
We understood that in the short run there might well be conflict
among these three objectives. We also supposed, or hoped, that in the
long run they would be mutually reinforcing. But the Alliance never
received the long-run test. After President Kennedy's death, the new
administration abandoned two of the three Kennedy goals -- structural
change and political democratization. The Alliance lost its distinctive
thrust and became just another U.S. economic aid program, employed less
to serve the goals of development and democracy in Latin America than
to serve as a political arm of U.S. foreign policy and as an economic
accessory of the U.S. business community.
The Alliance was by no means ineffective as a stimulus to economic
growth. An original goal, laid down at Punta del Este in 1961, was a
growth rate of 2.5 per cent per capita per year. Actually from 1961 to
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1967 Latin America grew at the average annual rate of 4.5 per cent; but,
because population grew even faster, the per capita rate was under 2 per
cent. It is impossible to determine how much of this achievement was
due to the Alliance, but a good part certainly was. Over the decade this
was not a contemptible record, and the Alliance was clearly responsible
for the allocation of some of the gains of growth to social development -the building of schools, hospitals, low-cost housing, roads, sewage systems, irrigation, electric power, public health and so on.
For all this, the Alliance accomplished far less than its founders
had hoped. A great deal of the new capital brought into Latin America
was offset by an outflow of capital to service and repay external debts
and to remit profits to foreign investors. The Alliance did not lighten
the weight of Latin America's external debt, nor did it improve Latin
America's share of world trade. It reduced neither unemployment nor the
inequality of income distribution. It did not significantly increase
literacy. The abandonment after 1963 of the original political and social
goals meant that the effort did not come close to bringing about the
structural changes considered essential to economic growth as well as to
political democratization and stability.
What can we learn from this experience? Some in retrospect have
condemned the Alliance on the ground that it was oversold, created excessive expectations and produced inevitable disillusionment. I am not impressed by this indictment. No doubt the men of the New Frontier were
enthusiasts; but, as Emerson said, "Nothing great was ever achieved without
enthusiasm." The Alliance was an effort to alter the consciousness of a
continent, and this is not to be done by understatement. Nor, for that
matter, did the administration conceal the magnitude of the problem.
President Kennedy emphasized the difficulties in speech after speech.
"The task we have set ourselves and the Alliance for Progress," he said
a few days before his death, " •.• is a far greater task than any we have
ever undertaken in our history."
Excessive expectations were a problem less for the people of Latin
America than for the people of the United States. The Second World War
and especially the postwar occupations of Japan and Germany had nourished
ideas in our o~~ breasts about our superhuman capacity to work out the
destinies of other nations. The Marshall Plan confirmed this sense of
national omnicompetence. The resulting illusions were crystallized in
a pompous term that enjoyed considerable vogue among government officials
and political scientists --"nation-building." In fact, our successes in
Europe and Japan proved very little except our capacity to help nations
that already possessed the industrial discipline, the managerial skills,
the educated work force, the physical infrastructure and the historical
and cultural prerequisites for development. The problem we faced in those
areas was reconstruction of war-battered economies, not creation ex nihilo.
The task of economic development raises a different set of questions.
I am not an economist or a banker, only an historian, and will not venture
into technical areas already surveyed by those far more expert than I. As
an historian, I surmise that an all-out magic-of-the-marketplace approach
would be as mistaken as an all-out statist approach. The United States
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itself developed through a mix of public and private initiatives. Latin
America will very likely develop that way too. The essential problem,
in my judgment, is less economic technique than it is political will.
President Kennedy recognized from the start that the future of the
Alliance depended on Latin government, parties and leaders honestly
committed to the Punta del Este goals. He never supposed that the United
States had the ability to build nations from without. "Only the most
determined efforts of the American nations," he said in 1962, "can bring
success to this effort. They and they alone can mobilize their resources,
enlist the energies of their people and modify their social patterns so
that all, and not just a privileged few, share in the fruits of growth."
He also believed, though he was too polite to say so, that "they and they
alone" could purge the public administration of graft and corruption, expand the educational system, control the military and restrain the greed
of the oligarchy. "If this effort is made," Kennedy concluded, "then
outside assistance will give vital impetus to progress; without it, no
amount of help will advance the welfare of the people."
The Alliance was thus a wager on the capacity of the progressive
democratic governments and parties of Latin America to bring about social
and economic development. Even Fidel Castro granted that the Alliance
was "a good idea" although "overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the
moment, under constraint •••• Despite all that I am willing to agree that
the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily
rapid course of events in Latin America." But Castro went on to predict
that Kennedy's "good ideas aren't going to yield any results ••• The trusts
see that their interests are being a little compromised ••• the Pentagon
thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all
the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage
the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him."
Everyone except the parties of the center-left, the moderate reform
parties flowing, twenty years ago and today, in two distinct but allied
streams --the social democratic parties, of which Romulo Betancourt's
Accion Democratica in Venezuela was then the most prominent, and the
Christian Democratic parties, among which Eduardo Frei's Chilean party
was then foremost. Where such parties were in power, the Alliance made
a difference. Where they were not in power, the Alliance suffered under
mortal handicaps. The wager failed, because, for diverse reasons, the
democratic parties in too many Latin countries were rendered impotent by
their two deadly enemies -- oligarchy and revolution.
In short, the first condition for success is a strong local government dedicated to the project of national development for the general
welfare. Herein it seems to me lies the fallacy of the 'military-shield'
thesis -- the notion that, if we provide the military shield, we can
persuade the government we have taken under our protection to carry through
the changes necessary to win political support and establish the basis for
economic growth.
The counter-insurgency delusion began in the Kennedy years and expanded
in the years thereafter. The trouble is that regimes that call for military
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shields to defend themselves against their own people don't care a damn
about their own dispossessed. That is precisely why they are under attack.
As soon as we insert our marvelous shield, moreover, we lose most of our
leverage; for the guarantee of military protection means that we renounce
our own ultimate sanction-- the withdrawal of support. Once we make the
declaratory commitment to a government under siege, we will find it increasingly hard to force a beleaguered oligarchy to take measures it honestly and
perhaps correctly sees as fatal to its privilege and power. It becomes the
policy of the blank check.
When we thus bind ourselves to a client government, we tend to become
the client's prisoners. Nor dare we forget that many nationalist leaders
in the Third World are practiced and skillful con men, virtuosi in the arts
of sweet-talking and swindling the superpowers. They will promise anything
to get the support they need to stay in power. Delivery on such promises
is not to be taken very seriously once the shield is in place.
I think that we must be extremely wary of military involvement in the
interest of regimes that on their own motion have shown no concern for their
own people. The military-shield concept works when it helps governments
already committed to an agenda of democratic reform; but Betancourt
(Venezuela) and Magsaysay (Philippines) were the exception, not the rule.
Most of the time the military-shield approach only nourishes the folly and
arrogance of the regime whose suicidal obstinacy has got it into such bad
trouble.
In any event, unilateral military intervention by the U.S. in Latin
America can only be, in the last quarter of the 20th century, a gross
error. Prudence enjoins a role of restraint. Let us throw the lead to
the Contadora group. The Contadora states know the problems and the terrain far better than we do, are more directly threatened by adverse developments and are quite as determined as we are to protect their national
independence. Nothing has got us into more trouble through the long years
than the delusion that we know the interests of other countries better than
they know their own interests. Whatever we do in Central America, we must
do on a multilateral basis; and, if the countries on the firing-line do not
see the threat as apocalyptically as we do, who is to say that they are
wrong and we are right? Do we really understand their own world better
than they do?
If the Contadora group fails to pass a miracle, we may have to resign
ourselves to turmoil in Central America for some time to come -- turmoil
beyond our power to correct and beyond our wisdom to cure. Yet turmoil,
after all, is the historical process through which nations, including our
own, achieve their national identity. Parturition rarely takes place
without pain.
I trust your Commission will make a realistic assessment of the extent
to which the USSR can really exploit this turmoil. The Soviet Union obviously
derives immense Schadenfreude from our predicament. But Central America for
Moscow is a windfall, a target of opportunity, not a target of deep strategic
purpose. The Kremlin knows that it cannot establish nuclear bases in the
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western hemisphere in 1983 any more than it could in 1962. It already
has conventional military installations in Cuba; and it knows that installations in Central America would be hopelessly vulnerable, to be snuffed out
at once in event of trouble. The so-called domino effect is quite as
likely -- I would judge even more likely -- to strengthen anti-communism
than communism in the hemisphere. As for financial aid to Marxist states
in Central America, supplying financial aid is about as popular in Moscow
as it is in Washington; and in any case the Soviet Union would be foolish
to make a major investment in Latin American economic development. Why,
as the Latin Americans themselves put it, would Moscow wish to fatten a
lamb in the jaws of a lion?
The future of Central America does not lie in our hands. It lies in
the hands of the Central Americans. I still believe that an approach along
the lines of the Alliance for Progress offers the best hope in the long run.
U.S. assistance can be effective as what Dean Acheson used to call the
"missing component" when the domestic will is democratic, organized and
resolute. But, as the Alliance experience suggests, it cannot replace such
a will where it does not exist. The best we can do is to help that will
to emerge -- and the way to do that is not to commit the prestige of this
noble republic to the support of rulers, whether of left or of right, whose
survival in power depends on the elimination of the democratic alternative
and who in the meantime torture and murder their own democrats.
I know it is against the American grain to suppose that there are
problems we cannot readily solve with sufficient arms and money. Abstention
may be a difficult choice. But history takes its own time. The ways of
history are inscrutable and often tragic. Peoples have to find their own
paths to nationhood, and these paths are sometimes bloody. As a wise
British ambassador to Washington (Lord Harlech) once said, "Every country
has a right to its own Wars of the Roses."
In the struggle for nationhood, the role of the United States, great
and powerful as we may be, can only be marginal. We cannot play God to
history and decide the destiny of other peoples. Maturity requires a
willingness to live for a season with ambiguity. As President Kennedy
once put it: ~We must face the fact that the United States is neither
omnipotent nor omniscient -- that we are only six per cent of the world's
population -- that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 per cent
of mankind -- that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity
and that therefore there cannot be an American solut.ion to every world
problem."

DR. NEVIN S.
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SCRIMSHAW

Statement for Kissinger Commission
My name is Dr. NevinS. Scrimshaw and I am an Institute Professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Director of the MIT-Harvard
International Food and Nutrition Program.

I also direct the

progra~

on "Food,

Nutrition and Poverty" of the United Nations University whose headquarters are
in Tokyo, Japan.

After obtaining a Ph.D. in Physiology from Harvard University,

I received the M.D. degree from the University of Rochester and served an
internship in Gorgas Hospital, Panama.

In addition, I have a degree from the

Harvard School of Public Health.
I went to Central America in 1949 to establish the Institute of Nutrition of
Central America and Panama (INCAP) under the sponsorship of the Pan American
H~alth

Organization.

In this capacity I worked closely with Ministry of Health

and other government officials in all six member countries and spent a good deal
of time in nutrition studies in rural areas of these countries.

Although I left

the directorship of INCAP in 1961 to go to MIT, I returned for several months
each year until 1975 for field research, and in many of these years directed a
summer field course in clinical and public health nutrition.

I have continued

my involvement in Central America through the participation of INCAP as an associated institution of the The United Nations University for research and
trainin~

in applied nutrition.

The problems of Central America are not due to Marxist intervention or the
East-West conflict.

They are rooted in landlessness, poverty, and injustice;

in governments that protect the already privileged, and tolerate, for most of
the people, a lack of education, health, food, housing, water, sanitation-almost everything essential for social well-being.
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I will summarize briefly the past and present nutritional and health
situation of the countries of the region before making a number of specific
suggestions.
INCAP was established for three purposes:

1) to determine the nutritional

and related health problems of the countries of Central America and Panama,
2) through research to fina practical solutions to these problems, and 3) to
assist in the application of these solutions by training personnel and assisting
governments.

The first two parts of the task were well accomplished in the

early years.
It soon became apparant that once breast milk was no longer adequate as the
sole source of food, growth and development slowed, morbidity from diarrheal and
infectious disease rose alarmingly, and the mortality rates for children under 5
years of age were among the highest in the world.

I have worked in villages in

both El Salvador and Guatemala where more than one-third of the children born
alive died before 5 years of age, and where children entering school at age 7
were four years retarded in weight for age.
In Central America, as in most other developing countries, protein-calorie
malnutrtion is the most prevalent and serious form of malnutrition.
Unfortunately, it has no easy technological solution because its roots are in
poverty and lack of social justice.

In 1950 a dedicated director of public

health in El Salvador explained to me that the government was on a tightrope.
With no social progress, unrest and violence were inevitable, but if the government tried to tax or limit their privileges, it was cheaper for the few

~xtended

families that controlled most of the good agricultural land and other economic
resources of the country to arrange for a revolution than to pay increased
taxes or give up land.

This observation, more than any other, helped me to

understand the realities of Central America and the limited social progress in
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Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and, until recently, Nicaragua, despite the
dedicated efforts of public health workers and considerable external assistance.
INCAP studies have also been instrumental in demonstrating the synergism
between malnutrition and infection.

Malnutrition weakens

resistanc~
l

to infec-

tion and leads to increased frequency and severity of diarrheal and respiratory
diseases and others of

inf~~tious

origin.

Conversely, each episode of infection

worsens nutritional status by reducing appetite and leading to significant internal and external metabolic losses of protein and other essential nutrients.

It

is for these reasons that control of infections is important to prevention of
malnutrition and vice versa.

Because of the unsanitary environments and poor

personal hygiene in which most of the population lives, diarrheal disease is a
particularly common cause of morbidity and mortality.
INCAP field studies have also highlighted the social and economic consequences of dietary energy intakes that are limited by poverty and underprivilege.
Men work hard at agricultural tasks for a few hours and then must rest for the
rest of the day to stay in energy balance and avoid chronic weight loss and
death.

They are not paid by the hour but by the task because there is so much

variation in what workers can accomplish and how long it takes.

They have

little energy to spare for the discretionary activities so essential for household improvement and community development.

As Fernando Viteri and co-workers

at INCAP have shown, additional food results in a dramatic increase in physical
activity of social, economic, and recreational value.

He has also demonstrated

that the same kind of restriction is observed in the play activity of
malnourished children.
Adolfo Chavez of the National Institute of Nutrition in Mexico has shown
that with less interaction between undernourished young children and their physical and social environment, performance on tests of learning and behavior is
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reduced.

Supplementary feeding increases activity and results in improved

cognitive test performance.

Both Mexican and INCAP studies have provided strong

evidence that retardation in physical growth and development is paralleled by
poorer performance on tests of learning and behavior.

This conclusion has been

reinforced by studies at the Universidad del Valle in Cali, Colombia by McKay
and others.
The more definitive INCAP's identification of the nutrition and related
health problems of Central America and Panama, the more glaring was INCAP's inability to achieve the desired progress in their prevention.

Surveys conducted

in the same Mayan Indian villages in Guatemala in 1950 and again in 1975, 25
years later, showed no change in food intakes or in the degree of growth retardation.
In the 1960's with economic improvement there was a reduction in the number
of cases of the severe form of protein-calorie malnutrition known as
kwashiorkor.

However, with inflation and the drop in coffee and sugar prices of

the late 1970's pediatricians now state that the malnutrition of the 1950's has
returned.

While meat production has increased, local meat consumption per

capita has actually declined because local purchasers could not compete with the
higher prices offered for meat in the U.S.
In El Salvador we were dealing with a high proportion of landless laborers
who had only seasonal employment and no access to land of their own.

According

to data prepared by FAO in 1969, the average per capita calorie intake in El
Salvador was the lowest in Latin America, except for Haiti.

More significant,

the FAO report noted that the average nutritional intake had been declining for
the last decade.
In both Guatemala and £1 Salvador the severe retardation in growth and
development of the preschool years was not made up during the school years.

In

fact, in the rural areas of Guatemala it became worse during the school years.
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In Honduras, conditions were similar but there was some small improvement in
weight for age during the school years.
In Somoza's Nicaragua the situation was equally bad and at the highest
levels the government was almost totally indifferent or resistant to INCAP and
PAHO recommendations

despi!~

the fact that Nicaragua, like most developing

countries, had some dedicated middle and lower level health personnel.

For

example, the iodine deficiency responsible for widespread endemic goiter can be
prevented effectively by iodization of salt and can be achieved by decree at no
cost to the government and with no justification for raising the price of salt.
This was achieved in all of the Central American countries, and endemic goiter
was eliminated as a public health problem- except in Somoza's Nicaragua.

One

of the first health measures in Nicaragua after the overthrow of Somoza was the
iodization of salt.
As INCAP came under increasing criticism for the persistence of malnutrition
in Central America despite a budget that amounted to nearly four million dollars
by 1980, it turned more and more to analyzing the multiple social and political
factors responsible and attempted to assist its member governments in the development of policies that would improve food and nutrition in their countries.
You are aware that in Guatemala 80% of the good agricultural land is in the
hands of a limited number of large land owners and that rural unemployment probably exceeds 30%.

What is not so well recognized is that the negligible taxes

on land allow the large land owners to use their land inefficiently or leave it
idle without serious penalty.

On the Pacific coast of Guatemala, exceptionally

fertile volcanic soils are being used for large cattle farms producing meat primarily for export.

If these were used for labor-intensive food and cash crops,

the rural employment situation in the area would be quite different.
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An AID PL 480 Title II program evaluation in El Salvador in July, 1971 is
illustrative. After noting that 70% of all children under 5 years of age were
malnourished, it states that

11

although the malnutrition problem justifies a

larger program ••• there is no broad public commitment and program for attacking
El Salvador's malnutrition problem.

Few leaders .•• seem to have a sense of

urgency about nutritional improvement ...
This attidue have never really changed.

T~n

years later, in 1981, the per-

centage of malnutrition was reported to be slightly higher- 73%.

The tradi-

tional power groups that have always dominated Central American governments, the
large land owners and business men, and their military supporters and paramilitary forces, block attempts at basic public health measures as well as land
reform, housing assistance, and community development.

I found in my files a

number of ambitious agricultural and health programs drawn up for El Salvador
that have never been implemented.
A tiny 2% of the population of El Salvador continues to own 60% of the land,
and 80% of the population earns less than the minimum needed to buy the
necessities of life.

Unemployment rates not only remain very high, as much as

one-third of the rural labor force, but also work remains highly seasonal.

1970

AID ROCAP data for El Salvador suggested a 64% rural unemployment rate at the
end of September, dropping to 8% for the coffee harvest, and rising rapidly
again thereafter-- ideal for the large land owners and disastrous for the rural
populations.
I have not been back to El Salvador recently, but in July of this year two
of my colleagues, Dr. John Stanbury of MIT and Dr. Carola Eisenberg of the
Harvard Medical School, visited El Salvador with five other distinguished health
professionals for the U.Sr sponsored by the American Public Health Association
and other health groups.

From interviews and site inspections they conclude
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that there is a virtually complete breakdown in the health care system and that
the training of health personnel is at a near standstill.

Worse still, they

found systematic repression and violence against health workers.

Any criticism

of the government can lead to discharge and often death at the hands of the
army, security or paramilitary forces.

Treating persons who are suspected of

being insurgents or even the collection of health statistics renders health
workers liable to reprisal.

An estimated 30 to 40% of physicians have left the

country since 1980, many as the result of death threats.
One country, Costa Rica, stands out as the exception in achieving dramatic
improvements in nutritional and health status.

In the early 1950•s infant and

preschool mortalites were high, the degree of growth retardation of preschool
children the same as in the highlands of Guatemala, and both kwashiorkor and
marasmus were hyperendemic.

As recently as 1966, 14% of the preschool children

were still more than 25% retarded in weight for age, i.e., second and third
degree malnutrition by the Gomez classification.

By 1982 it was only 4.8%.

Moreover, infant mortality was only 17 per 1,000 live births and less than one
per 1,000 for children 1 to 4 years of age.
Europe and North America.

These are the mortality levels of

Moreover, avitaminosis A and endemic goiter have been

eliminated as public health problems.

With enhanced child survival and improved

living conditions, family planing has become increasingly accepted.

In

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras infant and preschool mortality remain high.
This occurred with economic resources proportionately less than those of the
other Central American countries.

The difference was political commitment, a

government that cared and gave a high budget priority to education and health,
particularly that of the mothers and young children.
targeted goods and

service~

Government policies

(health, nutrition, housing, environmental sanita-

tion, education and welfare activities) to the most deprived population groups.
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This provision of social services has been part of a dynamic process of redistribution of national income enforced mainly in the 1970's.
Costa Rica has recently fallen on hard economic times, but its social and
health gains are apparently being maintained.

A recent article in the Boletin

of the Pan American Health Organization points out that in Chile, with a long
history of a national health system with wide coverage and emphasis on primary
health care, health has not deteriorated despite the present adverse economic
circumstances.

Nicaragua, despite severe economic constraints and all of its

external and internal problems, appears also to be achieving major health gains
at long last.
The conclusion is unmistakable.

It is not natural resources, the physical

environment, or gross national product that explain differences among the
Central American countries in nutrition, health, and educational levels, but
rather the policies that governments have followed.

Where they have been

responsive primarily to the interests of the large land owners and
industrialists, have allowed starvation wages, and have failed to spend sufficient money on education and health to achieve broad coverage, social unrest
has increased and indices of nutrition and health have remained low and statis.
This is a very sketchy and superficial account of a complex set of problems.
Moreover, most measures that can be identified as useful for improving any
aspect of the situation in Central America are multiple and interacting.
follows that there is no single, simple, or rapid solution.

It

Furthermore, most

measures that one can identify as helpful are likely to run squarely into
governmental unwillingness or inability to implement them.

Without a dif-

ferent set of government actions in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, there
is no hope for

significan~

improvement.

can only continue to deteriorate.

Worse, the situation in these countries
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What influence the U.S. has must be exerted toward desirable social change
and not to maintenance of the status quo.

The U.S. should encourage and support

the efforts of Central American governments to improve education and health, and
to achieve greater social equity.

It should not be supporting

mili~ary

forces

that are used for the repression of dissent, slaughter of present and potential
leaders, and maintenance of the privileges of a tiny fraction of the population.
There is simply no way that more military support at this time will help the
region.

Conversely support for greater social equity is not incompatible with

international policies favorable to the U.S. as the example of Costa Rica
illustrates.

As I stated at the beginning, the problems of Central America are

rooted in poverty, injustice, and landlessness, in governments that protect the
interests of a rich minority, and in inadequate health care, food, housing, education, water, and sanitation.

Assistance policies that address these issued

could have dramatic effects on the social and economic development of the
problem countries of Central America and on their political stability.

I will

briefly summarize some possible lines of action.
First, promote strong integrated programs of primary health care.

There is

need for a strong effort to extend primary health care to all populations,
including those in remote rural areas.

As WHO and UNICEF are emphasizing, there

are a number of proven measures that would be effective.
not the most important part of health care.

Curative medicine is

More important is a group of

actions that include education in nutrition and health principles, the use of
growth charts to identify malnutrition in young children, the promotion and protection of .breast-feeding, a comprehensive program of immunizations, the distribution and use of salt and sugar packets to make up fluid for the oral rehydration of persons with diarrhea, and improved environmental sanitation and per-
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sonal hygiene.

When these measures take hold, so do the family planning efforts

that must be part of the package.
For their success, these measures require thousands of auxiliary health
workers and community health volunteers.

They must be community-based, but

given strong logistic support by the health system.

They have already proved

successful in Costa Rica and there is a major effort at their implementation in
What is most important is not the individual measures in isolation,

Nicaragua.

but their introduction as a package.

Their effectiveness will be increased if

they include improvement of community water supplies, and mosquito vector
control for the prevention of malaria.
Second, promote and

support~

strong rural development program to include

agricultural policies that will increase both agricultural production and rural
employment.

Access roads, better communications, and improved land tenure and

taxation policies will be needed.

So will industrial developments that will

absorb surplus and seasonal labor and make urban migration less necessary.

Food

storage and processing facilities and services to provide agricultural inputs
will provide additional,jobs.

This should be undergirded with available rural

credit, strong agricultural extension services, and relevant agricultural
research.

Once again, isolated measures will be of limited benefit.

As

integrated package of improvements will be required.
Third, support helpful regional agricultural and economic measures.

A

number of regional mesures based on economic and political cooperation among the
countries of Central America will be more effective than dealing with individual
countries.
to help.

I will mention only two of these, both entirely within U.S. capacity
One would be an agreement with the region to buy guaranteed minimum

quantities of the key

exp~rt

commodities, coffee, bananas, and sugar.

A

regional agreement will avoid the present distortions of country quotas and have
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the advantage of requiring cooperation among the countries.

Similarly, a

regional grain reserve program could stabilize prices and ensure continuity of
supplies.

Once established with U.S. PL 480 commodities, it could be maintained

by production of the countries themselves.
Fourth, support regional research and training institutions.

The countries

of Central America are individually too small to mount effective and sophisticated research needed in the areas of nutrition, health, agriculture, and technology.

Fortunately, regional institutions for these purposes have already been

established and are among the best in the developing world.

However, the poli-

tical and economic turmoil in Central America threatens their very survival.
These institutions-- in nutrition, the Institute of Nutrition of Central
America and Panama in Guatemala; in health, the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory in
Panama; in technology, the Central American Institute of Science and Technology
(ICAITI) in Guatemala; and in agriculture, the Central American Institute of
Tropical Agriculture in Costa Rica (CATIE) merit strong support from the U.S.
and the international community for their capabilities in both applied research
and training appropriate to the region.
Fifth, encourage and

support~

regional entitlement plan.

There is a need

for some kind of regional entitlement scheme that would provide a safety net for
those most impoverished.

Whether this takes the form of a food stamp plan or

income subsidies, the experts must work out.

Although controversial, both

approaches have proved their effectiveness where they have been given a fair
trial.

Because the total population of Central America and Panama is only about

22 million people, external assistance to make this feasible is possible if
inflation can be kept in control.
some kind of floor needs

~o

Whatever the macroeconomic policies adopted,

be put in place for the very poor.

doing so must be balanced against the cost of not doing so.

The cost of

805.

Time does not permit elaboration of these proposals or any attempt at their
detailed justification, but I will be glad to answer questions.
Thank you.
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STATEMENT FOR THE KISSINGER COMMISSION
PART II: MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
BY DR. NEVIN S. SCRIMSHAW

Possible Lines of Actions Suggested in the Original Testimony
No.1.

Promote strong integrated programs of primary health care.
There is need for a strong effort to extend primary health
care to all populations, including those in remote rural
areas. As WHO and UNICEF are emphasizing, there are a number
of proven measures that would be effective. Curative medicine is not the most important part of health care. More
important is a group of actions that incude education in
nutrition and health principles, the use of growth charts to
identify malnutrition in young children, the promotion and
protection of breast-feeding, a comprehensive program of
immunizations, the distribution and use of salt and sugar
packets to make up fluid for the oral rehydration of persons
with diarrhea, and improved environmental sanitation and personal hygiene. When these measures take hold, so do the
family planning efforts that must be part of the package.
For their success, these measures require thousands of auxiliary health workers and community health volunteers. They
must be community-based, but given strong logistic support by
the health system. They have already proved successful in
Costa Rica and there is a major effort at their implementation in Nicaragua.
What is most important is not the individual measures in isolation, but their introduction as a
package. Their effectiveness will be increased if they
include improvement of community water supplies, and mosquito
vector control for the prevention of malaria.

Specific, Implementation:
U.S. AID should supplement WHO and UNICEF support of a package of primary
health care measures for Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras that have already
been proved effective in Costa Rica in reducing morbidity and mortality from
malnutrition and infectious disease in countries with the nutritional and health
problems of Central America.

These include:
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a.

Monthly weighing of infant and young children within their own com-

munities with the growth records kept by the mother for the purpose of detecting
the need for supplementary feeding and/or medical treatment.
b.

Promotion of breast-feeding and of appropriate supplementary feeding

once breast milk is no longer sufficient as the sole source of food.
c.

Effective comprehensive campaigns of immunization against five major

childhood killers:
d.

tetanus, polio, tuberculosis, whooping cough and measles.

Widespread distribution of packets of oral rehydration salts for the

treatment of diarrheal dehydration combined with intensive education for their
use, latrine construction and improved water supplies.
e.

Extensive programs of nutrition and health education for mothers and

the general public.
f.

Provision of essential medicines and medical treatment at the local

level.
No.2.

Promote and support ~ strong rural development program to
include agricultural policies that will increase both agricultural production and rural employment. Access roads,
better communications;-and improved land tenure and taxation
policies will be needed. So will industrial developments
that will absorb surplus and seasonal labor and make urban
migration less necessary. Food storage and processing facilities and services to provide agricultural inputs will provide additional jobs. This should be undergirded with
available rural credit, strong agricultural extension services, and relevant agricultural research. Once again, isolated measures will be of limited benefit. An integrated
package of improvements will be required.

Specific Implementation:
The action elements under this objective should be increased training, production of those products for which the region has a comparative advantage, and
increasing primary food production marketing and agribusiness.

The focus should

be on close working relationships between the public and private sectors that
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are socially responsive as well as economically viable.

The elements of such a

strategy should include:
a.

Sector Study.

There should be an in-depth sector analysis for com-

modities that can be produced efficiently in the rural sector to (1) increase
the region's ability to meet its own basic food requirements to bring availabilities to minimum daily requirement level for all people in the rural and urban
sector in ten years, (2) focus on those high value products that can be grown in
the tropics for which the Central Americans have or can develop a comparative
advantage in fresh product exports, (3) develop agro industry and tropical food
processing as an additional market for the region's products and (4) develop the
technical, research extension credits and marketing system which can support the
above-mentioned goals:
These studies should be carried out following a scope of work developed
so that the results would meet international assistance institution criteria.
Each phase of the four suggested should result in preliminary project descriptions in areas offering high opportunities for financing.
be carried out almost simultaneously.

The six studies could

Studies should project new needs for

longer term development (e.g., for five to ten years) in the areas identified.
Study cost for six countries: $ 1,750,000.
b.

Training.
1.

Graduate Level.

Develop a region-wide graduate program for agri-

culture, agricultural economics, forestry, marine fisheries, etc.

Training in

the U.S. at the M.Sc. and Ph.D. level should be developed immediately.

Since

many senior trained technicians become administrators of public or private sector agencies or divisions, all should receive management as well as technical
training, as an initial step, scholarships should be offered on a competitive
basis in each country by the U.S.A.I.D. mission to that country.

For the first
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five years, fifty graduate level scholarships should be provided per country
A manpower study of graduate trained personnel needs should be

annually.

carried out in the third year of the program to determine needs of the following
decade.

All candidates selected should agree in writing to return for two years

of public sector service for each year of training provided.

Preference should

be given to those who propose to study in research-critical areas, on tropical
products having high employment and/or income generating capacity.
Fifty scholarships/country:
times six countries:
times five years:
Total cost:
2.

Undergraduate Level.

$20.0 Million

The agricultural colleges of Guatemala, El

Salvador and Nicaragua are overcrowded, inadequately staffed and lack land on
which students can gain practical field experience in production, marketing,
etc.

It will be necessary to relocate the colleges of agriculture, construct

new facilities, retrain many staff members, etc. for long-term agricultural
progress.

Since it will not be feasible to relocate and upgrade the physical

plant of the three countries at one time, it is proposed that the facilities be
relocated in Guatemala (the poorest of the three in terms of
facilities/students) on an appropriate area of land to be provided by the
G··atemalan government in 1985-87, and a similar change made in El Salvador in
1986-88 Jnd in Nicaragua in 1987-89.
Cost of construction:
A.
B.

Guatemala (2500 students)
El Salvador (1500 students)
c. Nicaragua (800 students)
Total:

$10.0
7.5
4.5
$22.0

Million
Million
Million
Million

Staff for these and the other colleges of agriculture in the region
should receive refresher or graduate upgrading.

At least five staff members per

college should be permitted annually to return to graduate school for further
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~trengthening

in their area of specialization until all have had an opportunity.

This professional upgrading should be for a one-year period.

Each would be

expected to carry a full course load. A substitute professor should be made
available to replace the Central American professor while he is on training from
the University of Puerto Rico or any U.S. Land Grant University that can provide
Spanish-speaking counterparts.
Five professionals per country
from six countries for the
initial five years
5 x 6 x 5 x $40,000 for two year
A.I.D. financed scholarships:
$ 6.0 Million
c.

Vocational Agricultural Education.

The primary source of all extension

agents in the region as well as agro-industrial (fertilizer salesmen, production
promoters for processing plants) and farm managers for many years will continue
to come from the Vocational Agricultural schools of the region.

Each country

has at least one. All are extremely limited in facilities, land available for
field study in several is too small to permit real learning-by-doing practice.
The U.S. has a number of vocationally-oriented colleges that could work with the
C.A.P. governments and upgrade the quality of their graduates (hold to current
three-year training) as well as doubling the number of students in all but
Guatemala (it is probably the largest and best-equipped but still inadequate).
Also upgrade the quality and uniformity of training by holding regional short
courses annually.
Cost of upgrading facilities in
the region's schools
Cost of a five-year instructor
upgrading programs (6 countries)

$10.0 Million
4.0 Million

The Escuela Agricala Panamericana (Honduras) is considered to be one of
the best U.S. private sector developing country vocational junior colleges in
the world.

It has received some outside assistance on facilities and has an

excellent staff.

The school has for other than actual classrooms, dormitories
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and possibly some additional staff, the ability to at least double its
enrollment.

Its graduates are frequently considered to be the best trained

(with those of the University of Costa Rica) in the region.

It needs more core

budget support and scholarships for an additional one hundred each year.

The

students if qualified would come from any of the Central American and
Panamerican countries.

The. school should agree not to initiate a B.Sc. level

curricu1um in order to continue focus on the training level in which they have
been a real success.
This program should be privately financed by invitation of U.S.
Agricultural companies.
Estimated Costs:
100 students/year for 3-year
training course
Additional classrooms and
dormitories

d.

Ministry of Agriculutre Improvement:

$ 2.5 Million

1.0 Million

The ministries of agriculture have

made considerable strides to improve their facilities, staff, technical capacity
and experiment stations.
time.

No new experiment stations appear warranted at this

They do need further chemical and physical analytical capacity, access to

larger computer system for research and planning analysis, upgrading their use
of area frame sampling, vehicles for researchers, market technicians, extension
personne), etc., and improving their experiment station facilities.

A grant is

proposed after an initial needs survey to upgrade their capacity to conduct
research and train farmers in new methods of production.

An estimate of the

cost of such an upgrading is difficult to arrive at at this time.

Its total

cost may be in the neighborhood of three to six million dollars per country.
Estimated Costs:

$30.0 Million
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e.

Farm Training.

With increased income the demand for basic food crops

will increase by at least an estimated 20% in the first five years of the
region's development program.

Although wheat consumption would increase faster

than other basic food products, these (corn, beans, rice and sorghum) are
expected to rise by at least 30% in the first five years.

This thirty percent

includes a current estimated shortfall of 10% which the region is purchasing
offshore and 20% growth in annual demand.

The production required will be at

least:
Corn
Beans
Rice
Sorghum

760,000
80,000
140,000
110,000

Tons
Tons
Tons
Tons

(30% of 2,283,000)
(30% of 240,000)
(30% of 413,000)
(includes est. 40,000 for
Nicaragua &30,000 for Panama)

To meet this shortfall additional credit, technical asistance and
research will be required by the countries.
The estimated extension and farmer education resources needed annually
are (x $1,000):
Country
Total
Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama

Corn

Beans

Rice

Sorghum

$1,400
656
448
336
117
31

$108
51
56
80
16
10

$ 61
69
53
87
280
256

$ 89
184
60
53
56
40

$1,658
960
617
556
469
397

$3,048

$321

$806

$482

$4,657

(Calc. Method: Agent reaches 200 farmers growing 100 cwt x 2 crops on 2 Ha per
year divided by 20 to get tons, divide results by 1/3 of present production and
multiply by $8,000 [est. cost of extension agent].)
f.

Reform of Land Taxation, Distribution and Use.

An expanded land reform

program is needed throughout the region to permit a growing number of rural
people to acquire and use

~and

for agronomic purposes.

The program should
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contribute to better land use, recognize that farm size and production mix of
crops and livestock over time will require a flexible ability to adjust to the
changing economies of scale and use first quality land for intensive crops or
animal production as well as permit many who do not wish to farm to sell their
land.

The system should set a limit on farm size on a national basis and put an

upper limit to the amount
program.

of land that any one person can purchase under the

The suggested new approach would establish for all agricultural land

in the area to be classified by its productive potential (e.g., land use capability classification).

Each farm holding in each country would be taxed on a per

area basis according to its soil productive potential using a tax that increases
with a higher land use capability of the soil.

The tax could start low in the

first years and gradually be increased until farmers are forced to use their
land more efficiently or sell it.

The tax proceeds would be deposited in

national land banks and loaned to other potential farmers for land purchase at
low interest with up to 30 years for repayment.

The farmers must meet certain

criteria for purchase such as (a) the amount of land they can control (total);
(b) they must live on their farms; (c) they must plant at least one-half of
their land into permanent crops; and (d) a maximum income level to qualify for a
loan.

Preference should be given to farms in the five to twenty hectare size

class and to the development of more economic units from small fractioned land
holdings (e.g., minifundia).
The costs involved would be approximately (five-year period):
1.

2.

3.
Total

Development of a land use
capability map for each
country
Development or completion
of a modern land mensuration
and titling system for
each country
Continuing technical assistance
and training

$

20.0 Million (est.)

60.0 Million
6.0 Million
$ 86.0 Million

814.

g.

Agricultural Diversification Program.

The Central American region has

such a varied ecology that it can produce almost all crops grown in the United
States plus an additional one to two hundred other of tropical origin.

Many of

these have considerable developed-country demand in the United States, Canada,
Europe and the Caribbean markets.

Most have a high employment-generative capa-

city and income potential considerably above basic food crops.

Some of the

fruits and vegetables also have a significant demand when processed by canning,
freezing or drying.

Production for the winter fresh fruit and vegetable window

in the U.S., Canada, and Europe for some is particularly attractive.

In addi-

tion there is room for considerable growth in the production of deciduous fruits
for the Central American market and increasing demand for flowers, spices, and
foliage plants for regional and extraregional export.
Capital and technical assistance will be needed to make this become a
reality.

Producers must be trained in modern production and packaging methods.

Credit for imports and appropriate plant material must be multiplied, research
must be initiated to develop cost and result effective solutions to existing and
new problems.

The estimated costs for a program to expand production of the

traditional or non-traditional crops would depend upon the commodity mix
involved.

It is proposed that approximately 20,000 hectares of permanent crops

and 5,000 of annual crops be financed during the first five years among the six
countri e·s.
Production credit:

1.

2.

Finance 20,000 hectares of tree
crops (fruits, beverages, and
spices) at an average of
$2,000/Ha. Loan subtotal
Finance 5,000 additional
hectares of annual crops
(vegetables,- spices, flowers)
for export in fresh form or
for processing at $2,500/Ha.
Loan subtotal

$ 40 •0 Mi 11 ion

12.5 Million
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3.

4.

Technical assistance grant:
provide senior technical
assistance for research,
extensive and supporting infrastructure (irrigation,
packing sheds, etc.) development. Grant subtotal
Agro-industrial enterprise
loans to packing plants, food
canning processors, freezing
plant construction. Loan subtotal

Total
h.
Program.

$

6.5 Million

25.0 Million
$ 84.0 Million

Forestry Improvement, Natural Resources Conservation and Utilization
The improved use of natural resources is imperative if the region is

to continue as a viable economically active area in the future.

Forests are

being cut at an alarming rate, soil is being washed away in increasing amount
due to denuding hillsides and filling rivers and dams, natural fuelwood is being
depleted to such an extent that some households must spend six to eight hours
weekly to collect the wood that is needed for cooking.

Likewise since forests

and watersheds are being denuded water is not being held so that efficient irrigations systems can be developed for increased food production during the dry
season.
This program would begin to analyze the area•s forest and watershed
management practices, determine adequacy of laws and their enforcement, train
national staff on ways of developing a national consensus and local action to
conserve and carefully use the region•s natural resources.

Using satellite

maps, forest reserves, improved forest harvest methods and prevention of forest
fires and floods through improved forest and water management systems.

Stored

water for use in irrigation of intensively grown crops will be channeled by permanent water distribution systems and community irrigation districts.

Taxation

systems for their maintenance, improvement and expansion will be evolved to continue the process indefinitely.

A public training and education program via

radio transmission will form part of the outreach activities.
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During the first five years the following activities should be
contemplated:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Total

Natural resource mapping:
satellite macromapping of
the area (at 1:10,000)
18 month activity.
Technical training of forest
rangers, water use and soil
conservation specialists.
5 year activity. Train at
least 300 subprofessional
specialists per country in
five years in 1-3 month short
courses. The government will
be expected to pay salaries and
transport costs and the program
will provide senior technical
counterparts to national technicians. Training grant--

$

2.0 Million (est.)

2.5 Million

Development of a national
strategy and action program
for sustained maintenance and
harvest of the forest resources
in the region. 2 year activity.

10.0 Million (est.)

Development of a small farm
forest management project
involving at least 10,000 (total)
family hands in at least 3
countries (Honduras, Nicaragua,
and Panama) in a 5-year period.
Loan funds --

50.0 Million

Develop small and medium sized
irrigation systems for the
production of vegetables and
other high value commodities.
Areas and water are available
on the Pacific coast of Guatemala,
the coastal areas of El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama
and on the Atlantic coast of
Honduras. At least 200,000
hectares could be irrigated with
well designed systems and well
managed water use. Irrigation
also contributes to increasing
the effectiv~ use of all types of
infrastructure. Irrigation system
installed on 10,000 Ha. in 5 years

20.0 Million
$ 84.5 Million
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No.3.

Support helpful regional agricultural and economic measures.
A number of regional measures based on-economic and political
cooperation among the countries of Central America will be
more effective than dealing with individual countries. I
will mention only two of these, both entirely within U.S.
capacity to help. One would be an agreement with the region
to buy guaranteed minimum quantities of the key export commodities, coffee, bananas, and sugar. A regional agreement
will avoid the present distortions of country quotas and have
the advantage of requiring cooperation among the countries.
Similarly, a regional grain reserve program could stabilize
prices and ensure··continuity of supplies. Once established
with U.S. PL 480 commodities, it could be maintained by production of the countries themselves.

Specific Implementation:
a.

Regional Marketing

Agreement~

The United States presently purchases

coffee, cacao, sugar, bananas, cotton and beef from the Central American region.
These traditional exports are a major factor in the economic vitality of the
region.

At the same time, only a small portion of the total U.S. needs for any

of these products are from Central America.

In the framework of a new economic

relationship the U.S. could sign a regional purchase agreement with these
countries for minimum amounts of each of these products in a similar manner as
the U.S. has done with the U.S.S.R.

Such an agreement should operate for at

least five years with renewal options for additional periods.

The amounts

purchased would move upward as rapidly as is possible to absorb existing stockpiles of coffee and sugar and promote increased planting for the future.

This

would give the countries an assurance of a market and create a large number of
jobs throughout the six country area.

Since the U.S. is presently purchasing

these products there would be little additional cost in this approach.
b.

Regional Quotas on Central American Exports.

There are export quotas

imposed on the six countries by either the U.S. or commodity world-wide
agreements (International Coffee Agreement is an example), which restrict
exports or cause distortions of normal trade practices (e.g., backroad shipments
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of export products between countries to balance quotas, etc.).

It should be in

the best interest of the U.S. to promote cooperation and interdependence among
these countries.

Toward this end if the U.S. were to take the leadership in

establishing a block quota for any products that must be import controlled into
this country; this would then permit the countries themselves to negotiate individual quotas among themselves and make periodic adjustments among themselves to
compensate for unexpected shortfalls due to weather changes or other factors.
No cost would be involved in such a new mode of operation.
Similarly the U.S. could work to support block quotas in the
International Coffee Agreement and other international fora.

The U.S. could

also support existing quotas in the region to permit removal of the stockpiles
that exist for coffee, sugar, and any other controlled product.
c.

Regional Basic Food Crop Credit Fund.

In order to promote increased

production of basic food crops, additional capital for production loans are
needed.

These funds should total approximately 10% of production cost for the

four grain types produced and consumed in the region.

The new production would

not be expected to be produced in all countries in relation to their present
production levels.

More of the increase will be produced in Guatemala, Honduras

and Nicaragua, with only modest increases in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Panama.
Thus, the loan fund should be provided through the Interamerican Development
Bank to the Central American Bank (C.A.B.E) and from this regional institution
to national agricultural banks.

As an alternative, it could be provided by

A.I.D. to C.A.B.E. (using I.D.B. funds would decrease the U.S. direct funding
load).

The credit required would be approximately:
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B.F.C. Production Credit Needs
Corn
Beans
Rice
Sorghum

*

570,000
180,000
309,000
190,000

Tons*x
Tons x
Tons x
Tons x

$ 80/Ton
$220/Ton
$300/Ton
$ 80/Ton

=
=
=
=

$ 45,600,000.00
39,400,000.00
92,700,000.00
15,200,000.00
$156,900,000.00

Est. in 75% of annual production shortfall since two crops are produced and
some rollover will occur.
d.

Regional Strategic Food Reserve.

In order to respond to short-run

scarcities of the basic foods needed to maintaining socio/nutritional standards
and political stability, a regionally-managed storage program should be created.
The silos should be located at the Guatemalan, El Salvador and Honduras border
and at the Costa Rican, Panamanian border for easy access to each country.

The

silos should be constucted under and managed by a board of directors consisting
of the Ministers of Agriculture of the region.

Funds should be controlled under

their direction by the Central American Banks (C.A.B.E.).

The grain can ini-

tially be provided by PL. 480 as a donation to the region.

Countries could pay

for grain withdrawals either in kind or by cash payments within one year of the
withdrawal. Countries would agree to first use the regional strategic reserve
before purchasing offshore.

The reserve could be rolled over periodically to

maintain its quality by exchange for current crop grain.

The strategic reserve

should be approximately ten percent of the region•s current production.
(1981) Current Regional Production

(1 ,000

Tons)

Country

Corn

Beans

Rice

Sorghum

Guatemala
El Salvador
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panama

1,052
487
338
250
88
68

81
38
42
60
12
7

46
52
40
65
210
192

67
138
45
N/A
42
N/A

2,283

240

413

254

283

24

Subtotals
10% Stock (x 100 tons)

41.3

25.4
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Corn

Beans

Est. Delivered Price
80,000
per 1,000 Tons $
22,640,000
Est. Cost
Cost of Storage
Facilities
5,660,000
Subtotal Cost
per Product

$28,300,000

Est. Total Cost:
No.4.

Rice

Sorghum

220,000
5,280,000

$
40,000
16,520,000

$ 120,000
3,036,000

4,800,000

8,260,000

5,080,000

$10,080,000

$24,780,000

$8,116,000

$

..

$71,276,000

Support regional research and training institutions. The
countries of Central America are individually too small to
mount effective and sophisticated research needed in the
areas of nutrition, health, agriculture, and technology.
Fortunately, regional institutions for these purposes have
already been established and are among the best in the developing world. However, the political and economic turmoil in
Central America threatens their very survival. These
institutions -- in nutrition, the Institute of Nutrition of
Central America and Panama in Guatemala; in health, the
Gorgas Memorial Laboratory in Panama; in technology, the
Central American Institute of Science and Technology (ICAITI)
in Guatemala; and in agriculture, the Central American
Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Costa Rica (CATIE) merit
strong support from the U.S. and the international community
for their capabilities in both applied research and training
appropriate to the region.

Specific Implementation:
a.

Core Budget Support to Regional Institutions.

The regional institu-

tions of Central America (SIECA, CABEI, INCAP, ICAITI, INCAE, ICAP, CATIE and
OIRSA) conduct most of the leading edge research, train national technicians,
provide

~echnical

countries.

backstopping and many other vital functions in the six

All are financially supported by the member countries and secure a

large part of their resources for research and training from outside sources.
They are generally underfunded in the core budget area and could carry out more
research and training if their funding problems could be solved.
The U.S. should agree to match the Central American country contributions to these regional agencies for core funding and increase its financial
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support for regionally useful research and training.

The core budget support

could be channelled through the State Department's Office of International
Organizations.

The research and training should be developed through the Agency

for International Development's Regional Office (ROCAP) located in Guatemala
City.
1.

Per year estjmated cost core
budget support

$ 3.0 Million

Funds for research and training
through the regional institutions per year

2.

22.0 Million

of which:

Total

SEICA would receive
INCAP would receive
ICAITI would receive
INCAE would receive
ICAP would receive
CATIE would receive

3.0
4.0
4.0
2.5
1.0
7.5
$ 22.0

Million
Million
Million
Million
Million
Million
Million

SIECA funds would be for socio-economic research on regional
problems.

It would be expected to involve all of the countries and their tech-

nical people in the prioritization and implementation of specific studies.
Results would be used for regional (and possibly national) policy determination.
INCAP funds would enable it to update its equipment, maintain the best
nutrition library resource in Latin America, maintain and expand its training
program~

and expand its research directed toward the solution of the practical

food and nutrition problems of the region.

All of these are currently

threatened by the economic problems of the member countries and reduced availability of funds from NIH and other U.S. sources.
ICAITI would expand its support to natural resource, marine, food, fiber
and other product processing and industrialization and for holding training
courses for private sector companies, associationsg and cooperatives on ways of

822.

using industrial methods for expanding the market for the raw materials produced
in the region.
ICAE would use its research funds for conducting extra regional market
analysis on products that can be produced in the CAP region and case studies and
\

other types of applied research on regional industrial and agribusiriess
enterprises and business opportunities.

INCAE would be of great help in

assisting national governments to adopt business practices and in influencing
policy changes which would stimulate production trade and the training of a new
cadre of small and medium sized businesses.
!CAP would conduct research on the public sector of member countries,
its organization, operations and management.

Results should be utilized in

improving governmental efficiency, training public sector employees and
improving the linkage between public and private sector institutions.
CATIE would be expected to use these new funds to increase commodity
research on coffee, cacao, plantain and bananas, dairy production, vegetables
and spices producable in the region.

They would be expected to expand their

graduate school and provide increased training in improved plant and animal husbandry, especially on the small farm.
In order to better integrate U.S. assistance to the six countries of
Central America and Panama, the present A.I.O. organization should be modified.
Instead of six separate missions developing programs for each country and a
separate mission to work on regional problems, it is proposed that a single CAP
mission be created with offices in all six countries.

Programs having a common

objective for several countries could be developed and administered by the offices under guidance of the regional office.

Support staff in a number of tech-

nical areas could be located in the regional headquarters and would work regionwide assisting country offices.
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No.5.

Encourage and support~ regional entitlement~- There is
a need for some kind of regional entitlement scheme that
would provide a safety net for those most impoverished.
Whether this takes the form of a food stamp plan or income
subsidies, the experts must work out.
Although controversial, both approaches have proved their effectiveness where
they have been given a fair trial. Because the total population of Central America and Panama is only about 22 million
people, external assistance to make this feasible is possible
if inflation can be kept in control. Whatever the macroeconomic policies adopted, some kind of floor needs to be put in
place for the very poor. The cost of doing so must be
balanced against the cost of not doing so.

Specific Implementation:
This will require more time.

I will be out of the country for the next

three weeks, but will plan to forward a specific Central American entitlement
proposal to the Commission before the end of November.

Special Note:
I am greatly indebted to Mr. Donald Fiester, former Director, Office of
Agriculture, A.I.D., who has had more than twenty-plus years of experience with
the agricultural problems of Central America and in whose judgment I have great
confidence.

For further details on recommendations 2, 3, and 4 you may wish to

consult him directly.

824.

•

¥

League of
United Latin
American Citizens

Office of National Pres idem
MARIO G. OBLEDO

TESTIMOHY
BEFORE

PRESIDENTIAL BI-PARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA

PRESENTED BY
ARNOLDO S. ToRRES
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
NovEMBER 2J 1983

400 FIRST STREET. N.W.
2104 CAPITOL AVENUE

SUITE 721
SUITE 100

WASHINGTON. D.C 20001
SACRAMENTO. CA 95816

202/628-8516
916/441-5000

825.

Good Morning, Members of President Reagan's Bi-partisan
Commission on Central America.

It is indeed an honor to come

before such a distinguished body to present our views on U.S.Central American relations.

I am Arnoldo S. Torres, National

Executive Director for the League of United Latin American

Citizens

(LULAC), this country's oldest and largest Hispanic organization,
with over 110,000 members in 43 states.

LULAC National President

Mr. Mario G. Obledo was unable to travel to Washington for today's
session, but I bring his greetings.

In addition, Mr. Obledo wanted

me to convey his views of the importance this commission can have
on the future of our relations with Central America and Hemispheric
security.

Also, Ambassador Abelardo Valdez, former Chief of Protocol

with the Carter Administration, was prepared to join us today but
was called away on other business.

Ambassador Valdez has served

as advisor to the League on U.S.-Latin American relations.

"

This testimony is primarily a brief overview of the growing
concerns Hispanic-Americans have regarding U.S.-Central American
relations.

Portions of the following discussion appeared in an

editorial in U.S.A. Today July 25, 1983.
Hispanic-Americans have a growing concern about the problems
in Central America and the role of the United States in this evervolatile region.
sitivity

Many of us are finding that the cultural insen-

and ignorance which is prevalent in U.S.-Latin

American policy, and the insensitivity and misunderstanding of
Hispanic-Americans are interrelated.

Our continued reference to

Central America as "our backyard" is indicative of our paternalistic
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and crisis-oriented mentality.

We have a history of neglect and

disregard for Central America and that neglect cannot be rectified
simply by defensive responses to Cuba and the Soviet Union or by
throwing money into wars.

It is this neglect and disregard that has

helped create the desperate need for change.
This mentality is also reflected in U.S. Ambassador Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick's suggestion that development assistance on the scale
of the Marshall Plan ought to be implemented in order to thwart
Soviet-backed "subversion" in Central America.

Such a plan only

considers the problems of development in Latin America in a SovietU.S. contest and not in the context of foreign and independent
countries.

It is indeed unfortunate that an "expert" on Latin

America should think of cultural exchange, education and developmental assistance only in terms of a response to Cuban literacy
programs, fellowships, and other programs provided to our southern
friends by the Soviet Union.
As the days pass, the inevitable trajectory of our present
Central America posture becomes even more evident and ever more
foreboding.

The Administration seeks a military solution in

Central America which will have Hispanic-Americans fighting in
disproportionate numbers against our fellow Latin brothers.
Hispanic-Americans will be the first on the front line carrying
out this unrealistic and mistaken policy and we will be the targets
of the frustration of the American people as seen in the callous
reference of "fleet people".

In view of the paranoia and treatment

of the undocumented worker, it is conceivable that under war conditions we could hear the extremist calls of the far right for the
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establishment of internment camps for "Latin Communists".

LULAC

does not view this matter as a liberal versus conservative issue
but rather as a disastrous policy which has historically been wrong
and is now threatening to cause even more irreparable harm.

It

could have been avoided and we hope it is not too late to alter our
course now.

We Hispanics are becoming much more involved in this

debate and many of us are committed to providing our direct military
participation.
It is the shared obligation of the decision makers in Congress
and the Administration to see that national and international laws
are obeyed, that peaceful coexistence with our neighbors is sought
and maintained, and that the lives of American citizens are protected.
As those obligations are increasingly violated and as the number of
deaths of Americans in Central America increases, we must ask, who
in Congress or in the Administration wishes to bear responsibility
for failing to meet their shared obligations?
further military involvement:

That failure means

The finger being pointed will be that

of war.
Under most circumstances, a foreign policy which has caused
the loss of over 45,000 lives, countless human suffering and the
ever growing human tragedy would have warranted major changes.
Unfortunately, none appear forthcoming.

Is it un-American or unfair

to question or criticize the sanity of such a policy?
hope not.

I certainly
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The above concerns have received a great deal of attention
and appear to be growing in their acceptance by Hispanics and many
others.

Contrary to the contention that the struggles in Central

and South America result from the larger conflict between East-West
interest, it is clear that the instability has as its roots underdevelopment in all facets of life.

Perhaps the Peruvian author

Mario Vargas Llosa said it best in his article "Inquest in the
Andes", New York Times Magazine

July 31, 1983, in which he describes

the reasons behind guerrilla warfare in Latin America and the
struggle for democracy.
clarify

He writes:

"Perhaps this story helps to

the reason for the mind-shattering violence that character-

izes guerrilla warfare in Latin America.
are not "peasant movements".

These guerrilla movements

They are born in the cities, among

intellectuals and middle-class militants who, with their dogmatism
and their rhetoric, are often as foreign and incomprehensible to
the peasant masses as Sendero Luminoso is to the men and women of
Uchuraccay.

The outrages committed by those other strangers --

the Government forces of counterinsurgency -- tend to win peasant
support for the guerrillas.
Put simply, the peasants are coerced by those who think they
are the masters of history and absolute truth.

The fact is that the

struggle between the guerrillas and the armed forces is really a
settling of accounts between privileged sectors of society, and the
peasant masters are used cynically and brutally by those who say
they want to "liberate" them.
greatest number of victims:

The peasants always suffer the
at least 750 of them have been killed

in Peru since the beginning of 1983.
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The story of the eight journalists reveals how vulnerable
democracy is in Latin America and how easily it dies under military
or Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.

It is difficult for people to

defend a free press, elections and representative institutions when
their circumstances do not allow them to understand, much less to
benefit from, the achievements of democracy.

Democracy will never

be strong in our Latin American countries as long as it is the
privilege of one sector of society and an incomprehensible
abstraction for all the others.

The double threat -- the model of

General Augusto Pinochet in Chile and the model of Fidel Castro
in Cuba -- will continue to haunt democratic government as long as
people in our countries kill for the reasons that the peasants of
Uchuraccay killed".
This observation is perhaps the most eloquent and accurate
in describing the continued struggles in the southern hemisphere.
They should serve to put to rest the simplistic and extremely
dangerous contention that communism is under every rock and at the
root of all instability in Latin America.

It is sad to say that

despite such accurate descriptions this administration has
virtually ignored the underlying reasons for these continued
struggles.

As Hispanics who have had to undergo the same tribula-

tions in seeking equity in this country, it is safe to conclude that
the interest and involvement by Hispanic-Americans will continue
growing as the injustices facing Latin Americans continue to
parallel our own here in this country.
Thank you.
~
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